Recruitment of the land forces in Great Britain. 1795-99 by Western, J.R.
THE RECRUITMENT OP THE LAUD
FORCES IN GREAT BRITAIN. 1795-99













Forces for Overseas Service
Home Defence : General Principles
Forces for Home Defence
THE GOVERNMENT AND THE CONTRACTORS
fa) The System of Recruiting Connections
(b) New Corps v. Old
fc) The Counties and Towns and the Line
(d) County Recruiting for Home Defence
33
Chapter III : FINANCE AND INCENTIVES
Bargains with the Government
The Contractors and their Subordinates








Terms offered to the Men
Professional Recruiting Personnel
The Routine of Recruiting
"Territorial" Recruiting
Peculiar Sources of Men -
(i) Boys
(ii) Convicts
(iii) Prisoners of War
MAINTENANCE AND SUPERVISION 118
8 Care and Disposal of RecruitsThe Superintendence of the Recruiting Service
COMPULSORY LEVIES t THE MILITIA AND ITS AUGMENTATION 135
(a) The Militia System in Theory
(b) The Militia System in Practice
(c) Problems of Mobilization
) Militiamen's Families
) The Extension of the Militia to Scotland
) Resistence to the Militia Laws
COMPULSORY LEVIES SPECIAL FORCES AND CASES 187
fa) Problems of Urban Areas
(b) The City, the Tower and the Stanneries
fc) The Parochial Levy of 1796







COMPARISON OF YIELDS Page No. 280
fa) The Line : Normal Yield
fb) County and Territorial Regiments
(c) The Militia
(d) Cavalry Forces
THE VOLUNTEER MOVEMENT 236
(a) Government Initiative and Policy
fb) The Initiative and Control of the County
(c) Types of Leadership
(d) The Motives for forming and joining Corps
(e) TheAcceptable Conditions of Service
(f) The Fruits of Volunteering
VOLUNTARY EXTENSION OF SERVICE ;
THE VOLUNTEERS AND FENCIBLES 284
(a) The Volunteers
(b) The Fencibles : By Units
(c) The Fencibles : By Individuals
VOLUNTARY EXTENSION OF SERVICE : THE MILITIA 299
fa) By Units
(b) By Individuals : The Earlier Schemes
(c) By Individuals : The Events of 1799
SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS 327
REFERENCES 333
LIST OF SOURCES AND PRINCIPAL WORKS CONSULTED
CHAPTER I : POLITICS AND STRATEGY
(a) Introduction
To mobilize the manpower of Britain for war was a task which no
eighteenth century government could hope to perform with more than a modest
degree of success. The amy was disliked and despised by all classes as a
danger to liberty and a repository of scoundrels and outcasts. Service in
it, moreover, was known to be both unhealthy and degrading. Corporal punish¬
ment was too often the mainstay of discipline. Much of the amy's duty lay
in unhealthy foreign stations such as the West Indies where the ravages of
disease were impressive and notorious. Even at home, where the soldiers lived
in jerry-built barracks or temporary quarters, the deathrate in the army was
1
twice the national average. It was estimated that very few soldiers lived
2
and survived for as long as twelve years in the service.
Britain was at a serious disadvantage compared with the other great
powers. Her amy stood much lower in popular esteem. Its service was more
often outside Europe and correspondingly less pleasant. The standard of
living being higher than on the continent, it was less easy to tempt the lower
classes to enlist, while effective conscription - now just beginning to emerge
as a significant military factor - was not yet a possibility. Britain's
population was small, in any case, to discharge the responsibilities of a
great power. In an age of growing armies, she might find herself reduced to
military impotence.
Her great strength in war lay of course in her navy and her finances.
These both to some extent contributed to reduce her landward striking power.
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The navy took a great deal of money and a good many men that might otherwise
have gone to the army. The same might be said of the economic activities of
the nation. There was a reluctance to take too many men out of employment
and so send up wages. There was a passion for economy, a fear of over¬
burdening those national resources on which all else depended, that caused
ministers even in wartime to reduce the strength of the land force at every
opportunity and to refuse at all times to spend enough money on it to make
it an attractive service.^
From this situation, successive governments sought to escape by various
expedients which, taken together, form (apparently by accident) a policy.
The basis of them was that the army had to perform a number of very different
tasks, each of which could be devolved onto a separate group of persons willing
to do that particular duty (often more cheaply than the army could have done
it) but not willing (sometimes not able) to share in the rest of the amy's
work. When a specific emergency arose, the appropriate type of force would be
augmented to meet it, while the regular forces, available for all kinds of
service, would be concentrated where the need was greatest.
The tasks of the land forces may be enumerated as follows. They had to
participate in the campaigns of continental Europe and also in the very different
warfare in the tropics, against both whites and natives. They had to defend
Great Britain and in the absence of a police force they had to maintain law
and order. Similarly thy had to garrison India, Ireland and the colonies
and keep the inhabitants in submission. Finally, thy often had to serve in
the fleet. On the outbreak of war every effort was naturally made to
increase the regular amy which could be used for all these purposes. At the
same time, the pressure on it was relieved by the Raising of forces for more
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limited objects. For colonial and Irish purposes, various corps were raised
locally, with which we are not concerned in this study. For home defence
there were firstly the Pencibles, a part of the army but differing from the
rest in being available for home service only. Then there was the Militia,
raised by a compulsory levy of men which was a tentative approach towards
conscription. It had the advantage of being permanently in existence without
being always in pay. In peacetime, the militia men lived and worked as
ordinary civilians and were embodied only for a short period of annual
training. They could be called out in an emergency, kept mobilized for as
long as the government wished, and sent home when the danger was passed.
They were the only true reserve formation in the British service and a partial
solution of how to maintain a large force without too much expense.
The foregoing forces all consisted of true soldiers subject to military
discipline. For home defence there were also the Volunteers, ('.^Civilians
trained to arms in their spare time and only embodied when actual service was
in prospect. They were especially suited to taking over such military work
as was static, such as the manning of batteries round the coast. Apart from
this, large bodies could be kept in being to act as an ultimate reserve from
which the other defensive forces could be replenished in time of actual
fighting.
Police functions could, of course, be discharged if need be by the
defensive forces. These were, however, not entirely suitable for the purpose.
They were brought into service in wartime and had not the unquestioning sub¬
mission and lack of contact with civilians that marked the hardbitten regular.
Some special categories of Volunteers therefore existed solely or mainly for
the purpose of keeping order. They were formed of men of property and their
-it-
dependents, who could be relied on for this purpose and who would never have
undertaken any other sort of military work.
Such were the main types of force at the end of the eighteenth century.
The government expended and contracted each of than as the strategic needs of
the moment varied. It added further variations; units were raised for service
in Scotland only, for service in Ireland as well as Britain, or for service in
Europe but not further afield. There was the choice too between raising
forces directly for a given object and releasing existing forces for that pur¬
pose by raising other forces. There was finally the possibility of inducing
men enlisted for one type of force to volunteer to serve in another type.
Voluntary extension of service was to a large extent an invention of
the period under study. It was the lynch-pin of the system. By it, a series
of isolated forces became a group of complementary forces, feeding each other
with men. This was the only way in which the number of men. willing to join
the less popular branches of the service could be effectively increased.
The underlying principle was that if men could be lured into any line of
military life, they would become accustomed to soldiering, its terrors would
be lost, and its benefits - the chief of which for the poorer classes was
supposed to be pay without work - appreciated. The men would then respond
to an appeal to enter on more active and perilous service - especially if the
alternative was dismissal and a return to the toil of civil life. Thus forces
raised for limited purposes and which seldom fired a shot in anger performed
a useful service of national military education. Slowly and painfully they
built up a true reserve from which the regulars bearing the brunt of the
fighting could draw.
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(b) Forces for Overseas Service
V.'e must now show how strategic, financial and political exigences
determined the size and composition of the forces raised by Pitt's govern¬
ment in the years tinder study. The period contains two offensive phases -
the eras of the first and second coalitions against the French Republic -
with a defensive phase in between. It was naturally during the former that
the procuring of forces for overseas service took pride of place. In the
years 1793-5 there was a large direct expansion of the regular army by
ordinary enlistment. Recruiting activity was greatest in the vdnter months,
the idea being still to have a campaign in summer for which preparations were
made in winter.
The beginning was tenative and makeshift. There was an augmentation of the
old regiments and a number of independent companies were raised, which these
regiments were intended to absorb. In January 1793 the prospects were so
uncertain that Pitt and JDundas were arguing as to what should be done if war
did not come and the independent companies were disbanded before the raisers
1
had fulfilled their contract. In March the picture was clearer and Pitt told
the Duke of Richmond that he hoped to have sen 110,000 men to Flanders by the
end of the year and have 15,000 available by autumn fcr other expeditions.
The Duke regarded this as optimistic and said that six months in camp were
2
needed to make a recruit into a soldier. His words serve to indicate the
main trouble exper ienced by a government not able to decide on augmenting the
forces until it had decided on immediate action. The Adjutant-General
apologized to the Duke of York for the poor quality of the recruits sent out
3in these early days.
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In the autumn, the expected expeditions materialized - to Toulon,
Brittany and the West Indies. A strong effort was needed to fill the gaps
they left. A paper of September 1793 envisaged a very extensive augmenta¬
tion of certain regiments, starting at the end of November and producing 200
men per regiment by February. A fresh batch of independent companies was to
be raised at the same time, which would yield 2000 or 3000 men by Christmas.
These were to be put partially trained into seven regiments which had been
sait home from the West Indies as skeletons without any privates.^4" This plan
with modifications was adopted for all the regiments of the line. It will
be seen that a good body of men was to be raised early enough to receive some
training before the new campaign. In June 1793 Matthew Lewis, the Deputy
Secretary at War had noted that two months at Chatham gave the raw recruit
"habits of cleanliness and feeding" more essential than knowledge of marching
5C 5
and drill. He was probably the author of the September plan and doubtless
bore his own words in mind.
From September 1793 until the following spring a great many new regi¬
ments were ordered to be raised. This was an important new departure - only
one regular regiment, the 78th, had been ordered in the early part of 1793.
Unfortunately no memoranda survive to explain why the step was taken.
It points, however, to a further solidifying of the government's ideas about
the needs of the war. A paper by the Deputy Secretary at War in the summer
of 1794 pointed out that respectable gentlemen were not usually willing to raise
a regiment unless there was a prospect of its going into service as a unit/'
The 79th (August 1793) which started the continuous series of new regiments
9E
The main trouble with these men seems to have been sickness through inability
to care for themselves rather than lack of training c.f. pJ.21-2 and the
Duke of Richmond ¥030/81; 10193 (note 2 ante)
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raised at this time contained in its letter of service a promise that the
7
men would not be drafted'- which would necessitate keeping the regiment in
being for as long as the men's services were wanted. It is fair to infer
that by sanctioning a large number of new regiments the government showed it
had decided that the war would last some time and that the establishment of
the army would have to be augmented on a more then temporary basis. Perhaps
the French military recovery in the autumn of 1793 strengthened them in this
opinion.
A final measure taken in the winter season of 1793-4 was the ordering
of a further batch of independent companies in March 1794. The new regiments
and the independent companies ordered in the autumn had done well. 30,000 men
O
were raised between November and February. The augmentation of the old regi¬
ments on the other hand was an almost total failure despite extra time''being
allowed. The new companies were perhaps a hasty substitute.
By the autumn of 1794, the forces in Flanders had suffered heavy defeat
and there had been severe casualties both there and in the West Indies.
Filling the old regiments was the prime concern and virtually excluded the
raising of new ones. In July, Pitt suggested raising some regiments specifi-
10
cally to be drafted, under the patronage of some towns that had offered to help
11
and this was done. A number of other large draftable corps were ordered in
the autumn together with a further body of independent companies. The new
regiments raised the previous winter were augmented; a good many had to be
12
drafted to fill the old ones and then re-raised from scratch. The defence
of our overseas as well as our metropolitan territories was beginning to attract
attention. A large body of Fencible regiments were raised whose service
extended to Ireland and sometimes the Channel Islands as well as Britain and
-8-
which were primarily intended for those stations.
With the year 1795 we reach the end of the first offensive phase of
the war. A great deal had been accomplished, in however haphazard a way, to
increase the strength of the army. The Secretary at War claimed in February
1794 that 32,000 men had been raised for the regulars in the year 1793 - 10,000
13
more than in the best previous years since 1756, This record was very
greatly exceeded in the ensuing years. The strength of the regular forces in
British pay (i.e. excluding the Irish and East India Company establishments
and foreign mercenaries) rose from some 35,000 at home and abroad at the start
of the war to 130,000 in regular?and Fencibles in the spring of 1795^ and
this despite considerable casualties. The peak of endeavour had now been
reached: in the defensive phase of the war which followed the army shrunk to
15
just over 100,000 in 1797-8 . It could expand no further and seemed unable
even to maintain its ground.
The burdens thrown on it by the changing course of the war made this
doubly unfortunate. In January 1795» the government felt obliged to budget
16
for a still larger army owing to the collapse of the Dutch. The policy of
conquering the colonies of that and other countries caused an increasing number
of troops to be consumed in garrisons. The outbreak or threat of insurrection
first in the West Indies and then in Ireland intensified this process. The
whole army became locked up in local commitments and there was notliing left for
offensive action against the enemy. In June 1798, the House of Lords was told
that no regulars could be sent to reinforce the Irish government, which was
grappling with rebellion, because it would involve foregoing all possibility of
17
action against the French Coast. In May 1799» Henry Dundas told his colleagues
that the army could only get enough men to supply the needs of Ireland and the
A Q
colonies. The any had become a weapon large in size but without a cutting
edge.
The causes of this failure to expand are very obscure. The commonsense
explanation is that the country had been drained of potential recruits and no
further expansion was possible. WincOiaxn in 1799 thought the existing total of
19
forces of all kinds was the largest that the population could support.
Certainly there is evidence from the Highlands of an exhaustion of supply in
20
some areas. Perhaps the tendency to inflation following the suspension of
21
cash payments in 1797 made civil employment more attractive. High wages in
the locality are mentioned in 1799 as a reason why many militia men preferred to
22
return to civil life rather than enlist in the army .
The financial embarrassment of the government seems to have been an
important factor. The Duke of York carried out a great rationalization of the
amy establishments in 1795, reducing the number of regiments and making them
23
uniform in size. This was done in the name of economy. In 1796 the govern-
pjt
ment managed to save £800,000 by reducing the anyw4" The amoung of bounty which
25
might be given to recruits had been restricted in February 1795 and another
reform brought in by the Duke of York was the issue of money to recruiting
parties by special paymasters under government control. Any Agents complained
that the recruiting service was being starved of money. In August 1795,
Donaldson told Colonel Moray of the Perthshire Light Dragoons for which he was
agent that the government had never been so backward in the issuing of money,
especially for the recruiting service. None had been given out for two months.
Another agent, Kemp^5 declared that one officer had raised twentytvo men in the
first four months of 1796. Then the system of special paymasters came in and
owing to their parsimony in advancing money he only raised six during the rest
27
of the year. In March 1797 when things were at their worst, the Nottingham
* Not an entirely reliable source. He was a former employee of Donaldson
dismissed for irregular conduct. Seaforth Papers LXVII 27.7#94
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Fencibles were told that corps of this description had been ordered to cease
28
recruiting because of the difficulty of supplying the amy with money.
The government tolerated a deficit of some 50,000 on the authorized
29
establishment from mid-1795 to early 1797. They hopefully set a target
which the army failed over a period to reach. In the autumn of 1796 the
needs of defence being urgent, they resorted to large compulsory levies.
For raising taxes and hiring troops with them there was substituted a direct
tax in men. Compulsory service could not well be applied to filling the
re^Vjlr amy but a parochial levy was voted by Earliament30 in which the
parish officers were obliged to enlist a certain number of men, the cost of
the bounty being met by the ratepayers. This method had been used with
31
success to levy seamen but does not seem to have helped the army much on
this occasion. The deficit reached record heights that winter and in the
spring the government accepted the position (besides saving money) by scaling
32
down the establishment. A charge made then and now against compulsory levies
for home service is that they took away recruits from the regulars. This will
be Investigated later on - here we must note that the levies of 1796 certainly
seems to have embarrassed the army but that they were only brought in after it
had been given a fair chance to show what it could do.
While home defence pre-occupied the government, they could allow the
crisis in recruiting for the line to continue and concentrate on raising
defensive forces. In 1799 there came again the opportunity for offensive
action on the continent and building up the regular amy again took precedence.
It was now that voluntary extension of the limit of service by men enlisted
for defensive purposes only was first used with really striking success.
The new device had been developed during the defensive period in
response to the needs of imperial defence, particularly of Ireland. The
first step was taken early in 1794 when Fencible regiments enlisted for
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service in Scotland were persuaded to serve in England. The Fencibles
raised for Irish service that autumn were in same cases designed to enlist
men from existing Fencible regiments. In the following autumn, individual
soldiers in these regiments were encouraged to go into the line and a
reduction in strengths was ordered as a means of coercion. This was
contemporaneous with Sir Ralph Abercromby's expedition to the West Indies.
In 1795 also, acute shortages of seamen and artillerymen led to a first
interference with the "constitutional force". A defined number of militia¬
men were allowed to volunteer for the navy and the artillery.
In 1798 the government felt able to strengthen its financial position
by the imposition of new taxes. It proceeded to strengthen the system of
defence which had been improvised in the previous year and made renewed efforts
to increase the force for overseas service. Invasion and rebellion in Ireland
added urgency to these efforts. A new batch of Fencibles was raised in which
the limit of service varied from regiment to regiment. Some were confined to
the British Isles, some to Europe, some to Britain and North America. The
great object was to attract recruits who were afraid of the tropics. Mean¬
while, the augmentation to the militia raised in 1796 but left in reserve was
embodied and its members were allowed to enlist in the line, their service being
5A
also restricted to Europe, ahd in time to the duration plus six months.
Neither of the above measures yielded many men. More fruitful were the
offers of the English militia to serve in Ireland. These, like the first
experiment with the Fencibles in 1794 concerned whole units, not individuals.
They were unique in that the offers were for short terms of duty (six months
or a year to start with) after which each regiment resumed its old status.
The initiative was, or seemed to be, with the men themselves.
■12-
Parliament probably could not have been got to sanction the measure other¬
wise, With extensions it lasted almost two years, regiments being persuaded
to extend the term of their offers or being relieved by other regiments who
were willing to go. Some 12,000 men were added to the forces in Ireland
in this way^"* but the system was obviously precarious.
By 1799 the public had been prepared for the step of direct recruiting for
the line from the embodied militia. The diminishing danger of invasion made
a reduction of the defensive forces in any case both possible and desirable.
36
In July, an Act reduced the militia establishment by one quarter and authorized
militia men to that number to enter the line regiments. Some 10,(XX) men
responded. The Helder expedition could now be undertaken (it was assumed that
the men would need no time to shake down in their new regiments) and it was at
first rewarded by success - the capture of the Dutch fleet. Bundas considered
(and convinced his colleagues) that this event made it safe to reduce the
37
militia establishment to what it had been in 1793 - that is by three-fifths.
A special session of Parliament was called to authorize this and some 20,000
more men entered the line in October, The rest of the three-fifths was made
liable to recall in the spring - a precedent precaution and also a spur to
enlist in the line, for it was now harder for them to get civilian jobs.
It tea now the turn of the Fencibles. The establishment of a militia
in Scotland made it possible to reduce those regiments who still refused to
38
serve outside it and during 1800 their fate was shared by the regiments
confined to Great Britain. These corps were encouraged to extend their ser¬
vices to Ireland in order to avoid reduction. The regulars were successfully
encouraged to recruit from those that were reduced.
The year 1799 thus broke the impasse into which regular recruiting had
drifted. The efforts of 1798 had raised the army a little from the 100,000
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mark at which it had stuck. Early in 1800 it reached 1240,000 and thus could
provide not only the garrisons but an expeditionary force which the government
39
hoped could be launched in the spring at a strength of 57,000 infantry.
Strength had increased and method improved. The forces for the Helder cam¬
paign had been raised on the spur of the moment, just as had the men for the
campaign of 1793* There was not sufficient time for preparation. Yet they
had at least on this occasion been raised from a reserve of trained soldiers.
(c) Home Defence ; General Principles
Pitt's government haS been accused - though not as much as Addington's in the
next war - of raising too large a proportion of its forces for home service only.
Lord Kulgrave told Windham in 1797 that the defensive preparations "put us
somewhat in the situation of King James' description of himself in armour;
1'now I can hurt nobody and nobody can hurt me'." Yet if we examine the view
which the government took of the national danger, we shall find it supported by
weighty arguments and respectable authorities. It is necessary +o stop and
explore this neglected subject before we can show how the government's strategic
views were reflected in the composition of the defensive forces it decided to
raise.
The military advisers of the government took the threat of invasion
very seriously and thought it much greater than in previous wars. In 1796
2
a full report on the subject was drawn up by David Pandas, the Quartermaster-
General, whose department performed the functions of a modern General Staff.
He considered that the revolutionary spirit in politics and war had altered
the whole prospect. At home, the unreliable elements had never been so
numerous, "methodized" and ready "from the infatuation of the times" to
14-
help an invader. The French for their part had shorn themselves willing to
take risks that under the old regime they would have shrunk from. Their
victory over Holland had given them control of more coastline than they had ever
held before. It ought to be possible, by launching attacks from widely
separated points, to elude the British navy and get at least one segment of
the force ashore. The French, with their great superiority on land, always
sought to strike at the centre of the enemy's power. This was their logical
next step.
"In no country so much as in this", said General Dundas, "does its
fortune depend on that of the capital. V.'hile danger is distant its resources
and exertions are inexhaustible. If suffered to approach too near, its
artificial system may give way to such a degree as to endanger the whole
fabric". If the French could get only a few men ashore they might hope to
make a dash on the capital. In the ensuing confusion, rebellion might break
out and credit would certainly collapse. This in turn would lead to a
national paralysis and political collapse. Britain's finances were the
source of all her power. If the French could upset them by invasion, even
if their entire force was annihilated without making an overt military con¬
quest, they would have won the war.
This thesis is found repeated and amplified in many quarters, high
and low. On the political side, Colonel Anstruther, who ms Dundas' deputy^
remarked in a memorandum written about the same time as the above that the
French had been encouraged by success to continue the plundering mode of warfare
they had adopted. Their rulers would start fresh expeditions to get rid of
dangerous generals. At home the people would be discouraged by the loss of
allies and the opposition of factious and interested persons would be stiffened
by the downright disloyal.^
A MfOgilvy, whose memorandum is preserved in the Windham papers,
ventured further elaboration. The masses he thought loyal but change was
desired by a few speculative men and debased agitators. London was a centre
of profligapy with an underworld population 100,000 strong always ready to
revolt. In an invasion, refugees would crowd in while the rich would leave
for safer areas. There would be a run on the banks and a repetition of the
terrible events of 1780. The French would cheerfully sacrifice 100,000 men
5
if they could secure the ruin of British credit in this way.
When the financial crisis actually came the military factor was not
ignored in trying to account for it. In December 1796, a French fleet with
an array on board reached Bantry Bay and tried without success to effect a
landing. The British navy displayed considerable inertia in failing to stop
them. In the correspondence laid before the House of Commons, Pitt concurred
with the Directors of the Bank of England in thinking that these events were
the proximate cause of the demand far gold leading to the crisis of February
* 6
1797. The opposition touched on this question in the defence debates pro¬
voked by the Bantry affair. Col. Wood in particular stressed its importance
in introducing his motion for appointing a board of general officers to
7
superintend the defences. Nor was it left out of account in local drives
to improve the defences. Samuel Peat, who commanded the Northallerton
volunteers, issued a pamphlet on defence in which he called on everyone to
help in some way, stressed the danger to credit and contrasted the patriotism
of the business community, who ear/jed on their affairs as usual, with the
X
On this subject see E. Stuart Jones "The Last Invasion of Britain"
165-75 and c.f. R. Pares in English Historical Review Jl, J+A1 for
a parallel with 1756.
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cowardice of farmers and country gentry who demanded gold for their paper
■whenever there was an emergency.^
The political as well as the financial credit of the government needed to
be defended by military means. Morale was low and the stirring sight of a
national mobilization would boost it. Soldiers advising the government
usually pointed out that the English were soft from easy living and unlikely
9
to bear well the rigours of war. Anstruther urged that defensive measures
be quickly taken in hand as the opposition and obstruction they would meet
10
with would prevent their becoming effective for some time. Henry Dundas
told Grenville in 1796 that in order to win support for the war abroad it
would be necessary to come forward at the beginning of the session with a plan
11
of defence. This was done and Pox in the ensuing debates accused the
12
government of creating a scare to win support for its aggressive policies.
Ruling a pacific nation always slow to act, ministers has to arouse and
exploit enthusiasm as and when they could. A crisis tnabled then to raise
fresh forces which would be little use for the immediate purpose but would
stand the nation in good stead next time.*
Also we would recall the function of defensive forces in releasing
other forces for the offensive. General Dundas hoped especially to "free
the navy to exert itself at a distance on its own element instead of tying
it down to the passive guard of a coast", Pitt spoke in the same sense in
a debate on the amy estimates in January 1795.^+
To sum up then, we may say that the British generals, like the rest
of the upper class, were very afraid of revolution and very struck with its
power as a military factor. For reasons part military, part political strong
Consider especially the case of the Scotch militia p. 166
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forces were thought necessary at home. Add. to this the fragility of the
national finances in those days and it will appear vAiy a threat which seems
contemptible to a modern observer was probably not so and certainly did not
seem so at the time.
Strategic ideas not only demanded large defensive forces but also caused
certain types of force to be especially valued. Forces were required which
were effective end which were conspicuous and likely to create public confidence.
They had also, in common with the offensive forces, to be as economical as
possible. On the one hand, they had to oppose the landing of the eneny.
Here the government relied on augmenting the militia and fencibles. There
was particular concern to have a large force of cavalry. The eneny could
bring few horses with them and it was thought that they could be severely
15harried by this arm. Cavalry augmentation will be found to be a recurrent
theme until 1798.
The other branch of the task was the repression of disorder and sedition
and the general maintenance of the authority of the government. To this
branch also strategic ideas gave a special bias. Moreover, it was realized
that the French would have no supply line to speak of and would live on the
country. Therefore a most effective way of opposing them would be to "drive
the country": to remove all livestock and provisions, destroy what could not
be taken away and evacuate the inhabitants. This great task imposed even
heavier burdens on the forces of law and order. The Volunteers often seem
very ineffective, considered as a military force, but the importance of the
internal functions which they were designed to perform must always be remembered.
Ogilvy declared that the French Revolution had set the poor against the
rich and it was necessary for the latter to be well armed and organized if they
16
were to withstand superior numbers. Anstruther thought organization decisive -
18-
an armed and concerted minority could dominate the majority,-even if it too was
17
partially armed. Such was the philosophy behind much of the Volunteer
movement.
The government in short wished to hustle a good many men into arms not
only to oppose the eneny but to create confidence in themselves; on the
vital internal front they opposed the revolution with its own weapons - the
Volunteers taking the part of the National Guard.K
(d) Forces for Home Defence
The detailed application of the principles explained above must now
be given. At the start of the war, England already had the basis of a
defensive system in the militia which from December 1792 was slowly mobilized
and brought up to its full strength of some 32,000. Scotland had no militia
and for this reason the rhythm of preparation there was throughout the war
different from that of England. It was the government's wish to create a
militia there and in 1793 they announced a bill but went no further than to
introduce it at the end of the session and have it printed. Instead nine
battalions of fencibles were raised by Scottish noblemen. The Volunteer
movement also got under way, a few artillery corps being formed to roan batteries
-j
at places like Fishguard and Fowey.
By these means the exiguous regular army was relieved of its tasks at
home and set free to act on the continent.
The first great crisis or spasm of activity over national security took
place in 1794. The revolutionary government in France had scored its first
*
They were sometimes considered a counterweight to the expanded
(plebeian) militia.
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successes in the autumn and was preparing for a heavy attack on the allies.
These preparations included assembling an army in Normandy and building the
first flotillas of landing craft. The histoxy of Napoleon's great design
2
really begins now. In Britain the struggle between government and radicals
was at its height; there were Parliamentary inquiries into sedition and a
number of famous trials culminating in that of Hardy, the leader of the London
Corresponding Society, that summer. The Portland whi^s at that point joined
the government; even the Foxites were disturbed, Gray inveigling against
the anarchy in France and declaring he would resist invasion, were the enemy as
3
enlightened as could be imagined*
On the military side things appear to have started with a paper produced
in February at the request of the government by the Duke of Richmond, then
Master General of the Ordinance, General Officer Commanding the South Eastern
military district and Lord Lieutenant of Sussex. He-thought the French might
try either a full attack or a smaller one to create alarm. He called for a
concentration of force in case of the former and the building of numerous
batteries manned by Volunteers to delay the latter until the duly concentrated
force could move to the danger spot. Arrangements must also be made to drive
the country and for this purpose county meetings must be called and a large
number of Volunteers (especially horse) enrolled.
In his own command the regular force required was some 21,000 infantry
and 4,000 cavalry. Over 10,000 infantry and 3»000 cavalry would be needed to
bring his force up to that strength, leaving only 10,000 men for the rest of
England, He suggested therefore that eight new regiments should be exchanged
for eight seasoned ones from Ireland and the Scottish Fencibles should be
encouraged to offer to serve in England. (They were not bound to do this save in
an emergency). This should yield over 4»000 men by June. The augmentation
of the militia by compulsion would be too slow and unpopular to be of use but
20-
some said that 6,000 men could be added to the militia by ordinary enlistment.
The Duke was doubtful, but they should certainly try. On the other hand, the
want of cavalry might be supplied by starting a "horse militia". The cavalry
service was popular and in view of the small numbers involved the counties
might not mind compulsion.^
These ideas are clearly reflected in the government's plans. It was
decided to appeal to the comtry to raise the required force by voluntary
efforts. In March a circular was sent to the counties asking them to start
a subscription and form a plan of local forces that might be raised with it,
through the exertions of the local gentry. The -types of force which the
government were prepared to countenance were Volunteer Corps of artillery on the
coast and infantry in the towns; Volunteer Corps of pioneers; Volunteer Cavalry
Corps formed of the gentry and yeomanry of the county (hereafter referred to as
Yeomanry); the augmentation of the county militia by voluntary enlistment; and
the forming of county corps of Fencible Cavalry - the ne;irest approach as yet to
5
a horse militia: a county basis but voluntary.
A political battle at once developed over these proposals. The opposition
fought them tooth and nail in Parliament and the counties. They denounced them
as going behind Parliament's back and raising men and money without the sanction
of the legislature. The government secured the passage of two measures
6
legalizing the levies and claimed this had always been their intention.
Thar question of the subscriptions still rankled, however, Francis said that
they would not be voluntary as anyone not contributing would be a marked man;
7
a stigma would be incurred by anyone not willing to support the ministry.
Q
Lord Lansdowne also thought that few in fact would have any option in the matter.
Pitt later on declared the measure useful as making possible a manifestation of
patriotism. To this Fox replied that it would suggest that only the rich
9
favoured the war. There vere several long debates on the question mainly
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turning on the applicability of cases in 1778 and 1782 of similar expedients.
The latter gave the government a tu quoque against the opposition.
In the counties, the friends of the ministry commonly took the
initiative. Lord Buckingham offered to augment his regiment of militia as soon
10
as the plan was known. Midlothian under the guidance of the Lord Advocate
was very speedy in offering a corps of Pencible Cavalry * the reply was that
11
legislation was pending to enable them to do so. There were various ways
of bringing the plans before the country. Where they arrived in time, they
were laid before the grand jury at the Assises. This body might then start
a subscription,inviting others to join with them in contributing (as in
12
Berkshire ) or commend the measure to the county and ask the Sheriff to call
1 *5
a meeting (as in Glamorgan ). Elsewhere, it was such a meeting of the gentry
that took the initiative. In some counties like Lincoln and Warwick, so many
of the leading personages were in town that a meeting in London was necessary
to give the lead.^ In most cases, suitable patriotic resolutions were adopted,
a subscription list, headed by persons of weight, was produced and a Committee
was set up - which visually might he attended by anyone paying a stated sum - to
which the execution, and often the choice, of measures was referred.
Opposition was generally present and had to be circumvented. Prom
Hertfordshire, Lord Salisbury reported that many desired the county to act but
no one had ventured to speak at Quarter Sessions and a county meeting was too
dangerous because the opponents of the ministry would attend and there was likely to
15be a riot. In Norfolk this was precisely what happened. The resolutions
which were put to the meeting were challenged and as it was too large for
orderly debate those wishing to support the government were invited to withdraw
16
to another room, where they started a subscription and set up a committee.
In Essex the Lord Lieutenant was inactive and the opposition strong.
The friends of government refused to serve on the grand jury when they saw that
-22-
their rivals would be strong there and there was "very little disposition amongst th<
17
other jurymen to part from their money". The Hon. John QlmiHs, an extensive
proprietor in the county, stepped into the breach and a meeting was called at
18
which, despite the opposition of Mr Charles Western, one of the county members,
the usual measures were taken. Olmifts recalled that he had warned Pitt of danger
from "those permitted to assume direction of the county" but had not been
19
heeded. This case shows well how the amorphous character of county institutions
helped the ministry. The opposition received support in some places, such as
20
Surrey, but the plans of the government could not be dislocated.
In Scotland, a significant variation was introduced by the absence (along
with the militia) of the organization of the Lieutenancy. With the help of its
friends, the government caused meetings to be held in the Scottish counties
parallel to the English ones. Dundas, however, induced his colleagues to go
21
further and in April, Lord Lieutenants were appointed throughout Scotland.
In a circular of instruction to them, Dundas said his idea was for them to be
responsible for both defence and police. They were to encourage Volunteers
(horse in particular) according to the government's plan, of which they were
sent copies together with copies of the resolutions passed in some English
counties. They were also to appoint suitable persons as Deputy Lieutenants
(J.Ps. for preference) who were to inquire into the loyalty of the population
and invite all who were willing to enrol themselves under a pledge to act under
22
the command of the Lieutenancy in invasion or insurrection as might seem expedient.
To carry out these orders, the Lord Lieutenant called a second series of
county meetings throughout Scotland in the suirmer. The tone was more official
and less voluntary than in the English meetings. The new Lieutenancy was the
organ of action. An addition to the Cess at a fixed rate was agreed instead
23-
of a subscription, although it was purely voluntary. The resolutions passed
usually laid more emphasis on the dangers of radicalism than was common in
England. On the other hand, narrower party feeling was perhaps less in
evidence. The King noted the need to appoint men of due weight as Lieutenants
23
without regard to party. Dundas said the same in his circular with regard
to the Deputies. Some opposition men were brought in, though Dundas declared
later, for instance, that had he known Lord Tweeddale would oppose the govern-
pi
ment at the next election, he would not have advised the appointment. +
The results of the government's drive were quite good. Some 6000 Pencible
25
Cavalry were raised. The augmentation of the militia finally yielded over
26
5000 but in this year only brought in 2700. The raising of Volunteer Cavalry
was undertaken by many counties and this is the starting point of the Yeomanry.
Volunteers of other kinds also appeared in some numbers. The scheme of enrolment
in Scotland seems to have come to very little but there and elsewhere the
government had made a useful patriotic demonstration and rallied support for the
war.
The next great crisis came in 1796. The defeat of Holland made invasion
more probable but also brought home the bulk of the army which made the country
safe. By August 1796 the army had dwindled and the victories of Bonaparte made
it likely that Britain would soon be without allies. From this period date the
memoranda of Lord Cornwallis and Colonel Anstruther which we have already quoted.
The former desired a compulsory levy on men to be trained in their spare time
and be called up to augment the militia at need. In a grave emergency, they
could even be put in the regular army. The latter proposed obliging the counties
to recruit volunteers for the army at the rate of hab§ their militia quotas
(i.e.15,000 men in all).27
In October, Pitt announced in the Commons proposals clearly akin to
the above. 15»000 men were to be raised as suggested - half (as we have
noticed) for the regulars, the rest for the navy. A "supplementary militia" of
60,000 was to be raised by compulsion like the ordinary militia. It would
do twenty days' training, a third at a time, so as not to disrupt production.
A force of "provisional cavalry" 20,000 strong was to be obtained by a levy
of one in ten on all Ipfrses liable to tax (a balot deciding which owners, with
their horses, should serve). A body of sharpshooters would be raised by obliging
holders of licences for sporting guns (mainly employers of gamekeepers) to supply
28
a man each - which would yield 7000.
These forces were all to be irregular, with fairly scanty equipment.
As they were not to be permanently embodied, it was possible to get nearer to
•> •«
conscription. Pitt said that for the supplementary militia, the exemption for
men with more than one child would be done away with and substitutes to serve
in lieu of men chosen would only be allowed if they came from the same locality.
The Opposition declared, as we noticed earlier, that the government was
plotting aggression under cover of defence. They attacked the measures of the
government in detail and secured the withdrawal of one of them - the levy of
29
gamekeepers. But Pox brought himself finally to concede that the government
30
appeared to be sincere and Pitt declared nin-tenths of the people believed in
31the danger. The adoption of compulsory measures at this time indicates a
strengthening of the government's position. In the course of 1797 the new
forces were brought into being without much obstruction - except from the common
people.
Measures were also put in hand at this time to prepare the internal
defences of the country. The general policy here is most clearly expressed in
a paper of August 1796 by Lord Cornwallis, Master General of the Ordnance and
-25-
General Officer Commanding the Eastern Military District - the leading
32
military brain in the government. After suggesting a plan for dividing
the country and calling out all able bodied men, he pointed to the obstacle
of disaffection, helped by apathy, and said that Britain must follow the
example of revolutionary France and America by setting up Jocal committees of
zealous and determined men to enforce the will of the executive. The Deputy
Lieutenants who should perform this task were often feeble or even disloyal:
some better way must be found of securing reliable helpers. The committees would
function on parish, hundred and county level. When an emergency came, they
would arrest everyone known to be disaffected or suspected of so being.
They would conduct the evacuation of people and goods from the enemy's path
and destroy what could not be removed. In all this work their chief agents
33
would be the Yeomanry and Volunteers.
General Dundas worked our these ideas in seme detail. He wanted a "systen
of vigour" to repress disaffection, keep everyone at his post and cause requisi¬
tions for the army to be properly obeyed. "No roan ought to remain neuter and
the lukewarm should be more than suspected". He was particularly concerned
with the capital. Properly led, he was sure that it would prove a source of
strength and that enthusiasm could achieve there what it had done in a neigh¬
bouring country. He envisaged a complete plan, some <Jf it publicised before¬
hand, the more secret parts ready as printed circulars to be sent out at need.
He later produced a timetable, setting out what was to be done each day after
mobilization. Here we find the system of committees (both in London and the
provinces) envisaged by Cornwallis. Strong proclamations would have to be
34
issued to secure obedience and striking examples made if necessary.
The government would not permit the Volunteers to expand until the
compulsory levies were completed, in order to prevent competition. They
then stimulated action in two directions. A circular of March 1797 outlined
-26-
one plan. It was for the policing of urban areas. Associations of
respectable householders -were to be formed, in each parish. There vas to be
no drill and no uniform unless desired but the members were to arm themselves
at their own expense and be organised in groups of fifty, each with its own
35
rendezvous and plan of action in case of alarm. These "armed associations"
multiplied in the ensiling years. They were barely military in character and
little trace of their activity remains.
The plan adopted for driving the country was the result of the local
initiative of Dorset; where the Sheriff devised a scheme in virtue of his
power over the posse. The magistrates were asked to make returns of mem able
to bear arms,of the other inhabitants and of live and dead stock. Plans were
made and a rudimentary organization created to call out the one and remove or
destroy the other.^ In November 1796 the government sent copies of this plan
to the other coastal counties with instructions to arrange to "drive" every area,
within twelve miles of the coast. The Treasury would pay compensation to those
37
whose property had to be destroyed. County meetings were held as a result of
38
this circular, and part of the augmentation of Volunteers in the course of
1797 may be attributed to it.
Events in Scotland again followed a rhythm of their own - in fact they
reversed the order of events in England because the expansion of the Volunteers
came first and the compulsory levy afterwards. The first move was parallel
to that for "driving" the English coastal counties. Lord Adam Gordon,
the Commander in Chief in North Britain stated the need to arrange for this and
39
also to organize such loyal inhabitants as were willing to bear arms.
AO
A circular similar to the English one was therefore sent out in February and
resulted in county meetings throughout Scotland. At these an enrolment similar
to the abortive one of 1794 was put in hand. Again this led directly to very
-27-
little, but as a result and with the encouragement of the counties a great many
new Volunteer Corps were formed. Several counties took this opportunity to
express their support for the Banks and exhort all to accept their paper in
payments .43- Several also declared that more useful than the present measures
would be a Scotch Militia,4-2
The government seem to have been desirous throughout the war of estab¬
lishing some general national levy in Scotland, The attempts of 1793 and the
county enrolments of 1794 and 1797 point in this direction. There was also a
plan early in 1797 for a general muster of the Highland clans,43 From the
adoption of new measures in England late in 1796 a serious argument, which will
be described elsewhere, began on whether to levy a militia in Scotland. In
April 1797, the government stopped the great augmentation of the Volunteers
that was going forward except for corps on the coast and in the towns.44- Soon
afterwards a militia bill for Scotland was brought in and passed. The first
task in bringing the new force into being - the making of lists of persons
liable for service - took place in the late summer of 1797. It was accomplished
despite heavy rioting throughout the southern half of the country.
We may sum up the efforts of 1796-7 by saying that large irregular forces
had been raised to act as a trained reserve in case of emergency. In the criti¬
cal state of the nation's finances, this was the most the government could af¬
ford. The same system was at long last extended to Scotland. For the sake of
symmetry we may here notice that the militia system was also extended to the
Tower Hamlets at this time, while the City of London had been brought in in 1794-
and the Stanneries were to be in the next emergency of 1798.45 Mainly for
internal purposes a large addition had also been made to the Volunteers. In
all this the government was more solidly supported by the upper classes than
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before and was able to impose unpopular measures of compulsion both on them
and on the poor.
While these preparations were going forward, Bonaparte completed the
defeat of the Austrians and Pitt's government was engaged in negotiations
for peace with the Directory. The French had made an abortive attempt to
invade Ireland and a raid on Wales but this appeared the most they could do
against Britain. However, in August 1797 Huskisson told the Horse Guards that
Pitt and Dundas thought the Directory were probably only prolonging negotia¬
tions till the autumn, when the Channel Fleet would have to go to harbour to
refit and the invader would have his chance. They therefore wished to know
if the plans which the Duke of York had put before them were going forward and
if plans which were too expensive or alarming to be implemented as yet were
ready for the moment of danger.46
General Dundas replied that the Supplementary Militia had bean raised
and trained but the attempt to fill the depleted regiments of the line had
failed and even the (old) Militia was much below strength. Plans were ready
to call out the Supplementary Militia and fill up the existing cacfifes in an
emergency.47
In September 1797, the last chance of peace was ended by the coup d'etat
of Fructidor. In October, Bonaparte was appointed to command the Army of
England and preparations for an attack began on an unprecedented scale.
Bonaparte gave up the idea of invasion for the time being in February 1793,
but preparations continued and resulted in the abortive expedition of Humbert
to Ireland that summer.43 in 1793 therefore, there was a third period of
crisis in Britain. The government took stern measures to improve its finanoes
of which the introduction of the income tax was the most important. The
Opposition, on defence questions, gave less trouble, Sheridan even making a
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defiant speech against the French in which he included some not veiy helpful
suggestions.49
In March 1798* Henry Dundas assumed the direction of the defensive
effort. In surrendering Home affairs to Portland in 1794* he had lost control
of the militia and Volunteers; as Secretary of State for War he was virtually
confined to external forces and operations. In February 1798 he pointed out
to Pitt that the depletion of the regular army had left him nothing to do and
he should either be given charge of the defensive forces or left with Indian
affairs alone, the third Secretaryship ceasing to exist.50 Accordingly, al¬
most all the military business of Portland's department was transferred to his.
The chief military measure now taken was to turn the irregular forces
previously raised into regularly embodied forces. Half the Supplementary
Jfilitia was called out in February and either put in the existing militia regi¬
ments or (in the larger counties) formed into new ones. The other half was
called out in May. Meanwhile, the levying of the Scotch Militia had been
taking place and half of this was called out in May and formed into regiments.
The other half followed in October. The Provisional Cavalry was not in such
good shape as the other forces. It had proved cumbrous to levy and no attempt
had been made to train it, Dundas told the cabinet he would re-organize it and
hoped to make efficient a fair part of its 10 or 15,000 men.51 However, there
were 16,000 Yeomanry and 14,000 other cavalry now in being. The Generals told
Dundas in June that they could use no more.52 Therefore only six regiments
were embodied that summer.
Behind these forces the government proposed to call out the nation's
manhood as a national reserve. The plan for a general enrolment and a pre¬
paration to drive the country which had been applied in Scotland was now carried
out throughout the kingdom. Weight was added to the government's case for
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prooeeding in this way by the researches of John Brace of the India Office
into the means adopted to resist the Armada. His report lays emphasis on the
centring of all preparations on the Lord Lieutenant, responsible to the crown.53
A Defence Act54 was passed giving statutory force to the plan that had been
adopted, especially to the requisitioning of property, and county meetings were
held everywhere (even in Scotland where they duplicated previous efforts) in
April.
The government gave far more direction and control to the counties on
this occasion. The Generals commanding the different military districts atten¬
ded the county meetings or sent representatives. There were also Commissaries
(from the Treasury department charged with the supply of the army) to explain
the methods of driving the country. The printed plans sent out were far more
voluminous than heretofore. There was no compulsion upon individuals to serve
but the Act did make it obligatory for the counties to call for voluntary ef¬
forts. This was a further step forward from the latitude of 1794.
Henry Dundee' circulars to the Lords Lieutenant on this occasion give a
clear idea of the sort of Volunteer force the government wanted. For driving
the country, voluntary effort was relied on for pioneers, drivers and horses
and carts. There were to be corps of guides to assist the army and a new
attempt was made to mobilise the gamekeepers on a voluntary basis.55 The
fishermen were to be corps of §ea fbnoibles to defend the coast. 56 In aiming
the lower classes, a clear division was made between the urban and the rural
poor. The former were not to be armed on any account. The latter were to
be encouraged to enter corps officered by the landlords and farmers.5?
For the maintenance of order, the towns were to have infantry corps of
respectable householders and their nominees, able if need be to take over from
the army and free them to fight. In the country, the Yeomanry were to be
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expanded as much as possible.^ The government had encouraged this since the
previous year by allowing those liable for the Provisional Cavalry to discharge
this obligation by producing Yeomanry instead. The same circulars mentioned
the need for a network of committees of zealous individuals (as proposed by
Cornwallis in 1796) to organize the driving of the ccuntiy.
A plan by General Dundas for the protection of London shows how the
Volunteers were to be employed. The alarm would be given by bells and rookets.
Everyone was then to stay indoors if possible and illuminate their windows.
Hie Volunteers were to patrol the streets accompanied by Justices and seize
and summarily execute persons found aimed or engaged in plunder. Plotters
were to be identified in advance so that they could be seized. Crowds were
to be dispersed and the roads kept open. It might be necessary to stop the
exodus of refugees. At several central rendezvous there would be large re¬
serves of Volunteers. Small bodies would be stationed at local rendezvous
from which a constant series of patrols would radiate. Outside the town the
Yeomanry would keep the roads open59 - the flow of provisions to the capital
was of course of vital importance.
1798 was the climax of the government's defensive effort. A large
military force raised by compulsory levy bore the main burden. Behind this
was a "Volkssturih" of the peasantry raised by laying an obligation on their
social superiors. The propertied classes were extensively organized to repress
any attempt to upset the social order. In the event, the battle for Britain
was won in Egypt and the French were put back on the defensive without calling
these forces into play. Next year saw them reinforcing the offensive arm
(as we have seen) and as in 1793 holding the fort while the army went abroad.
Hie militia was reduced to its old strength, the surplus "stood down" remain¬
ing as a reserve. Hie Volunteers were extensively formed into battalions and
-33
formed a cheap irregular force for emergencies - like the Supplementary Militia
at an earlier date.
We have now explained, as well as may be, the circumstances in which
the Pitt government undertook the various augmentations and diminutions of the
land forces and their intentions in so doing. The way is open for us to exa¬
mine the methods by which the men were raised and the relative success and
contribution of each in mobilizing the manpower of the nation. First we shall
consider the system of voluntary enlistment both for service in the regular
amy and for service at home alone in defensive forces. Then the expedients
in which compulsion played a part will be studied - chiefly defensive forces
are involved here, with one exceptional attempt to supply the line. It will
then be time to show how each of these very various methods contributed some
men, for differing terms and purposes, who could not have been got in other
ways. After a parallel treatment of the Volunteer movement, we shall conclude
by describing the attempts to supply the regular army or the foreign stations
from the forces enlisted for more limited purposes. As has been noted, it is
these attempts which to some extent justify our regarding a veiy mixed bag of
forces as a national military system with a standing amy and reserves.
CHAPTER II : THE GOVERNMENT AND THE CONTRACTORS
(a) The System of Recruiting: Connections
Recruiting in the eighteenth century depended, like politics, on a system
of patronage and connections. A landed magnate might sometimes raise a regiment
by his influence alone, - but the supply of recruits was so exiguous that a vast
terrain was needed to produce a regiment. The normal scheme was to use the
little interest of each officer, from Colonel to Ensign, to build up a mosaic,
each piece of which represented a few men for the corps to be raised.
There were two sorts of recruiting interest, which may be called "terri¬
torial" and "professional". The former comprised first the assistance of rela¬
tives, The family solidarity of the Highlanders led them to raise men for the
promotion of such of their number as chanced to be officers. The friends of a
Lieutenant or a Captain would sometimes make their offer direct to the War Office,
asking for authorization."'" Some officers had contingents raised by their fathers,
when these were men of substance. Alderman Long of Canterbury raised a company
2
for his son, a Lieutenant in the West Indies. Dr. Kerr of Northampton super¬
vised the raising of a regiment for his.^ The possession of land was the obvious
source of influence. Richard Burton a half-pay Lieutenant makes an offer be¬
cause he is a Yorkshire freeholder with interest in the West Riding.'*' Paul
Pickersgill, formerly a militia officer, had a small estate near Bristol and
5
thought his local connections would enable him to raise a company. Captain
Cuninghame of the 70^ sent a beating order34 to his brother, proprietor of the
family estate at Thornton near Kilmarnock, and asked him to try and get a man
6 7
or two. Dr. Kerr raised his son's men in the area of his medical practice.





"Professional" connections were those with the various persons, settled
especially in the great towns, who made recruiting their trade. Captain Fielder
King, who did much of the raising of the 81+^ made an offer on his own account,
mentioning that his personal influence would enable him to secure the best
9"established parties" throughout Lancashire and the lest Riding. A variant
on this theme is provided by Lieutenant Budworth who offered to recruit in
Lancashire, where formerly he had great success, and succeeded in enlisting all
the men who "went with" him in 1778.*"^ Of course, each officer tried to amass
as many sources of influence as possible. Major Ouseley offered to raise 500
men in 1798. His father was a landlord with some influence; he himself was in
touch with military men throughout the country and had already got promises of
eighty recruits.11
Sometimes the sum total of the recruiting interests by which a corps was
raised amounted to a compact provincial connection. Colonel Bernard was able
to claim that the Blft1 was the most provincial regiment in the service as it was
raised in Yorkshire, Lancashire and adjacent areas, only two parties going south
12
of Trent. As a rule, though, even individual officers had their interests
very widely scattered. A Lieutenant Cameron raising a company in 1793* had one
party in London, nine in East Anglia where he was assisted by the "first people",
and three under relatives in the Highlands.1^ Captain Campbell, himself at
Manchester, had a party at Newcastle tinder the care of a friend.1^ Larger corps
therefore tended to be recruited from everywhere under the sun. When Thorns
Graham of Balgowan raised the 90^ he called it the Perthshire Volunteers and the
15
magistrates there subscribed towards it. But Hill, his Major, got men through
his family connections in Shropshire.1^ Others came from Graham's hunting
17
friends in Leicestershire. Parties were active in Lancashire, Cheshire and
other industrial areas. There was too a contract with HerriHin, the most
-35--
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notorious crimp in London*
Mackenzie of Seaforth also employed Hamblin and hoped to get 160 in
19
London for his Highland regiment* The Manx Fencibles were later rebuked
20
for using Hamblin and those of Angus for employing civilians at Shored!tch
21
were reported to the War Office* The parties of the Somerset Fencibles
22
were spread over a distance of three hundred miles. The Scotch Brigade,
recruiting for which was confined by a gentlemen's agreement to that kingdom,
23
had an officer raising men in Worcester where his family lived* Thus even
supposedly provincial regiments were often not so; we may add that very many
regiments in Britain had parties in Ireland as well and vice versa.
When a corps, of whatever size, had to be raised or augmented, the first
task was thus to build up a body of recruiting connections capable of supplying
the recruits. What was it that led men to join in the work? For most of those
involved, promotion was the goal. All commissions in the Army up to that of
Lieutenant Colonel were normally obtained by purchase; it was an easy step to
ask for men instead of money. By this expedient all recruiting except the
routine replacement of casualties was carried out. It was used equally in the
expansion of old regiments, the creation of new ones, and the raising of un¬
attached bodies of men by contract with the government. Almost all the lesser
officers engaged in recruiting are thus accounted for. So are some of their
seniors who raised whole regiments. The son of Sir James Grant for instance,
having been disappointed of promotion in 1799 by the failure of Sir Benjamin
Dunbar, whom he was helping to recruit, to get his regiment passed fit for
service, offered to raise a Fencible regiment of his own. v
The more important and influential personages however, often had motives
of a wider sort. Patriotism whs one of these. Lord Macdonald who raised a
regiment in 1798-9 announced at one point that he had become more conscious
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since he started of the need for patriotic endeavour. He had therefore
25
decided to take no money from government for the work. The eldest son of
Viscount Hereford offered in 1795 to raise a regiment in Wales. He said that
his family had always exerted themselves in the defence of their country since
26
the Norman Conquest.
Family considerations were commonly important. Promotion, if not needed
for oneself, might he required by one's military relatives. The Duke of Gordon
raised a regular regiment for his son and a Fencible regiment of which his
27brother-in-law took command. Mackenzie of Seaforth also brought forward a
2g
brother-in-law to take charge of his regiment. Lord Buckingham helped to
29raise one for his illegitimate nephew George Nugent. "There are" said Lord
Macdonald "upon all Highland estates descendants and friends of the respective
families ...... who look upon a war as a sure means to rise under the auspices
of their superior.Sir James Grant wished to augment his Fencibles in order
to oblige his friends.^" Some years later Colonel Macleod made a similar
32
request in respect of his regiment} he was pressed thereto by Macleod of
33
Caelboll, Lieutenant of Cromarty.
The general importance of a family might be enhanced by the patronage
which a regiment would give it to bestow. Seaforth wished Mackenzie of
Fairbum to be a Major in his regiment and avowed that this was a job to increase
his influence ( he was then the Member for Ross-shire). As he had served the
government well and at great expense by producing men, he felt this to be a fair
return.'^' In Aberdeenshire, the Hay family, supported by Lord Aberdeen, con¬
tested the electoral ascendency of the Gordons at a by-election in 1800. In
1794, the same combination had challenged their military ascendency by raising
35
a regiment at the same time as the Gordons and seeking the official patronage
of the City and county. How they were defeated on that occasion we shall see
-37-
in a moment. The Hays had started as clients of the Gordons and "built them-
37
selves up into rivals by fortunate marriages. Behind them stood the Duffs,
3$
to whom they were thai connected - traditional rivals of the Gordons kept in
39
Otmity with them by the persistent efforts of Dundas.
In Scotland, bitter recruiting rivalries existed between the families
because more of them had a hand in the business. In the extreme north, Sir
James Sinclair and Sir Benjamin Dunbar were constant rivals, sending up bounties
by competition. Sir James tried to delay raising the second battalion of his
Fencibles till Sir Benjamin had finished his levy - which he thought would take
some time as the Mackays, his allies, were working on their own account.
Earlier that year (1794) Sir James had been impeded in raising his first battalion
by Sir Robert Sinclair, recruiting far his father-in-law the Duke of Gordon.
Sir James* recruits were said to be offering their officers money to be let out
"to go with the Lady Madelina."^" It was in the heat of this struggle that that
lady (Sir Robert's wife) was accused of kissing recruits, thus originating
(apparently) the famous legend that her mother the Duchess had helped the family's
I o
efforts in this way. Sir Robert got only a few men however, as he had started
work too late.^ Bounties only rose three guineas against Sir James in the
„ . j.J.
course of the year.
Rivalry in the country was bound to merge in general political rivalry
and the hunt for places which went on at court. Lord Mountnorris felt himself
slighted by not receiving command of the Wexford Militia and so he proposed to
45
raise a regiment. As it seated at first that this might not be allowed, he
begged his friend Sir George Yo^ngethe Secretary at War to intercede with the
King and ask in v-hat way he had given offence.^ Lord Breadalbane was related
to Lord Lauderdale who was active in the Opposition. He asked if the government
would be offended if he gave the majority of one of his regiments to a Maitland.^
-38-
When levies had been decided, the government could tip the scales between
rivals or add to the connections of a contractor. Nugent, having got the
to
backing of Lord Buckingham and Lord Grenville, tried for that of Bundas.
Janes Durham, who raised the Fifeshire Fencibles in 1794, wanted Dundas to inter¬
cede for him with the Lord Lieutenants of that county and of Midlothian and with
. L.Q
the Lord Provost of Edinburgh,
The government's decisions on recruiting questions were often taken with
♦
the aspect of patronage mainly in mind. The events connected with the raising
of Seaforth's regiment, the 78^ are a good example. Seaforth seems to have
had a strong and independent position in Ross-shire but to have led opinion in
the county in approving the government's policy at the outset of the war.^
Dundas got in touch with him through Alexander Brodie, a mutual friend - a "nabob"
51
who represented Elgin, Banff and other Burghs in Parliament - and offered to
let him raise a Fencible regiment. Brodie persuaded Seaforth to offer and Dundas
52
to accept a regiment of the line. Seaforth's brother-in-law, Mackenzie of
Balmaduthy, thought this an excellent opportunity for him to form a connection
53
with the more honest and patriotic part of the administration and hoped a
British peerage would be the final reward^ (as it was).
Seaforth wanted rather better terms than other recruiters v/ere getting -
55
in particular five guineas a man levy money instead of three and some officers
to be appointed who would not normally have been accepted (one was in the
56marines). Lord Amherst, the acting Commander in Chief, was recalcitrant.
At his elbow however stood Captain Cochrane his A.D.C. - a tool of Dundas whose
57
business it was to drop hints. At one point, Dundas caused Lord Arnherst to
SI
be told "if he will not do his Jobbs, he cannot Jobb for his Lordship." Finally
the contentious business went through, though Brodie said the transfer of the
marine officer was "a difficult job and will probably make a noise." In June,
there were similar bargainings when the regiment was augmented. Brodie
recorded a conversation in which Nepean the under-secretary, warned Dundas that
the King would reject the proposed new Lieutenant Colonel as too junior in his
present rank for promotion. Dundas said that the King was glad enough of the
men, that for his part he would not advise Seaforth to accept unfavourable
terms and that he was ready to bring the matter before the Cabinet.
Everything has to be paid for. Brodie thought it prudent to give the
6l
regimental Agency to one of Dundas* proteges, Humphrey Donaldson. This man
acquired a good deal of business among the Scottish regiments and two of Dundas'
62
proteges nearly went into partnership with him. Seaforth was annoyed at the
63
appointment and to appease him Brodie gave up what was to have been his own
gi
reward - the regimental chaplaincy for a relation.
It was the ministers who commonly took an interest in who was to raise
troops. Pitt asked Sir James Sinclair to do so - the idea came as a complete
65
surprise to him. Dundas enquired of Simon Fraser if he could raise one of the
Fencible regiments of late 1794. He at once set to work sounding the clan and
produced a scheme and a more suitable man to command^ Even the first batch of
independent Companies in 1793 was divided for purposes of patronage between
67
Dundas and the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.
Ministerial interest continued into the later lives of the regiments.
The rivalry of Hays and Gordons in Aberdeenshire has been alluded to. In 1795,
all new regiments with numbers over 100 were reduced. This included Hay's
(the 109^). A great fuss was made because the regiment had been raised under
the patronage of the city of Aberdeen and the men were enlisted on condition of
being discharged within the county.^ There were meetings of protest.In
Parliament, the matter was aired by two stalwarts for the Opposition on military
70
questions, Generals Fitzpatrick and Macleod. From this uproar nothing of
■4.0-
course resulted.
Reductions of regiments continued, to remove all those above 90. Two
exceptions were made - the 98th, under the patronage of the Duke of Argyle* and
the 100th, the Gordons• In December 1796, Dundas wrote to Lord Huntly the
Colonel of the latter, and said that the regiment had only been saved by urging
that the sources on which it drew could not be tapped except by the family
connection. It was therefore very necessary to make it more complete than it
was. He could not alloy/ it to have any recruits from the parochial levy.^"
Thus two regiments raised in the same area in competition with each other
suffered very different fates. The political, content of the recruiting system
cannot be better illustrated.
It is unfortunately not easy to match these Scottish instances, with their
wealth of detail, from English sources. But no-one reading the letters of the
English officers to the various ministers can fall to notice that they breathe
the same atmosphere. The endless bargaining, the rivalries and the tinge of
favour and patronage will receive further illustration in this Chapter and the
next.
(b) Old Regiments v. New Corps
The government was swayed a good deal in its recruiting policy by con¬
siderations of patronage but there were also theories about the proper composi¬
tion of the recruiting force which had their influence. The choice lay between
the old fighting regiments recruiting,as it were, in their spare time and
specialist corps organized solely for recruiting (with v/hich new regiments in¬
tended to fight may largely be classed). The case against the former v/as strong.
The shortage of officers was, an -t-.Vin prcoooding pages one of the great
*
Not Lord Breadalbane.(Portescue IV Appendix A.) His was the 116th, See
Dunn Phttison's histozy of the 91®^ (as it became).
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handicap3 of the service. Colin Campbell (raising a regiment) declared that
subalterns were as difficult to get as privates (1794)1 The Royal Dragoons was
short of its full establishment of Cornets till 1796. Regiments on service
had not enough officers to go round. The Adjutant General promised the Duke of
York in April 1793 that as many officers as possible would be spared from re¬
cruiting for the front.^ The 29^» when being extensively recruited, was left
4
in charge of the Lieutenant Colonel and the Adjutant alone. Regiments at
Hilsea sent out so many officers that too few were left to keep discipline.
One proposed to use the Quartermaster, who was suitable for a commission, as a
5
recruiting officer. Another had to have its recruits conducted part of the way
to Headquarters by a borrowed parly of Dragoons.^
Regiments going abroad had to be told to leave fewer parties' and Pox
the Inspector General of Recruiting was informed for instance that the 52nd in
g
India could spare no more officers for recruiting without damaging its efficiency.
Regiments were naturally often reluctant to spare their best officers for re¬
cruiting. Gavin Kempfc an Amy Agent, already mentioned in the first Chapter,
said that young, inexperienced officers were normally sent recruiting. They had
no success, got their accounts in confusion, and ofter ruined themselves by
9 10
extravagance. Officers at home on leave from distant stations were also used.
They cannot have been too enthusiastic, and anyway were usually at home because
broken in health.1"*"
Even if the best officers were sent, there was often little chance of
success. The officers of a regiment, collected haphazardly by purchase, need
not have among then the amount of recruiting "influence" needed to supply the
corps,' had they been chosen on their merit as fighting men, the same would have
applied. The "Scotch Brigade" was formed in September 1793 "by the surviving
officers of the force of that name in the Dutch service who had left it rather
■A2-
than break their oath to King George in 1782, The British government had
given them half-pay ever since. They were to raise three battalions of 420
12
rank and file each, Efy the following June their respective strengths were
80, 94 and 268, They were then given better terms but though the third was
13
complete in October, the others made little progress. A re-organisation into
14
four battalions under a Colonel in Chief did not help these first two and in
15
April 1795 they were absorbed into the remainder.
It was a grievance that officers from the half-pay were put into the bri¬
gade by the Conmander in Chief when the "Scotch-Dutch" officers proved in-
l6
sufficiently numerous. All save one refused to help in recruiting. This was
the common experience of new regiments forced to employ more officers of this
description than they wished: "no more half-pay officers, mind that! " said
17
Mackenzie of Seaforth, offering his second battalion. In 1793# the cavalry
and then the infantry regiments endeavoured to augment themselves. The am¬
bitious scheme of the latter to raise their strength from 600 to 1050 failed
despite the incentive of promotion. Ordered on November 1st it was intended
to take three months."'"® Not a single regiment completed on time."^ The
following June, thirty-one regiments were allowed to abandon the scheme and stay
20 21
at an establishment of 600. Fifteen more were established at 850 and six
22
were given a year's clothing for than number. Such was the recruiting per¬
formance of the regimental officer.
The alternative system was to abstract the officers skilled in recruiting,
filling the gaps in regiments from the half-pay and "new entry." The authori¬
ties periodically invited officers to come forward (with their Colonel's recom¬
mendation and consent) and raise Independent Companies. These varied in size
from 20 to 150: in the majority of cases, the officer was allowed to have two
-43-
subordinate officers and engage an appropriate number of HCOs. There were
three "waves" of Independent Companies in the early years of the war - set going
in January and February2^ 1793 and Maroh2^ and October 1794.2^ Advertisements
were put in the London Gazette2^ and their officers flooded the War Office with
offers, often explaining their recruiting connections and past successes.
Officers recruiting for a regiment would often ask to strike out on their own
and sometimes caused trouble by trying to take over for themselves men they had
collected for others.^ Hew regiments tended to start as collections of officers
of this kind. Lieutenant Heron for instance had been raising men in Cheshire
for the 11^ regiment j 2& Graham took him into the 9Qth to do the same tiling in
the same place.^ In Hoveraber 1793, some letters of service provided that
officers for the regiments were to be taken mainly from the Independent Companies^0
(the first "wave" of which would then have been completed and disposed of).
From February 1794 an increasing proportion of letters of service specified that
officers likely to be useful in recruiting were to be chosen. This provision
appears especially in the case of "territorial" regiments, where it was the under¬
stood thing anyway, but it was applied more widely than that. 3-*-
We must not lose sight of the shortage of officers. In September 1794,
Agents were told that several new regiments had less than the full number and
unless vacancies were filled within a month, or in incomplete regiments within
a month of inspection, officers from the half-pay and Independent Companies would
be put in, prior to foreign service,32 it was an advantage of corps intended
solely for recruiting that at a pinch they could do with fewer officers; the
logical extreme here was reached in the Draftable Battalions which from 1795
supplanted the Independent Companies. J. II, Loft, who as a Captain organized
the raising of Prince William^ regiment, was given a Letter of Service in
December 1794 to raise 4,000 men to be delivered in monthly quotas rising from
4.00 in January to 750 in May and then falling to 550 in both June and July when
33
the levy was to be completed. They were to go into old regiments. He had
the normal complement of NCOs per 100 men, but no officers, although he later
34-
asked for, and got, an adjutant and quarter-master. Major Wood in May 1795
35
undertook a hybrid corps, based as he said on the analogy of the Fencibles
in that the officers had only temporary rank although the men were destined for
36
general service and in fact for drafting. They were mainly (but not, it seems,
wholly) foreigners. Captain Steele was authorised (February 1796) to raise 1,000
men for drafting, with 30 sergeants, 30 corporals, and 20 drummers. He was to
have an acting adjutant, quarter-master and surgeon,"^ Several other corps on
this pattern, interspersed with Independent Companies, were authorised in the
ensuing years and when the government undertook to raise men for the Bast India
Company (1799) this was how they proposed to do it. Many of these corps were
intended primarily, however, to raise men in Ireland,
Now it soon appears that recruiting corps also had their disadvantages.
Captain Shaw declared that older regiments could get men at a lower bounty and
scarcely any would join "undefined" corps. The regiment was also helped by
having an organisation behind the recruiting officer and being able to offer him
better financial terms and the prospect of employment when promoted. The writer
ends by asking that he may raise his Independent Company for service in a parti¬
cular regiment.^ Glory and good repute were great assets to a regiment in
recruiting; to join a corps that must be drafted was to buy a pig in a poke.
The fear of Chatham Barracks "that receptacle of the sons of slaughter" where
these corps were disposed of was a hated symbol of this uncertainty. Loft said
five men could be got for corps not going there sooner than three for corps that
were, and insisted on his men being inspected at Southampton or Plymouth.^*"
Worthy officers aspired, like Shaw, to finish up in a good regiment and
-4-5-
thus the Independent Companies were to some extent self-liquidating.
Lieutenant Wilmot sold some men to Lord Charles Somerset because he had no-one
to discipline them in Bristol while he went to South Wales •where his connections
42 .
were. He then accepted a beating order from Lord Charles (which was later
held to have voided his letter of service),^ and enlisted men for another regi-
44.
ment. He had the chance of entering two regiments. These deals were mostly
with new corps. A common case however, was that of a Captain Campbell who
secured leave at the outset to have his men inspected and absorbed by a regiment
I C
in Liverpool ( he prevailed on the 30™1 to take them, a month later when his
Company was almost complete) Avoiding the long march to Chatham was a strong
motive in these casesj the officers usually went with the men.
The officers who remained recruiting tended to be those fit for nothing
else. Graham was permitted to keep officers of this kind at their work if he
» •»
could replace than from his second battalion for active service. The reverse
case he met with when Hill (the future Commander in Chief) was refused leave by
his regiment (at first) to join the 9°^ as Major because he was too valuable
JO
an officer to be spared. The regiments tended to release officers far re¬
cruiting that they were glad to be rid of. Thereafter, isolated from regimental
life, they were absorbed into the recruiting service and its corrupt ways. Pew
men or bad men were the result of their labours.
The last Independent Companies were discontinued because of their lack of
success.^ So were most of the Braftable Battalions.food's was stopped
51
because his men were short and unfit, Murray's because his conduct was ir-
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regular. Loft was stopped in June 1796 - he had not finished a year after
54
he should have done and one in ten of his men were rejected. Many crimes are
recorded against his agents J the spectacle of his depot at Louth was said to be
55
responsible for the militia riots in that area later in 1796. In a way, he
-46-
vsas a victim of persecution. Because of the curious composition of his corps,
56
recorded on his beating orders, they -were thought forgeries. A regiment had
57
to be ordered to leave his parties alone - while they behaved.
Hostility to professionalized recruiting existed in very high quarters.
The King in January 1793 displayed a tentative but decided objection to Inde¬
pendent Companies. Dundas thought it prudent to restrict their number and leave
room for an augmentation of the old regiments as well. Lewis said the experience
of the previous war suggested that Independent Companies could raise thrice the
number of men as the old regiments in a quarter of the time. Sir George Yonge
was sorry that the King would not leave it to the Cabinet. His opposition
appeared to be due to the influence of certain Colonels of old regiments - perhaps
58
the Duke of York himself - who had objected on a similar occasion in 1790. We
shall encounter further instances of the hostility of the military caste to the
successful recruiter who won swift promotion by his efforts.
The case far recruiting through the old regiments was much strengthened
by the catastrophes of 1795. The Army in Holland had lost heavily during the
|-Q
retreat J the strength of the 12'^fell from 815 to 425. The drain of the
West Indies reached its peak and remained heavy: in 1796-8 the 13^ Huzzars lost
3356° and the 69th 89761 - almost their entire strengths. Such regiments were
sent home to be re-raised, any stray privates being left behind. (This process
was made easier by improved relations with the U.S.A. after 1795; when they were
62
bad, Lord Arnherst thought it necessary to send men out to the officers.)
Similarly, in order to keep old regiments in the field, new ones were drafted
6 5
leaving the officers and NCOs to re-raise from scratch. Thus there was a
higher ratio of officers to men and plenty of formations with nothing to do but
recruit.
In this fluid situation, the new Commander in Chief set to work. Some
forty new foot regiments were reduced, leaving about a hundred (slowly brought
6L
down to ninety). Lord Westmoreland emerges as their defenders he thought
65
that re-raising them would succeed and recruiting by old regiments fail. In
the autumn, the remaining regiments were given a standard establishment of 10
companies of 100 rank and file. All regiments were to have five Field Officers
instead of three and twenty-one Lieutenants instead of ten. Those in the West
Indies were also to have two extra Captains. But the cardinal reform was that
66
all the regiments abroad were to have two Recruiting Companies; after at first
67 68
deciding otherwise, the authorities sanctioned the same for regiments at home.
These Companies each comprised a Captain, two Lieutenants, five Sergeants, five
Corporals and four Drummers^ but no privates.^ The cavalry regiments each had
a recruiting troup of a Captain, Lieutenant, Cornet, Quarter-master, four sergeants,
four corporals and a trumpeter.^ These arrangements were varied to suit cir¬
cumstances.
In November 1797, regiments under six hundred strong were established at
72
that figure but retained the extra officers - at least till vacancies occurred
•77 yi
naturally.'-3 Some recruiting companies were abolished: "skeleton" regiments,
of necessity devoted solely to recruiting, did not need them. Apart from that,
the idea was that each regiment should have an established number of persons
recruiting. Fox saw to it that the Troops mid Companies of regiments abroad
*7r
were kept up to strength; and, for instance, the 2nd Dragoons was told (in
1795 but admittedly before the new arrangement) to reduce its recruiting personnel
76
from some fifty officers and men to under twenty.
Better results should have followed from such system I Some regiments
made modest progress: the 14**1 Huzzars (it was easier for cavalry) raised 450
77
men in 1797-8. But in general the years 1795-9 were poor for recruiting.
An attempt lias been made in the first chapter to explain why. Good order also
X
tended to diminish the chances of success.
The government was thus faced with a dilemma in the choice of method
and inclined either way as transitory circumstances dictated. Though recruiting
corps predominated in 1793-5 and regimental recruiting in 1795-9* yet the system
of augmentation was persisted with in the earlier years in such regiments as
would co-operate and some draftable corps and new regiments were raised in the
later years. The latter if not raised only to he drafted, had some of the
attractiveness of the old regiment for the good officer and man, and so had a
better chance than the former. Various accidents caused them to be offered.
Macleod of Colbecks, who raised Fencibles in 1798, had offered in 1794* but had
78
left it too latej the desired quantity had been contracted for. Seaforth
offered a further battalion in 1798 (which was not accepted) because a great
79
many lads in Lev/is ■who had been too young in 1793 were now fit to serve.
Only one observable and perhaps conscious trend in government policy may
be noted, namely the tendency to "nationalize" the recruiting service in wartime.
The new corps as we shall see* were under closer government control than the
regiments and their parties. The period when the latter tended to grow in im¬
portance was the period when they too were being subjected to more central con¬
trol. Thus the way was being paved for the centralised recruiting service which
was tried in 1807 and towards which Kemp4> pointed as the solution to the problem
in a memorandum which we shall consider in the next section.
(c) The Counties and Towns and The Line
Apart from altering the internal mechnaisms of the recruiting service,
the government could also strive to make it more rational and efficient by giving





duplication, and difficulty of supervision resulting from everyone operating
everywhere at once can well be imagined and will be fully analysed in a later
chapter. Could a neat geographical division be substituted?
In the case of the regiments of the line, an order of 1782 had allotted
each one to a county, with instructions to cultivate ties with it and so make it
a reservoir of men.''" The official Recruiting Instructions of 1796 required
regiments to recruit each in its own county and so acquire % local interest that
may materially assist them in obtaining Men." However, they were also allowed
to send parties to any of the manufacturing towns of England and Wales and to all
2
parts of Scotland and Ireland. Cavalry regiments and some foot regiments had
no such connections and very few of the new regiments had them.
There was in practice a certain effort to maintain local connections but
it did not amount to very much. For instance the 22?^ (Cheshire) Regiment had
five parties in their county in November 1796 and only one outside. In July 1797»
there were three in the county and seven outside, ranging from Glasgow to Norwich
and Bristol. That situation continued more or less in 1798-9The 49^
(Hertfordshire) regiment had one or two, occasionally four parties in the county
in the period July 1796 - December 1797 but they had other parties in Scotland,
the West Riding and Gloucestershire or South Wales for most of that time.'4" The
13th (Somersetshires) had three parties in the county on an average from May 1796
to March 1797. Four more were permanently in Shrewsbury, Bristol, Ireland and
Scotland respectively. Devizes, Leicester, Newbury and Nottingham were also
5
visited.
As for the men received by the different regiments, the 14^ (Bedfordshires)
enlisted 55 men from its county in one period and 28 from adjoining counties out
of a total of 633.^ The 53rd (Shropshires) out of a body of just over 1,000
recruits enlisted in 1795-9 bad 38 from its own and 97 from adjoining counties.^
50-
Shropshire figures in an interesting episode in January 1795 when Colonel
Williams * new regiment had to be drafted. General Cuyler who had inspected
it asked for the men to be put into his own regiment, the 69^. This already
had many Shropshire men in it and he was well known in the county, having raised
the 86^ and recruited for the 55"^^ there. He thought the men would like his
9
regiment and Williams said the recruiting service would benefit. This plan
was agreed to and Cuyler said that the men were content and the effect on county
opinion should be good - it had not been known there that the regiment was being
drafted.*^ The regiment raised by Sheffield was drafted into the which was
in theory attached to the North Riding."*"*" It was apparently the policy of the
government to draft what should be Scottish regiments into other Scottish regi¬
ments.*^
New regiments quite often had some county designation but we have seen
13
how little that meant for the Perthshire Volunteers. The gentry of Inverness-
shire, in the course of their meetings to organize the defence of the county in
1794, voted their support for the regiment to be raised by Simon Frazer, which
took the name of the county,***" But no action appears to have followed and the
slight connection is to be explained by the fact of a Frazer being the Sheriff.
Such county connections as existed were wholly a matter of the connections of
individual officers, such as Cuyler's in Shropshire, There was no link with
any local organization. The gentlemen of Shropshire wished in 1794 to use part
of their subscription for defence to find recruits for the 53**^» the county regi-
15
ment. The regiment did nothing whatever to use the money, so in March 1795,
16
it was applied to the Yeomanry instead. Williams1 regiment does not come into
the picture.
The government vols pleased by Shropshire's initiative and suggested to
17 18
some other counties - such as Cheshire and Essex - with money to spare that
51-
they should help their county regiments: Dundas observed in writing to the
Lord Lieutenant of Cheshire that recruiting for the old regiments had "been sadly
hit by the onset of new corps. Nothing was done on these lines. The Duke of
Richmond said that it was not desirable to propose any such scheme in Sussex
because it would lead to a debate on whether to raise troops for foreign or for
19
domestic service. This would end as an argument on the justice of the war.
To build up a sound local connection it is necessary to have a permanent
depot in the area. This was precisely what all the regiments of those days
lacked completely. The ultimate development of such an institution was associa¬
ted with the forming of the troops of the line into regiments of two battalions
(one always to be in the home county) and their association with the local forces
of the county, which were further battalions of the regiment. It is interesting
to note the barrier in the way of having regiments of two battalions. There
were a few such - the 25"^ and the 84^ for example. Dundas in 1794 suggested
dividing all the old regiments into two battalions, each of which was to re-
20
complete. He was told that in both the two previous wars some additional
battalions had been added to existing regiments and on their reduction the
officers in both battalions were considered as one body for the purpose of de¬
ciding which of them, by the rule of juniority, were to go on half-pay. To
universalize second battalions would thus spread insecurity tbrought the service.
Officers in an old regiment would find themselves retired through the intrusion
of someone senior to themselves into the second battalion, with which there might
21
be no contact or exchange of information. The rules governing seniority would
have to be changed - a difficult and unpopular business.
There was in apy case no idea as yet of using linked battalions as a way
of promoting the county connection. The idea of a connection between regiments
of the line and the appropriate county regiments of militia was however to be
—52—
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broached by the Conmander in Chief during the next war and was already in the
air. The Worcestershire militia for instance endeavoured to copy the uniform
23of the regiment of the line allotted to that county. Here however we approach
the rather different subject of recruiting the line from the militia, which must
be considered separately.
One more or less isolated attempt was made to expedite the recruiting of
certain new regiments by attaching them to towns - an experiment already tried
in the previous war. In the summer of 1794, Pitt was disappointed at the pro¬
gress of the new regiments. Noticing that a good many towns were offering to
help in the raising of regiments by certain officers recommended by themselves,
he suggested that these offers be accepted on the understanding that the regiments
would then be drafted to fill the old ones, which were falling behind in the race
for men. A circular was sent out to the officers who had been put forward in
25this way, asking if they v/ere willing to proceed on that basis. One or two
town regiments had already been sanctioned and others now followed. In all
sixteen were formed in 1794-5 and there were one or two odd ones later.s
Almost all were regiments of the line, one or two such as Kerr's (Northampton -
1794) and Rann's (Birmingham - 1799) were Fencibles.
The initiation of these regiments was usually by way of a petition by a
number of substantial townsmen naming an officer and offering to countenance him
in making a levy. The petition in support of Ram had 109 signatures including
26Matthew Boulton and was addressed to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. A
petition from Manchester in 1798 put forward de l'Hoste (who had already raised
one regiment for the torn) and noted that Manchester had now contributed three
27
regiments during the war. Corporate towns could make their offers in more
Hy Aberdeen, Birmingham, Bristol, Chester, Coventxy, Exeter, Glasgow, Jedburgh
and others, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Northampton, Norwich, Sheffield,
Stamford, Wakefield. See (esp.) WO k/\52t 154, Index, "Letters of Service."
But see also p. 53
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style: at Northampton it was the Mayor who convened the necessary meetings
23
and sent the offer on behalf of the inhabitants. At Birmingham in 1794,
two offers were made and the two officers each put an address to their backers
in the newspapers, with the text of the official letter of acceptance and a
29
personal pledge of their best endeavours.
The amount of help given by the townsmen varied and is difficult to
assess. At Northampton, a committee was set up by the Mayor to help but^° it
was Br. Kerr the father of the Commandant (who was absent on active service) who
31
raised the men as noted above. In Sheffield, the offer of the regiment was
made by the partisans of Lord Fitzwilliam at the time of his joining the ministry
"their views being decidedly and avowedly to strengthen the government, which
32
measure is notoriously known to have had the happiest effect." There was an
imposing procession through the town to start things off. The regimental
colours were carried in front. The Cutlers' Company, the Town Collector and
Trustees, the members of the Vestries and the gentlemen of the town and neighbour¬
hood were escorted by the town's Volunteer Corps and the local Yeomanry commanded
by Lord Fitzwilliam. With such support, no-one dared to molest the recruiting
parties. But D. J. Cameron, the commandant, said the town's zeal was unique in
the West Riding.^
Elsewhere, the manifesto of the town was often not followed up. The
point of the proceedure for the officer who was to raise the regiment was pro¬
bably to impress the government with the influence that he had behind him and
so secure their favour. J. E. Urquhart who raised the Essex Fencibles in 1794-5
was married to the daughter of a burgess of Harwich who was alleged to have
turned the scale at the parliamentary election of 1784. He was also a protege
of Ferguson of Pitforn, Member (in the Gordon interest) for Aberdeenshire.^ He
35
secured the backing for his offer of the towns of Harwich, Maldon and Banff.
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In the last case, his "brother thanked the Corporation for their support but
nothing was ever done by them to help raise men.^
Political and extraneous considerations are very clearly seen when Hay
tried to get the support of the City of Aberdeen for his regiment. His rivals
the Gordons, naturally took action to stop this and Professor Copland of
Marischall College was sent to interview the Provost. It then appeared that Hay
had been distributing bribes and was trying to get a letter written to the Member
for Aberdeen and other Burghs obliging him to use all his influence in Hay's
favour. The Provost promised his good offices in stopping this and succeeded
37
in getting the letter watered down to a mere introduction.
Where there was a Corporation, there was at least a body that could take
action to help. Town regiments often came from unincorporated places and the
string of petitioners were unorganized. There is no record of committees. The
existence of two Birmingham regiments in 1794 points to confusion, and Matthew
Lewis the Deputy Secretary at War said they would be hard put to it in each case
38
to prove any real connection with the town.
It was when the regiments came to be drafted that the commandants tried
to capitalise their position as protege's of a town. We have seen how officers
did not care to raise corps that were going to be drafted. Lewis in the letter
just cited, doubted if respectable gentlemen would raise troops on such terms
but the town regiments mentioned, being raftre haphazard collections of men, would
<Zg
not object. It seems possible that the government's idea was to use the
patronage of the town to counter the unpopularity which a corps known to be raised
for drafting would have among officers and men. The commandants however, although
told of the intention to draft in advance, took no heed and fought against fate.
It is clear too that Lewis was right in predicting that the prospect of drafting
39
would not be mentioned to the men.
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D, J. Gamercan declared that if the Sheffield regiment were drafted there would
be an uproar in the town and Lord Fitzwilliam's influence there would be ruined^
Another Cameron, raising a regiment for Wakefield, said that he could not raise
an augmentation if his men were drafted.^ Two regiments, the 105^ (Leeds)
and the 113th (Birmingham) mutinied at Cork in September 1795 when the order to
lp
draft was finally given. They had to be surrounded and forcibly disarmed.
A number of the 113^ sent in a petition through Mr. Villers, a Birmingham
magistrate very active against recruiting abuses. They said that advertisements
had promised them a return to civil life after the war. Now they were going
into old regiments, never dismissed from service. They had been promised in
the handbills that they would not be drafted. Their officers, knowing this,
had taken care to get them out of the country quickly. Villers confirmed the
circumstances of their enlisting.^
The work of the town regiments, honest or otherwise, cannot be said to
have advanced the principle of localization. If the towns were small they could
not supply a regiment from their own population. If they were large, they were
already full of parties from so many regiments that a town regiment only added
to the confusion. Anyway, even the regiments sponsored by large towns did not
restrict their efforts to them. The Wakefield regiment had parties at ten other
places in the lest Riding and also at Chesterfield, Uttoxeter, Manchester,
Glasgow, Newcastle and Retford.^ The 113^ (Birmingham) operated at Shepton
Mallet, "Wells, Walsall and Shrewsbury and had a contract with a crimp in
ig
Liverpool. Colonel Blair of the Liverpool regiment quarrelled violently with
the Corporation of Glasgow over his recruiting activity there.^ The Sheffield
lO
regiment had parties in Lancashire.
The town regiments with a few exceptions were thus gilded versions of
the draftable corps already discussed. They were a haven of the professional
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recruiters who were often in close alliance. MacDonell of the 113^ and Cameron
of the Wakefield had both come from one of the regiments formed from the offioers
of the Independent Companies. The former handed over to the latter a party he
Kg
had established far their former regiment at Lichfield. The same Birmingham
regiment provided a Lieutenancy for the son of de l'Hoste of the Manchester - a
50
boy not yet fit for service. Colonel Ram's officers for the Birmingham
51
Pencibles of 1799 were poorly thought of. One had been a footman.
If these corps made any lasting contribution,it was towards an increased
professionalism in the recruiting service as noticed at the end of the last
section. Gavin Kemp6 was the Agent of the 113th^52 ge produced a memorandum
suggesting that in each sizeable town there should be a recruiting depot in charge
of an officer permanently stationed there and not attached to any regiment. With
the countenance and help of the townspeople, he should raise men, give them a
53little training and send them to join a regiment - preferably the county one.
Thus the ideas of a depot and of county connections v/ere growing up side by side;
the principles were moulded by the very imperfect attempts at the practice of them.
(d) County Recruiting for Home Defence
The great hindrance to the localization of any regiment's recruiting lay-
however, as we have seen, in the difficulty of combining within a regiment enough
officers possessing recruiting influence in the same area. It was hard enough
to scrape recruiting influence together on any basis.
Here was a case where it was easier to achieve results in forced for home
service. Gentlemen willing to serve as officers at home only were thicker on
the ground. In England the militia, officered by the county gentry, were a
nucleus. So the plan of 1791- proposed to raise Fencible Cavalry 011 a county
basis and also to augment the militia by voluntary enlistment. The initial
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cost of bounties and horses was to be met by county subscriptions.1 Forces
of this type were raised to the extent noted in the first chapter, and there
were also some corps of Fencible Infantry, mostly from Scotland.
The political struggles in the counties over this measure are also
described in chapter one. There were some crises which had no real connection
with politics. Northumberland and Carnarvon both desired forces that helped
the defence of the county in particular. The latter county eventually augmented
2
its militia but many would have preferred sailors and the committee was accused
of exceeding its powers.^ There had been a slow start apyway because the county
was poor and the Lord Lieutenant apologised for giving only £100Northumber¬
land would have preferred something akin to Volunteers but there was a great fear
of arming a large body of the people unless they were sent out of the county.
The gentry there were mostly absentees and an insurrection of the Methodists
5
and dissenters who thus might come to control the force was to be feared. After
discussing various alternatives, the county was finally brought to augment its
militia.^
Sometimes unsuitable schemes were suggested. The Duke of Richmond pro¬
posed that the SussexMilitia be augaented with corps of artillery and cavalry.
This was because the county was thinly populated and could only provide a few
7
men, who should be used to the best advantage. The government objected that
every militia corps would at once try and diversify itself in this way. Sussex
might raise its contingent only as Fencibles but there would be an understanding
8
that the detachments would always serve with the militia. Angus decided to
raise Fencible Cavalry, but hearing that enough of these had been offered they
switched to Volunteers. Then it appeared that the government would have preferred
g
Fencibles after all, so Fencible Infantry were finally raised. David Scott
the County Member took the initiative and was very worried at the effect of the
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government's indecision."*"'"' He held his seat very precariously for Dundas and
doubtless feared he would become unpopular. He was ousted at the next election,
but that was two years afterwards."*"*"
The great point was to get the gentry to come forward as officers and on
the whole this was done. Worcester is an example of an exception. No-one
there was willing to raise additional companies of militia and so the augmen-
12
tation had to be made (more slowly) by adding to existing companies. As a
rule, though, there were men to step forward and raise the men, while at the
same time giving a lead in raising the money. The Duke of Atholl asked Moray
of Abercaimey to raise Fencible Cavalry in Perthshire. If he stepped forward,
the vital support of the active gentry would easily be secured. In such
troubled times, those who usually "live in ease, affluence and I might almost
add comparative indolence" should exert themselves.*"^ In Cambridgeshire, the
Grand Jury at the assizes passed a resolution calling for the raising of Cavalry.
Its foreman was General J, W, A«ieane and it was his son who took command of the
14
corps.
Rivalries and sinister interests were of course not absent. A Fencible
Corps raised in Orkney was dissolved in 1796 for inefficiency. In 1798, its
unmarried members offered to form a new corps under the Sheriff, their former
15
Adjutant. Sir Ralph Abercromby the Commander in Chief in North Britain de¬
murred because any corps raised there would be an "island job.""^ In Perth¬
shire, Abercairney was challenged for the command by 3c($chc$ of BeflSchef who
solicited support by circular. Abercairney,s friends would not stoop to can-
17
vassing but they put it about that he was standing, which had its effect. In
Essex, both cavalry and extra militia were raised. Colonel Burgoyne of the
cavalry claimed the final surplus of the subscription for an augmentation, and
on behalf of Pitt, George Rose wrote a letter in support of the claim. The
partisans of Colonel Strutt of the militia threatened to oppose it very forcibly
in the committee. OliHius, the leader of the whole Essex movement, smoothed
things over by referring back to the government; he accused Rose of enmity
towards himself,1® In Dumfries, the government tried to push a gentleman into
the Majority of the Cavalry against the wishes of the Lord Lieutenant because
he had married the heiress of Lord Home.
The respective spheres of the Commanding Officers and the cor.mrit.tees for
managing the county subscriptions were not always properly defined. In
Ayrshire, the meeting to inaugurate the scheme and the committee set up by it
had between them decided to raise two troops of cavalry and had nominated two
gentlemen to command them and another to be a Lieutenant. Andrew Dunlop, one
of the troop-commanders was nominated to command the corps.20 On his being
appointed he proceeded to nominate the proposed 3^.sutenant to the command of the
other troop instead of the person chosen by the committee. The civilians were
considerably annoyed.21 In Berwickshire, Sir Alexander Don wrote to say that
the county had decided to raise cavalry, leaving the choice of officers to the
government, and then proceeded to offer himself to command, as the man whom the
county wanted.22 Qq the whole, the initiative and the work were wisely left to
the commandants. Sir William Dick took the lead in pressing for an augmentation
of the Midlothian Fencibles and it was stated that the levy of the existing two
troops was entirely his work, as agent for the committee,23
On the finanoial side, the committees naturally intervened much more.
In Perthshire, the committee said that enough money had been raised for three
troops. They fixed a maximum bounty for men of ten guineas and a maximum price
for horses of £25. An account of £1,000 was opened for Abercairney at a local
bank.24 Expenses proved greater than had been expected. Abercairney men¬
tioned to the committee the expense of keeping up the recruiting parties, the
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high bounties (in his own troop eight guineas for most of the men find more for
the rest) and the need to give one or two guineas to the bringers of recruits
pC
instead of a half. The committee were not satisfied. In 1796, a form of
account was suggested which might cause them to issue more money. It included
the items noted above and such things as loss by desertion, legal charges, and
certain maintenance charges not met by the government. In May 1797 (three
years after the first levy and two after the augmentation) the committee had
£3,660:15: 5 in its hands. The officers claimed A.,000, They had originally
27
been promised £2,524*10: A compromise was proposed but some accounts
were not settled in 180
In Cambridgeshire, the Adjutant of the militia, was luckier in his cal-
29
culations far he expected to raise men at six guineas and they cost just over
£7.30 It was possible as a result to raise two troops of ca\" Iry instead, of
31
one, as well as the militia augmentation. The accounts for the cavalry were
presented in July, only four months after the levy had started. There was then
a hiatus because the conardttee was not very numerously attended and thought
themselves not competent to depart frcsn a resolution of a large county meeting
by passing the accounts. The departure involved was that the county had sanc-
32
tioned the spending of £1,500, whereas the accounts came to £1,182:13: 8.
The amount of help, financial or otherwise, which the officers received
from the county fluctuated. Burgoyne in Essex told his friends not to subscribe
for his proposed cavalry corps but to give their money to the official county
project of augmenting the militia. As a reward, he was allowed to call his
33
corp3 by the name of the county. We have seen what reception he met with in
asking for something more substantial. In Cambridgeshire, the cavalry received
34
every help from the militia, being given a number of men to start the recruiting.
Of 55 men in Abercairney's troop, 9 were supplied by himself, 15 by his officers
35
and 12 by various civilians (who would appear to be -well-wishers in the county.)
A problem presented to the militia 7.1th the voluntary augmentations was how to
replace casualties'^ - the county funds would not stretch to it and the govern¬
ment, which looked after the Pencibles in this respect, did not feel responsible
for recruiting the militia.
That it was upon the gentlemen of the county coming forward as officers
that all depended is vividly shown when there was a. general augmentation of the
Pencible Cavalry in 1795. This was paid for by allowances of levy money by the
government. The motive power behind it is shown on a letter of the commandant
of the Roxburgh Cavalry, He found some influential gentlemen of the county
37
desirous of joining and so offered an augmentation. In Ayrshire a shortage
of persons with military experience and good local connections held up the de¬
cision to augment,**®
From Dumfries came a plea to appoint the officers quickly so that they
39
could help at once with the recruiting. The government's plan envisaged the
augmentation of the existing troops first before new ones were added, This
meant, as the commandant of the Hampshire Cavalry complained, that new officers
could not be appointed till a late stage in the levy,^" Lord Ancram insisted
jn
that the order of the augmentation be reversed, Berwickshire demanded the
same terms,^ In Fife, the prospective officers were fortunately willing to
join in the recruiting before they could be appointed,^
Although the farces raised by the counties in the way described were
small, they were significant. The Pencible Cavalry were a distinct institution
in themselves, a "horse militia" with a special place in the government's
strategy. The militia augmentation could make . n important difference in the
force supplied by certain places. It was as large as the quota in small counties
like Anglesea and the Isle of Wight, half the quota in Wiltshire and Buckingham-
45
shire. The effort of Lancashire was particularly noteworthy. This county's
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militia regiment of 1,000 men was far too small a tax on her increasing popula-
2u6
tion. In the autumn of 1794» it was decided to raise a Fencible Infantry
I "7
regiment of equal strength under the command of Lord Grey de Wilton* The
48
county bore the whole initial expense except for the supply of arms. That
this was regarded as an extra militia regiment is shown by the fact that it
alone was given family allowances from the government like the militia when it
4.9
went to serve in Ireland*
These county levies nevertheless had no very immediate sequel* In 179&,
compulsory levies were imposed which took up most of the counties' attention.
Lord Buckingham made a stand for voluntary recruiting. He discussed the matter
with various militia officers who concluded that to augment the militia by com¬
pulsion was impossible, while the use of the ballot was dangerous in any case
50
because dangerous and disaffected elements would be brought under arms. He
therefore offered to raise by voluntary enlistment the whole quota assigned to
Buckinghamshire in the militia augmentation. After a great deal of shilly¬
shallying, by which he was justifiably incensed, the government came to the con¬
clusion that he might not do so, the Act of 1794 having expired, which allowed
51
such levies.
County recruiting was destined in the immediate future to take place
v/ithin the framework of compulsory levies and to supply the regular army for the
most part indirectly through enlistment from the militia. The voluntary effort
of 1794-5 had nevertheless kept things moving in the counties at a critical
point and was not without its effect on the method of raising the militia as
52
will be told in due course.
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CHAPTER III ; FINANCE AMD INCENTIVES
(a) Bargains with the Government
The actions of the govern-ment cannot be entirely understood - still
less those of anyone else - without an investigation of the eppallingly
difficult subject of recruiti ng finance. Promotion (including coming on
to full pay) was the real incentive and reward of the officer.* The "levy
money" issued to him was mean t only to pay his expenses - a point made
especially clear in a letter telling the King's Dragoons that of the £5 a man
paid by the government, the recruit was to receive 53/- and the officer 32/-
for recruits deserting before inspection and so certified by the commanding
officerl(10/- was the customary expense of the party per fnlistment). What
happened if there were fewer deserters than expected is another matter, but
the intention is plain.
The Independent Compan ie6 wore raised for promotion. In January 1793
Lieutenants and half pay Captains had to produce fifty rank and file for a
"step" or full-pay.2 In March 1794 Captains were asked to raise 150 (some
later ones 100) for a step and Leiutenants fifty.® In October 1794, the same
4
demands were mads and some Majors also raised 100 for promotion. A few
C
Ensigns raised 20 men for step at various timessundry offers were received to
6 7
raise men for a chaplaincy,0 a post on the Staff in India and so on.
Old regiments were augmented in a similar way. In February 1793,
Dragoons regiments were augmented by three troops on a plan decided at a meeting
8
of Colonels. The Adjutant General wrote to his own regiment to know which
Q
subalterns would undertake the levy. In April, various augmentations of the
Foot Guards were consolidated into a plan to raise the company strength to 100
rank and file and moid four companies to the first and two to each of the other
two regiments.'-0 In November came a general plan for the infantry, the
* See page 35
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invention of General Cunninghame." By this the strength but not the number
of the companies was increased (from 60 to 100) but an extra Lieutenant-Colonelcy
and Majority were created in each regiment. The existing Major was supposed
to sucoeed to the former and the two eldest Captains to be promoted, vacating
two companies.* (This plan was later extended to the cavalry when they
were willing to adopt it.)*® Each vacant troop or company meant promotion for
a Lieutenant and an Ensign (o r Cornet) and vacancies for two Ensigns (or Cornets)
entering the army.
The new regiments were raised on the same principle, by contracts between
the raiser, and his officers, as we shall see. (It should be noted that Rank
in a Fencible regiment like this did not carry the right to half pay and was
proportionately less valuable). The letters of service of the Town regiments
of 1794 mentioned that officers wore to be assigned quotas and they are
specified as 100 for Field rank, 50 for a Company and 20 for a Lieutenancy.^
The Commandint of a new regi ment expected, like his officers, to be recompensed
by his rank, and many and bitter were the disputes which this aroused.
Such was the rewardj to achieve it the officers must spend much money,
and as the demand and so the price of men rose they were permitted an increasing
supply of it from various sources. These were mostly closely connected with
the systems of promotion outlined above. When an officer was promoted as a
result of raising men, the commission he vacated commonly reverted to the
government, which sold it to recoup itself for the levy.-*-" As the war
progressed, officers were increasingly allowed to receive part of the price,
not only of their own commission but of the other commissions vacated in
* See Fortes cue IV 211
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consequence of each promotiai • Captains raising for a step in March 1794
received £1100 from the various officers thus promoted in succession,*6
Conversely, officers promoted as a result of recruiting might be called on to
pay part of the price of their new commission to the recruiting fund.
In this way officers with cap ital and officers with recruiting experience could
form a part-nership. This was the system of the Guard*s' augmentation of 1793,*'''
and the $br9&el of Cunningharafs plan. In the letter, the regimental fund
received £4650 from the offx cers involved.*" In new regiments, the bargains
between the raiser and his of ficers would similarly include money as well as
men as convenience dictated.
As a rule the undertakers of levies (including Independent Companies) were
letter? ofset-vice
permitted to choose their own officers butXsometimes forbade them to receive
money (as opposed to men) for the appointments*® and usually limited their
choice. At first, officers usually had to be taken from the half pay of the
rank they were to hold. As this source dried up or when undertakers were
in diffieultios, they were all owed to sell certain stated commissions to
officers of the rank below - which was more lucrative,22 Field Officers were
7 '2
sometimes increased in a regiment so that the now posts could be sold.
The undertaker usually had the patronage of Snslgncies and the regimental staff,
where questions of seniority did not arise,24 In many Fencible and Dreftable
Battalions he was allowed to "recommend" the promotion of an officer or officers
25
who had no ostensible connection with his regiment. This perhaps was rather
a reward than compensation for expense.
The direct issue of levy money was varied in its amount according to
the other resources allowed to the officer, so as to keep the various undertakers
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at the same determined rate or rates. In January 1793 the issue was three
or five guineas a man varying inversely with the amount of patronage and
directly with the size of the levy.**® The Independent Companies of March
27
1794 were mostly at five to seven guineas on the same basis, and the
28
cavalry augmentation was charging eight by the end of 1793. But Cunningham®•s
plan marked a decisive change. Added to levy money at fivo guineas for the 450
29
men, the payments by officers gave a total of £6,9QC of £lg a head* To this
rate and more, other corps gradually came to approximate £15 levy money (ten
guineas for Fencibles) was almost a standard issue by 1795 but fluctuations
(plus the fact that although intended to cover all expenses, they were the same
as the maxima payable to recruits) show these figures were not the whole story.
An officer was told in August 1795 that only ten guineas was allowed when the
undertaker named the officers.^ On the other hand the Draftable attalions
got 25 guineas and Loft was spe cifieally told that five of thi3 way in lieu of
appointing officers.3* (Grey considered that counties actually paid had
reached 25 guineas by the end of 1794.) Lastly it must be noted that under¬
takers received £1.5/- e man to provide slop dotting and Dr. Kerr (for instance)
hoped to recoup his losses by having the payment for his regiments' full clothing
anteidated.33
The last case brings us to some devices used to strengthen the credit of
the recruiting officer and protect him against loss. The subject is conventiatly
introduced by the request of four Scottish Colonels of new regiments that their
off-reckonings and assignments (payments for clothing and so forth) should be
paid quickly, as the manufacturers in their region gave only short credits of
three or four months,Levy money was usually advanced from time to time as
the Agents of the undertakers requested it. In the case of augmentations under
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Cunninghame's plan, the government advanced money to the regiment up to the total
of the proposed recruiting fund and collected the money from the officers when
35
the levy had finished and the promotions tdc en place. The commissioning of
officers normally took place after the inspection of new corps, bjit the dates
of the commissions (from which pay began) were sometimes made the same as the
letter of service. This was mainly to promote the supply of subalterns to the
*57
new regiments.
The officers' best safeguard against financial loss was "intermediate
inspection". This first comes to the fore in connection with the augmentation
of November 1796. Regiments were told that recruits could be provisionally
approved by a Field Officer of the regiment or by the commandant of Chatham if
it was abroad. The full bo u nty would be paid for men who deserted after
7G
this. The men had still to be finally approved and those rejected or
deserting after intermediate approval could not be counted in the number required
for the promotions,3® as the 29th found to its cost.^ A concession on these
41
lines was greatly sought after. . Some Draftable Battalions and everjtfew
Independent Companies4^ had the privilege of having their men "finally" inspected
as they were raised, without waiting for the completion.
When the Permanent Superintending Field Officers got to work* the system
could be more generally adopted. In October 1796, it was ordered that they
should intermediately approve all recruits raised for general service and certify
that they had received two guineas in cash and one in necessaries towards their
bounty. This sum was paid for deserters, together wHh subsistence from attestation
to desert on if Fox (who suggested the scheme) thought there had been no delay in
sending them for final approval,43 In 1799 the Fencibles were ordered to have
all their men inspected by the Superintending Field Officers unless they were




be sent to the nearest such Officer. Thus the system was a powerful aid
to centralization. Men rejected as unfit normally received pay from the
date of their attestation. A final concession was the inspection of certain
regiments (Graham's for instance)48 intended to be 1000 strong when they reached
600. This was a combination of most of the advantages referred to above,
besides being a great aid to discipline.
Such were the means at the government's disposal to encourage or indemnify
the recruiting officer. What considerations guided them in the use of those
means? Generally speaking, whenever a particular class of recruiter was seen
to be less successful than oth ers he was given better terms. There was a sort
of handicap system. The old regiments found themselves, for reasons which we
have explained, at a bad disadvantage in the early years of tho war. In September
1793, the 77th was saying that higher bounties were the only cure.4(i The augmen¬
tation that November, with its great increase in bou ty, was in effect the answer
to this plea. The Scotch Brigade, which for this purpose counts as an old regi¬
ment, was stated to have beer given this same rate in levy money because its
officers showed themselves bad at recruiting. The Independent Companies mean¬
while were beginning to suffer from the competition of new regiments, and it was
proposed to grant these who asked for it an increase of bounty to five guineas.48
This was done in October 1'92T® A more signal mark of favour at the same time
was the formation of several regiments to be officered by those lately employed
in those Companies. By the sale of oertain commisisions to officers not in this
category, they were to have 1© vy money at the new £15 rate.80
We have mentioned that a cause the army had much at heart was the
restriction of the power of richer officers to break the order of succession and
get ahead of those senior but poorer. The insistence on tho employment of half-
pay officers was a consequence of this feeling. In October 1793, half-pay Captains
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raising independent companie s were all given seven guineas bounty money instead
of five. From the following year, offioers were commonly not allowed to recruit
for promotion unless they had a certain degree of seniority. In the Town
regiment the officers raising for the rank of Captain and above had to be of
three, sometimes four, years standing in their then tank. If they were of
six years* standing they got eighteen guineas levy money; if less, twelve.^-
The officers who undertook the Independent Companies of October 1794 were mostly
CO C 7
eighteen guinea men and othe rs who were eligible were put up to this figure.
Others protested when they were not. Lieutenant Antrobus (twelve years' standing)
54
had finished raising his quota at eight guineas when the new order came in.*'
Colonel Podmore wanted a$ Lieu tenant Colonel of his regiment an officer who was
already one by brevet. He was to have eighteen guineas if he had previously
pe
been a Major for six years.
Finally it may be noted that a longer time was allowed for the levies of
meritorious cases. Three months was almost always the time for a levy of what-
56
ever size, but the Scotch Bri gado had no time limit and Independent Companies
were occasionally given more time.
The new regiments, with the exceptions noted, got the least sympathy.
As a class they were strong in territorial connections, rich civilians and
organization and needed it less. Eventually the help given to everyone else
caused even them to feel the pinch and this was ©specially so when they were
drafted and had to be re-raised from scratch. They were usually offered an
augmentation on Cunninghame's plan,8^ and when they had been drafted they were
allowed to use its terms to fiW&tlCC recompletion to 600 - which involved
acquiring officers for 1000.58 This was in 1795 and clearly foreshadowed the
new arrangement in the army. Many of them closed their lives that year; on
the whole probably without sufficient recompense to the Colonels.
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In arriving at its policy, the government was of course governed not
only by considerations of equity but by what the market would bear. There was
a constant process of bargai ning, as described in the last chapter in the case
of Seaforth's regiment. So me interesting memoranda taken into consideration
in late 1793 - early 1794 (when the old regiments were being augmented and
the raising of new ones got under way) throw light on the process, A paper
prepared for Lord Amherst in the War Office showed that the old regiments were
being driven out of the market by the new corps and could not increase their
resources by an augmentation in which they would only sell the Ehsigncies to
civilians. The prioe of these was low and there were few purchasers.
Independent Companies were declining in popularity (the high War Office had
reported even in the spring that only Cornets of a few weeks1 standing would
undertake them) and so anyone, however junior should be allowed to raise them.
Many officers who would not engage in new levies might recruit for promotion in
their own old regiments and there should be a scheme to accommodate them.^®
The plan associated with General Cunningham© of augmenting the old regi¬
ments and providing incentive and finance by adding a Lieutenant-Colonel and a
Major to each now came into view. It needed much pounding into shape. The
strongest argument behind it was that vacant Majorities were scarce and the
market pri-e was £1600 or £2000 even in a new regiment compared with the
regulated difference of £1100, Two Captains in each regiment were to raise
200 men each for the two majorities, selling their commissions and getting five
guineas, levy money from the government. Assuming the recruits to cost fifteen
guineas each, a Captain would have to pay £600 out of his own pocket towards
promotion - a very favourable price.60
In subsequent conversation in October 1793 between Pitt and Sir George
Yonge, the Secretary at War, it was thought that the Major wiio was to be the
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second Lieutenant Colonel sho uld pay £1000 - £100 more than the official price
but less than the market price - because he would not be able to do any
recruiting work and so should make up for this in money. The elder of the two
Captains should have to raise more than the other because he would be the eldest
Major and almost immune from reduction at the peace. Two days later, Sir George
inclined to think these later refinements might be overdone. If the scheme was
to work the terms must be generous, must seem in fact a special favour.^
In a paper suggesting the new regiments to be formed by officers formerly
of the Independent Companies it was proposed to supply most of the finance by
the promotion of Field Officers who would sell their existing commissions.
There were few Lieutenant Colonels who would be ready to join in such a scheme
CO
but its success was expected from the great number of Majors wanting promotion.
Thus the testing of the market went forward and terms were so modified as to
bring out the officers to act.
The dilemma of policy in choosing the best type of recruiting force is
clearly reflected in this business of granting terms. So for from reducing
competition, the authorities intensified it by making it more even and promoted
an inordinate rise in bounties. There is little doubt that this resulted from
the predilections of the senior officers who were conseqiently ill-placed to
oppose abuses. It is true that when the first four regiments to have £15 levy
money (as mentioned above) were got going, the Colonels were summoned to a meeting
S3
to agree on a maximum bounty.JO A similar step was taken by four Scottish
64
colonels. But this was a drop in the ocean. The Board of Ordnance, which
might have made some objection, contented itself with periodically enquiring
what level levy money had reached In the Line and increasing what was paid to
Artillery recruiting officers to follow suit.
3c we come to 1795 and the advent of the Duke of York, the advent also
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of signs of shortage of two vital commodities - seamen and money.
Circulars were sent out in February and March 1795, limiting bounties to fifteen
guineas for general service and ten guineas for the Fencibles. They specifically
refer to the bad effect high bounties were having on the recruitment of seamen
arid the second one ordered all seamen in the army to be turned over to the navy.S6
That year an Act of Parliament made each locality raise a qaota of men for the
navy; Greenock having complained of military competition in carrying this
out, the War Office was able to assure the Admiralty that the new maximum
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bounties were below what the commissioners there were offering.
The desire for economy had always been important. Brodie told Seaforth's
brother in law that the insistence on the use of half pay officers was due to a
desire not to increase the number of persons receiving pay. In proposing his
draftable corps. Wood spoke of the saving of having no officers to be added to
the half pay list.ti9 Fielder King spoke to the same effect in offering a
regiment of Fencibles70 and Windham in Parliament stressed this advantage which
the Fencibles had.7* Here then we have more reasons for the eclipse of the
Independent Company and the new regiment, and the perfecting of a more orderly
(but less successful) recruiting service. Much was doubtless due to the wisdom
of the Duke of York; but something also to the pressure of Admiralty and
Treasury on a reluctant army.
(b) The Contractors and their Subordinates
Having made his bargai n with the government, the recruiting contractor
was in a position to borrow the cash for his operations in anticipation of his
reward. Brother officers were sometimes resorted to. Lieutenant Aska was
offered help by Colonel Flow© and he asked the War Of"ice if money from the pro¬
motions (it was an augmentation he was concerned with) would be forthcoming soon
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or not till the quocas were completed.'' Lieutenant Antrobus was financed by
one Armstrong who at one point was threatened with ruin by the Lieutenant's
ill luck.^
The Army Agents, however, were the proper and normal source of credit
for the recruiter, Graham is commiserated with by his second in command for
being "so deep at the Agents"3 and this was a common enough trouble. Naturally
too great a generosity was no t in the interest of either party. Some officers
were faced with ruin through the bankruptcy of their Agents.* Cox and
Greenwood advanced half the money promised to Lord Huntly for the levy of the
Gordons as soon as the letter of service was issued. The other half was
advanced when half the men had been raised.^ Donaldson told Abercaimoy to
draw forty-day bills on him wh ich would be accepted as cash in Edinburgh.6
He later compl.ainod that one officer was drawing bills for a longer term.
Owing to the irregular way in which money was then being ordered by the War
Office, this involved heavy discounting. When the Corps was properly estab-
i<tSnC$
lished it would probably b© paid more regularly and^could be anticipated more
cheaply.'
A year after the 113th had been raised, end a month or so after its
drafting. Lieutenant Colonel MaoDonnell was on bad terms with his agent Kemp<fe
£2000 had been advanced by the latter and was outstanding. So on the other hand
was money for the sale of certain commissions and a year's off-reckonings for the
regiment's clothing cCttffing service in Ireland. With these taken into account
MacBonnell would be solvent. It will b® seen how valuable was every effort
by the government to pay its contractors in advance or backdate their remunerations.
The Agent acted as guide, philosopher and friend to the contractor,
especially if he was an inexperienced civilian. Donaldson told Abereairney to
buy his regimont'3 clothing mainly in London because only there did orders for
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unlforms reach a volume enab ling firms to specialise in the business and
execute large orders. On the other hand, he passed on a tip from Colonel
Graham to buy the necessaries (i.e. underwear and so forth) from local shops,
as better quality would be ensured.9 The Agent also had to see to it that his
client's interests wore properly pushed in the intrigues at the government offices
The Contractor had of course to como to terms with the officers taking part
in the levy with him. He issued them with Recruiting Instructions containing the
gist of the terras on which his corps ws being raised. Specific quotas of men
were usually laid down. Dr. Kerr stated that his Field Officers raised 80 men
for their rank and the Captains 60.^ In the Braadalbane Fenoibles the quotas
wore 35 for a prospective Captain, eight for a Lieutenant and six for an Ensign.**
In Grant's the Colonel was to supply 68, the Lieutenant Colonel 65, the Major 55,
Captains 40, the Captain Lieutenant 23, Lieutenants ten. Ensigns eight, the
Adjutant and the Quartermaster sixteen each, the Surgeon and the Chaplain ten
each and the Surgeon's Mate six. Sir James thought the first two quotas too
high but in proportion to the dignity if not the value of the rank,*^
On the other hand, Lord Breadalbane for his third Battalion of Feneibles
laid down no quotas but merely pointed out that the success of the levy depended
on the officerB'exerting themselves.*3 The 38th raised under the auspices of
the Duko of Argyle is an exam pie of another variant in which men and money were
both required. I&isigns could give two men or £200. Captains (who were brought
in from civil life) had to pay for their anterior steps as Ensigns and Lieutenants
and give fifty men. Lieutenants gave £300 and fifteen men.14
Some system of compounding for men with money was needed. Dr. Kerr made
his officers pay two guineas for every man short at the inspection.*-55 Lord
Breadalbane made the same oharge in his Fencibles and was prepared to pay the same
sum for every man supplied by an offleer in excess of his quota,*6 The efforts
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of officers might be very uneven and Seaforth complained that he had raised 400
17
out of the first 600 of his regiment - he was very dissatisfied with his
officers as we have seen. There also had to be an agreed way of passing on the
money allowed by the government and advanced by the agent. Lord Breadalbane
asked his officers to draw regular sums, noting each time how the previous sums
18
were spent. In the Perth Highland Fencibles, Captains were allowed to draw
£100 at a time but Subaltern only £50.*^
The whole business of bargaining was repeated by the recruiter with his
officers in Just the manner that tho government had gone through it with him.
lie had to test the market and Judge the fairness of offers received; as for
example when James Horne wrote to ask if his brother might raise a company for
Seaforth in return for the bounty and the right to nominate the Ensign.20
The government always disclaimed any power to interfere in these agreements2*
and told a regiment engaged on the augmentation of November 1793 for instanee
22
that the officers must sort out the charge among themselves. All did not
run smoothly. Officers sometimes failed to keep their bargains, either by
23
not paying their due or not helping in the work of recruiting. This was
perhaps especially true of the augmentation just mentioned where the promotion
24
was being bought by some bjjt the work was being don© by others. " The partner¬
ship was a desirable but not necessarily a happy one end is a further factor in
the failure of this levy.
Nevertheless, many bitter contentions between officers came to public
notico. A Captain Farquharson was the centre of a sories of claims and accusa¬
tions concerned with the Loyal British Fencibles (Colonel Sir Robert Stuart).
The Captain claimed to have bean promised and deprived of the Lieutenant Colonelcy,
other officers recommerded by him sharing this fate. He said the Colonel refused
to assemble the regiment in order to prevent it going abroad, issued too little
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money for recruiting;, distnisse d the Agent and clothier appointed by himself and
threatened him with a legal action to recover money.The Colonel replied that
the Captain had tried to usurp the Lieutenant Colonelcy by signing documents in
that style; that he had recommended officers as having recruiting connections
who did not pretend to have any; and that thoy had raised few men and were in
his debt. Farquharson he discovered was known to the War Office and in Edinburgh
and Berwick a# a scoundrel. The War Office certainly ignored the Captain's
letters.The Colonel, whose regiment was never very good,28 ^g probably
unbusinesslike,
MacDonnell was slow in settling with the officers of the 113th,
In particular. Lieutenant Thomas Evans still had a claim for £900 in respect of
the raising of 130 men throe years after the regiment had been completed and
almost two after its dissolution. At one point he demanded this sum and
suggested that 200 guineas of it might bo settled by procuring an Ensigncy for
his brother. By 1798, the debt, although not extinguished, had been reduced
to a small amount.2®
Sesforth had several epic struggles with his officers. When one of his
battellions war, augmented in 1794, the two officers who were to be the extra
Field Officers r/ere told to deposit th© price of these commissions. For seme
reeson they did not feel themselves obliged to do so and beaforth considerably
out of pocket, was still trying to get his money in 1798. A Captain
Stewart went to law with him ovor some men for whom he declined to pay.
Apparently his refusal was because Stewart had not completed his quota in time
and ought therefore to take a lower sum. beeforth was reminded by his lawyer
that the men had eventually be en delivered and had come in handy because there
had beer an augmentation.He thought more money should be offered to impress
70
the Court.0 Apparently Seaforth lost the day.
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Was recruiting a sphere in which the rich and powerful lorded it over the
poor and deserving? Of course the possession of more capital confers an
ascendency in any trac/fc.. We ha- e seen too how politics often obtruded even in
matters of detail, A relation of the Lord Chancellor had his offer of a corps
laid by that personage before the "Privy Council"3® (the cabinet perhaps).
A supporter of the government was given a Lieutenant Colonelcy when ha had been
promised a Colonelcy. He wi shed to see Pundas privately about it, so as not
to make trouble.^ On a humbler scale there are, for instance, persons able
during the augmentation to purchase promotion over the heads of their seniors,
who had the first option but could not always afford it/ On the other hand,
politics might cut the other way as we have also seen. The reduction of Sir
TRatkin Williams Wynn's regimen t was attributed by some to the dislike of the
Lord Lieutenant of Ireland for his kinsman the Marquess of Buckingham.36
Wealth without experience merely meant that the officer was fleeced by the wily
37
Sergeants and crimps. The brother of Lord Uxbridge raised men for a Captaincy
"so that my nam® will look better in the lists",He paid £21 a man, which he was
told injured other corps. He was willing to compound for the rest of his quota
at that figure,69
Patriotic Thomas Graham was denied permanent rank because he had only
entered the army at the beginning of the warj yet he had suffered heavy
40
financial loss and was rendering distinguished service in the field. He was
also given trouble by Colonel Ferrief, an old professional soldier of the Scotch
Brigade, who accused him of embessling £200} after much work with old recruiting
accounts, he was able to refute this.^ "Soak the rich" was the policy of the
higher ranks in the army. The military caste, led by the Puke of York, were
incensed at the disruption of the customary order in the servioe by the needa of
expansion, as witness their opposi tion to the Independent Companies in 1793,
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The rule of seniority was pro-fcected by giving bettor terms to officers of longer
standing in their rank who we nt recruiting. It was the cry of the Opposl tion
also, voiced by Generals Ttfttleton and Macleod in Parliament that wealth was
42
ousting merit through recruiting activity. In fact, public money was being
sj?ent to prevent this, thereby adding to the cost of the service which the
Opposition of course denounced as excessive.
Whet are the facts ? General Small the Governor of Guernsey had no
private income but thought th at if he were allowed to raise a regiment he
43
could improve his financial position. Fielder King, who had organized the
raising of the 84th and then offered a regiment on his own account, said he was
a "soldier ef fortune" and could not purchase promotion but h® could raise good
mer, sooner than anyone else.^ "Soldiers of fortune" too were the officers
of Sir William Johnstone's Fencible regiment raised in 1798.^ They worked on
such a narrow financial margin that when the authorities demurred about making
a further advance of pay they were told that many of the officers would be
forced to leave the regiment and live with friends to economise, with bad
effects on regimental efficiency.^6 They duly got an advance.
MacDonnel of the 113th (Birmingham) regiment is an example of an old
officer who rose by recruiting. He had served in the Seven Years' War and
been a Captain since that time (though he had been a Colonel in the Portuguese
service). II© achieved th© rank of Major by recruiting in the spring of 1794
and became temporary Lieutexxant Colonel by raising the 113th; although he failed
to get that rank made permanent, it would give him the full pay of Lieutenant
Colonel during the w r.47 He attempted a draftable corps in 1796 and offered a
regiment of riflemen. He died in 1793.
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Th© officers of the Hebrides could not afford to purchase promotion but
could raise men cheaply in that poor and populous area.49 In Ross-shire
Macleod of Geatjies wrote to Seaforth to complain of the onerous terms under
which he was expected to supply men for his son. The members of the wealthy
families of England could spend what they chose to "climb to the top of their
profession"* It wag difficult for "the younger son of a little Gcots laird".
In spite of all this, he said be was going on recruiting in the expectation
50
that the terms would end by being better.
Possession of capital in short did not count for everything. The
talented officer with at least the value of his commission behind him ^ had
every chance to rise in the world through recruiting. The critics were right
in suggesting that the recruiting specialist was often a bad officerj but
it was the corrupted professional, not the wealthy gatecrasher, who deserved
the most criticism.
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CKAPTBR IV 8 THE PROCESSES OF VOLUNTARY EKLISTMBMT
(a) Terms offered to the Men
The upper ranks of the recruiting hierarchy and the problems that were
especially theirs have now been described. It is time to turn to the humbler
figures and to the actual work of getting men. A final element in the bargaining
between government and contractor must now be mentioned - namely the terms of
service which might be offered to men willing to join.
Senior military officers had very definite ideas about why men enlisted
and so about what terms it was worthwhile to offer them. The Duke of Wellington's
famous remark is 'fcjlldly echoed by Colonel Grey, who had superintended recruiting
at Nottingham for fourteen years, writing to Cagtlereagh in 1309. The motives
for enlisting which he gives are "predeliction for that life, quarrels with
masters and farmers, love of novelty, irksomeness of trades, the pressure of
the times on some'particular branohes of manufacture, love of what is frequently
regarded as comparative idleness" and lastly, to escape charge# of bastardy.
Only unsuitable material in the form of "trafficking, calculating manufacturers"
were influenced by the financial inducement of a high bounty.!
Lord Chatham in 1804 declared that the motives of recruits were irrational
and it would not be possible at once to increase the number of recruits by more
favourable terms of enlistment.2 Lord Mulgrave and General Craig hoped by this
latter means to induce respectable families to send their black sheep into the
3
army. In short, only disorderly elements would join and the attractions were
glamour and idleness. No wonder Hewett, the Inspector-General of recruiting,
thought there was no possibility of increasing the supply4 and Sir John Kooreagread.^
They despaired the more because they thought the soldier's life a very
eligible one, offering the recruit a good bargain. He was enlisted for life
(strictly speaking, for as long as His Majesty thought fit) and although many
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poople already thought this servitude, It was argued that security was what the
poor man desired. After twe nty years, when he would still be only forty odd,0
I
he would be confined to light) duties in an Invalid Company or even put on a pension,
Chatham stressed the need to make the pensioner's lot desirable, to attract men,
n
He was echoed by Hewett and by Fox, a former Inspector General.' The flaw in
R
the argument was that for,/ so Idlers, it was admitted, lasted beyond twelve years.
The pay seems to have been th ought adequate, especially after it was raised in
1787. In that year the Duke of Buccleuch issued a proclamation to quiet th© fears
groused in the Lothians by the establishment of a Scottish Militia, In it, he
claimed that army pay was now better than that of most day-labourers and many skillec
c
men. The upper class felt that soldiers were the idle servants of an extra¬
vagant household, David Dundas, in the memoranda of 18G4, said that a soldier
was unfit and unwilling to earn his living by working.This was the usual
view.
Improvements in the te rms of service during our period were not as a
rule intended primarily to increase the total supply of recruits. There was
a drastic increase in bounties, but as far as the army was concerned, this was
to suit the officer rather than th© men. Pay was doubled in 1797, but this was
a result of the naval routini es. (In 1795, it had been proposed, in order to
allay the discontent caused by rising prices, to pay the troops in bread instead
of money,)** Pay as an incentive to join was only considered (indirectly) in
the case of the officers. In November 1783, the price of Ensigncies and
Cornetcies was decreased by the Commander in Chief to 700 guineas because of
falling demand.
The early years of the nineteenth century saw a great controversy over
the limitation of service to a term of years. Many officers were in this case
prepared to concede that an alteration of the soldier's contract would increase
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the flow of recruits. Battle was really joined with the reports of 1804 on this
problem contributed by various senior officers, which have already been extensively
quoted. The scattered beginnings of the argument are visible in our period.
Fencible regiments, limited in the area of their serv ce, were universally
known to be a wartime expedient destined to disappear at the peace. Recruiters
for these regiments sometimes held out, therefore, the inducements that service
in these regiments would be for the duration only, although in theory this was
not the case. In December 1794, Dr. Kerr complained (with the support of the
*
municipality of Northampton who were helping to raise his regiment) that the Loyal
Leicestershire Fencibles were advertising for men to serve for the duration and
estimated that this gave them an advantage of five to one against him.^®
The War Office at once ordered the offending regiment to desist and sent a
circular to the other Fencible regiments forbidding this practice and requiring
an answer.
These answers all protested innocence^ though there were vague allegations
against others.The truth of the matter was probably given by Colonel Leith
of the Aberdeer.shires who seid that advertisements of the kind complained of were
issued by civilians, who replied insolently to his complaints. It was a pity
there was no means of disciplining them as the practice was likely to lead to
mutiny.^ It was probably a fear of giving the soldier more claims against the
government that led the War Office to crush what might have been an interesting
experiment, despite its improper beginnings. The only regiment that seems to
hove got away with it for a time was Sir W'atkins Williams Wynn's which was
attested for service for as long as the militia should be embodied. The augmenta¬
tion of theregiment however (after the prohibition) was raised without this
limitation.*®
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Tho coming of war was a cruel blow to the recruiting service of the East
Indie Company's army. In 1792 it raised 1601 men; in the next two years
together only 1228. (Its annual requirement was estimated to be 836 or ten
per cent of the force). The detestation of the Company's service* combined with
the Company's inability to match the government in raisin bounties (in peacetime
it had given £5,9,2.) combined to produce this result.The standard of
height was brought as low as B'l" for lads under 20 in an endeavour to bring in
20
men not wanted by the army. Finally, in 1797, the government withdrew the
Company's licence to recruitin 1799 after protracted argument, the Company
agreed to let the government raise men for it and an Act of Parliament was
passed to allow this.^2
Even in 1794, Lieutenant Povnts who had formerly served in the East
suggested that the correct p o licy would be for the Company to enlist lads
under twenty and give them the option of coming home after five years.
In 1798, the Company insisted that whoever raised nen for its service must e-list
24
them to serve for ten years; otherwise adequate numbers would not be got.
The Chairman explained that the King's regiments had the prospect of returning
to Europe as they were relieved bjit the Company's soldiers did not come home
till they were worn out. Consequently (the lower orders being of a roving
disposition) there was much stowing away on home bound ships and desertion to
native princes, who were anxi ous to attract Europeans. Enlistment for a term
of years was needed to stop these practices and counterbalance the eligibility
of the roval service. He suggested that to obviate confusion the draftable
corps that were to raise men partly for the Company should raise the rest on
the same terms for the royal regiments in India.^5
The army did not like being associated with the Company's service in any
26
case, and for some recruits to be given better terms than the rest was
* See pages 44 t 97
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intolerable. The Commander in Chief finally proposed a compromise which
2ft
was accepted. All recrui ts were to be enlisted to serve without a time
limit but the Company's officer receiving the men drafted to that service at
Chatham was to givo them a certificate that they were enlisted for ten years
29
and would then be brought home at the Company's expense unless they re-engaged.
In this roundabout way enlistment for a term of years was brought into use; as
much it seems to improve discipline as to promote recruiting.
The great advocate em o ng the politicians of enlistment for a terra of
years was William Windham, who worked for it in and out of office in the early
1800s, While Secretary at War during ctfl! period he was already (though not
very actively) in favour of it, A letter which he wrote to Crenville in
February 1798 suggests that his interest in emigres and hence in foreign corps
in British pay, which all had peculiar terms of service, may have led him to
the views he adopted. He protested against the Commander in Chief's decision
to disband Rolle's (Swiss) regiment unless it whindundertake to serve for the
duration or for life. Attri buting the decision to a "restless desire" to get
rid of all corps who would not serve in the West Indies he noted the bed political
effect likely in Switzerland and argued against the opinion that enlisting for a
term of years was prejudicial to discipline. The French and much of the Austrian
army, the British militia an d some even of the regulars, -were enlisted on this
basis without prejudicial effect.0^ In May 1799, the plan to recruit the army
from the militia drew from him a rival memorandum. beclaring that the limit had
perhaps been reached of the force which the population could produce, he agreed
that the militia should be greatly reduced in strength in order to get men for
service overseas, oth militia and regulars should be raised by voluntary enlist¬
ment and in both cases for a term of years. The abolition of the ballot would
result in a great fall in the size of bounties, which could be reduced also by the
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offer of annuities and widow's pensions and the freedom on dismissal (enjoyed
already by the militia) to practise any trade in any corporate town. A more
respectable class of men would, he hoped, be brought in. They would be encouraged
to re-engage by a further bounty and the difficulties of regiments abroad would
be met by compelling time-expired men to serve a short extra period with higher
pay and ships trading with the different stations to carry small bodies of men
out and home at a fixed charge. He mentions that he had discussed details with
31
various persons and clearly s well thought out policy had matured in his mind. A
It was however the militia that was the true pioneer of a limited period
of service. It first appeared in the field of ordinary recruiting in the
augmentation of the militia in 1794, when the men were enlisted in effect for
32
the duration. It was ©nils ting from the militia and Fencibles that finally
made the idea seem important. Windham was surely influenced by the important
memoranda of Colonel Anstruther and the Duke of Gloucester on this subject to be
found among his papers*. Dundas in 1798 suggested a number of the "skeleton"
regiments to recruit men to serve for three or four years only and to get as many
as possible from the Fencibles,It is to the chapters on enlistment from the
Militia and Fencibles that this subject really belongs.
Geographical limitation of service was, unlike a limit-ation of time, a
well established means of encouraging enlistment. The Fencibles were kept to a
lower bounty than the line and yet succeeded in keeping as full at ten guineas
as the regulars at fifteen. The (supposed) effect of this type of limitation
on recruiting is shown in the Letters of Service of a batch of Fencibles raised
in 1798. Some regiments were to serve in Europe end for them the levy money
K
See pages 311 and 315
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was ten guineas. Others were confined to the British Isles and for them it
34
was eight. Again it is wi th extension of service that a further treatment
of this subject belongs,
A guarantee against drafting was greatly desired by all regiments and
especially those with terri torial connections. It was of course the interest
of a recruiter to preserve his regiment if he could and his plea was that if the
regiment was drafted, the prospect of future recruiting would be injured.
Several instances have been gi van in a previous chapter of the drafting of local
regiments and of the argument and trouble involved. The Highlanders were so
touchy on the subject, so fearful of being separated from their own leaders,
that Seaforth said that if his second battalion was raised as a separate regiment
and not with himself as Colonel he would be "gibetted" as a jobber who "sold"
his neighboursThe Gordons had to promise that the men enlisted for their
line regiment would not be d rafted, although there was nothing in the letter
of service to warrant this.®^ Fr«zer urged strongly that his Inverness-shire
regiment be preserved, as the men were neighbours, but had to admit that
'zn
recruiting in his case would not be seriously impeded by drafting.
The only regiment of the Line that was guaranteed against drafting in
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its letter of service was the 79th (Alan Cameron's). ' Notwithstanding this
it was nevertheless drafted i n the lest Indies in 1797; the officers and IJCOs
were sent home to re-raise i t. Cameron w^s a man of violent temper and there
is a famous story of how when a similar threat was made in 1796 he bearded the
Duke of York and declared that he and his men would never obey the order to be
drafted, were it given by the King himself.®® However that may be, his letter
to Dundas on the subject was equable enough. e said that his sergeants would
take a long time to re-raise the regiment after this episode and it would be
much better to preserve it an d send to it 500 recruits collected for th© 42nd
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which was 600 strong and could spare them for a time. This party of recruits
included some of his clansmen.In cases of this kind the authorities, as we
have remarked, usually trie d to put the men Into other Scottish regiments, or
accommodate then in some way as when the second battalion of the 78th was drafted
41
into the 37th but the officers went with the men.
The importance of abolishing drafting as a means of increasing regimental
loyalties and giving the recruit confidence in the service and a feeling of
"belonging" was as well unde rstood then as it is now. Windham, in his report
on limited service already qu ofced, made the abolition of drafting a cardinal
feature of his scheme, and because there had been so many promises on the
subject and so little performance he proposed to do it by Act of Parliament.^
It was only in the case of the Fencibles however that an effective promise was
A
generally made and stuck to. ° For the regulars the abolition of drafting has been
end remains an unattainable ideal,
A promise that could be made more readily was that the men, if dismissed
from the service, would be reduced in their own county. This again was usual
for Fencible regiments and it was a stipulation for those of the Line raised with
local or territorial support. The idea behind it was that the men were not to be
swallowed by the army for ever but returned to civil life; it was thus a
roundabout way of conceding service for a term of years. Thus Mrs MacNeil of
Barra wrote to Captain Cameron of the Gordons that if the recruits she was
sending him were reduced h© was to send them straight home and dissuade them
from enlisting in other regiments because their families had only let them go
44
at all as a special favour.
The promise was departed from in the case of the partial reduction of
some Scottish Fencibles serving in England early in 1796. From the West Lowland
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regiment it we8 reported that 76 men had agreed to this arrangement without
45
protest and it was expected th at they would enlist on the march home.
A party of discharged men was found destitute in London and sent home by
46
sea - doubtless they would have enlisted otherwise. It was the general
request of these regiments that the men should march or sail to Scotland as
a body under discipline and be discharged there. The Glengarries in
particular were afraid of tho effect on recruiting if this stipulation was not
observed.^ Concessions were made in most cases: the Northern (Gordon)
Fencibles for instance were sent by sea to Dundee and discharged there.*®
In the case of Line regiments the government showed greater consideration.
When they were drafted, a promise was mad® that the individual members would
49
still be discharged at home if the corps into which they were put were reduced.
Thus it will bo seen that a few tentative efforts were made, mainly in
connection with the attempt to localise recruiting, to improve a little the
terms of the soldiers' contract and lessen the gulf which existed between him
and the citizen and civil life.
(b) Professional Recruiting Personnel
This section is concerned with those who made recruiting their trade,
and of their relations with the regiments and officers who employed them.
In theory, strict military discipline prevailed. The War Office issued
"beating orders" to the cotnmsr der of each corps authorizing him to raise men
by beat of drum anywhere in the kingdom and ordering the civil power to assist.'''
Those of the old regiments were issued annually, expiring with the Mutiny Act
on March 25th. Those for new corps were valid until the corps was complete.
Copies of the beating order were issued by the commander to each officerrecruiting
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er<idj6ed with his name. The officer similarly gave a copy to each sergeant in
command of a party, endorsing it with the sergeant's name. Thus there was a
proper chain of command. But the scattering of parties made real control diffi¬
cult and even the appearance of discipline was not always well preserved.
Major Syer, recruiting for the King's Dragoon Guards, was stationed at Ludlow
and in command of parties at Leicester and Nottingham.^ The magistrates of
both towns objected to the beating order of Sergeant Higginson, in the former
case wrongly because it was signed by the Commanding Officer and not the Colonel
of the regiment;3 in the latter, rightly because it was not endorsed to the
sergeant.^
The recruiting sergeant was thus a fairly independent personage. All the
more reason for choosing men specially fit for the work, and we find, for irstance,
the 25th asking that its parties may be formed from the part of the regiment
g
serving as marines, as most of the UCOs experienced in recruiting are afloat.
Pensioners and Invalids were often asked for, as likely to be experienced
one officer got into trouble for taking some Invalids from the Plymouth garrison
without proper authority. Regiments borrowed from each other - Bernard pro¬
mised to lend his sergeants to the E8th if not called on to raise more.^
Regiments abroad were often allowed to hire parties when they could spare no
g
DCOs from service. Thus sergeants proficient at recruiting tended to stay
at it, working for various employers and many vjho were fit for no-hi.ng else were
lo
retained in the service for this purpose, Moreover Scsfcrth was reluctant to
send any sergeants of his Militia regiment recruiting because they would be
completely spoiled for further work ana would acquire a skill little -ceded in
the Militia.11
These recruiting tradesmen tended to strike root in a particular area and
there build up a "goodwill". David Gibson operated at Glasgow and claimed to
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hove raised 375 man in three months, for two local regiments besides some for
the "Edinburgh Volunteers". He asked for a direct contract with the War Office,
stipulating for himself the pay and "Euniform" of a sergeant.^ Dr. Kerr reported
that his sergeants and drummers refused to to attested and had to be paid
13
respectively a guinea and upwards of half a guinea a week; a man named Berry,
who was attested, complained of a broken promise when made to march away with
14
the regiment. Many sergeants were enlisted in the first place as such because
of their recruiting potentialities - we oven hear of one who was a landowner.
The whole class seems to have expected considerable profit from their occupation
and some were more ambitious. Sergeant Wilson of the 82nd had joined in the
hope of a commission but after two years and heavy losses by recruits deserting
16
had not obtained one. Sergeant Frazer had been taken from the 71st by Colonel
Hay to recruit for the 109th. He was later offered a commission In the Drummond
Feneiblos but Hay refused to release him.^ (Hay declared that this was because
of the man's insolent conduct)
The twin summits of this recruiting career were a commission and a public
hou6®. Ensign Busby, formerly a sergeant, kept an alehouse at Manchester; he
was suspected of embezzling bounty money.^ A Lieutenant, likewise promoted and
20
recruiting at Bridgewater, left the work in charge of his wife. Lieutenant
Wheatley, of whose proceedings the ma-isfcretes of Newbury complained, turned out
21
to b® a publican} the Duke of York proposed to take away his commission,
22
though it was represented that he had sold his inn when h* had become an officer.
We do not hear much about how sergeants were paid, but illicit gains are
often reported. They often exacted small fees from the recruits they enlisted.
23
This was forbidden in 1796, They handled quite useful sums. On© of Graham's
helpers was prepared to rive Sergeant Kowtow up to £50 - he was to hand over the
attestations of the men he got. It we suggested that direct payment by the
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regimental Agent would be more convenient. Some men used their opportunity
merely to riot. Sergeant English of the 11th got into debt with various
tradesmen at Warrington where his party was, and was finally court martialled.
Others were more cunning. One, Allison, styled Lieutenant and perhaps only a
crimp, had recruited for three regiments in Lincolnshire, Before the war he
had been a Journeymen weaver but he was said to have made £1000 mostly by the
26
improper sale of discharges and to have bought an estate. " .Sergeant Page of
the 82nd was sent an attestation of a man he had got, to give to the officer
commanding the party. Instead he gave it and the men to another regiment -
27
doubtless for a consideration. Sergeant Marsh, who absconded from the
headquarters of the 133rd without settling his accounts was reported to be
purchasing an Ensigncy.2® Promotion from the ranks was rare in the eighteenth
century; this means of obtaining it is not usually mentioned and certainly it
does the army little credit.
Normal military life had so little hold over the lower members of the
recruiting service that it was natural that many should escape altogether and ply
their trade in the freedom of civil life. This was sometimes innocently done,
A Captain Palmer had been employed by the firm of Lawrie to recruit for regiments
of which they were the Agents, He had served in the American war and since been
on half pay, but because he was not attested for the regiments employing him, he
fell under the ban on civilian recruiters of March 1795, '-le appealed to the ftar
<L°l
Office without success againsc the taking away of his livelihood, James Fletcher
recruited for eroard at bolton and quarrelled with the sergeants there. Angry
at the charge of being no soldier he declared he was twice wounded in America
and invalided out of the 33rd.30 Sometimes a useful recruiter could not be
taken into the army; a Collector of Customs worked for some corps at Hull until
rebuked by his superiors
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Hihat usually happened however was that on the completion of a corps, a
man *vould retain his beating order end go on recruiting as if nothing had
happened.32 In course of time, he might amass several. It was easy to
procure them and alter the names and dates to fit.®® He would call himself
Lieutenant or Sergeant and wear some sort of uniform. Infamous individuals were
often at work. Colquhoun, on© of the London stipendiary magistrates, reported
that theives, coiners and receivers were active in recruiting, One individual
who styled himself Lieutenant was a coiner who drove into town from a secret
lair and disposed of his produce in an open market. He had latterly escaped
conviction through a technicality.34 Such men raised recruits on any terms and
by any means and sold thera for whatever they would fetch. The gulib^le officer
in a difficulty was their prey.
The more respectable workers were injured by the operations of these man.
Colonel Bernard wrote in July 1794 on behalf of several officers recruiting at
Sheffield to protest against the activity of unauthorized half pay officers and
of pensioners and hired sergeants who were in the pay of London crimps. Usually
possessing several beating orders, they were raising men to be sent to Chatham
35
where they were sold for 30 guineas. (This would be to replace men rejected
as unfit at the inspection. Officers raising a quota for promotion might be
ruined if they could rot ro-complete it within the time limit). The recruiting
officer was outbid by the racketeer, and the reputation of the service was ruinod
by the public picture of "crimps'1 kidnapping men for the army. Civilians also
suffered, as when a man bought e uniform and other goods to the value of £30 by
38
means of a bill drawn on a fictitious "superior officer". Yet there was little
the War Office could do about it, as they told Bernard. The beating orders were
difficult to keep a check on. Hven a person so military as an out-pensioner could
only be deprived of his pension. The zeal of the civil authorities was all the
V7
army had to look to#
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The lowest rank in the recruiting service consisted of men to put on a
show for the populace, carry on the work of persuading individuals (any member
of a party with a proper seating order could legally enlist men) and look after
the recruits when got. There were two main species, bmart young soldiers wore
needed to represent the glamour of the army and drill the recruits, and also to
show the good quality of the recruiting regiment. An officer of the 90th
recruiting in Wales was allowed to take a man with ftim* who had previously joined
him there, to show that the men he got ware not "sold" but went into a good
38
regiment. On the other hand, there were wily recruiters of the professional
type, with the same sort of history and doubtless hoping to make enough money to
start on their own, A Drummer employed by a (bogus) Lieutenant Napier had been
given five guineas by the 88th and told to consider himself enlisted if he did not
bring a man within a given time. He rocruited for the crimp in the disguise of
a Sergeant of'the Militia,® Reputable parties also employed such persons;
a deserter useful in recruiting is allowed to be kept by the regiment using him
if the regiment from which he deserted agreed,
The tale is completed by Drummers and musicians hired to add to the
military aspect of the party. How little military they might ;-© is illustrated
by the case of a boy of thirteen taught the fife by his father and engaged to play
it for a party while it was at ^Worcester, The Sergeant of the party got him to
enlist by raking him drunk with eider and was opposed by the magistrates in an
attempt to smuggle him away without the necessary formalities
(c) The Routine of Recruiting
Bven st the best of times recruiting was an ill-conducted affair.
The baseness of the motives appealed to and the loose-ssa of the organisation
combined to lower its tone. Intoxication is the central theme; the associations
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of the recruiters end the precautions of the magistrates alike direct, our
attention to low public houses and disorderly celebrations, John Clarke
got drunk at the Green Dragon during a fair at Swineshead in Kesieven, A
few days later a party was sent to his master's farm to tell him that he had
enlisted for the 84th/
Lieutenant Whoatley (mentioned above) brought a man before the magis¬
trates on a Wednesday who had bear, enlisted on th© Monday at a "ravel".
During the intervening period ha had not been to bod, had drunk fairly solidly
at tho revel and the Lieutenant's public house, and was still not sober,
Wheatlay refused to release him unless he paid back £4, 13,6, allegedly given
him as bounty money. This tha magistrates disallowed, saying that as the man
had been in the custody of tho party the whole time he could not have spent
it - yet he had none on him,^ It was not only the intoxicated who were imposed
on. The enlisting shilling was slipped into the hand or pocket of a innocent
by-stander who would the be told that its receptio made him a soldier whether
he would or no, A sergeant even claimed a toll-collector at Iftorcester, having
give- hima shilli >; for a halfpenny due and refused the change,"'
Th© law was on tne side of the recruit, Th© Mutiny Act provided that
when he had enlisted (the act eirg symbolized by the receipt of a shilling)
twe ty four hours must be allowed bo elapse before the next stage in the
proceedings - attestation. At th® end of this time he wet; take before a
magistrate and had ther the opportunity to "disss fc" to his e listmo t, he
then hod to repay any ounty he had been given, plus twenty shillings "smart;
money" for the expe sen of the party. He had a fu ther twe ty four hours in
which to pay this. Those still agreeable to serve had to take an oath of
attestation ©fore t »e ma istrate. Until 1799, the exact wording was decided
by the regiments, althou h uniformity was encouraged. A printed form of tne
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oafca with a clause certifying that it had been taker,, would be produced.
This the magistrate filled up with the man's nam and signed* The man's height,
age, trade or other details might e e tared, and also how much bounty he had
been promised a d what had lean paid in goods and kind. The man had to swear
that he was a Protestant, not ruptured or subject tc fits, not an apprentice
or a meaner of the forces a d that he had agreed to serve during his majesty's
pleasure, to obey the articles of war, and so forth. The Attestation was kept
by the regiment (usually by the Agent). The appearance before the ccagisfcrate
could oe postponed up to four days from the e listme t{ if a recruit absconded
p
before being sworn he was a deserter.
The recruit should therefore have had every opportunity of changing his
mi d, undarsfca ding the nature of his enga eme-fc a .d complaining to the magistrate
of sharp practice, Unfortunately the complexity of the lew hindered its
being either understood or e forced. Even the stipendiaries of Marlborough
Street were willing to swear a man within 24 hours of his enlisting if he was
sober.° The magistrates of Newcastle declared they would always do so in wartime
to expedite the King's service and were perturbed when one such enlistment was
7
voided by the King's eneh. An officer challenged the correct interpretation
of the law of smart prevailing at Dumfries. Elsewhere he had found the view
p
ao epfced that smart must be paid within 24hours of enlistment, not attestation.0
Ilia y officers asserted that a ir.au could, at his ow request, be sworn before the
24hours were up,1" Less innocent were recruiters who avoided the more meticulous
magistrates. Thomas Hoi heck was o'-e 3ueh, living near bromes grove. He reported
that a party t ere preferred to take its me to Birmingham by post-chaise to be
attested.^ Much worse is a Scottish case in which ar officer a d a magistrate
invited a man into the house of the former, plied him with drink and attested
11
him on the spot.
The norm in recruiting appears to have been sharp practice with the
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appears-cm preserved. There was also more blatant illegality. Kid apping
occurred. An elector of Newbury was put in a cellar by a crimp and taken to
Chaltham - on© of the Members for Berkshire wrote for his release.*^ The
Rev.Abdy Abaiy reported on orgy of violence arouvd Sppin which threat© ed to
drive the people to riot. Four militia Privates had been found assaulting and
carrying Thomas Kiernan, whom a London crimp had refused to take from them because
his enlistment wan so patently underduress. . A farm servant was seized at
13
or. inn a d held at the point of a bayonet until released by his master's landlord.
At Lsytonstona, Mr. Hosanjuet refused to at1est a man into whose hand 3er eaht
Warwick had forced e shilling* The 3er ea-fc vowed to have him ai d brought some
man from London to carry him off* whom the constables prepared to resist by force
with the help of the e ra ed inhabitants ,*^
An offence that was quieter and safer was enlisting men merely tc let them
go again for "smart"* This was illegal when they were not taken before a
15
magistrate to declare fcr.oir distent 1 and is a practice reported from all t e
large towns* Probably tho legal sum alone was usually astfed but Allison (already
referred to) charged John Clarke seven guineasj the shaking hands on the
bar ain he slipped him another shilling* had him properly attested and for his
discharge charged him thirty. A variant reported from Wolverhampton was a
lunatic turned in by a crimp as a deserter for the sake of the 20/- reward.*6
Competition was inevitably fierce. No corps had an area exclusively its
own a d the big towns attracted parties of every kind. Apart from straightforward
salesmanship and offering hi her bounties there were several underhand ways of
opposing competitors. One was slander. raptain Houghton of the 53rd complained
from Newcastle under Lyme t at a 3er eant hall was telling the parents of his
recruits that the regiment was in a da.nerous place and t eir sons would be
1?
killed. "Lieut© ant" Napier's "Sergeant" at Chelmsford seduced recruits by
telling t em their regiments were going to India.*'5 This station aid the
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possibilifcy of being "sold to the Company" wejsCthe particular dread of recruits*
A memorandum of 1799 regards recruiting for the Company by the King's officers
as something likely to damage the royal recruiting service* Chatham barracks,
where the "selling" took place, was regarded with special dread; the recruits
of the 42rd were promised from 1787 onward that they would not be sent there
20
but would go to the regiment direct from Fort George. Such war. the material
for lying tongues.
The other main branch of improper competition was facilitating the
movement of a recruit disgusted with his corps into one he like better. It was
quit© proper for a recruit to break one enga erne t by paying "smart" a d then
21
at once enlist in another corps. Parties sometimes offered to pay the smart
money for a man who consented to transfer to them. This was strongly contested
22
by several officers but the opinion of the War Office does not appear to have
survived. As the payment of the bounty and the deductions from it aroused many
grievances in the mind of the recruit, it was a very useful weapon to have.
Actual seduction of properly enlisted soldiers was probably confined to crimps.
The commandant of the Windsor Foresters told the Town Clerk of Windsor to
prosecute two men for inducing two of his soldiers to desert and enlisting
them for other regiments.The 1st Devonshire Militia were warned against
crimps recruiting for the East Indies who persuaded men to get themselves dis¬
charged "by promises they cannot perform, for purposes they dare not avow".2*
Recruiting parties, needless to say, did not always behave with decorum.
Ensign Gilmer %vae told to stop beating up after dark with lighted torches at
25
Newark, though he protested that complaints proceeded from private spleen.
No relief appears to have come to the unfortunate tailor of Stamford, the room
under whose dwelling was used as a guardroom. Two complaints were sent via the
War Office that he and his wife were unable to sleep,26 Mr Nicholas Keane of
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Cheltenharn and Attorney General of St, Vincent had the unpleasant experience
first of having his coloured servant abducted from his own house with a
magistrates1 warrant, of being assaulted and pushed out by the sentry and
37
another man. He took a fever as a result.
Not only the individual civilian but the civil power itself was defied}
Sergeant Hill was told by the Mayor of Devises to stop beating up (it was
9,30 at night) w ereat he drew his sword on the Mayor and told the Drummer "to
beat on and bid the boys halloo". He was finally arrested and taken to the
"blindhouse" by the bailiff and constable, helped by a sergeant of Militia,
Op
He was convicted of assault at the next Quarter Sessions. Lieutenant Topp
was approached by the master of an apprentice he had enlisted. Despite a
magistrates1 warrant and the presence of the constable he allowed the man to
be put in the local gaol arid the master to be run out of town with the threat
29
of a beajting. Lieutenant Talbot found that at Brewood near Wolverhampton
—oJ
the Justice had forbidden the tradition^baiting of a bull at the fair.
He, therefore, bought a bull and had it baited to coin popularity for his
recruiting efforts. When the magistrates objected, he made a sharp reply.
He later defended himself by saying that he had not realized that magistrates
30
had legal powers to prevent bull-baiting.
Even the military power was sometimes flouted. Lieutenant Mitchell
of the Marines had a quarrel with Sergeant Hobson of the 70th at an inn in
Devizes, in the course of which the former found himself in the fireplace.
Hobson was arrested by Mitchell's party and (it was said) buffetted and collared
by Mitchell while in custody. The Officer Commanding Hobson's party took up
his cose and there was a long correspondence in which each side accused the other
of being drunk. The affair was only ended by an enquiry by a Field Officer.
31
Hobson was released and both sides were told to let the matter drop.
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Th© recruiters were not alone in their wrongdoings they had frequent
cause of complaint against the civil population. Riots against crimps were
TO
common and reached serious proportions in London in 1794. William Wickham
reported from Whitechapel that Lewis Harris, who had lately opened a
"rendezvous house" in Smithfield, should be put out of business. The people
hated him as a crimp and as a Jew and the diseffected were stirring them up.
Later on there ?/as danger when cries were heard in the night from the house of
Noble, a crimp, and the constables, on breaking in, found three men who had been
33
tortured to make them consent to attestation. The Magistrates had to assure
the populace that the government did not countenance such practices.
It was inevitable that the mob should suspect certain actions even of honest
35
parties. When deserters were imprisoned they were sometimes forcibly released.
One of Graham's agents was badly mauled when trying to arrest one.3® parties were
37
occasionally lynched at races and fairs.
The populace sometimes tried to set the recruits against their officers.
At Warrington, the men of a new regiment being collected there were told not to
38
march unless their bounties were paid in full. The people of Newcastle
caused a mutiny by telling men of the 111th they had be© "s Id" to the Indies.
An officer refused to march his recruits through Banbury as Colonel Roberts lost
fifty me" there by the persuasion of the inhabitants,^®
Magistrates were often hostile. Like the mob, they had an understandable
tendency to think the worst of the recruitin, service. An officer unable because
of a ridir.g accident to at l est a recruit within the legal time limit was
threatened with gaol by a zealous magistrate.Perfectly legitimate parties
were refused billets and put in prison on suspicion of having forged beatiri
orders.4^ At Manchester the magistrates were only available for attesting
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recruits or Wednesdays and Saturdays. Out of their number, a clergyman
named Griffith, came drunk to the Ira which Captain Cameron of the Wakefield
Regiment used as his rendezvous. He accused him in the presence of his
recruits of being a scoundrel and a crimp end of imprisoning men. Disdaining
the protection of his cloth, he accepted a challenge but whe the Captain sent
his second round next morning , Griffith was sober a d thought better of it.
His real grievance was seemingly that Cameron attested his men before other
justices, who were "puppies and apprentices'' compered with his experienced
self.^ The ignorance of the law of attestation which so ofter prevailed
did not always help the recruiter. Magistrates sometimes refused to regard
absconding recruits as deserters and would not authorize their arrest.At
46
least one such deserter was taken under a magistrate's protection.
Obstacles of a litigious kind were encountered. N.C.O.'s and recruits
were ofter committed on charges of bastardy a d had to be left languishing
47
in gaol pe ding a financial settlement. Parties deprived of their N.C.O. in
48
this way were a prey to indiscipline. The enlistments of workers hired by
the year (chiefly farm servants but also colliers in Durham^®) was sometimes
challenged by their masters who o this or other pretexts withheld their arrears
of wages. Local legal opinion usually^ upheld them and the War Office doubted
its power to help.51
In meeting opposition, violent or otherwise, the recruiter had one
fatal handicap. He must maintain his interest. He could not afford to incurr
the hostility either of the magistrates or of the populace. Often absconding
52 F3recruits were allowed bo escape and unfavourable ' jud-meets acquiesced in
to keep the goodwill of" the neighbours.
The recruits themselves were not a whit better than those who engaged them.
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Their abuses can mostly be put under a single headings multiple enlistment.
The great object was to receive as many bounties as possible. Desertion was
a major evil in the army at this time and thirteen thick volumes of War Office
correspondence in our period are taker up with it,"^ A lar,.;e proportion of
the deserters who were caught were claimed by two cr three regiments and the
War Office had to adjudicate between them by sending for the attestations and
comparing the dates. It was recognized that this involved injustice, as recruits
often absconded without attesting from one regiment but were later attested by
55
another,' Aliases complicated the disputes still further.
Catching deserters had in the past bee left to the common informer,
who would report thern to a ma istrate in the hope of a reward} if the Justice
saw fit to have arrested a d then to convict t e suspect, the government
collected the man and paid the money."" In 1794, the effects of desertion on
the recruiting service caused the War Office to adopt a new method. It caused
regiments to send in returns of all deserters, specifying their birthplace,
where t ey deserted, arid their trade and giving a full personal description
(clothes included) of each man. These details were published in the "Police
Gazet.e" of the time, the "Hue and Cry", and this was circulated free to every
recruiting party. No officer was to have a man attested without consulting
his back file of the paper,57
It was obviously 8 losing battle. Major Passingham enlisted two men,
who later brought a third, said to be a cousin of one of them - their name
was Williams. The Major suspected the third man and found, with the help of
the "Hue and Cry", that he was John Conner who had deserted from the 5th Light
Dragoons six weeks before. In t at time he had moved from Uxbridge to Chester,
His "cousin" was less suspect because he had seemingly never had a regimental
haircut. The remaining man had, and also signed his name in two different ways.
The Major was sure he was Healey, advertised just above Cornier. He confined
all three and sent "likenesses" or the two he suspected to the War Office -
where unfortunately they do not seem to have been preserved,^® This incident
shows the size of the task; no less of a handicap the the absence of
photo raphy was the poor state of medical science. The infirmities of
recruits were often not discovered till they had served some time or until
they had bee inspected by a very experienced surgeon at a big military centre.
They would then be discharged - and would promptly reer.list, confident of
being again discharged, (They ?.'ere usually careful to spend all their bounty
B9\
money first* )
Unfit men from various regiments congregated in the Channel Islands,
should, it was recommended, be kept in the army for the sole purpose of
fir.
preve ting their thus defrauding recruiters. A man was committed as a
deserter at Manchester, though knowr- to be unfit, because he absconded from a
party with £1. 3* 6* bounty and later enlisted in two other regiments,The
simulation of illness was a kindred abuse, extending the above principle.
Regimental surgeons naturally got to know most of the tricks, but one cavalryman
escaped active service and very nearly got a discharge by simply claiming that
he could not bend his icneee. Discharges sought for these and other reasons
are ofte declared by officers to be a mere prelude to re-enlistment.
The crowning instance is of a turbulent individual reported as having e>listed
twice and expected to do so again before reaching home. But he would always
63
be discharged - he was a clergyman 1
Loss of bounty a-,d goods given to deserters was the heaviest expense a corps
recruiting had to sustain, Graham claimed bo have lost £6000 this way in
raising his second battelionthe 107th, to have lost £3000." Perhaps
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the recruits should not e blamed too much. Against a ma in Bertie's
regiment who confessed to having deserted from two others, who was worthless
a d bolfCthe marks of punishment on his beck ca be set (in the same letter)
a contrite corporal, anxious to serve but drive to desert by brutal treats© t
in his old regiment ,otl Sir He ry Dalrymple had groat difficulty i persuading
a court-martial at Chatham that it was neither legal nor proper for soldiers
sent home from the Continent to be invalided out to be re-enlisted at onc-e
without even waiting for their discharges"Diddle the doctor" was too
often the motto and if recruits were a low type of men, they had a low example
s et t hem .
(d) "Te ritorial" Recruit in;.;.
Of what we have called "territorial" recruiting, the Highlands of Scotland
provide the most striking cases and the system in use there must now be
described. It was often referred to at the time as "feudal" and certainly
was so if that term be taken to mean primarily the connection of land tenure with
military service.
Each landlord ad the men of his estate "enrolled i your ^fatistical
lists" as Brocie said to Seaforth,^ A list of January 1792 shows the inhabitants
of the parish of Mess, which belonged to Seaforthj the families in e»on
townahip are shown, with the number of persons in each.** The Countess of
Sutherla d, when a regiment of t e Line was to be raised in 17SS, caused a
census to be take of the me on the estates ad the called for a proportion of
them to come forward. This was the basis of the whole.
Nevertheless, it was not a matter of simple conscription but rather of
steady pressure and i-duceme t from above, A vital part of the work was dore
by the members of the Chief's family and his other clients, We have seen how
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each clan contained many army officers who would be brou -ht forward and gain
promotion from a levy* Brodie hdf|>ed that Seaforth would find many Mackenzie?,
A
on the half-pay list fit enough to serve," Such men would e (or would be
related to) the smaller landed proprietors in a Clan district ad the tacksmen^
factors and other estate officials who stood betwee the big landlord and
the peasant cultivators • The interest and influence of the middle element
was thus firmly engaged, A tenant in Lochaber was willin to get men for
the Cordons to secure promotion for his son, the-- in the 7Sth,1 Ore Mackenzie
was described as a good Highland recruiter, popular with his tenants who would
be happy to bring him forward by giving some of their men," 0 e of the Cordons
pointed to the need net to allow too many gentlemen to engage in any one
7
district - there would be great competition ad bounties would rise.
The Honourable Eric Msckay provides an example of a variant on the above
theme, for he sent out circulars not only to the tacksmen of the estate of
Lord Reay, but to at least one minister, who was to "enforce from the pulpit" the
plan of raising a regiment to fight the o emies of religion,' Lord Breadslbsre
succeeded in gaining the support of the tow- of Cupar by a judicious
presort of coals for the local poor. The Town Council agreed to give extra
bounty money to men who were raised in the neighbourhood,®
It was the peasantry who occupied the holdings a d tilled the soil who
had actually to supply the men. This might involve bringing forward their
own sons a d servants or • imply hiring recruits or helping to pay r'or their
hiring* One of Ceaforth'e tenants in Lochalsh hired a man in 3kye at "21,
He received the five uineas levy money but bore the rest of the expense.^
The Duke of Cordon's te a ta in Kirkmlchael aid Strathdown advertised
lr. the Aberdeen Journal that they would give five guineas additional bounty
* page 35-36
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fco men going with certain officers who were enlisting in defined areas.oix
12
farmers gave a man each to Sir Robert Sinclair. The Duke of Gordon's tenants
in the Aucht ard Forty agreed to double the bounty bein, paid to recruits and
to organize entertainments to help in the work i- order to remove the Duke's
/3
"umbrage " •
In the 3readalbane papers, there are numerous accounts of men supplied
by tenants. A list of 151 men enlisted at Taymout'n in April 1793 shows 76
supplied by their fathers, mothers or brothers. 36ware described as
"volunteers": most of these ware regarded as serving for a particular place
ad some were marked as serving "for himself" or "for himself and " some
relative# One man wag supplied by a schoolmaster, his father,^ Another list
includes a man supplied by a vintner and another provided by Duncan ^hippen
described as a Hermit.'A paper among the accounts shows Alex. MePhie brought
by Peter Brown but his bounty paid by Lord freadalbsne, while William Munro
was brought a d paid for by Donald Clark; for two other men# the cost was
IS
shared by the bringer a d the Karl.
The proceedure in making a levy was to call a meeting of the tenantry
in each area and threaten a d cajole them into making proper bargains. Major
Mackenzie stayed the week-e d with the minister of a (seemingly recalcitrant)
village, attaching Sunday service. On Monday, he colled a meeting of those
not formerly coming forward, but only got one man. On Tuesday, a meeting at
another village produced eight; and on "Wednesday, at a rendezvous on Lochcarron,
the recruits he had ot in various villages came to meet him by previous
17
arrangement and were marched off to Fox*t eorge.
Mackenzie of Fairburn, a small landowner, started off with a manifesto
threatening ruin to such tenants s would not help him. He then brought in
-106-
§
Colonel Baillie, an acknowledged expert in negotiating with Highlanders, He
promised them remission of a year's rent a d the payment of bounties to the
19
men brought forward. At Castle Brahan, Seaforth's principal seat, the
factor had great trouble with the tenants when the first battalion of the
78th was augmented. The most eligible men were already enlisted and several
te ants with suitable sons had moved away. Discussions were held and the
19
factor reported he was gradually break-lag the ice. For the ori inal levy
at a meeting about the renewal of leases, he had asked point blank for men.
He was received with silence. After the meeting, he was told that the men
would permit their sons and servants to enlist bub would not bring them forward
themselves, Th© factor said Seaforth's presence was indispensable to further
20
progress.
The Chief indeed had to do much of his own work, despite the help of
subordinates. Lord Itecdonald said there were "a thousand stipulations on such
occasions a_out land when they shall return and an interim accommodation for
21
their fathers end mothers", which only the Chief could satisfy them on.
Seaforti said that he had personally raised 364 out of his first body of SCO,22
The Duke of Gordon made a progress through his estates in 1793, when raising
Fencibles. At Glenffcidick, he received deputations from the outlying areas.
At Tomintoul he was heckled by one man who afterwards apologised through the
minister and begged to be enlisted. Tv/entyone men joined him at Badenoch,
23
58 in Loohaber and si* in Kuntly.
A fallacious belief held even at that time is exemplified when Brodie
writes "I trust that feudal attachments 3till existing among the Mackenzies will
induce them to follow their Chief without any greater pecuniary consideration than
24
What may be wanted to furnish them with necessaries. Stewart of Garth strikes
a similar note and is anxious to deny that promises of tenure of land on
favourable terms were used to induce men to enlist.*^ Enough instances have
* The case against Garth is mad© by Bulloch xxx
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slready been quoted in this section to show the falsity of such a view.
Even Garth was prepared to admit that the men were promised land on
return from the wars. Eric Mackay stated the matter thus: "when from the
advantageous terms offered by the government, joined to precedence and the
means they will have to make savings, should they, as it is possible, be
ordered to that cheap country Ireland, the men may be enabled and disposed
to take farms on the Reay estates, they may be assured of a preference over
those who did not engage or to any others upon equal terras".^®
Lord Huntly in his recruiting advertisements also promises a preference in
27
allocating plots on the Gordon estates.
What such promises might mean M the land-hungry Highlanders is shown
by the petition of Patrick Mclntyre to Lord Breadalbane, His father had been
mad© to give up pert of his plot to John Mclntyre a men of poor character and
no capital, John was 3aid to rest his "lalm on the services of his brother
with the Argyleshire Fencibles in the war of 1778, but that man's services
had been rewarded by a plot on the farm of Stonemillichan end anyway it was
Patrick's father who had got him to enlist, John should be given part of
28
the plot of another man who had never supplied a recruit. Another petition
to Lord Broadalbane, from a post-runr.er, said that he had enlisted on the
promise of a croft with the Cham ©rlain of C-lenorehy. That gentleman having
29died without heirs, he had lost his protector and had not yet been rewarded.
The conferring of land was not confined to the recruits themselves.
For supplying his som(still at school) for the Gordons, Thomas Macpherson
asked a half eighteenth part of land, free of services. lie suggested two
places whore this might be, one of which woe considered more suitable as the
otner farm was already saddled with two "pensioners''. The tenantry at anothei
place would doubtless make room for his eldest son, who was also to receive
30
provision. As Lord Macdonaid said, stipulations in respect of relatives
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were common. George Gordon, a man of good physique, had been turned out of
his croft. He enlisted on promise of some sort of provision after the war
end meanwhile a holding for his wife.^ Peter Gordon, a tenant, enlisted
because his younger brother would not go. He asked that his wife and
"orphants" should have their holding enlarged, for it was unbearably small,'--
Were abatement of rent given as a recruiting reward? The offer made
for Fairburn to his tenants of a year's rebate of rent had already been quoted.
Seaforth's factor mentioned in 1794 that if rents were raised it would put an
effective stop to recruiting. Promises were made on the Gordon estates that
53
rents would not be raised. In a list of terms required by some Breadalbane
recruits, there is frequent reference to their parents holding their crofts at
the present rents and without being disturbed, and also to their being given
34
free grazing. In this ag® of intensifying pressure by the landlord on his
tenantry, such promises were worth a great deal.
Koney payments to the recruits v;ere on no mean scale. Sums paid on
the Gordon estates rose from ten guineas in March 1794 to £21 in May and June,
though some were paid only fifteen guineas at that time. In badenoch, ten
men got from £13 to £21, ten more £12,18/- each, six others twelve guineas
and five were content with five guineas to £10.16/., Peter Gordon mentioned
above was given two guineas but his wife got eighteen.36 Neil McMillan got
eight guineas and his father twelve. One man was given eight guinwas to
start with, and, on two subsequent occasions, seven and five guineas more.^6
Having struck bargains with most of the tenantry, the overlord turned
to the coercion of the reluctant few. Maekay desired the tacksmen to send
lists of men who did and also of those who did not join.® In the Breadalbane
papers, there are several lists from November 1793 of tenants with sons fit to
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serve wuo had supplied none. Th&s in borlich there were twelve such persons
40
with sixteen sons between them, in Ardeonaig 22 with 31, in Deshair 17 with 30.
From 1794 there is a "list of persons warned for not giving their sons as soldiers
Seventeen persons on the list are noted as having given a man ; the other
fourteen apparently remained obdurate/1'- A "list of disguising persons in the
officiarics of Lawers, Crauich and Mornish" included some that "dispises them
that intend to save your lordship" and one group that had supplied one man when
they should have given five or six.42 "a just account of the most ungrateful
tenants in the officiacy of Lawers when his Lordship raised his regiment in the
Spring of 1793" identified the former group more closely. They included the
two sons of a wright who said they could not be mad© to go and he would rather
leave the estate than submit.^ Ho doubt the fat© of these resistors was
often unpleasant.11
Recruiting could be linked with the general discipline of the estate.
A further item in the Ereadalbene papers is ominously heeded "wood steallers
(sic) warned". Of thirteen persons named, six gave nan, three more gave their
44
sons and four were marked "togo". On the Castle brahan estate disenssions
on recruiting were in some way mixed up with discussions on illicit stills.^
The lords, however, were not unmerciful towards their tenants. A man
was discharged from the Breadalbane (on finding a substitute) when his father
46
died leaving no-one to manage the fare. A list of men in Fernan who might
be serving Lord Breadelbane noted that some were the sons of widows or frail
47
men who could not run their farms without their help. Men were expected
to offer but might not be taken. Private William Munro wrote to ask Lord
Dreadalbane to get him out of a detachment of pioneers because his companions




"I offered my service to your Lordship at tho raising of the regiment but your
Lordship was so kind as to pass me, but afterwards I was ordered to enlist by
48
Mr James Campbell, your Writer". John Crorar's eldest son was "passed from"
by the Earl because he was the only one old enough to help his father on the
form; wages were so high that Crerar would have to give up unless he could do
without hired mar;. he wrote later to ask that the exemption be continued.'5"
The tenantry did not always submit tamely to the levies. Those on
Fairbglrn's estate, after listening to the threats and offers mentioned earlier,
came together in a body and made a collective offer to supply his needs if he
"gave them £400 a year down of their rents and grant leases". These were
regarded as exorbitant terms but they were the last word, and no men could be
got from the estate.Seaforth was opposed at Stornoway by a regular
insurrection. A body of men fortified a hill above the town and forced others
to join them, smashing the farm implements in villages which refused. The mag¬
istrates went to parley with them and assured them that no man would be taken
against his will. They demanded a written undertaking that none of them or
their friends would be taken. The government was alarmed and naval forces
were asked for.
Resistance was generally more passive. When Seaforth augmented his
first battalion in June 1793, the men of Lewis fled from the farms.
The wives of men who had enlisted were finding it difficult in any case to
work their lend and now threw up their leases. The threat of a general
cp
Press by the navy added to the panic. At Banff, the men "do not like going
to be killed, they say". Those on Sir Robert Sinclair's estates fled to the
c4
hills, but he said the same had happened to Sir James Sinclair and Lord Caithness.t'
Su-h was the system of recruiting in the Highlands. How widely did it
extend? Even in the Highlands it tended to weaken. The rivalries of the great
1
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personages and the conflict between clan solidarity end the claims of the feudal
superior whose territories might cut across clan divisions were disintegrating
factors. Donald Cameron was Captain of a company of his clansmen in the Northern
(Gordon) Fenci*les. His behaviour was insubordinate and he felt safe in this
because he thought his men would obey no-one but he. His bluff was eventually
called end the men were token from him and put in other companies; in six
months they had forgotten their clan loyalties
A tie, rather stronger than the average and which may have had its
parallels elsewhere, was that of Roman Catholicism. The theoretical pro'
hibition of their enlistment in the ranks was not ended till 1791 in England
end 17S3 in Scotland.®® A body of them entered Frazer'6 Fencibles in 1794 and
aroused the suspicions of the Ministers that this was a war to restore the
F7
old religion in France. The company of Macdonnells who entered the Grant
Fencibles and later formed the nucleus of their chief Glengarry's regiment
were a fanatically clanish and disorderly body." Isolated by such suspicion
the Catholics might be expected to have a similar solidarity in more southerly
regions. There was certainly a project for a Catholic gentleman in Lancashire
to raise a body of soldiers from his laeighbours; but offers by Catholics
were likely not to be publicised as such.7^
goThe Highland system is found in Ireland and may have been general there
since the condition of the tenantry was analogous. There is at least on®
instance in Wales. Sir Watkin Williams Wynn was confronted in 179E with
attempts to make the men of his regiment of the Ancient British Forcible
Cavalry e list in the ro ular army. He protected against this, because he
would never be able to persuade the peasantry of his estate and neighbourhood
that be had not sold them.®® When a proportion of the regiment was disbanded
m See page 290-291
/ See page 272
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at the end of the year, he demanded that they be first marched to Wrexham, lest
61
they be enlisted on the way. This is the authentic Highland note.
We should no doubt think of territorial recruiting in England as a very
different phenomenon. The social status of the tenantry was totally dis¬
similar and they could hardly be sectored in the same way. That territorial
recruiting existed in England and the Scottish lowlands, that such influence was
possessed by high and low from Lord Buckingham and Lord Uxbridge downward is not
in dispute. But no direct evidence of it seems to be available: we can merely
infer something of its working from the study of county connections and the
militia. Perhaps it is to the position of the local vrorthy or1 magnate r.s a
purchaser of local goods and an employer of labour that we should look, rather
than to his standing as a landlord. The tradesman of Iluntly who express:ed the
hope that clothing for the Gordons would be mads in the town from which their
commander took his title^ is the last, clue that can be provided from the
material of this section.
(e) Peculiar Sources of Men
Besides the main orthodox methods of territorial and professional
recruiting, three queer devices remain to be noted - the enlisting of boys,
convicts and prisoners of war.
(i)
"Boys" for military purposes includes all persons under sixteen, but a
better definition is perhaps 'young and under There were a good many such
in the various levies. Lord George Lennox for instance complained that the
Independent Companies coming into Plymouth were made up largely of weakly boys.*
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Some were not weekly and had their usesj special permission was sometimes
O
given to recruit them as Drummers for recruiting. The most that could
usually be claimed however was that they would soon groiv and be ready for
g
service. The Duke of York, dosiring some Fentitles for for immediate service,
said they must have no boys in them. In disposing of such as were got, the
East Indian station was the obvious solution. The voyage took upwards of six
C
months during which the lads had time to reach the proper height. Others
6
were sent to Gibraltar to grow. "Skeleton" requirements could also use them.
The 15th, it was suggested, could got plenty of boys of 15-1C from 5'1" upwards
who would be fit in nine monthsj the regiment was so weak that it would not be
7
sent abroad before then. Considerations of this sort must have prompted the
setting aside of six regiments (the 9th, 16th, 22nd, 34th, 55th and 65tn)^ and
later throe more (the 4th*', 32nd* , and 52nd**) to recruit boys only. The
order of December 1797 expressed the hope that there would be a school, turning
out the more intelligent as good ECOs. The maximum age was eighteen.
Those under sixteen could be as short as 5*1" but must be "long in the fork".
The bounty was five guineas. Fhsils instead of firelocks were the arms.
Each lad was to be certified by his parish not an apprentice. Six grown men
12
per company were to be kept as ECOs, Others were enlisted as regimental
tailors.*°
Some progress was made - the 65th rose to over 500 in December 1799
14
and from being a skeleton now wanted only five to complete. But other,
quicker methods were being tried. The 4th,*^ 16th*" and 52nd*^ gave their
boys to the others and. turned to recruiting from the militia. The remaining
regiments grew up end went on servicej the experiment never came to anything.
Grey incidentally was against enlisting toys. He said they contracted bad
18
habits and many died. Most would still enlist if left until grown up.
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(ii)
Pardoning criminals on condition that they joined the army was a very
old device end all that romained of the policy of conscripting vagabonds -
19
abandoned but harked back to regretfully.' There were three types of such
pardons# Soldiers convicted by Court Martial petitioned the Commander in
20
Chief (or sometimes their officer did so ana were sent to serve abroad
22
for life or a term of years. Sometimes the Court Martial itself imposed
23
this sentence. The regiments receiving these and other convicts were
chiefly the 60th24, the 20th Light Dragoons (permanently in Jamaica) for cavalry,2*'
and the New South Wales Corps2" (convicts guarding convicts). These men concern
us in two instances. Many ware deserters who were shovelled out of the country
wholesale to where they could plague the recruiting service no more. Many were
Fencibleg and Militiamen who thus found themselves extendftigthmir service and
reinforcing the line. This was the fate of sons of those concerned in the
27
mutiny of the Breadalcane Fencibles in 1795. Men in this position are also
found in the next type of case - soldiers sentenced in the civil courts and
again pardoned if they would serve abroad. Three members of ilopetoun's
Fencibles sentenced to death for rape were allowed to pass into Hay's new
28
regiment. Another time, three more men of that regiment convicted of stealing
a gown from a strumpet, petitioned to go inoo the Scotch Brigade.
Civilians convicted in the courts had usually to petition the Home
Secretary^ who procured a pardon for them if the army would accept them.
Sometimes the court took the Initiative} a magistrate discharged a man convicted
31
of stealing timber on his undertaking to join the tunny and turn king's evidence.
Sometimes the Sheriff32 or other prison authority contacted the army. In February
3*3
1795, fortyone men in lev/gat® were allowd to go to the 60th * . The gaoler had
them attested04 and they were taken by water under guard from billingsgate to
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Chatham.^ The Surgeon General scon afterwards examined all the men in the
36
prison to see who ©Is© could be taken if pardons were issued. Local
recruiting officers were sometimes approached, Dr, Johnstone, whose son was
recruiting for the Scotch Brigade at Worcester, wrote in support of a petition
•2*7
of a prisoner there to serve therein. Officers were however sternly for-
38
bidden to go and recruit in prisons,'"1
Owing to the state of the penal law, quite honest men could be got
for the service in these ways. Three man asked to enter the 58th who hed been
39
sentenced to transportation for stealing a goose. But on the whole they were
a sorry crew. It was remarked about a draft for the Hew South Kales Corps that
40
owing to the type of man it was difficult to say how fit they were for duty,
A battalion of the 60th was warned that a batch of deserters coming out was
likely to fain illnesses in order to got home and special car© would be needed
in medical examinations.-^ A men who asked for a pardon was described as a
thief and an incorrigible offender and was ordered to be discharged with
42
ignominy rather than inflicted on another regiment. Another man was to be
punished as an example* no regiment would want such a creature.The Duke
of York reacted strongly when a marine was sentenced by Court Martial to serve
in the Now South ft'ales corps; it was neither legal nor right to make service in
the army a punishment for the other forces.4"" A magistrate opposed the entry of
four convicts into the army because they would leave "iarg© families to burden
45
the parish. Sir Abra.iam liume who had interested himself in a convict was
told that they were e nuisance to convey from confinement to the army and the
46
soldiers of the regiment into which they were put felt "discredited",
47
Despite the good service of the 60th the government was not prepared to
fill the army on any scale from the prisons.
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(iii)
There was a different feeling about one category of prisoner. From the
fall of Toulon, an increasing number of prisoners of war, mainly seamen, came
into British hands. The setting up of emigr^ corps in the latter half of 1794
enable advantage to be teken of this. The Comte defector was commissioned to
4R
raise © corps entirely among the prisoners of war and mainly among the
"cannoniers" of the French fleet who were ©11 royalists.^9 He was to have
c0
first pick, but the other corps had already been at work several months when
El
h® was given this priority in December 1794." Their officers descended on the
52 53 g4
prisons at Plymouth and at Porchester and Bishop's Walhem near Portsmouth.
Hector stressed the necessity of separating the "menenrs et furieux" from the
"bons at indecis" who could be worked on by visiting priests and their own
Cff
officers. Another officer wanted separate prisons for royalists, moderates
56
and the republicans who were dominant even in prison. A third noted that
many royalists were afraid of their comrades and the "Tribunal". They ought
57
to be removed quickly.' Severe weather was responsible for the enlisting of
nearly 300 at Porches tor in the mid-winter of 1794-5."'® Among all this flotsam
of war we hear the cireumstances of Jean Hou^airon captured when returning from
India by an English privateer who joined the corps because he found an uncle was
a sergeant in it.59
Troubles were not absent. Neither the military nor the prison authorities
fin
were very co-operative*w but then General Cuyler said the French officers at
61
Portsmouth were ill-behaved. The scoundrelly Charmilly gave the gaolers
62
a guinea per man supplied and thus cut out the honourable Hervilly.
The officers did not trust their men* they wanted them transported on warships
6'3
for fear of mutiny. Three were alleged to have asked for repatriation with
64the object of setting fire to the ship that took them* some were found to be
Jacobins and had to be put pack in prison.6^ More remarkable was the decision
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to disband Charmilly's regiment and repatriate the men (1796) pending which some
four hundred, whose loyalty was not particularly suspect, were put back in
66
Porchester prison.
The conquest of Holland by the Branch led to the arrival of many Dutch
and German prisoners and deserters and on them attention is concentrated after
1795. They differed from the French (and Spanish) in two ways# Firstly they
wero more "loyal"; even the prisoners nad often been captured already from the
Austrians.®^ Secondly, the 60th regiment could enlist them, whereas it could
not take Frenchmen®® ( not that that had stopped Captain Walker, recruiting for
an augmentation of one of the Battalions.®®) Recruiting them was therefore
70
confined mainly to British officers and was seemingly more decorous. Dutch
71
emigre corps existed but did net reach large proportions till 1789»
The ordinary British regiments war® in theory forbidden to enlist
foreigners. But Colonel Campbell of the Dumoartonshire Fencibles, having
exhausted his local terrain, proposed, rather than go to London, to bring over
72
500 Prussians. he had lived in Berlin and spoke German well. His wes not
the only Fencuble regiment to try and violate tne territorial provision on
7 ^
whio'n they were based thus drastically. The crimps were also at work; Cuyler
reported that som© omS in Portsmouth ware enlisting refugees from Toulon and
74
elsewhere and hurrying them to London for new regiments. Nor was the govern¬
ment entirely adamant. In at least two instances prisoners of war or foreign
rj r
soldiers were offered to a native regiment.'0 A final odd cage was when
Lieutenant Munro was allowed to enlist Blacks at Portsmouth for the Vvest Indian
regiments because he said they could be got cheaper there than at heme.^®
Such were the various efforts to round up the foreign elements that strayed
within our shorosj a strange case both of scraping tne barrel and of the
international brotherhood of arms.
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CxIAPT £R V ; MAIN1' EKAHCS MP SUPERVISION
(a) Care and Disposal of Recruits
When the men had been enlisted, they had to be housed, transported to
their regiments and there absorbed into military life. Each of these stages
aggravated the evils of the recruiting system. The scattering of parties
meant there was always a long march to the headquarters of the corps.
Desertion was always worst on the march. Two Independent Companies of recruits
marching from Chatham to Portsmouth had already lost six then they reached
Guildford.'- Though the men were now in a body under the eye of an officer or
sergeant, discipline remained bad. In a new or temporary corps the officers had
not yet received their commissions and it was not possible to hold a court-
martial, There were mutinies, A party of Fencibles being marched to Chatham
by a corporal refused to go beyond St, Albans, saying they had been "sold",^
Another party at Rickmansworth had to be assured by the Justices in the name of
the government that it would not be sent to the Indies,**
New corps concentrated at their headquarters were a terror to the local
inhabitants. The sheriff-depute of Perthshire asked that Graham's men should
not be feasted on the King's birthday bjit on the next dayj he seemed to fear
that their participating in the general rejoicings would turn them into a riot.
The letter was not received in time, and the banquet was held without ill effects.^
The 114th, brought from Ireland to be inspected at Abingdon, excited the wrath of
the magistrates of Berkshire, They asserted that the publicans and populace
had been terrorized into iving a favourable report of the regiment's conduct to
the inspecting officer and asked the Commander in Chief for an inquiry - preceded
by the removal of the regiment.^
To return to recruits on the movej billets were a source of dispute \vith
the civil power. Beating orders replaced the usual "marching orders" as
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authority for billettingj as they did not specify a route they were more open
to abuse. The High Constable of Finsbury found that parties went from inn to
inn collecting money which the innkeepers would rather pay than carry out their
obligations. They thwarted the constable's control by having several beating
orders. If he endorsed on one that they had been billetted they showed the
publican another. Recruits enlisted two days after a party had arrived in a
place were not entitled to billets. The parties therefore kept the attestations
of men who had deserted and used them for new men. Ordinary troops with "routes"
made things worse by pretending to be recruiting parties and acting likewise,
A small staff had to be employed to supervise billetting, the Constable himself
controlling those who had beating orders and not "routes".®
At Kidderminster stationary parties had been billetted for seven days
(the maximum time) at ea h of the inns in turn. A new bailiff (a former
publican) upheld the law by making them live (in the same place) as troops in
7
quarters. He also refused billets to men who had been on forays and returned -
the law was that a party could not be billetted a second time in the same pi ce
during a period of 23 days.® These examples display the common abuses of billettinf
The ill-feeling which resulted is shown in the case of a party at Bristol which
was refused billets because certain members of it had already received some and
had therefore to hire quarters. This spread the injurious opinion that they
were agents of the Bast India Company,r The offence of the Sergeant in charge
in cursing and threatening the municipal clerks is thus understandable.
At the request of his officer the margistratas forgave him and the party was
billetted after all.*® Some fared worse. Recruits of the 106th marching from
Norwich on the way to Ireland were refused billets at Barnet.^
Parties on the march gave trouble in other ways. Some villa es like
12 IS
Claiming on the way to Portsmouth and Holmes Chapel on the way to Chester
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(end Ireland) were perpetually overcrowded with them# Sometimes they were
stranded through the HCO in charge jjnprovidently spending all his money and
being unable to pay for billets. The civil power had then to come to the
rescue. A party of Graham's regiment at Bedford was unable to move unless
the magistrates advanced their subsistence - which they were unable to do
without guarantees140 men of the same corps had to be fed and lodged by
the town of King's Lynn - in this case because the unsoundness of the ships
in which they were going to Southampton made it necessary to land them.^
We hear more of the grievances of the townships than of the hardships of the
parties, but George Frazer reports that a party was once marooned by a snowstorm
and six recruits froze to death. Some men of the 13th were found destitute
by the Sussex militia which therefor© "enlisted" them. They were allowed to
17
stay there.
Herching recruits thus presented insoluble problems. The basic element
was perhaps the shortage of persons able to keep discipline. Kempe in his
plan for the reform of recruiting" hoped to achieve great things by moving the
recruits to their destination in large bodies and teaching them discipline on
the way.*® One new, unestablished regiment, that cf Leafcherfamd, did this.
But Captain Copson, for instance, who was sent toChatham with 200 boys from Sling
(near Southampton) complained that instead of six officers he was given one to
help him. His NCOs had, he feared, pocketed the money given them to pay the
billets. He did not sleep between Eling and Guildford and almost despaired
20
of arriving at his destination. Ho wonder Major Barrett®, in command at
Sling, preferred mocement in parties of 30 and 40, which preference was endorsed
21 ,
by the War Office. But this mwantsoattering and a loss of control from above,
with the results we have seen. Sometimes corps organized purely for recruiting
a See page
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and not for service were allowed to have their men inspected in several
local centres and put into established regiments on the spot. This device
was of limited application, served mainly to prevent loss to the officer by
desertion, end was not liked by the authorities as lessening their control
over the quality of recruits. The real answer to the problem was transport
by sea,
no
To be allowed the expense of sea transport (half a guinea a man)"'
was a privilege greatly sought after. Desertion was prevented and discipline
made easier, Chatham, Southampton and Plymouth were the army's main points
of concentration. Recruits and raw regiments could easily sail thither down
O "Z
either side of Britain, From Fort George,' Leith,2^ Berwick2^ and Hull2u
(for the West Riding) they would go to Gravesend and march to Chatham, From
27 28
Scotland and from Chester (for Lancashire and part of the Midlands) they
went to Barnstaple2^ and then marched to Plymouth, The use of the Channel
Islands as a sort of dumping ground for recruits is related to this use of
"Zf\
shipping! it was similarly agreed to send Irish recruits to the Isle of Man,
There were drawbacks. Graham's men were kept waiting some time (and delay
always meant loss) because the transports were not ordered up from Leith to
Dundee, "The Public Offices do not seem to understand each other's motions".
The soldiers' wives had to be exhorted to preserve cleanliness, and so health,
on board,A party going from Gravesend to join the Mackay Fencibles in the
32
north was stopped by an embargo on shipping. An officer was almost ruined
*Z-Z
when his Independent Company was captured at sea by the French, These tribula¬
tions were however a small enough price.
Clothing the recruits was often a serious problem. When enlisted, each




uniformj when he ranched his regiment, he got a proper uniform. As Pox, the
34
Inspector General of Recruiting, pointed out this system worked badly in wartime.
Regiments were mostly abroad and often took their clothing supply with them so
that their recruits were only supplied when they at length reached the foreign
station. Corps used only for recruiting were not responsible for clothingj
the men were only supplied when they were put into a fighting regiment.
Regimental agents were supposed to send clothing to these drafts and to men
■zc
going oversees if th® regiment had not taken it with them. They were negligent
36
is dojng so. Slop clothing had thus to suffice for quite a time. It consisted
37
only of linen trousers and a jacket-waistcoat (they often failed to meet) and
38
neither recruits nor parties had greatcoats. From November 1796, a flannel
39
waistcoat and drawers were part of the issue/ but reci uits took some time to
learn to take care of their clothes and wore them cut ct a great rate.4^
This was why regiments were reluctant to supply their men too soon.^ Dishonest
recruits also sold their necessaries - which presumably did not show.
Recruits were thus insufficiently clad, Sir William Pitt spoke of one
lot at Southampton as "ragamuffins",43 sjr Dalrymple reported that the many
drafts at Chatham arracks were "half naked and in rags filled with vermin and
filth".44 Disease was an inevitable consequence. Desertion was encouraged
and also made easy since ragamuffins were not readily identified as soldiers.4,K
It wss difficult for depot commanders to step in as there was no sure way of
recovering expenditure from the regiments.4^ Recruiting parties, especially in
new corps which had no stock of clothing also suffered from the parsimony of t<e
government. Colonel Treen declared that he could not complete his regiment
unless his ragged sergeants were reclothed/"7 add whet could the effect have been
tf
on discipline and public opinion, when a sergeant of the 30th had only a pair of
regimental trousers to show his connection with the army?*!^
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The lest stages of a recruit's career as such tvere his inspection and the
settlement of his accounts. He then began his ordinary service, sometimes with
the corps w ich enlisted him and sometimes with a regiment into which he had been
drafted. The settlement of accounts was chiefly necessary because the full
bounty promised was never paid at the time of the enlistment. Dr. Kerr gi\res
one reason for this in complaining of a man who would not march unless he was paid;
49
if this was done he would desert. But the main reason was to ensure that the
recruit had a balance in hand to meet the cost of equipping him - as was then the
system in the army. Charges, regulated by royal warrant, were deducted and the
recruit was paid the balance of his bounty and of his pay, which began from the
date of his attestation.
Whenever soldiers were drafted, it; was the aim of the receiving regiment
to see that they were not in deofc to their old officers nor these officers to
them. The receiving regiment would in one case have to pay the debt, in the
other to exact payment, in each case assuming the old officers place viz-a-viz
the man. The War Office often prevented a tangle of this kind by sanctioning
a "bounty" of l|- guineas a man to settle debts.^ Regiments receiving, recruits
from another corps were on their guard for it was a notorious source of trouble. x
The 43rd refused to accept men from Stribling's regiment because no money was
forthcoming to settle with them,"^ Graham reported receiv?.ng men with arrears
C 2
of bounty owing, especially from the 124th, The General limitation of bounties
was probably opposed for reasons of this kind. The War Office noted that men
lately enlisted at a high bounty (£15 was the legal maximum at the time) should
54
not have debts exceeding £1. There are curious cases in which an officer who
had enlisted some men by an offer of less than the maximum sum was made to pay
the maximum by his superior officer.®®
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Th© War Office thought that even quite a smell body of men joining a
regiment for service should be attended by an officer and two or three sergeants
to settle the accounts.®® Recruiting officers however were unwilling if not
unable either to attend or to pay up. It wasted their time and strained their
credit. The sudden death of the Colonel found Stribling's new-raised regiment
at Plymouth without a y officer present save the Paymaster. Even he had no
57
money with which to settle with the mfin - an ugly situation. Sir William Pitt
had to appoint an officer to look after fragments of new corps that had accumulated
at Southampton, who riskily allowed pay to some of them, but was unable to corres-
CO
pond, with all the Agents, so that their accounts were in confusion.
General Hyde reported that some recruits who had been placed in the 19th with
their officers had been promised the payment of their account before embarkation.
The dab© of this had been put forward and the men were nearly naked but the officers
refused to pay up until their own accounts were settled and the regiment said that
they were not authorized to advance the money. The War Office replied that on
59
the contrary they had been so authorized - a vary suggestive state of affairs.
When there was a mutiny in the 118th at Birmingham, the magistrates put
it down to the accounts not having been paid end the officers not being present
with the regiment to do it or take care of the men.®0 Thus endless trouble was
caused and the haphazard way in which the matter was finally dealt with might
cause more still. Bernard sent a sergeant round tho different regiments into
61
wnich his men had been drafted. Colonel Fullarton had to defend his new
cavalry regiment against a charge of being mutinous. He said that necause of
an Election, orders came to march to Kilmarnock and settle all accounts.
The regiment was short of officers and the Agent hod to pay the accounts and
complete the task in thirtv-six hours. Hard drinking followed and one man who
had not been fully paid refused to go on parade. His example was not followed
-125-
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but there was an alteration lasting a quarter of an hour. Thus the recruit
passed into the army - neither well disciplined nor well cared for but gloriously
drunk.
(*) The Superintendence of the Recruiting Service
Regimental independence was still greatly respected at this time and it
was bo the Colonels and commanding officers that control of recruiting was
chiefly left. But we have seen how the conditions of the service loosened
ordinary military discipline and both the Secretary at War, responsible for
"law and finance" and the Commander in Chief responsible for the efficiency
of the army found it necessary to interfere. For the former, the magistrate
was the natural agent. The extensive connections of the Justices with the
recruiting service will be apparent from what has gone before. It was the
policy of the War Office to support and encourage their intervention in the
interests of order and legality. This was partly for political reasons.
Ordering a discharge asked for by a Mr Athorpe who lived near Sheffield, the
War Office declared that it was desirable to stretch the rules in order to
encourage ®n active magistrate living in a very unsettled area.* Mr Syfcon
wrote from Shropshire to complain that e Lieutenant Campbell, applied to lo
release ©n apprentice, had publicly insulted first his clerk end them himself.
He suggested "that in this populous anu manufacturing district, the authority
of the civil magistrate should be upheld, against the military in perticaler"2(sic).
This note wee frequently struck by complaining magistrates and the
Secretary at War responded with protestations of his resolve to uphold the
civil power. "ut this policy was thought justified ever, from a military point
of view. The Mayor of Stratford on Avon was told that Rann*s corps then (1799)
quartered in the town3 was amenable to military law but the officers were not
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commissioned (it wes a now corps) and the Secretary at War's private opinion
v/os that sich a "parcel of recruiten could only be kept in order by the enforce-
4
ment of the known lews by the magistrates. The Mayor of Richmond (Yorks) wes
assured that no harm cam® from magistrates disciplining a party that had offended
them. Officers were too scarce to allow of one commanding each party and the
army's reputation would suffer if it was thought there was no other control.®
Because of the riots against crimps (1794) officers recruiting in London were
told to inform the nearest Justice what houses they had hired to receive their
0
recruits, so that he might occasionally inspect them.
The War Office acquired a body of regular correspondents among the
Justices in the chief recruiting areas. With the various Stipendiaries in
London there was constant contact - notably with Colquhoun of Shoreditoh
who suggested (among other things) a plan to suppress illicit beating orders
n
which was promised earnest consideration, Athorpe in Sheffield, Haden, Hicks,
Villers, and Holbeek in the Black Country, Richardson, Baily and Griffith in
Manchester could not have written more if they had been paid agents.
Information and plans flowed in. Dozens of magistrates wrote occasionally and
were replied to with decisions of cases and definitions of the law. Officers
wer© told to respect their .judicial dec is ions j even in doubtful cases the
magistrate was supposed to have done whet he thought his duty.
Those who disobeyed suffered severely. A Mr Maxwell was raising men
for an Enslgncy in the 113th (Birmingham) Regiment at Bromyard in Herefordshire,
He was assisted by his father, a surgeon-apothecary who had brought in a
8
"notorious fellow" to help. They trepanned several men who however were released
by the two local Justices who were asked to attest them. At last young Maxwell
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furious, told his sergeant in the magistrate's presence to carry off one of
these men as a deserter end he was token to the regiment, where he finally
attested in despair." The populace vaere angry, their loyalty was shaken.
The War Office when told ordered the man's release and advised Lord Amherst
that Maxwell should never be commissioned,^ Despite the intercession not only
of his colonel, who collected evidence on the other side and pleaded the
rashness of youth in mitigation, but also of the two magistrates (both clergy-
-.12
men) the War Office refused to forgive Maxwell un-fcil the Justices declared
that the salutary effect of his disgrace would not be weakened thereby,1®
One of the few instances on the other side may finally be given,
Mr Coltman (whom we shell set in another chapter) complained on behalf of the
magistrates of Lindsay of the insolence of a Captain Holmes,^ The War Office,
though reluctant to believe ill of an experienced officer, finally decided they
were right and ordered him to apologise.^-® But there had been a delay because
Holmes had been sailing from Hull to Southampton!® when complained of and had
lost some relevant papers in a storm. The magistrates (whose letters have not
survived) were apparently annoyed by the delay and the terms of the apology.
Annoyed in turn by their discourteous tone and the suggestion that he should
condemn men unheard, Windham refused to take the matter further - which he
17
would otherwise have done.
The Commander in Chief's main check on the efficiency of regiments
was the periodic inspection, A newly raised corps was inspected when complete
by a General Officer (a Field Officer if it was a small body) assisted by a
surgeon. Each man was examined and those unfit or not up to the standards
prescribed by General Orders and in the Letter of Service authorising the corps
were rejected. The inspecting officer had a copy of the Letter of Service and
a list of the clothing which the men were supposed to have. He had to see that
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they were properly supplied end that the instructions which the commandant
had issued to the recruiting officers were in accord with the Let* er of
Service.1® His report comprised statistics of the age, size and nationality
(English, Irish, etc.) of the men and setae remarks on the quality of the
regiment.*®
The Process wse; prooe ly none too efficient. The regimental surgeon
20
was very properly not employed - a civilian was usually hired for ten or
2i
twelve guineas which was charged to the regiment. There were no instructions
22
to guide him and his ideas of the medical standard required by the army must
have been fcpiprecise. Men were usually required to be 5*6" tall (5*4" in the
case of growing lads). As for age, the line (but not the Fencibles) were limited
to men between 18 and 35.^ But even when the Colonels had not been given
25
greater discretion by their Letters of Service, the inspecting officer claimed
great latitude. ilajor Farquhar defended his superiors at Chatham against the
complaints of a regiment abroad for which they inspected recruits. lie thought
they could deviate from their instructions if there was five or seven years'
service left in a manj if the boys and older men were rejected, only a third
of tho men would be left. One-eyed men, though unsightly, were efficient;
26
a man reported unfit was not so when medically examined. Experienced officers
were doubtless the best judges, but the remarks, (a few lines on e single sheet
of paper) suggest snap decisions. Men are "mostly good", HCOs. "good looking",
27
officers "seem zealous".
Inspecting officers were often too indulgent and even in league with the
recruiters. General Leslie inspected the 78th though it was not qjite complete
in the hope of relieving the officers of their financial burden. fie dined with
the officers afterwords and they "took a hearty glass", tie confided the contents
of his report to the commanding officer and said that he hoped to obviate any
28
further inspection. General Ihitelocke was a very good friend of Sir Willia^
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Johnston© whose new Fencibl© regiment he had to inspect in April, 1799.
A month before, he showed him his official instructions end an adverse report
29
that had been made on Tyndale's regiment, thus prompting him on what to avoid.
On the other hand, some inspections seem to have been both thorough and unpartial.
General Garth said that he was "shut up" for three days from nine till five
30
examining men of Sir Thomas Dunlop*sFencibles at the same time in 1799.
Soma abuses were chocked. The worst men were weeded outj the commandant
e
was often able to replace them at once from a surplus of recruits above the
stipulated number. Disputes arose of course. General Douglas, Colonel of the
99th, complained of the rejection of some ninety men by General Musgrave.^
His main objection was that they had been dismissed before he could appeal to
higher authority, lie said some were only a fraction too short and others had
•20
merely declared they were over age." The War Office supported Musgrave.
Incorrect, if not fraudulent, meansurement of recruits was freqjent; Sir Hew
Dalrymple even said he wished the real sizes of the men "had some resemblance"
34
to those in the record. Perhaps the most useful service of the inspecting
officer was to see that the accounts were paid and trouble averted. Sir Ralph
Abercromby was told by Sir Benjamin Dunbar that he had no money to pay the men.
He caused the money to b© adv oed and warned the War Office to look closely at
Sir Benjamin's accounts. "
The recruits of regiaentc already on the establishment were inspected
by the Colonel or his deputy. In these cases the Commander in Chief had only
an indirect control through the annual inspection of each regiment at which
proceedings were similar but defective men (because they could not instantly be
replaced) were less easily got rid of.
Inspections were a clumsy instrument} the Commander in Chief mad© at
this time an important attempt to improve on them by instituting a system of
control. The beginning of this was the so called Inspector General of Recruiting,
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slready established in 1793, who was in charge of the recruiting parties of
•20
regiments abroad, except when their Colonels undertook to supervise then.
The commandant of Chatham barracks had ©n analogous relationship to the large
mass of companies and corps orgsnised solely for recruiting because almost all
of then were sent to him to be inspected and disposed of. ' In July 1794,
3ft
these two offices were conflated on the death of Inspector General Townshend'
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(and after an attempt to transfer his functions without his title and emoluments)
and were held successively in our period by Sir Hew Dalrymple ^ H. E. Fox,^
(brother of Charles James) and S. Hewett.^'- There were two other slight inter¬
ventions by the government to regulate the dispatch of recruits abroad. Men
raised by the East India Company were inspected by an officer from the Horse
Guards.*1 ' In 1796 a cavalry depot was established at Worcester (later moved to
. 44
Maidstone; to train recruits going to the lest and East Indies.
In the provinces, General Officers had occasionally intervened to control
parties. General Balfour ordered all parties to leave Newcastle in May 1795
4 5
because they interfered with raising the town's quota for the navy. • The
Commander in Chief in Scotland inspected those corps which in England would have
48
gone to Chatham and his letters show an active interest in recruiting conditions
47
in his command. In 1796 he arranged the division of it into four recruiting
districts and the stationing of a Superintending Field Officer in each,"^
These Superintended were the great innovation of the Duke of York. In each main
recruiting centre tnere was now an officer in correspondere© with the Inspector
49
General. They were assisted by a Paymaster and a Surgeon; two staff sergeants
were also allowed^ and clerks could be hired - a regular bureaucracy for a
military unit in these days. They were the Commanding Officers of all the parties i
their districts, sole channel of correspondence between therm and the Inspector
General and fully responsible for the maintenance of discipline. They inspected
recruits, received weekly returns and could order Courts Martial.1"
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They were not perhaps a very active body. Th® one appointed to Bury
St. Edmunds in 1796, lived in Ipswich and went to Bury on BAondayg to so® recruits.
If he managed to let his house, he proposed to move to Bury for the summer.
In the absence of another Drummer to inflict the lashes, he felt h® could not
53
hold a trial of Drummer Berryman and proposed to send him to Chatham.
Such was the personnel. How powerful could they be made? The Inspector
General was accustomed to draw up Recruiting Instructions for the parties under
his command in which the restrictions of Daws end Orders on the service were
embodied. In this he merely did what each Colonel did for his regiment.
In 1796 we find a new set being drawn up by Fox in consultation with the War
Office and Commander in Chief.1 The latter himself issued th© instructions
of small recruiting corps. In December 1794, the War Office sent copies of
th© Inspector General's instructions to a number of new regiments. Observance
of these would obviate th© difficulties found by certain officers in the settle¬
ment of accounts, A standard attestation form was also sent, henceforward to be
obligatory.555 The financial screw was something few officers could oppose;
abuses and lack of form would diminish if they meant pecunuery loss.
A standard attestation was recommended to the Fencibles in November 1794,®^ and
the recruiting instructions to some at least of the old regiments at home.57
The Superintending Field Officers watched for irregularity; they had among
other things to report to the War Office any oases where they thought a civil
FS
prosecution desirable at public expense." Suchaid was often desired by an
officer involved in s dispute and threatened with loss. As noted aoove and for
reasons already explained* they provisionally inspected many recruits before the
march to Chatham or their regiment. The strengthening of their informal grip




recruiting instructions and the Adjutant General had to negotiate with the Duke
of Gloucester.®® But doubtless the urgency of wartime helped on the process;
from the beginning of the war the government had been able to insist on direct
CA
weekly returns from all recruiting parties. At any rate, the War Office and
Horse Guards had between them the moking3 of a solid system.
Its utility is to be doubted, Shortly after the Duke of York became
Commander in Chief an attack was made on two evils. A circular to new regiments
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of February 1795 restricted bounties to a maximum of fifteen guineas for
"general service" and ten for Fencibles. Another in March""'' repeated this and
also prohibited recruiting by civilians; any recruits raised by a person without
a proper beating order were to be released by the magistrate asked to attest."
The "Public Offices"of London were seat the circular00 and also asked to confiscate
the beating orders of persons who were not attested soldiers.1'"^" The control of
gc
bounties was implied in Grey's report of" 1809 to be the raiscn d'etre of the
Superintending Field Officers, Certainly the best check was the issue of money
to the parties via their Paymasters, which was the rule for instance for regi¬
ments in the Channel Islands."® Kemp^, as we have sosn^ accused the Paymasters of
being niggardly in thoir advances and cited an officer who had raised twentytwo
men in the four months before becoming dependent on them and only six in eight
67
months thereafter. Major Cunningham® recruiting for the 70th at Swaffham had
a balance in hand of £3,7.1-g-. at the end of 1795 which hed jumped tc £92,0,11-^,
in October 179S and was still £82,13,114* the following June, In December 1797,
he was owed £21,6,11'?, At that point he seems to have started '-"rowing money
through the local Paymaster and in the six xoonths following he spent £121,7,6,






The elimination of civilians also had its drawbacks. Many were innocent
and useful - examples with a hard case have already been given. A hardish case
the other way xvas Lieutenant Lyston who had to give up raising men for promotion
because he had gone an active duty leaving the work to be done by a civilian, now
godisallowed.^" Major Campbell of the 132nd considered the withdrawal of civilians
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a great blow to recruiting. Nor can prohibitions impress one when earlier a
sergeant in London, dismissed on the direct order of the War Office, continued
71
work as a crimp from a public house.
Rather half-heartedly, an attempt was made to diminish --ompetition by
controlling the movement of parties. The Inspector General could of course
order the movement of parties under his own immediate charge, but also the
commanding officer of the 22nd, for instance, was told (1797) to inform Fox
where he sent his parties and advised to send them to the county with which the
72
regiment was supposed to be connected. When Manchester was reported over-
73
crowded. Fox was told to order some parties away. But the War Office refused
74
to order parties to move at the request of each other or even, when they were
doing well, at the request of a magistrate.75 Theydieclaimed the power and
referred enquiries to the Colonel, The situation of regimental Headquarters
77
was strictly controlled but that was to prevent overcrowding.
More frequent inspections were en adjunct to these attempts at increased
control, and much trouble they caused. Preparing and waiting for an inspection
was an ag rovabion. Dr, Kerr had to call in his parties when recruiting was at
its peak. After a long wait in idleness, the regiment was moved to Ireland
and inspected a second time, when 260 im* : were unexpectedly discharged and grave
78
financial problems caused. Graham's second battalion was inspected twice and
more man xvere got rid of the second time - there had been a good deal of fever in
rtq
transports and billets. When the Loyal British Fencibles were faced with a
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third inspection, the commanding officer pleaded that no more men should be
rejected? otherwise it would be "a business without end" as all inspecting
80
officers had different opinions.
A Middlesex magistrate declared that in the recruiting service
pi
"irregularities, when not very excessive, have their advantage*
himself a Superintending Field Officer, thought that if only bounties were
cut by a reduction in the issue of money, order would return and his own office
Qg
would be unnecessary save in the largest cities." Thus the Superintenders
distrusted themselves and indeed it seems that reform too often meant quality
at the expense of quantity and regularity at the expense of incentive.
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GHAPIER VI: COMPULSORY LEVIES t THE MILITIA AMD 115 AUGMENTATION
(a) The Militia Systera in Theory
In describing the recruitment of the regular army and kindred forces,
it is possible to take for granted a generally accepted picture of their
organization. So little attention has been devoted to the structure of the
militia however, that it may not be out of place to indicate in passing some¬
thing of the general character of this force. The present chapter will there¬
fore be slightly more discursive than those proceeding it.
The constitution of the militia in our period was laid down in the
General Act of 1736.^ This was a consolidating measure, embodying the pro¬
gress of ideas from the first revival of the militia by the elder Pitt. It
was closely copied in the Acts for augmenting the militia in 1796-7.2 The
system comprised a compulsory levy of men from each county proportionate to
the number of men therein who were deemed fit and liable for military service.
The organization by which the levy was assessed and raised was very
closely parallel to the civil institutions of the county. At its head was
the (Lord) Lieutenant appointed by the King and usually identical with the
Gustos Rotulorum, or head of the magistracy. His agents were the Deputy
Lieutenants, appointed by himself subject to the King's disapproval, who were
almost always chosen frora the Justices of the Peace; some of their duties
could be done by the Justices,3 At county level, the main business was done
by the General Meeting of the Lieutenancy, corresponding to Quarter Sessions;
subordinate to this were Divisional Meetings of Deputies, corresponding to the
local sessions of Justices. The orders of these bodies were executed by the
»
constables of the hundreds and parishes. Both the General and the Divisional
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Meetings had an official Clerk.^
There was one great difference from the civil system. Boroughs were
included with the counties in which they stood for militia purposes. The
Lords Lieutenants appointed Deputies within them who were subordinate to the
county Lieutenancy. In certain cases however, the chief borough magistrate
was to be allowed to appoint Deputies for the town because custom allowed it.5
There were a good many special provisions in the Acts - to take account of
local custom or autonomy.
Fit men aged eighteen to forty five were held liable for service unless
included in several categories of exempt persons. These were peers, members
of the regular forces (including garrisons), officers serving or who had served
for four years in the militia, members of either university, the clergy
(including dissenting ministers and teachers), peace officers, articled
clerks, apprentices, sailors, workers in the royal docks and arsenals, Thames
Watermen and poor men with more than one child born in wedlock.''' An Act of
P
1794- added members of Volunteer Corps. The Acts of 1796-7 restricted the
exemptions by making liable (for the augmentation) peers, non-resident members
of universities, persons entering Volunteer Corps after October 20th, 1796 and
poor men with up to three children. A child now had to be under ten or
infirm to count towards exemption.^ Thus broadly speaking those liable were
the younger section of the lower class and most men in other classes. For
the augmentation, part of the older section of the working class was brought
in.10
To assess the obligation, the General Act ordered a General Meeting
each year on Tho Tuesday after October 24th. This ordered Divisional
Meetings on stated dates and issued precepts to the constables of hundreds
to order the parish constables to make lists of men between eighteen and
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forty five, stating their trades and whether infirm. These lists they
had then to take to the Divisional Meetings, having posted a copy on the
church door at least three days before. At the Meeting, anyone wishing
to do so had to appeal for exemption and after the Deputies had decided
these cases the lists were amended accordingly and the numbers sent to the
Clerk of the General Meeting. At the next county Meeting the returns
were examined and the quota of men to be levied by the county was divided
between the hundreds on the basis of these figures. The following Division¬
al Meetings would further divide the burden between the parishes.^
The original county quotas were stated in the act.1^ The General
Meetings were obliged each year to report the total of men liable in each
county to the Privy Council which was empowered to alter the apportionment
of the stated national total according to population changes.^ The returns
were made but the Privy Council did nothing and by 1796 the burden was very
badly distributed. The augmentation was therefore so apportional that when
added to the existing quotas it corrected this disproportion.3^
Having settled the parochial quotas, the Divisional Meeting gave
notice through the constables of a further meeting po choose the stated
number for each parish from among the men liable there by means of a ballot.^
There were now several ways in which the men required might be
obtained. The man chosen might serve himself. He might produce a sub¬
stitute who had to be from the same or an adjoining county, to have not more
than one child (for the augmentation frora the same county, but he might
have any number of children) and to be approved as a fit person by a Deputy.
Failing this, the principal was liable to a fine of £10 (£15 for the augmentation)
or else was compelled to serve,^ The Deputies were empowered to recruit
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men with these fines.Finally, the General Act empowered parish
officers with the consent of the Vestry to recruit Volunteers to serve
as substitutes and recover bounties paid to them to the extent of £6
each by levying a rate.^ For the augmenatation, it was jjOoVidcJ
$rnf>Iy that men might be brought forward at the local Meetings and
ballotting might be postponed in certain cases to allow the whole
quota to be completed in this way,^
Special provision was made for Quakers who chanced to be drawn.
The Deputies were empowered to provide substitutes for them and recover
the cost, by distraint if necessary. There was also special provision
for distraint on Quakers refusing to pay the rate for the levying of
volunteers.20
A ballotted man choosing to serve in person was sworn in by the
Deputies at the next local Meeting after the ballot. (Until 1797, he
had to swear that he was a Protestant)* If he did not so choose, the
substitute or volunteer had to appear and be sworn instead. Ballotted
men in the old militia had to serve for five years. Substitutes and
volunteers also had to, but with the addition that if embodied for
21
service they had to go on serving until disembodied. x The entire
augmentation was liable to serve for the duration of the war plus one
month. Time-expired men might be enlisted for a further term as
volunteers by the regiment.22 Militia men were not to serve outside
Great Britain.^3
Ballotted men whose assets were worth less than £500 were to be
paid a bounty of half the price of a voluntary recruit, at the expense
of the parish.2^ This provision was omitted from the first augmentation
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Act but put in without retrospective effect when most of the force had
been raised.^ Once ballotted, a man ceased to be liable until his
turn came round again (if ever) unless he only paid a fine, in which
case he was exempt for five years. Persons ballotted for the old
militia were not liable for the supplementary force.^ A ballotted
man's rights were not d^xninft^od in any way if he served by substitute.
The men having been found, a system was needed for drawing them
into service. For this purpose each county contingent formed a
regiment or regiments; the Act laid down in general terms the establish¬
ment appropriate to regiments of different sizes and the contingents of
the smallest counties might be combined.27 The Lord Lieutenant appoin¬
ted the officers, subject to the King's disapproval, and also to a
complicated scheme of property qualifications, which were lower in
28
boroughs and various other places than elsewhere. The Lieutenancy
was empowered at five-yearly intervals to discharge up to a third of
the officers if others expressed a desire to serve.29 in contrast to
these amateur soldiers, there was a full-time Adjutant from the army
with a small staff of permanent N.G.O.3. They looked after the arms
and stores of the regiment in peacetime, which were kept as a rule in
the county town.30
In peacetime, the militia was only called out for twenty eight
days' training each year. For the rest of the time, they were civilians
and not under any military jurisdiction. The civil authorities had the
job of calling out the men and punishing those who did not appear. The
Genera], Meeting fixed a rendezvous for the county and notified the parish
constables (through those of the hundreds) .*33- The Act of 1786 provided
k When the force was embodied for actual service, the constables had to
notify each man personally ( 26 Geo.Ill c 107J68)
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(as a measure of economy) that only two-thirds of the whole body were
to be trained| the rest were to be sent home again and used only to
fill any vacancies that might happen during the training.32
The King could embody the militia for actual service at any time.
He was obliged merely to notify Parliament within fourteen days,
calling them together if necessary for the purpose. When embodied
for service or training, the militia were under military law and
were paid and clothed as infantry.-^ Pay and clothing wore provided
by the national authorities, A "marching guinea" was given for each
man called out on actual service, to provide him with necessaries.
This came from the funds of the local Receiver General of the "(and Tax.
A further guinea was paid for the same purpose after every three years
of active service,34
When the regiments were serving, Hie replacement of men promoted
to be N.C.O.3, or dying or deserting or found unfit became an important
question. Vacancies were filled by the Divisional Meeting holding a
ballot of the men liable in the parish for which the man dropping out
was serving. In the case of deserters, the regiment could only ask for
a replacement after a lapse of three months and the deserter, if caught,
still had to serve the full term as a supernumerary. In the case of
men whom the regiment thought unfit, two Deputy Lieutenants had to
confirm the discharge before a ballot could take place.^ The general
Act prescribed a minimum height for the service of 5'4" but for the
Supplementary Militia this was lowered to 5*2",
For the purposes of this study the militia may perhaps be described
as a tax on manpower laid on each locality, payable in men and preferably
■la¬
in local men. How far it was from conscription is finally demonstrated
by some clauses at the end of the General Act which envisage the failure
of counties to raise their quotas. On Christmas Day each year, the
Lieutenancy had to send a return of the county militia to the Clerk of
the Peace for submission to Quarter Sessions. If there was no return,
the Justices had to raise by a rate on the county a sum equal to £5 for
each man of the county quota. This sum, paid into the Exchequer to be
applied as Parliament might direct, discharged the county's militia
obligation for the year.37 These clauses were not brought into play
during our period; tut it was only recently and under safeguards that
the counties had been willing to accept a fixed obligation to supply
men,
(b) The Militia System in Practice
Against the framework provided by the laws it is possible to make
intelligible the very haphazard information that has come down to us
about how the militia were actually raised and called into service.
The general conduct of business resembled the civil side of the
county government in being happy-go-locky and adhering only in a general
way to the law. Lords Lieutenants varied somewhat in seal, as did
their Deputies. The complaint is sometimes heard that there were too
few of these.' When the militia was augmented in 1796-7, seme counties
enormously increased the number to ensure there were enough always active.
84 were created in Derbyshire at one swoop, 30 in Essex and 29 in
Leicestershire.^ In the Forest Division of Berkshire, for which the
Minutes for 1786-95 survive, two or at most three was the usual attendance -
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two individuals doing most of the business - although as many as six
turned out on occasion.^ The only permanent officials were the Clerks
at Divisional and County level, and their number could be reduced by
pluralism. The Clerk to the General Meetings of Bedfordshire in 1798
for instance, was Clerk also to two Divisions comprising two-thirds of
the county.^ There is some evidence of defective clerical work. The
Cambridgeshire Militia complained that even in 1795, two years after
embodiment, the county had supplied no roll of the men who 3hculd be
serving with the regiment, and the Adjutant was unable to say which
5
parishes had failed to produce men.
Inefficiency apart, there were a few disputes on questions of
jurisdiction. The Corporation of Newoastle, for instance, claimed the
right to appoint the Deputies to serve within the borough (a right granted
in the General Act to Berwick), The Secretary of State gave his opinion
that there was no precedent for this,^
Of the various branches of business, the adjusting of county quotas
was neglected, as we have seen, by the Privy Council, The enlarging of
the militia in 1796 and its reduction in 1799 gave an opportunity for
complaint of which some advantage was taken. Carmcaflthen on the first
ocoasion found itself likely to be overburthensd in the new levy because
three parishes had been inadvertently included in the last county census
which belonged for militia purposes to Pembroke.^ (The law was that a
8
parish lying in two counties belonged to the one where its church lay).
The Membersfor Somerset similarly complained (March, 1799) that their
county*s quota was too large because part of Bristol had been included
in it that really lay in Gloucestershire and so too had all the visitors
to Bath and their servants.9 The complaint could be the other way.
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Dorset's quota was reduced, more than the common proportion in 1799,
to take account of the shift of population. The Lord Lieutenant was
upset, because this would entail a reduction in rank for some of the
militia officers."*"®
In the assessment of the burden within the county, the inter¬
pretation of the law was not strict. In calling for returns of men
liable, the Lieutenancy of Lancashire told the constables that men who
were exempt (a list of the grounds of exemption was included in the
precept) might be left out, although those merely unfit were to be
included,Probably most of the sifting of the lists was done at
parish level, where the circumstances of each man would be known. The
The Minute Book of the Forest Division of Berkshire contains no claims
for exemption for several years. Furthermore, many people did not
trouble to claim their exemption unless they were actually chosen in
the ballot. This was not legal but was apparently tolerated. The
Corcjifji Clerk to the General Meetings suggested to the Home Office
that they should be subject to a small fine.**"^
Various contentious cases did arise, which the Divisional
Meetings had to decide, A Meeting in Cambridgeshire had over eighty
cases brought before it at one ti; e. Eighteen appeals succeeded on
the ground of short stature and eleven because the applicant had two
or three children (in one case two and the wife about to lie in).
Various assertions of lameness in the legs or arms were made - some
were accepted, some rejected, and sometimes a medical certificate was
asked for, There is not enough detail to show if the Deputies were
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dealing justly,, Still, the man with a hare lip whose appeal failed
was doubtless jealous of the man who was excused because he had been
knocked on the nose, while the three one-eyed men who were made to
serve seem unjustly treated. In all, twenty one appeals were rejected,-^
The ground of appeal that appears to have caused most trouble was
membership of a Volunteer Corps, Successive changes of policy made
the position in this matter very complicated and Deputies sometimes
failed to do justice to Volunteers for this reason. At the same time,
many felt that the Volunteers were being let off too lightly. Lord
Bateman the Lord Lieutenant of Herefordshire opposed the formation of a
new Corps because it would increase the burden on the rest of the county,
The Duke of Northumberland, Lord Lieutenant of that county, would give no
support to the Volunteers because they would be the ruin of the militia."^
The reply made in Herefordshire was that the Volunteers were composed of
men who would never serve in person and whose obligation as Volunteers
was greater than what they would face under the militia laws, Full
consideration of this question must be deferred till the chapter on the
Volunteers but meanwhile we may safely accept the last view,^ The
absence of true conscription and the restricted number of the Volunteers
made the matter a financial one rather than a fight for men,
Roman Catholics were debarred by the oath from personal service
in the ranks of the militia. They had to serve fcy substitute whether
they would or no. A complaint was mado on their behalf by Lord Hawke^
and the law was amended as we have seen. It is doubtful if this amend¬
ment made any great difference - few wished to serve in person.
The burden of the militia seems in general to have been accepted
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by this time without much complaint and despite the considerable
augmentation in this period. This is in striking contrast with the
Provisional Cavalry, a compulsory levy which was an innovation. We
shall record some outbursts of popular anger but there were only a few
protests from the literate. To stand for these, here is the complaint
of a group of Cornish Yemen. The sum of half the average bounty for
recruits paid to each militia man was assessed on his parish, those who
had previously been drawn from the militia being exempt from the rate.
These exemptions had raised the sum payable each time to £5 for each
rate-payer. Soon there would be only one or two left, with a burden
/f
likely to make then bankrupt. The cost of the militia to the landed
interest is something that Bhould not be lost sight of.
The assessment having been made, the men had to be raised.
How were they in practice provided? Very few of them were "principals".
In 1793, the War Office decided to make an ax-gratia payment of two
guineas to substitutes who had been due for discharge but because of
embodiment must now serve for the duration. The militia regiments had
been circularized to know how many substitutes there were in each.
The answers have not for the most part survived but in a circular
acknowledging receipt of them, the War Office stated that most of the
19
men were shown to be substitutes. Returns of this period show 14.3
out of 560 in the Leicestershire regiment were ballotted men;'^ 69 out
of 216 in the Monmouthat'll out of 477 in the West Middlesex.^2 The
23
Nottinghamshire regiment had only 34 principals and the substitutes oui>-
numbered them by six to one in the Worcestershire.^ Principals who
did serve were often men who might have enlisted; like the one in the
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Lancashire militia who wrote to complain that his family had not received
their allowances and said he was an old soldier who had served at the siege
2*5
of Gibraltar.
For those who could not afford to hire a substitute by themselves,
the commonest device to discharge their obligation was probably a Militia
Oluh. The men of a parish who were liable would join together and
raise by subscription a suia to be given to those on whom the lot fell,
to pay for substitutes. From Atherton in Lancashire,, there survives
a rough paper (unfortunately without date) the phrasing of which
suggests an uneducated writer, in which 166 men engage to subscribe
?/- eaoh, yielding (after deduction of 2/~ "paid for warming") £53. If
none of the subscribers were chosen in the ballot, the money would be
refunded. If it proved insufficient for its purpose, the ballotted
man had no further claim on the subscribers,^
Informal arrangements of this kind could of course be commer¬
cialized. A "Militia Society" advertising in a Worcester newspaper in
November, 1795, offered for a subscription of 5/6d. to get a substitute
for anyone drawn before November 1st next year. It had agents in
Evesham and Kidderminster and customers could also send their sub¬
scription through their newsagent,27 An army officer reported that at
Salisbury the Postmaster (who was also the printer of the local paper)
2f?
sold the prospectus of an insurance society, Later we shall find
Lord Seaforth having trouble with the companies in Scotland. Charity
as well us commerce might step in, however. In Scotland, also, we find
societies of gentlemen formed to hire substitutes for the poor of the
29
locality. The Duke of Buccleuch declared this "to be the normal
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English practice.
With the help given him by the legislature the poor man was
probably able as a rule to comply with the law without excessive
hardship. In one Division of Cambridgeshire, a Deputy was
astonished after the ballot for the Supplementary Militia to find that
many who could ill afford it were paying ten guineas for a substitute
without a murmur. A few who had not found men were given a day or two
more to do so.^
The arrangements so far described wore better adapted to supplying
money than to getting the men when it was supplied. For this also,
collective effort tended to be substituted for the action of the indi¬
vidual b&llotted man. In the Linton Division of Cambridgeshire, where
almost all the parishes had subscriptions to provide substitutes, the
men wore hired by the Clerk of the Division. The Deputies approved of
this practice, since b&llotted men could hai^y wander about the country
searching for substitutes and were not good judges of whether the men they
found wore fit to servo. The Clerk expected some remuneration for his
trouble but was not out for profit. In raising one batch of nineteen
32
men, he only made three guineas for himselfI
Collective effort was stimulated as the war went on because an in¬
creasing proportion of ballotted men preferred to pay the statutory fine
rather than find a substitute. Lord Hardwicke in 1798 explained why.
When the Act of 1786 had been passed, the £10 fine was much higher than
the price of a recruit. Bounties had risen so much since then that the
fine was now a soft option - a fact recognized by making the corresponding
-14S-
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fine for the Supplementary Militia £15. Beside this opinion may be
set the experience of Lord Radnor in Berkshire as early as 1794. Man
were paying the fine in preference to finding a higher sum for a
substitute and the upshot was that the money paid in was not enough
to hire the number of men wanted. Lord Radnor asked the Home Office if
it was legal to hold several ballots for each vacancy until either a
substitute was produced or the accumulated fines grow large enough to
3/
complete the regiment.
There was something to be said for the prevalence of fines. They
wore a check on the further raising of bounties by the militia themselves,
•• ««
A well-to-do ballotted man or a militia club had no objection to paying
out a heavy sum once and for all. Recruiters for the army complained
from "the start of the war of the high prices paid for substitutes. Fifteen
or even twenty five guineas was mentioned — more than for overseas
service. The Worcestershire Regiment was offering the former sum in
1795,-^ when the competitive increase of bounties had been forbidden in
the other branches of the service. The limitation of the bounty that
might be given to militia men was considered by the Commander in Chief
and his advisers in 1797, but the idea was abandoned as impracticable.^
By limiting the liability of the ballotted men to a sum of £10 - almost
the same as the raaxiraum bounty payable by the Fencibles - or at the most
£15, it might be possible to do by inducement what could not be done by
compulsion,
Left with the fines on their hands, the Deputies came increasingly
to call on the county regiments to enlist men for bounty just like the
array. The General Act forbade militia regiments to beat up for recruits
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undor any circums tances.Hie augmentation by voluntary effort in
1794 was done in this way in some places however and it was legalized
in 1795 for the replacement of men who had volunteered to leave the
39
militia and go to the artillery or navy. In Cambridgeshire, a General
Meeting of Seotember, 1796, fixed the responsibility for filling the
deficit in the county regiment on the appropriate parishes and advised
all concerned, in view of the shortage of substitutes, to pay the price
40
and let the regiment find them, A memorandum in the Home Office
papers which appears to data frcaa early in 1799 noted that Deputies were
everywhere encouraging this practice with the result of divorcing the
ballot from the actual raising of the men. All the business of the
county might be complete, but the regiment would have not men but a
balance in its funds.Ms view is given point by a Court Martial on
Colonel Colby of the Pembrokeshire Militia in 1800, when he was accused
among other tilings of failing to raise two men in place of two who had
entered the navy five years before. It was found that he had not
raised the men, although he had not embezzled the raoney.42
It was the constant wastage of men from the militia when on
service that regimental recruiting was used to counteract, fhere is no
suggestion anywhere that the major work of raising the county quotas for
the augmentation was done in this way.* fhe subject of the deficit was
a source of constant friction between the county and the regiment. Under
the conditions of that time, regiments lost a fair number of men by disease
and desertion even when they saw no fighting. Men also had to be
"Except for Lord Buckingham* s proposal of 1796, which was refused (p.62).
But he was Lord Lieutenant end a territorial magnate as well as Colonel
of the regiment.
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replaced when promoted and Lord Kardwicke noticed that parishes were
reluctant to send good looking men to tho regiment in case they were
chosen to bo sergeants and had to be replaced* He suggested that the
A3
county as a whole should replace promoted nen.
The main battle centred round sen who were unfit. Regiments
tried to purge their ranks of short or unsightly raenA4> and refused to
accept some of the men sent to fill deficits* Deputies disagreed about
what constituted unfitness to serve as a recruit or a serving soldier.
In Cambridgeshire, they refused to concur in the discharge of a number
of men who were afterwards pointed out to an inspecting general, lie
agreed with the regiment and noticed especially two men who were lame
and one with a growth on Ms neck,^ One recruit was sent back at once
with an expression of astonishment that he had been passed by an
experienced Deputy.^ One parish flatly refused, to replace one dis¬
charged man and got two Deputies to sign a letter to that effect, although
they afterwards declared they did so only after a false promise to delete
the offending passage,^ Noting that twenty six of the Supplementary
/Qilitie newly .joined were unfit, the Lieutenant Colonel of the Carabridge-
sMre said that the men of the Suffolk were much better and inferred that
the Deputies there were much better supporters of their regiments,^
A memorandum of 1799 in Dundaa1 papers suggested that a penalty
should be imposed on Deputies not filling vacancies within a certain time -
soma had failed to act after three or four years,^ Another letter noted
that men enrolled in the county were not given any peremptory order to
join but stayed at hone for a month or two before doing so. They
nevertheless received back pay from the time they were enrolled - a "bounty
for a species of desertion,"^® Scattered instances could be multiplied
-151-
of friction and. hostility. It will bo observed that some of the
trouble, though by no means all, would be obviated by letting the
regiments recruit their own men.
It is not surprising bo find a permanent deficit in the militia,
with a tendency to grow,, Even in March, 1795, a return showed fifty
51
two regiments were together short of 1207 men and the Duke of Portland
sent a circular to sixteen (each more than twenty five short) exhorting
52
them to complete speedily. In April, 1796 the deficit of all sixty
six corps was 1832 (the effective strength being 35,333)and
5A.
appropriate orders were again given. Early in 1799, there was
apparently a feeling that the Supplementary Militia either could not or
need not be completed. Lord Salisbury noted in July, 1798 that Dmidas
had led some to believe that the government did not wish the deficit in
the augmentation to be made up.-*-2 The memorandum of 1799 quoted earlier
on the subject of recruiting by fines was written to show the injustice
of an idea of Dundas to stabilise the militia at the numbers then reached -
the counties who had done most would then bear the heaviest burden,
Wilberforc® wrote in the same sense in support of one of the Colonels of
the West Riding J&litia, He x/as disturbed at thx prospect of counties
who had found their share of the existing aggregate obligation of 104,000
having to maintain all their men when the total was reduced to 82,000.^
Soon after this, the reduction of the militia to fill the line regiments
robbed the problem of its urgency.* The militia had never apparently
risen above 80,000.^
'Severe measures were nevertheless adopted in 1799 but their importance
for us lies in their effect on the opponents of recruiting the line from
the Militia. See p. 321',
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(e) Problems of Mobilization
The militia sen, raised mainly toy a civilian organizations were
of no use until they were fitted into a military cacfie, Both the "old"
militia and the augmentation were conceived of as a reserve of trained
men who could be quickly assembled at need and as easily dispersed. For
these reasons it is unwise to discuss militia recruitment without showing
how readily the men could be made available in the various crises when
their services were called for#
The method of forming regiments and appointing officers has been
explained. The officers were of course drawn in the first place from the
county families and much of the smooth running of the system depended on
this. In Lincolnshire, the Lord Lieutenant wished to appoint officers
for the Supplementary Militia as soon as possible because resistance to
the augmentation there had largely come from the feeling that the gentry
should step forward first and lead the people, not merely coerce them#-1-
The militia was essentially a product of what we have called "tmitorial
recruiting connections", though in a roundabout way# •
From the military point of view, the system had its drawbacks#
The county corps were of very unequal size, ranging from two companies
for Rutland or Anglosea to five regiments (in 1798-9) for Lancashire or the
Vlest Riding. Where there were several regiments, they were completely
independent and presented no problem except for the one that comprised
the leavings after malting the rest a proper size# The average county
might supply a single regiment, but no two were the same size. The
officers were only half soldiers and tended to want a goal deal of leave
to attend to their private affairs - especially the senior ones who were
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men of wealth. When the militia wag embodied for any length of time,
these amateurs tended to resign and leave a gap that could not be filled.
Special acts had to be passed to give pecuniary encouragement to those
willing to act as militia subalterns^ and regular officers on half pay
were asked to come forward in the emergency.^
What with odd-sized units and absent officers, the militia might
well lack both efficiency and discipline. On the whole, however, it
seems to have been a well trained force, thanks largely to the devotion
of the ex-regulars who served as Adjutants. Striking instances to the
contrary served nevertheless to keep disquiet alive. A serious mutiny
of the Oxfordshire J&litia in April, 1795, during which they seized
grain and sold it cheaply to the poor, was attributed by the Mayor of
Hastings to the absence of two thirds of the officers.^" In 1798, the
militia of Cumberland, and "Westmoreland wore in a mutinous state - it
turned out that no Field Officer had been present with either since 1793.^
There was a very strong consciousness of the position of the
militia as the "constitutional force". Hie milfcia estimates were
prepared by a Committee of the House of Commons, not by the War Office.^
Hie government was as chary of giving orders to the counties en military
as on civil matters - they often did by legislation what they might have
done by executive action and consulted the Lord Lieutenants and officers
at every turn. Hie senior militia officers, especially those in either
House of Parliament, were members of a Militia Club which met during the
Session in London and gave their opinions on all questions. They were
the authors of the scheme for gratuities to subalterns already mentioned^
and we shall see them consulted over family allowances and the recruiting
-154-
A
of the army from the militia. With such men as Lord Fitzwilliam,
Lord Hardwicke and the Marquess of Buckingham at their head, they formed
an "interest" which the government could not ignore - which they never
showed any signs of wishing to do. Thus for political as v?ell as
military reasons, the militia tended to be a source of trouble or at any
rate preoccupation for the planners.
Tuch uero the general conditions in which the militia was brought
intb service. We can now turn to the successive crises or calls to
arms which the civil and military branches of the organization had to face.
The initial call out began in December, 1792 and took until March. The
first regiments to be called out were those of counties on or near the
south or east coasts,9 The two thirds that had been drilled in 1792 were
first called for, and then the rest,"'"® Gradually other counties were
called on, working across to the west until the Welsh contingents were
brought in. The War Office had to get the Lord Lieutenants to appoint
agents for the regiments and send details of the numbers of men to be
paidj^ the Treasury had to be informed.^
The counties had to cope with several problems. In Cambridgeshire,
and probably in most counties, the quota had been allowed to run down
towards two thirds the proper strength <* the number which the county was
obliged to train - and the deficit had now to be filled,"^ Whereas some
counties ballotted for a fifth of their quota each year, others
replaced the whole at once and the service of all the men ended at the
same time. In Buckinghamshire and Hertfordshire this was at the end
of 1792, It was thought fairest to disembody the former and ire-enlist
15
such of the men as were willing, replacing the rest by a ballot. In
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the other case, Lord Salisbury galvanized his Deputies into action and
said that there were plenty of substitutes a;id it ought to be possible
to get the regiment together without any postponement.
Elsewhere, the Deputies were left the choice of dismissing time-
expired substitutes and holding new ballots or making them save for the
duration. * In the latter case, it was decided to give a bounty
of two guineas at the government1 s expense, and likewise in future to
substitutes having to serve beyond five yearsThe former mode caused
trouble in the North Riding where the price of substitutes had naturally
risen in the emergency and there was a demand that the bounty of half the
price of a volunteer should be raised also-P In Lincolnshire a complaint
was that sen failing to appear bad been replaced by ballot while those who
20
esse were made to serve. These problems, and the matter of the families
treated in the next section, were overcome and the militia was 32,000
strong by the spring - though not at full efficiency.
Hie augmentation of 1797 was impeded in sane places by the riots
described later on. A little trouble was caused by failure to observe
any distinction between meetings held under the old Act and under the new,
and making the same do for both. This wa3 illegal. In Lincolnshire
21
it was one cause of the riots. In Northumberland, the Deputies felt
themselves unable to carry out the provisions of the Act because the
annual lists of men liable were made before they had cognisance of it and
did not contain information (for instance as to the size of families) needed
to decide on appeals for exemption from the new levy. The Act did not
*Fortescue (IV S3) implies that the militia had to be reraised from
scratch - surely a gross exaggeration.
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empower them to cell for ew lists and so they had reached an impasse.'"
They wrote to the Duke of' Portland who criticised their lock of initiative
and referred them to the amending Act.**3 They refused to be convinced until
June 1797, six months after the levy had been made elsewhere. A strong pro¬
test by Portland to the Duke of Northumberland^4 resulted in their consenting
25
to act, though sure that it was illegal. Portland asked as late as
OCt
November what progress was being made." The Duke of Northumberland was
both contemptuous of his Deputies and angry with Portland for having answered
them in the first place.
Legal difficulties such as this were evidently widespread for the
amending Aefc*^ is mainly a measure of clarification. Nevertheless it is
clear that the new levy was smoothly and expeditiously made for the most
part. General Dundas could say next summer that the force in nil but six
counties had not only been raised but trained.*
The duty of organising the training of the whole levy for twenty days
as soon as possible was laid on the Lieutenancy, as in the case of the peace¬
time militia. They were to fix the time and place and could divide their
county contingent into several sections to be drilled separately. Clothing
28
and arms were to be supplied as they thought necessary. The existing
militia regiments were to supply officers and NCOs to train the men as far as
2b
possible but additional officers might be appointed if necessary. The
30
amending Act allowed the use of Chelsea pensioners.
The General Meetings duly -ode arrangements and reported them to the
government. February, March and April 1797 were the months when most of
31
the training was done. There was a little difficulty over supplying




feared that any officers sent from th® militia would us® the occasion merely
32
as an excuse to go on leave. Absenteeism among the men to be trained was
also a problem; Lord Radnor was not sure of the way to impose filpes on
these people and order their replacement if they could not be found.^
But complaints were not numerous. In Cambridgeshire the enthusiastic
Adjustant Wale found the first division very willing to learn and made
good progress despire falls of snow. Some of the men became desirous of
entering the old militia and going on service at once. Wale thought the
whole body fit enough to be added to fully trained units without inconvenience.
Only one men absconded and in order not to disturb the goodwill he was
recommended to mercy when caught.^ The main problem arising (with sub-
, 35
sequent divisions; was lack of specie to pay the men.
The embodiment of the Supplementary jliilitia in 1798 was a more diffi-
36
cult matter# Rough plans for doing this had existed from the beginning.
General Dundas later proposed to embody a third of the force for some months
37
and then disembody them and embody another third, and so on. For this he
thought legislation xvould be necessary, IN January 1798 he advised the
government, since the necessary Bill would not be opposed, to order the Lords
Lieutenant to go ahead at once and have all completed by a specific dafce.^
The government did this, sending also the heads of th© Bill so that th®
39
Lieutenants could suggest amendments. The pace was too rapid. The first
Bill (passed on February 20th) specified the assembly of all the men by
40
February 28th, though General Dundas had pointed out the need for more
time in counties, where the instructions would be later in arriving.
4<
Within three days an amending Bill became law changing the dote to March 10th.
The earlier measure provided that when the men were assembled (by sub¬
divisions) one half were to be chosen by ballot and told to go to a county
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rendezvous appointed by bh© Lord Lieutenant.The remainder were to be
44
sent home. All were to be paid for their attendance. Militiamen might
volunteer to join the embodied portion in lieu of others on whom the ballot
45
had fallen. An Act passed at the same time enabled the army to recruit
from the Supplementary/flilifcia and the Lords Lieutenant were told by circular
to keep the embodied half at the rendezvous for a spell while the regulars
tried to enlist from them. After eight or ten days, those who did not enlist
46
were to be marched off to service.
The physical task of organization was great. The men had to be sent
as a rule to regiments serving at a distance from their own counties and General
Dundas stressed the difficulty of marching 20,000 men about the country in all
directions at the same time.^ The regiments had to spore some of their scarce
officers and NCOs to conduct them. Where this was impossible, the inexperienced
officers of the Supplementary/Wilitia had to be used. Lord Lieutenants were
told to appoint a full quota of these (one for every thirty men was the
guiding principle) but it was not easy to find When new regiments
were set up, the problem of command was naturally acuter. It was met in
part by sending some SCOs and steady privates of the old militia to be the
NCOs in the new battalions. An equal number of recruits was sent in exchange,
49
to keep up the strength of the old regiments.
heedless to say, there were wrangles between regiment and county about
the quality of the men. The Colonel of the existing North Riding regiment
insisted that the recruits be divided between his and thr new regiment on the
basis of their taking alternate men as they came up, The Lieutenancy pro¬
tested against the imputation that the men were inferior.**" Deserters some¬
times presented a problem. The new Act put in force the provisions for
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punishing and replacing deserters already in use for the old militia.
The Lieutenancy of Cambridgeshire had the ingenious idea of allowing persons
ballotted to replace deserters a limited time in which to try and catch the man
52
they were to serve for. If they succeeded they were discharged. This was
not legal under the general Act but appears to have been so under the new one.
The most controversial problem was whether the new levy was entitled
under certain conditions like the old to half the pries of a volunteer.
The second of the two acts of 1796 specified the assessment of this sum by
the Deputies, but for the purposes of the General Act."- The embodying Act
54
said that it was to be given only to men ballofcted thereafter. There was
C
a violent legal controversy about the due of the rest. D When the question
first came up, at the time of the drill in 1797, the government declined to
give an opinion and said that if informal agreement among the Deputies was
impossible someone should bring an action in the Court of King's Bench.
They seem later to have come down in t eir own minds against the men.
In Lancashire, the Deputies paid the money and were then unable to compel
the parishes to reimburse them. ° In Lincolnshire, the money was refused
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to the men, who accused the Deputies of withholding their rights. By that
time, the government could answer with the view incorporated in the embodying
, . 59Act.
No sooner had the first part of the new militia been digested than the
rest was called out (April 1798). The embodying Act empowered the King afresh
59
to do fchis» so there was no further legislation. On this occasion the work
seems to hove gone ahead without much trouble or complaint.
The final crises within our period were the two reductions of part of
the militia in 1799. They formed part of the schemes for getting militia
men to enlist in the line. The plan of July envisaged reducing militia quotes
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by one qusrter. A circular instructed Lord Lieutenants to fill any deficit
there might be before this was done and to eliminate any surplus left after
60
men had gone to the line by discharging unfit men and men with large families.
Thus there was a straightforward purge by the regiments of undesirable elements,
without the need to quarrel with the parishes about replacement.
In October things were more complicated. Three-fifths of the quotas
of July had to be reduced, and those wno did not enlist were not to be dis¬
charged but to remain militia men, subject to recall. Casualties in the
militia were to be replaced from this reserve, which was to be kept up by the
counties to one fifth of the July quotas. Men enlisted for the augmentation
of 1794 were not to be disembodied, es they would not be liable to recall.
There was no other restriction on who might be released., Where there were
several regiments, the Lord Lieutenant had to arrange and co-ordinate the
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work: in some counties the number of regiments had to be reduced.
In these larger counties, the Lord Lieutenants had a difficult time.
Lord Derby in Lancashire feared in the earlier reduction that through lack
of co-ordination too many would b© discharged and the county would refuse to re-
6H
place them. For the second occasion he got the two regiments to be done
away with to send a third of their strength to each of the other three regiments,
the reduction being made from these aggregates.^ Even then, one regiment com¬
plained that it was sent all the bad men, and the share of another had to be
64
marched to it, having already participated in one diebandment, Lord Fitz-
william decided to adopt Lord Derby's plan in the West Hiding and also to
disband firstly men with families, then those serving as principals and then
65
by lot. In general, family men were let out first.
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The disbanded men war© marched home in s body and given two weeks'
pay and their uniform. Full lists (showing for whom each man served) had
to be sent to the Clerk of the General Meetings, The officers who became
redundant retired and received a gratuity of sip months' pay, A certain
number might be kept on as supernumeraries or with lower rank. There were
66
similar arrangements for NCOs. A good deal of trouble was caused by the
jealousies of the officers on this occasion, the Colonels and Lord Lieutenants
making valiant attempts to be fair. It will be seen that disembodiment was
a regimental rather than a county affair and no doubt better done in consequence.
Such was the way in which the national reserve force responded to the
needs of the hour. It was, considering its cumbrous constitution, remarkably
efficient in doing so, and its value as a recruiting instrument lay not least
in being able to produce men when asked and to keep them in store,
(d) Militiamen's Families
The soldier of this period was not normally a married man. If he was,
his family either lived in squalid conditions with the regiment or stayed at
home, usually on poor relief.* If e "citizen army" was ever to be created,
this would have to be changed. Here the militia led the way and in so doing
made part of its contribution to widening the field of recruiting. The
development of policy at this time is not without interest from our point of
view.
The militia acts of the mid-century had mad# provision for the families
of ballotted men serving in person, but by an oversight th© consolidating
Act of 1786 was silent on the subject, A meeting of the "Militia Club"
in December 1792 called Dundas' attention to the subject and h® promised
legislation. The main purpose of this would be to shift th® financial burden
from th® parishes where th© families were "settled" to those for which the men
2.
served. The question at one© arose - were the substitutes to be included?
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Lord Euston (Lord Lieutenant of Suffolk) ss?id that men would be disinclined to
serve if the matter was left to the discretion of magistrates.* From several
regiments including those of Suffolk, Devon and Somerset come reports of neglect
4
of the families by th© magistrates and murmurings among the men, Bundas
c
decided to refer the cose of the substitutes to the cabinet,1' The Act as
passed covered thems Dundos said it did not fix th© sums to be given in the
0
case of substitutes' families but it is by no means clear that he was right.
The system established wos that the wife of a militia man and each law¬
ful child under ten years old unless they followed the regiment were entitled to
a weekly sum each equal to a day's labour at local rates which was to be paid
by the parish in which they lived. The parish for which the man served would
reimburse the sum involved on the order of two Justices, If the respective
parishes were in different counties, the reimbursement was made via th© two
7
county treasurers.
The inclusion of the substitutes was not an innovation but dated from
th© previous war. A weighty case was made out against it nevertheless by
quite important people. Lord Buckingham said that this wes the heaviest bur¬
den of the farmers in the late war# Men with large families would not be
engaged in their own localities but would go Co other counties where the facts
were not known and thus impose themselves on the public. There should at
least be a limit of 5/- a week to what each family might receive as of right.®
Sir Charles Willoughby, Chairman of th© Quarter Sessions of Oxfordshire, also
spoke of the burden on the poorer formers and the need to conCtl5».8te them for
political reasons. Egged on by their officers, men ware demanding 2/- a week
for a wife, even when the parish offered to find her work. Sir Charles com¬
plained of the power in Parliament of militia officers and Lord Lieutenants
who promoted these expensive measures - interesting evidence of a "militia
interest" at work.*^
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Th© general working of the system need not concern us. An unsuccessful
attempt wa3 made to confine allowances to children born before the man entered
the service'*'* (it must be remembered thet substitutes were supposed not to be
allowed if they had more than on© child). Quarter Sessions seem to have taken
the lead in making scales of allowances which they recommended the Justices to
12
adopt in interpreting the act. Various anomalies cam© to light and were
corrected by later acts.*® In particular, NCOs. were brought within the
scheme. Tnere were occasional quarrels, such as whether the families were
entitled to allowances when the regiment was in its own county. The Law
14
Officers in 1799 concluded that they were.
The question remained whether family allowances might be extended to
other parts of the forces. There was a considerable controversy over the
status of the families of men who had beer, added to the militia by voluntary
enlistment (the plan of 1794). Volunteers in lieu of part of the quotas were
included in the scheme and specially mentioned by one act of 1795.
This was held not to apply to the men of the augmentation. Apparently a
sudden discovery of the state of the law was made by some authorities.
The overseers of Birmingham, which supplied men for all the surrounding
counties, reported in 1797 that the various county treasurers had stopped
paying for the volunteers' families.1® Something similar happened in Cornwall.
Considerable burdens were thrown on the places whence the men had come.
On bfahalf of Kidderminster, where the poor rate had risen from £70 to £100
a year as a result of this, a local M.P. requested legislation in 1798.
19There were other similar requests at this time. The counter-argument
20
was that an unlimited liaoility would be imposed on the county.
Nevertheless, the first act for the reduction of the militia in 1799 ordered
provision for volunteer's families at the expense of the county.
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In the offers of the militia to serve in Ireland lay a new opportunity
to extend the provision for families. The men had always to be reassured on
this head. For instance, the officers of the BedfordshireJ^ilitie promised
that if the rogiment went to Ireland they would use their influence with the
22
magistrates to see to it that the families y/era generously provided for.
On the other hand it was reported from Hampshire that the parsimony of the
2 %
magistrates had made the men unwilling to renew their offer to serve.
The government decided to help out. Orders were given to the Commissioners
of Taxes to pay 8d, a week to the wives and children under ten of men going
to Ireland, Payment was to be through the overseers as a rule but families
following the regiment were to receive the allowance - this marks an advance on
the statutory provision,1'^ Families of volunteers were however left out, as
they had beers at home,2 ^ One county regiment of Fencibl© Infantry - the Royal
Lancashire Volunteers - also received this allowance, being regarded as almost
OC
an augmentation of the militia.
Within the militia, allowances had b5» 1799 been given to men raised by
voluntary enlistment and men serving abroad. This invited comparison with
conditions in the regular army and when the enlistment of militia for the
line was planned, the question was raised, Dundas, in the memorandum of May
1st 1799 in which he presented the idea to the cabinet, proposed that allow¬
ances should continue at the government's expense for the families of men who
enlisted. He said that there should also be on annuity of 40/^- for the widows
of men who died in service and that this should be extended to the whole army,
which would encourage recruiting. The soldiers were jealous at seeing pro-
27
vision of this kind made by voluntary subscription for sailor's families.
Lord Spencer replied that such provision was made only when seamen were killed
in action; if the soldiers got something better, the seamen would demand
-16E-
rsciprocity, Grenville agreed with this. ® Windham*2® thought the idea of
pensions a good one.
The idea of pensions was not followed up. The provision of family
allowances in the case of militia men entering the army was opposed by Colonel
30 , .
Elford (for instance} because it would make the other soldiers jealous.
A suggestion was made that the bounty for the militia volunteers should be
regarded as partly compensation for loss of the allowances and that half of
it should be paid to the family.^ In the end nothing was done and militia
men entering the army forfeited the allowances - with results on the work of
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recruiting them that we shall notice in due course.
The problem of those families is part of the financial problem involved
in expanding the forces. A large part of the active manhood of the nation
could be drawn on only at on increasing cost per man. Compulsion moreover,
which might diminish bounties, ivas here leading to increased recurring charges
in their stead.
(a) The Extension of the Militia to Scotland
Owing to the fear of Jecobitism, Scotland had not been included in the
revival of the militia in the time of the elder Pitt. We have noted the
abortive Eill of 1793 which got only e first reading.^ hews of it had reached
Scotland! a Selkirkschoolmaster told Dundas that the idea was unpopular and the
Duke of Gordon said he could raise no Feneibles bill the militia has been com¬
pleted.^ The project then slept and in November 1796, at the time of the new-
English levies, Dundas told the Duke of Montrose, "you mtight be overrun with
half-a-dozen Invasions before a Scotch Militia Bill could b® agreed upon, formed,
passed and put in train for execution.""*
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A similar conclusion was reached at some meetings of influential person¬
ages in Edinburgh in March 1797 which woro the subject of a report by Colonel
Dirom* to the Lord Advocate. They considered a militia on the English pattern
unsuitable for Scotland because the middle class there was too poor to afford
substitutes. It could not be more than about 5000 men and to levy it would
cause trouble and tempt the enemy to invade. An irregular force like the
English supplementary militia would be the thing and they should try to
build up the Volunteer movement in imitation of this, ultimately devising a
militia law which would build on the basis of the volunteers. Meanwhile they
advised an augmentation of the Fencibles and the enlisting of men by the
4
"skeleton" regiments to serve for a limited time.
Others were now taking a different view. Some of the county meetings
called to consider the raising of volunteers - those of Berwick, Fife and
c
Inverness for instance - declared that the institution of a militia would be
preferable. At the end of March, the Buk® of Atholl was in London and
gathered from Portland that a militia bill was to be brought in, Dundee showed
him the correspondence on the subject and said that the Lord Advocate was drawing
up a bill but the opinion of the Scots themselves would decide the matter.
Returning to Edinburgh, Atholl found conflicting opinions: the Lord Advocate
had gone to Londbn to report and the government had delayed a decision till he
arrived, Atholl himself favoured a militia but inclined to think it a long
term measure which should not interfere with the Volunteers.
The government finally decided in favour of the militia, suspended the
augmentation of the Volunteers and brought in a Bill which was passed without
much difficulty in the course of the summer.''' In executing its first main pro-
it
Author of two complete treatises on the defence of Scotland prepared in
1797 end 1803 at the request of the Quartermaster General. Watson 1754,
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vision - a census of men between nineteen and twenty-three years of age -
the authorities were obstructed by the remerkabl© riots which will be described
in the next section. Having xveafchered that storm, they were bothered with fresh
doubts as to whether to call the force out. The Lord Advocate wrote to hurry
O
things up in November. The ballots were held and half the force was embodied
in May 1798 without opposition. Yet even in the autumn of that year, Atholl
desired a fresh start and a new act before calling out the rest. He proved to
9
be alone. The Duke of Montrose pointed out that legislation would so delay
the levy that the men would not b© trained in time for the start of the cam¬
paigning season of 1799. Futhermore, it might occur to Parliament to grumble
at the smallness of the force and the confinement of its service to Scotland.
After t'n® war there would be time for a new act to remedy these defects. ^
Thus the debate closed and the rest of the new militia was brought into service.
The character of the force may now bo explained. The main Act of 1797
followed the English pattern in the main, varying it to suit Scottish conditions.
Six thousand men were to be raised. This number was to be apportioned between
the counties by the Privy Council, to which each was to send a return of the
number of men liable.^ The work of taking the census was to be done by the
village schoolmasters. The men liable were those aged between eighteen and
12
twenty-three. Among the exempt were men with two children, schoolmasters
13
and professors. An attempt to get university students exempted as English
14
ones were apparently failed. An Act of 1799 widened the liability to
15
include men aged nineteen to thirty. Service was for the duration of the
war plus one month and was confined to Scotland. Substitutes had to be
unmarried,By the Act of 1799, ballotted men chosing to pay the fine and
being again bellottad were exempt from further liability on paying £5.-^
Previously, a fine seems to have carried no exemption.^-8
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In embodying the force, the Act envisaged counties supplying a company
of man or less. In the former case, the Lords Lieutenant were to appoint
all three officers of the company, in the latter they were to share this patron¬
age,*^ Although county regiments were provided for,2G the clauses allowing the
21
combination of small units into regiments were to have an importance they
seldom had in the English act.
In considering the application of the law, it will be convenient to
explain first how the force was called out and formed into regiments. The
census having taken place in August 1797, the quotas were apportioned by Order
22
in Council in March 17S8 and the ballot followed. At the same time, the
government announced their intention of calling out half end adding the rest
later ° and an act was passed similar to the one celling out half the supple-
24
moetary militir, The two helves were embodied by Orders in Council in May
and Dovember<,2'; They were formed into ten regiments, Perthshire and
Lanarkshire had one $ piece and the rest ware formed of groups of counties ,2t"J
The plan was probably the work cf Major Uundas Saunders, a relative of the
Dundases.2^ The government appointed the Field Officers and the grouping of
counties were probably decided by considerations of patronage, Dundas said
that if he had known Lord Crsufurd wished to command a regiment, he would have
put Fife and Stirling in different regiments instead of the same on©. As it
was th© Duke of Montrose (Lord Lieutenant of the letter as Craufurd was of the
28former) had on overriding claim*
Th© appointment of the inferior officers was a sourc© of some trouble.
The property qualifications laid down in tno Act naturally differed from those
in England, having to be expressed in terms of Scottish land law. Confusion
was caused by the absence of precedent and the doubt as to what constituted
29
the Scottish equivalent of a freehold. The Duke of Buccleuch reported also
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that the chance dating of commissions by the various Lords Lieutenants had
30
settled the seniority in his regiment in a very arbitrary way. Lord Seaforth
also complained of this and was anxious that seniority should go according to
31
previous service. He was also anxious that promotion should go by seniority
and persuaded all the Lord Lieutenant who apDointed officers in his regiment
?2
(except the Lieutenant of Caithness) to leave the filling of vacancies in his
hands.
It will be realised that the link between counties and regiments was
tenuous compared with the connections in England. This made the chief
difference when it came to raising men. Lord Garlies reported in May 1799
that as a result the counties sent any man who was not tot cfcivously unfit
and the regiments rejected any man who was not above average in quality.
There was no spirit of give and take, Many ballots had been held to replace
men whom the regiments rejected and soon there would be no men left to be
ballotted.*"""' The Lord Advocate commented that the General Officers Commanding
might be ©sk«d to arbitrate in such cases.^ Lord Garlics wss an optimist in
supposing that the problem was absent in England but the tone wss certainly harsher
in Scotland, Lord Seaforth had quite a sharp misunderstanding at the outset
with Hrodie the Lieutenant of Nairn (no enemy of his) over who was to arrange
for the men of that county to march to the central rendezvous of the Northern
35
regiment. H© complained that the counties sent him nc proper returns of
officers appointed or men ballotted, Men arrived with only scraps pf paper
bearing their names." In 1799, he was still grumbling at dilatory way of
doing business in the Highlands and trying to ley down standard forms of corros-
37
pondence. He had a first class row with Morayshire which tried to oblige
him to accept men under the regulation height. The regiment, he said, must
38
be the judge of whether © man was fit for His Majesty's service.
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It will hove been noticed that the ballot was very quickly followed
by partial embodiment. With the regiment in existence to recruit, the
counties were tempted to leave the work to them after providing a nucleus,
thus immediately adopting the current English practice and making the ballot
less of a reality than, for instance, that for the English Supplementary
Jlilitia, The Highland nobleman at the head of some of the regiments were
much better able to recruit than the counties. The duke of Atholl had to
be told to hold a proper ballot in Perthshire for the deficit in his regiment
39
and not fill it merely by voluntary enlistment, Seaforth got the men for
40
his own county of Ross, receiving the fines from those liable to serve.
He consented later to raise men for other counties supplying his regiment on
41
the same terras.
Energy on the part of the regiments was matched by slackness in the
counties, Caithness took no notice of Seaforth's demand for its quota of men
and then offered to pay him fines for them. He agreed to find men for the
second half of the quota, ordered to be embodied in November, but insisted on
A !?
the county producing the rest. Much earlier on, Dumfries, Orkney t-.J-
Clackmannan had failed to send in returns to the f>rivy Council and43 end ,r "«.al
act was needed in February 1798 to enable tfce <p.otae of the rest; to be apportioned
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without them, Dumfries had been held up by the riots but the other two had
no excuse. Finally all carried out the law except Orkney,* which sat tight and
did nothing, apparently on the ground that almost the entire male population
war© seamen, beaforth was furious at this. He said the inhabitants of
Wester Ross were as much seamen as the Orcadians - that is to say, both groups
were inshore fishermen. The Lieutenancy of Ross had ruled that they war© not
to count as seamen, and there was much discontent at what hah hap .yen-/: c iswhere.
Seaforth noticed that Orkney had been equally successful in avoiding © ''hot press"
on that coast some years before,4®
* Shetland was excluded from the Act,
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With the counties backward, the working of the local ballot was not
always smooth. The devices used in England to spread the financial load were
at once adopted. The gentry in Kincardineshire started subscriptions to hire
substitutes for those who could not afford them as soon as the first census
46
had been mad©. The insurance companies were active even in the Highlands
and caused Seaforth much trouble. Men who were ballotted took no action,
expecting the Company to do everything. Seaforth said that if they did not
produce a man or a fins, they would b® proceeded against as deserters and mad©
to serve if caught. Their agreements with the insurers wsrs nothing to him.
Nevertheless, he asked the Lord .Advocate to warn the companies not to evade
47
their obligations. On® firm said that the fault was all with the men, who
had neglected to notify their being ballotted,^ but there is seta© evidence
49
against this.
For the rest, Beaforth was troubled by men absconding without attempting
to join. A strong circular was sent to the Deputies of Ross calling on them
to eateh the deserters and if not found, to reploce them by a ballot in the
50
same parish. In Lewis, the brothers of seme deserters offered to serve
FT
instead. They were to be taken, if fit.' The fact that so many Highlanders
bore the same nam® led to at least on© cess where the identity of a ballotted
52
man was disputed. The authorities could be obstructive. The Factor of Harris
53 F4
shielded a deserter. The Deputies of one region refused to act.
Four constables were in prison at one point in 1799 for refusing to carry out
orders? their fines were paid for them.
The history of the militia in Scotland in these early years shows the
nation being accustomed for the first time to a compulsory levy. The size of
the force raised may not have justified the effort, but the government, bji its
perseverance in the face of opposition and even insurrection, had created an
important new militisry institution from which posterity might be expected to
derive the main benefit.
-172-
(f) Resistance to the Militia Lews
The government was successful in greatly augmenting the English militia
and creating a corresponding force in Scotland. That it came fairly near to
the maximum which the nation would bear and showed some courage in pressing
is
its policy homersugnested by the forcible resistance which it met with when
the new lews were put in execution.
The levying of the Supplementary Militia in November 1796 was the signal
for serious riots in the Eastern counties and a few elsewhere. Lincolnshire
was the county most troubled. There were several reasons for this. Lists
of men liable had been ordered to be made, not at the normal General Meeting
on the Thursday after October 24th but at a special General Meeting on September
30th.* This made the people suspicious and when the now plans of government
2
vrere announced they scented s plot. The Duke of Anca6ter, the Lord Lieutenant,
was an inactive men end so were his Deputies. The Subdivision Meetings appointed
to receive lists from the constables at Lincoln and Gainsborough were not held on
3
the appointed day owing to the Deputies failing to attend.
In the rest of Lindsay (the northern half of the county) thepe was violent
action against the Deputies who did attempt to do their duty. The first
meeting to be held was at Cafcstor. A mob of 500 or so gathered there, seized
the lists from the constables and forced the Deputies to adjourn.^
A few days later, another meeting was neld at Horncastle. It was November 5th -
market day and Guy Fawke's D^? - and young men had been coming into the town in
some numbers. Pickets were set up on all the roads to the town and as the
constables came in to deliver the lists they were stopped and made to give them
up. Those who objected were made to comply by being lifted up by the ears.
The mob then assembled in the town and began a demonstration where the Sub¬




Alford was the centre of a third Subdivision. In view of the violence
£
which had happened elsewhere, it was decided not to attempt a meeting there.
A mob nevertheless had assembled and was not satisfied. A Deputy who arrived
for the meeting in ignorance of the postponement wag given his horse and told
to go. The men then went to the house of a gentleman who was thought to have
the warrant for the meeting though in fact he was not even a Deputy.
Failing to get the warrant, they started to levy a contribution of 5/C from
each person of property in the neighbourhood. It was all peaceably done,
7
but the Vicar feared the worst when nig'ht came, if the men started drinking.
8
Money had also been demanded at Horncestle.
In southern Lincolnshire, a mob tried to interrupt proceedings at Boston,
but were frustrated by the Yeomanry.* In Norfolk the General Meeting itself
on November 15th was disturbed by the Norwich mob. They clustered around the
carriages of Lord ""Gownshend and the Deputies and would not let them enter the
10
Courthouse until o p&blic session was promised. Once inside, the leaders
of the mob were given copies of the Act and it was explained to the people.
The leaders proceeded to reply and kept the meeting in uproar. Finally,
the Lieutenancy adjourned to a private room and there made orders for Sub¬
division Meetings and a further General Meeting.At Lalinford, considered
the most riotous Subdivision, a ballot for vacancies in the old militia was
12
stopped by the mob. Several gentlemen of the county concluded that the
new militia could not be raised and a Mr Adair wrote to Lord Townshend on their
behalf, stressing the change of arming the people at all in present circum-
13
stances.
In Northamptonshire, there was considerable insecurity. At Welling¬
borough there *ras a riot which was ;ut down by a speech from one of the magis¬
trates and the orrivel of the Yeomanry. At Kettering, the Subdivision Meeting
14
was forced to adjourn and the lists were destroyed. At Northampton there was
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a noisy demonstration and th® mob invaded the room where the Meeting was
being held, but the Deputies succeeded in serving; the lists, finishing the
business elsewhere end dispersing the mob, all without the help of the
15
Yeomanry. Parts of Buckinghamshire were affected by this oofamotion.
16
Th® Subdivision Meeting at Wing was dispersed and the lists destroyed,
17
There were seditions leaflets issued at High Wycombe. On® Subdivision
Meeting in Cambridgeshire was so numerously attended that it was thought
prudent to have a troop of cavei ry stationed reedy just across the county
border.'''®
There were scattered incidents in other parts of the country.
In Warwickshire and Gloucestershire there was some murmuring and at Stow
on the Wold in the latter county there were signs of an attempt to organize
1Q
resistance. Meetings were interrupted and lists destroyed at Oswestry, which
was the centre of a turbulent industrial district,^ at Bala,'"* and at Ulverstone
in Lancashire.^2 At Penrith, it was the ballot that wcs interrupted, later on,
in December. A mob seized the records and burned them. The Deputies celled
on the principal inhabitants to appear and help to keep order, but none came.
The mob threatened to set fire to the building if the Deputies did not dis-
23
perse, so they adjourned.
On receiving news of the trouble, the Home Secretary ordered more
troops to b® sent where necessary. The Lord Lieutenants v/ere told to hold
large meetings of Deputies and others to enforce the law which everyone of
25
any weight or influence should be got to attend. " Th® ringleaders were
to be arrested as soon as it could be done without fear of their being released
26
by the mob. These instructions were carried out and in a short time peace
was restored and the law executed.
-175-
In Lindsey, the work was done by Mr Coltman, the Chairmen of Quarter
Sessions, and Sir Joseph Banks, President of the Royal Society, They laid
plans for imposing meetings at which Ellison, one of the county members was
27
to attend, When the troops arrived, a series of night raids was mode to
28
catch the leaders, some of whom had fled. Informations were heard at
the normal meeting of Justice at Spilsby and then special meetings were held
at Alford and Horncastle on the two following days to hear more. Three men
were sent under guard to Lincoln end the informations were sent to the govern-
30
mcnt with a view to prosecution at the expense of thetreosury. On November
19th Ellison reported that all was quiet, though the farm servants were still
31
restless and there was need for the presence of troops.
In Norfolk, the second General Meeting to receive lists from the Sub¬
divisions was held without incident. The Magistrates of Norwich who had
been supine on the previous occasion, pledged their assistance. Special con¬
stables were sworn in. An imposing body of troops was drawn up in front of
the Castle. The mob contented themselves with burning Pitt and Dundas in
32
effigy. In Northamptonshire, the magistrates decided that the troops ought
to be in attendance at all the Subdivision Meetings. This wos done.
At Thorpe in the south-west of the county, Mr Wodhull, the local Deputy,
refused to allow them to attend the meeting or to give them billets in the
area. They were given lodging by some sensible farmers and only thus, it
was thought, was a riot prevented - the populace was only waiting for them
33 iA*
to leave. Mr YYodhull resigned in protest at this unconstitutional lnter-
34
fereno© with the functioning of the militia laws.
Lord Buckingham was anxious to restore order in his county himself.
The Aylesbury Yeomanry Troop went to the help of the magistrates at Wing and
he followed with the Buckingham Troop. They attended several subsequent
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meetings there to overewe the populace and chased and caught several ring¬
leaders. The people of Chadlington fought a rearguard action with them to
protect the retreat of one or two. Trials were planned, again at the expense
35
of the Treasury. Elsewhere the disturbance had been small and order was
soon restored.
las the movement seditious in character and origin? A good deal of
provocative rumour lay behind it. In Lindsey the story had been that the
cost of getting substitutes would be two or three guineas for every man liable.^
3'
In Warwickshire, the people were told that they would b® sent to the East Indies.
2BIn Northamptonshire it was thought that the people had simply been misled.
Efforts were made to explain the scheme by means of advertisements explaining
that the levy was for home service under local officers and the number required
39
was a small proportion of those liable. Lincolnshire had one of these but
40
they also appeared in counties like Worcestershire where there was no trouble.
In Carnarvonshire, the proceedings of the various Meetings were wisely trsns-
41
lsted into Welsh*
A certain amount of organisation ley behind the demonstrations. The
Crier of Spilsby had gone about on the Monday before the Ilorncastle affray
reading a notice that the young men going thither were resolved neither to
pay nor to serve. This had followed a meeting in the churchyard the previous
42
day. Oaths were take . The rioters both at Home 83 tie and Alford wore
blue ribbons.4^ The democrats at iotbingham tried hard to exploit the tew
situation. Abandoning a meeting to call for peace, they orgs ized os in the
town (w ere fee magistrates were friendly) to protest against the new lew,+'
A Pistol Club was formed and loyal citizens were terrorized by shots fireP
into their houses. The government were warned to send a force of infant
when the ballot was held - cavalry could be opped by stretching chains across
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the narrow lanes# Proper measures would seem to have been taken as nothing
further was reported.A~' It appears that the radicals were resdy end able to
make capital out of popular misgivings, but t at little came of it whan the
government nad fully informed the people and at the same time shown willingness
to use troops.
The protests of England were puny compared with the rebellious convulsion
which swept across Scotland at the end of August 1797, As Sir Gilbert Elliot,
not long home from the turbulent Mediterranean put it "Scotland wet stark mad
as if it had been bit by Corsica".^6 The occasion was the holding of Subdivision
Meetings to make lists of men liable under the new act. Trouble started in
Berwickshire, On the 17th, Lord iiovwe reported that Meetings had been interupted
4?
and Deputies assaulted ad forced to resign* Mobs had gone through the
48
country forcing all to join them and one Deputy had had his ricks burnt. The
49
movement spread to Roxburgh, where the women viere very active in making trouble.
There was a violent set to between mob and Yeomanry at Jedburgh, a Captain being
50
severely wounded.1 At Selkirk, the Deputies wore run out of town by a mob from
Galashiels*^ East Lot ian was in confusion - there were riots at Gifford
ard Haddington* Elliot saia that the schoolmasters were everywhere being
intimidated and refusing to act."* At Canonby in Midlothian the young men
P4
seized the parish registers and their elders could not calm them.
Meanwhile, on the 23rd, the Duke of Montrose had arrived in Edinburgh in
the middle of the night to say t at mobs in Stirlingshire were obstructing ad
terrorizing both the Deputies and the schoolmasters." There was no general
disorder) the Sliding Volunteers were called out and the various meetings were
56
adjourned."" At Forfar, the sheriff and magistrates were forced to suspend
t eir proceedings ad give en undertaking that they would go no further."
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In Fife, there was widespread trouble and destruction of lists In West
59
Lothian, riots at Linlithgow and Bathgate,
It was in Lanarkshire ard Dumfriesshire that things were worst. In the
former county, the Duke of Hamilton was an inert Lord Lieutenant and few
Volunteers had been raised. The Duke had unsuccessfully asked for more troops
60
to be sent. The method of opposition favoured there abouts was to threaten
Deputies in their houses, Mr, Grierson in Dumfriesshire had held a Meeting
peacefully but the mob came to him and forced him to agree to do no more.^
Mr, Lockhart was at the house of a friend when the mob invaded it, looking for
him. He argued with him for some time and finally signed a noncommittal
62
statement. He was an old mane and was so upset by this experience that he
resigned his Commission,6^ Mr, Brown, having been forced to take an oath at
his house in the sense desired by the mob, got the Duk© to suspend the act in
his district. He was very anxious that an attempt at legal proceedings be madej
64
the law would be made; the law would be flouted further.
The Provost of Lanark, finding himself abanddned by his burgesses, gave
65
the mob the desired undertaking. In the north of the county, at Cadder, the
mob searched the Deputies for papers when they arrived and kept them prisoners
66
for an hour, trying to make them swear an oath. The schoolmaster there had
had his papers takem from him the previous night by a mob led by two men with
blackened faces and women's clothes. He had had to flee the perish,
67
His family had been living in dread for a fortnight. At Rilpatrick, near
by in Dumbartonshire, a mob coming largely from Cadder chased away the Deputies
who took refuge in the house of the Lord President of the Court of Session,
The mob was afraid to attack the house. The volunteers and some troops hurried
CQ
out from Glasgow and dispersed them with bloodshed. Such was the character
of events that the Duke of Hamilton finally concluded that the Act could not be
70
executed end suspended it throughout his jurisdiction.
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In Dumfriesshire, the schoolmasters were everywhere the subject of
violent threats and the Deputies and the various meetings were forced to
promise to stop. Only Dumfries was quiet, thanks to its U>lunteers who also
71
marched out to protect the house of one Deputy, At Moffat, the people
locked the Deputies in the church, burned all the papers and paraded through
72
the streets behind the town drum. The Duke of Buccleuch reported that the
73
whole of Annandsle was terrorized. In Ayrshire, Beith in the north and
Ochiltree in the centre were centres of trouble. The people of New Cumnock,
near the latter place, almost killed their schoolmaster by ducking him in s
loch. Large meetings at night were reported to be held on Galston Moor near
Kilmarnock, The Deputies of Gilston had made improper promises to their
charges,7^
At New Galloway in Kirkcudbright, the meeting had got through its
business in peace when three cheers were given and a crowd rushed in and
75
seized the papers, trying to extract an oath from the Deputies. In
Wigtownshire, finally, the Act was not executed in half the county as a
result of a preposterous Incident when the Deputies at the meeting at Wigtown
were shut up inside their meeting place with a body of troops drawn up out¬
side. The mob was able to prevent them giving any signal to the troops, who
were therefore unable to take any action against the mob.
The government showed itself resolute amid the surge of revolt.
Responsibility mainly lay with a small group in Edinburgh - Lord Adam Gordon,
the Commander in Chief, the Lord President of the Court of Session, the Dukes
77of uc«"leuch and Montrose, Lord Adam wrote for reinforcements and there
were also letters to the Home Office from various |.ord Lieutenants. The Duke
of Portland at once gave orders that General MusgraV®, commanding in North East
78
England, was to reinforce Lord Adam whenever asked. He instructed the Lord
Lieutenants (as in the troubles of 1796) to rally,the weighty inhabitants,
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overow© the people by their authority and by military force, and arrest the
79
ringleaders when it could safely be done, Dundas was at once consulted in
view of his special knowledge, and he suggested putting printed notices on
80
church doors to inform and convince the people.
On the 27th the Lord Advocate who had been in the Highlands, was
back in Edinburgh, He found a party of waverers, led by the Solicitor-
81
General, which he proceeded to squash. He was sure that firmness would
secure obedience and noted that in the south-east, where trouble had started
82
it was already subsiding. The Duke of Hamilton received orders from both
83
London and Edinburgh to rescind his suspension. In view of the danger in
Lanarkshire and Fife, the little group in Edinburgh supported Lord Adam in
84
requesting 3000 men from General Musgrave. The Lord Advocate's confidence
inspirited London, Dundas wrote on September 4th that he was clearly taking
the right steps and there should not be a cabinet meeting on the subject as
85
that would dramatise the situation, Portland told the Lord Advocate to
make the propertied classes conscious that this was a dangerous radical revolt;
to enforce the Act first where it was easiest and at a later date in the more
difficult counties: and to inspirit the Yeomanry and Volunteers by having
parties of regular troops to support them and protect their hones - as in
86
Ireland, Portland throughout was insistent on the need to bring forward
87
the Volunteers against the mob. The political good sense of this is obvious.
Before this time, on August 30th, the Lord Advocate had -written to say
that the upper classes were now realizing their danger from the radicals. But
the gentry were cowed throughout the south west end in West Lothian the Yeomanry
were demoralized by the threat to their barns. He had two fears: that adequate
reinforcements would not be sent and that the gentry would continue to allow
38
themselves to be intimidated. This was his nearest approach to pessimism.
181-
His later letters contain both bad and good news through most of September,
but he always inclines the balance on the favourable side.
The authorities would seem to have succeeded in quietening the fears
of many of the people. Proclamations were issued by such Lord Lieutenants
89
as the Dukes of Buecleuch, Hamilton and Montrose, They all took much the
some line, with variations. The levy was not en onerous one and family men
were largely exempt. The honour of Scotland demanded that they should have
a militia. The English had resisted its introduction there in former days
but were now reconciled to it. Substitutes were allowed by periodical sub¬
scriptions, (Montrose gave £40 to one of these). Service would be limited
to North Britain and the pay end privileges (including the right after dis¬
missal to practice a trade anywhere in Great Britain) were explained in detail
end recommended as very eligible. The Sheriff of West Lothian's^poster was
thought to be especially cogent, and copies wore sent for distribution to the
sheriffs of allthe Highland counties,^*
What could be done by good organization and careful preparation of the
public mind is seen in the case of Renfrewshire, Mr McDowell, the active and
zealous Lieutenant of the county, had begun by putting a very thorough explana¬
tion of the Act in the newspapers. He coupled it with s storn warning against
disobedience, making special reference to the Acts against combinations based on
the taking of oaths. He "staggered" the Subdivision Meetings so as to be able
92
to attend each one in person. On finding a schoolmaster who had failed to
make a list, he gave him a sharp order to comply with the lew and was obeyed.
At one place, he found nothing done because even the factory owners were dis¬
loyal - an unusual situation. He proposed to demand from them lists of all
their employees and post these up as the lists of men liable, leaving the
93
matter to be adjusted by appeals. Thanks to his vigour and good sens®, the
turbulent industrial county of Renfrew was perfectly quiet throughout the riots.
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Elsewhere, the appearance of troops heartened the gentry who proceeded
with th© business as soon as they wore able. The South-East was the first
area to be qi ietened, The alarm had first been raised there and the capital
was near at hand, so that it was easy to order and to send reinforcements,
94
3y the beginning of September, Berwickshire and Roxburghshire were quiet.
In the latter county the Duke of Roxburgh desired the troops to remain in
support of the Volunteers - the farmers who mad® up the Yeomanry were busy
harvesting and the Infantry were not mobile enough. The work of taking
precognitions against those who had intimidated schoolmasters was going forward
95
- not very easily because th® schoolmasters accused everyone indiscriminately.
In West Lothian, the Volunteers attended th® meetings at Linlithgow and
Bathgate and prevented further rioting. They were supported by a body cf regular
96
cavalry. In Fife things had quietened down and precognitions were taken in
97
villages where lists had been destroyed, new lists being ordered.
In Midlothian, the entire Voluhteer force of Edinburgh was mobilized by the Lord
98
Advocate and ready to march in support of the Lieutenancy, Proceedings there
99
were carried through without interruption.
The black spot in the south-east was the violent affray at Tranent, in
East Lothian on August 29th, The Deputies went to hold a meeting at that
village accompanied by detachments from tvro cavalry regiments. Tranent then
consisted of a single long narrow street and the place of nesting was a public
house about half way along it. The troops escorted the deputies thither and
then stationed themselves at either end of the street. A mob now came and
demonstrated in front of the inn, driving away some soldiers who were sent to
guard the door. The deputies barricaded themselves in. The cavalry galloped
down the street but were driven out with two hurt by the hurling of bricks from
the roof tops. The Deputies were also bombarded and the people went out into
the fields to attack them from the rear. This was their undoing. The cavalry
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wenfc round end scattered them and then opened fire with their pistols at the
men on the roofs. The mob scattered in the fields and there was a general
100
chase.
This chase was the cause of much trouble. The officers lost control
of their men - apparently because the bugle calls of one regiment were not
intelligible to the mei? of the other - and the exasperated soldiers hunted their
101
opponents across country, killing 11 a d wounding 13 - some of them at least innocent
102
bystanders. The Public were much upset and began to talk of a "massacre".
The government considered a public prosecution cf the soldiers? a private one
was started under the auspices of Opposition lawyers.105 affair blew over
but was frightening while it lasted.
In the counties further out the return to normal was slower. Operations
104
in Stirlingshire a d Lanarkshire were postponed till the end of September,
By then the ferment had subsided a d little trouble was experienced. There was
need for a considerable military demonstration at Falkirk, where the manager of
105
the Carron iron works was celled in to help to keep his men in order. * In
Dumfriesshire the Act was not fully executed by the e d of the year.^° Ring-
"I AO
leaders however were arrested ad some meetings were held. At Moffat, the
108
troops clashed violently with the people as they had at Tranent. The
south-west was less disturbed and the arrival of troops put things to rights.
In Ayrshire, the Lord Lieutenant, with the help of some of the volunteers, visited
the more troublesome villages demanding submission. He agreed to intercede for
the pardon of the young men of Beith on condition of a full admission of guilt
109
and prompt execution of the law.
The groat fear now was that the Highlands would fijjulsfce the Lowlands and
give trouble. The Duke of Portland was more afraid of that than of a serious
rising in the industrial areas.Lord Adam Gordon said that cavalry would be
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useless in the Highlands and it would be difficult to subdue them but he did
not expect trouble, ** There were in fact only two outbreaks early in
September, In the Ahoyne district of Aberdeenshire, a mob assembled a d
insulted a Deputy and a Minister, The Subdivision Meeting had already been
postponed to allow a broadside sent out by the Duke of Gordon to circulate,**2
The Duke visited the area himself and reported all clear at the beginning of
October, **®
In Perthshire, the Duke of Atholl behaved very weakly. Before the
business began, he had already agreed with the Deputies that proceedings should
stop if the act was resisted.**^ He was himself confronted by a mob at Blair
Atholl and after reasoning with them in vain he consented to a suspension ir. the
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district. Other deputies also met opposition a d he wrote round to them
giving permission to stop if they wished. In the Highland part of the county
there was a total suspension and in the lowland area things were little better,
A good deal of violence was offered and this may have saved the day, for the
Duke's tenaatry turned out to protect his person and were very active in helping
to arrest ringleaders, 'roops were now coming up and quiet was restored,***^
The Duke wished to hold up the business further while he induced the people to
raise recruits by ordinary enlistment and thus supply the farce required,118
But the Lord Advocate was told early in October that a proper census could safely
be held,**® and the Duke was urged in that direction,""20 With this episode
the revolt may be said to have closed.
We must a.:,ain enquire into the character of the revolt a d whether it was
a seditious movement. The authorities were all certain that it was a Jacobin
plot because there WB3 simultaneous outbreaks everywhere,1^1 This is much
more likely to have been due to the holding of oubdivision Meetings everywhere at
much the same time; a real revolution is seldom well planned. The people
-185-
had certain grievances. The raising of a very small force of militia after
offers to raise a very large body of Volunteers had been refused, looked
suspicious.The restriction of the levy to those aged nineteen to twenty-
three had been meant so generosity but was the reverse for those on whom the
123
burden fell. The people had not been properly informed and Iialdsne of
Gleneagles said that they now expected to have everything explained to them
"so far as the spirit of democracy prevailed". He also thought they remembered
the fate of the Scottish Fencibles, bullied into saving in England against their
124
original terms of service.
There was no need to postulate sedition, and reports of it must be to some
extent discounted in view of the prevailing panic. An example of this may be
givem Mr. Forbes of Celleuder arrived in Edinburgh in a great hurry from
Stirlingshire a^d said that he had personally witnessed the mob burn his mansion
to the ground. It subsequently appeared that they had not come nearer than
12R
fifty yards down the drive and had not so much as broken a window.
.evertheless, the seditious,as in England, worked to turn the situation
to account. The Minister of Campsie described how they created discontent out
of nothing by spreading rumours and jeering at the young men as priest-T» otden
and sellers of their birthright. Parties of young men then went through the
126
district intimidating the rest. In this area north of Glasgow, many who
were not natives - including many Irish - took part in the riots.In Pertnshir
there were s number of itinerant agitators and it was a large body of strangers
at Blair Afcholl who encouraged the local tenantry to the point of resisting their
128
Duke. There ere plenty of cases of intimidation to increase support, as
129
for instance in Berwickshire.
At Strathsven in Lanarkshire, the young men met a d elected leaders. It
was proposed to petition the authorities in Edinburgh against the Act but the
-186-
villagers were dissuaded from this scheme by e local lawyer deputed to help the
schoolmaster,*^ At Dairy in Ayrshire, the people plan1 sd a Tree of Liberty,
These democratic strivings were surpassed in Fife where sixty-one villages elected
e delegate each to a central body, A meeting of thirty of them war, visited
by some magistrates with a party of Yeomanry. They were told that they might
continue their meeting (they too were drawing up a petition) but ware warned of
132
the likely consequences to themselves.
From Lanarkshire it was reported that the Act was making the government's
153
natural friends - the country peopl© - link up with the townsfolk in opposition.
CL
There ars^few signs of more respectable elements fishing in troubled waters.
Mci)owsll in Renfrewshire reported a number of persons of substance (besides the
134
factory owners mentioned earlier) as hostile to the Act, A deputation
interviewing one Lanarkshire Deputy celled for the abolition of the horse tax t-
which sug est's that there were persons with some property in the movement. There
is little doubt that the mass of the p ople were loyal - nor was it supposed
otherwise - but the authorities were surely right in believing that if they
yielded in this matter, other grievances would be brought forward and a most
fruitful ground for agitation opened up,*®®
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CHAPTER VII ; COMPULSORY LEVIES ; SPECIAL F ORG RJ A'.D CASES
(a) Problems of Urban Areas
The last chapter describes the levying of a force in a country that
was predominantly rural and then the raising of a similar force in a funda¬
mentally similar country. In this chapter, we shall describe what happened
to the county military institutions, when they were set to work in a different
milieu and when they were given the task of raising forces of a different kind.
It is a commonplace that the eighteenth century system of local government
worked tolerably well in the countryside but broke down in the more urbanized
areas. The seme thing applies to the system in its military aspect. In
Birmingham, for instance, the overseers considered it impossible to take a census
and conduct a ballot in the normal way. The county agreed to assume that their
fair share under the General Act was 109 men and this number of volunteers was
raised at the expense of the perish rates.* The second Act relating to the
Supplementary $2i.litia ordered a special return of men liable to be made from
thence to the Privy Council which was to fix the town's quota d?r«ct instead of
leaving it to the Lieutenancy of Warwickshire.2
The two areas which appear to have given most trouble by reason of their
urban character were Greater London - especially Middlesex - and Lancashire.
The Middlesex regiments were the worst in the militia. In August 1793, one
regiment was still ninety below strength. The Lieutenancy had done nothing to
3
supply men but they had picked up some going through Essex. In November 1798,
Colonel Lord Mansfield complained that even the "old" establishment of his
-138-
regiment was ninety short. Of the Supplementary $lilitia, the Yiiar Office
had led him to expect 700. Only 120 had belatedly arrived and half of these
were unfit. After five years of war the Deputies had still not sent rolls of
the men who were supposed to be serving, showing for whom or where they served.
Among other things, this made it impossible to certify that certain men were
4
entitled to a small bounty for length of service,
A report on the Y/estminster (Middlesex) regiment in 1799 stated that
tiere was a deficit of 745 men. Of the Supplementary Militia for the regiment
only 355 had been supplied instead of 745. The effective strength was only
120 Privates of which only 80 wore fit, the youngest of whom was sixty.
There were only five a-tive officers. The inspecting officer sug ested the
discharge of 34 unfit men and was astonished to find that the drill was as
good as it was.*'
This report, though the worst, is not untypical. The SurreyMilitia
was also thought poorly of. In 1799, the first regiment was described as a
poor one. The Lieutenant Colonel was Inactive and of the two Majors one was
6
frankly undesirable and one too old. It is unusual to find officers inspecting
the militia disapproving of both the officers and the men.
Lancashire did not suffer so much in the matter of quality. The county
quota, of 1786 was probably too small in relation to population, since in 1793
Lancashire had one regiment, in 1798 this was raised at a blow to five and in
7
1799, when the scale of force of 1793 was reverted to, she still had three.
When colled upon to bear her share of the augmentation, however, she fell short
in quantity. In November 1798, the 5th regiment was 600 short and the government
proposed to give up the struggle and disband it. Lord Derby the Lord Lieutenant
a *
demurred and promised that it would be 500 or 600 strong by Christmas.'
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Th© first source of the trouble lay in the volume of work required in
organising a ballot. In 1795 the Lord Lieutenant of Middlesex told the govern¬
ment that the vast population mad© the ballot 6t slow job and a quick filling
of the deficit was not to be expected. In 1799 he was saying the same of the
efforts to fill the gaps in the Supplementary j^ilitia and emphasizing the strain
Q
on the patriotism of the Deputies of so much work, Mr Stable's accounts for
his expenses as Clerk of the General Meetings and also to the Divisions of
Westminster, Holborn and Finsbury give a good picture of the volume of work.
For the Supplementary Militia, these divisions supplied 4997 men out of the
county total of 5820.^ In 1796-7 for raising the-SupplementaryMilitia, lists
and tickets for the ballot had to be made in these divisions to the numbers
respectively of 25,801j 23,311$ and 9,310. Ballots followed not once but
repeatedly, in an effort to fill the deficit end replace absconders. In 1797
the three divisions had twenty-three, eighteen and twelve ballots respectively.
The numbers chosen to serve were seldom under a hundred, usually over two hundred
and often four hundred or more.*^ In 1798 there was new lists and tickets to be
made and ballots totalled eight, eight and five. In 1799 they rose to fourteen,
ten and eighteen - all on a very large scale. In the latter year the Clerk hod
12
to attend 137 meetings in Holborn alone.
Each time a batch of men were drawn to serve, they had to receive individual
13
summonses through the constables. The following table indicates the size of
this task in some individual parishes.
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St. Giles in the Fields 2901 summoned (1798)
St. George, Bloomsbury ... 480 " (1798-9)
St. Margaret's, Westminsters-
Dean & Sanctuary Ward ... 193 " (1797-8)
Petty France Ward 173 " "
Milbsnk Ward 340 "
The numerous but very incomplete accounts of the parish constables from
which the above sample is taken make it clear that several constables were
functioning in each parish and perhaps the number was increased for thi6 purpose.
This did not redeem the system from clumsiness; the attendances of constables at
Meetings make impressive totals. Meanwhile the pluralist Clerk in his "General
Meetings" capacity had to make rolls for the use of the regiments and inform them
of the progress made. We do not know what staff he had but he noted that making
14
a roll of the fore® for Henry Dundas was a very troublesome matter.
In Lancashire, the Lieutenancy had to re-arrange the apportionment of the
quotes for the Supplementary jljilitia three times on receiving reports from sub¬
divisions that their original returns of men liable had been wrong. The Clerk
of the Liverpool Division reported that he had originally returned 3000 men lieble
but the Deputies had been dissatisfied and twice ordered the whole work to be
done again. The third list showed 4800 able to serve. The Clerk justified him¬
self by reference to the difficulty of the work in a big town and by the fact that
even the original 3000 were many more than had ever been returned from Liverpool
before,^ x
The shortcomings of the personnel are very apparent in Lancashire.
Tn© Clerk of the General Meetings was past his work for some years before his
1 6
replacement in 1798 by a more active man. There was a shortage of Deputies?
in the Warrington Division, not a single one was normally resident when the
17
militia was embodied - they were all officers. The lowrer parts of the organisa¬
tion were therefore liable to go astray. The returns of men liable in 1799
were not in the hands of the General Meeting in December, although they ought to
have been sent in by October.In 1792, so it was discovered, the constables
of Blackburn and Rossendale had left two or three hundred who were liable off
the list in each place.In 1798, it was found that no return had been mad©
on
the previous year by the constables of Preston. The General Meeting eventually
had one before it which it considered defective and a full enquiry was ordered at
a session which th® Corporation, the Vicar and the local J.Ps. were invited to
attend.
Apart from the inefficiency of the levy, the ease with which the men
could abscone in urban areas was the main problem, Nathaniel Conant, a sti¬
pendiary magistrate, considered that as the inhabitants of the urban part of Middle¬
sex, especially the poorer sort, were not personally known to each other in the
manner of a country district, it was fatally easy for the men to desert.
Substitutes behaved, it seems, just like ordinary recruits in going off as soon
as they had their bounty and in this way would hire themselves out many times over.
** p 2
Conant singled out the Jrigh in London as notable offenders. When the Supple¬
mentary Militia of Middlesex came to be drilled, only 70 attended out of the 485
of the first section called for. Lord Titchfield, the Lord Lieutenant, said
those that came were a very poor lot and could see little use in continuing the
23
training. In 1799, when the militia establishment was reduced and the men
released made liable to recall, he said the measure was impossible in Middlesex.
If the men they had collected were ever let out of the service, they would never
* 24be seen again.
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Conant estimated that some 3000 men had deserted from the MiddlesexMilitia
9t
during the years 1793-9. But the anonymity of a great city protected the
ballofcted men no less than substitutes and a great many chosen simply ignored th©
summons to serve or find s man. Dtable&J accounts record that after every one of
the numerous ballots a long list of such defaulters had to be called on to show
cause why they should not be proceeded against. He said that 5000 such summonses
had been issued in the period 1796-9, He did not not© how many of the offenders
were brought to book.4"6
In Surrey the Croydon. Subdivision raised 500 men out of © county "supple¬
mentary" quota of 2460 at a cost of £5000 and more. Nevertheless, the Third
regiment was 800 short when the force was embodied and Croydon's share of this
deficit was 200 which would cost £2000 more. They hoped to escape the burden
27
of putting the disused local Provisional Cavalry into the militia. As in
Middlesex th© fruits of so much effort had wasted away by desertion.
In Lancashire, it was likewise found that men would engage as substitutes
and desert the next day. In Liverpool and Manchester, seamen often engaged in
20
this way and were off th sea again before they could be sent to serve.
During the drill of the supplementaries, 250 were absent from the body trained
29
at Wigan alone.
Lancashire also had trouble in calling outfier supplementary men to b®
embodied. When the second hafl of the force was ordered out, the Deputies were
slow in informing the Lord Lieutenant what rendezvous were considered suitable.
It was therefore difficult to inform th© regiments soon enough when and where to
30
collect th© men. As a result some 600 men arrived in Manchester to find no
officer to receive them and no means of paying them. The local Deputy was
absent} th© Justicesfcwice ordered fchera to be billetted but this was not
sufficient and many went home, till 150 were left, almost starving. The magistrate
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wrote to the War Office, noting the imprudence of treating the poor so
31
inconsiderately at this time. Thereupon en officer recruiting for the
line was ordered to subsist the men.A militia officer finally arrived
end a re-assembly was ordered."5'1 The muddle may account for the weakness
of the county's junior regiment which was supplied from here. In June
1798 it had only received 173 men out of 990 and the Deputies were doing
34
nothing to remedy this.
?trw Im
In Middlesex there was seemingly no^trouble but in the Borough Sub¬
division of Surrey, the Deputies in February 1798 found that 300 had attended
instead of 1000 and concluded wrongly that they were supposed to take half
7C
the number actually appearing, instead of half the quota. A re-assembly was
ordered, but to have neglected an opportunity to impoundthe few still willing
to serve was asking for trouble.
The general state of confusion finally prompted extraordinary action.
In Lancashire, a special General Meeting was held in July 1798. The deficit
then existing was analysed and accounted for as follows!
Dead ...
Discharged, promoted, etc ...
Deserted or not found
Enlisted in the line ...
Too ill to join
TOT A L
The first four regiments were 161 short. The rest of the deficit was con¬
centrated on the lest. T e county's quote tfas 5160,
The meeting ordered the sub-divisions to take immediate action to
replace the missing men. The local Clerks were to make lists of deserters
and try to prosecute. Proper certificates of the men enlisting were to be
got, w ich would exonerate the county from replacing them.* Medical certificates








were to be sent every fortnight to each sick man till he died or joined.
New man were to be apportioned between the regiments by ballot. There
was to be a drive against defaulting constables end insufficient returns,
Tho 1aw on bounties for Supplementary Militia wen was to be explained to the
people.* In another sphere, lists were to be made ®f people not joining in
36
voluntary activities under the Defence Act,
A good deal of activity followed this meeting. Lord Derby the Lord
Lieutenant at once reported tbat he hoped soon to complete all the regiments
37
except the last. A new and energetic Clerk of the General Meetings was
setting his office in order and trying to make the local Clerks keep him
properly informed of the state of the ballot. He hoped that a General
Meeting in October could be got to order each regiment to maintain an
officer permanently in the county to collect recruits before they could
desert.®® The difficulties of the situation are clearly seen when this
Meeting had to be adjourned in the absence of © quorum. An advance that
40
was made at. this time was to divide the Manchester area into two sub-divis ions.
In November, the county Clerk estimated that the deficit had beer, reduced to
237.^ The junior regiment totalled 371 rank and file at that time.^
In July 1799 (not counting a detachment from the first regiment) it was 476
A
privates strong. As the reduction of the county quota by enlistment in
the line in 17^8 had fallen on it, this was much as it should have been,^
Surrey like Lancashire held an important General Meeting in the summer
of 1798 which did something to get things moving.^ Middlesex proved to be in too
bad a way to be redeemable by administrative vigour. In May 1799 Lord Titchfield
* See page 159
/ i,e, 9G0 less 412, which Lord Derby suggests was an iiacomplefce figure -
P«ge 314
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declared that the militia laws operated well enough in the country but would
never work in Middlesex. He presented to the government the report of Mr
45
Nathaniel Conant already mentioned.
This included e draft bill (with some notes by Titchfiold) which would
make principals whose substitutes deserted before joining liable to take their
chance in e fresh ballot. They could gain complete exemption by paying a sum
not to eatceed ten guineas adjudged to be the price of a volunteer. The money
would be transmitted to the regiment which would recruit with it, rendering
accounts to the county. The recruits would be assigned as substitutes to
those who paid the bounties, in order to ensure their entitlement to family
allowances. The census of men liable to serve was to be done by the con¬
stables requiring householders under penalty to make lists of the appropriate
members of their households.
46
These reforms were embodied with little change in an Act made applicable
to Surrey and Middlesex. The ballotted men who paid the bounty were enabled to
receive half of it at public expense as if they had found a substitute. Lord
Titchfield had been, insistent on the new census system which Conant was shy of
putting forward. The only substantial modification of it was that constables
47
were empowered to make the returns themselves in the case of certified Quakers.
The payment of the fine by persons ballotted now became universal, and
apparently the regiments were assigned districts of the county in which to recruit
48
with these. This system was farther than ever from conscription but did make
more practicable an effective levy from local sources.
Pitt's government had already reformed the civil government of Middlesex
by extending the system of stipendiary magistrates. They now began, under the
guidance of one of these, a reform of the military side, calculated to adapt
this too to the unusual conditions of urban life.
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(b) The City, the Tower and the Stanneries
These three populous franchises had all been excluded from the
measures of the elder Pitt's time and since, reinvigorating the militia.
Subject to older acts, they had in fact no militia at all. Respect for
their privileges doubtless accounted for this, but it v.as clear too that
the danger of arming the industrial working class would have to be faced
if a levy were to be made there.
1
The City of London 1'iilitia was reconstituted by an Act of 1794
2
amended by smother in 1795. Both were repealed and replaced by a con¬
solidating measure the following year. The general framework of the
national militia laws was reproduced with some radical differences.
Instead of a Lord Lieutenant, there were commissioners of Lieutenancy, who
also corresponded to the General Meetings elsewhere. They were an institution
of long standing whose composition did not have to be defined in the Acts and
were made up of civic dignitaries. They appointed the militia officers,
who had to be Freemen or their sons, and not bankrupt.^
Twelve hundred men divided into two regiments was the force to be
raised. In 1794f individuals and corporate bodies were ma.de liable to
provide men according to their Land Tax Assessment. The lards were obliged
to provide quotas according to the totals of these assessments w&thin each
and then the quota was supplied by ballots in the ordinary way. Only clergy
5
and those who had served were exempt. The Act of 1795 did away with the
ballot and caused the lards to line recruits for a bounty (maximum £10) to be
raised by a rate. In default of a man, the War could pay this sum as a fine.
The two regiments were now to be attached to and supported by the east and west
halves of the City respectively.^
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Substitutes under the first and recruits under the other Acts had
to be residents of the City or the area within three miles of it.
They were not to be men with more than one child. Those under the former
Act had to serve for as long as the force was embodied. For the rest, the
term was five years in all circumstances.^ Even when embodied, half the
force always had to stay in the City; the rest might be ordered out, but
Q
not further than twelve miles. ' The Lord Mayor might call out the militia
9
to assist in keeping order. The men were entitled to family allowances;
the later Acts provided for their payment by the Wards according Jro the
10
size of their quotas.
There existed in the City an old levy called Trophy Tax, for the
defraying of militia expenses. The Commissioners were empowered to levy
one month's assessment of this each year - that is to say £^£66.13.4. - and to
apply to the Receiver General of the Land Tax if they needed more money than
11
this. 1
The origin of all this legislation is obscure. In 1799» the Common
12
Council claimed that it had taken the initiative. The measure of 179k was
seemingly drawn up by the Lieutenancy and Common Council in co-operation and
13
then put through with government support. Sheridan attacked the Bill of 1795
which he said was contrary to the City's charter. It was defended by Alderman
Lushington. ^'r Next year it was said that the Lieutenancy had brought in a
15
further Bill without consulting the government. The Honourable Artillery
Conrp ny objected to a clause giving the force the rights of the old trained
bands. This would have given it the right to share the Company's parade
ground. Their opposition was not successful, and an acrimonious controversy
between the two bodies ensued.However, there are small incidents, the
absence of more suggests careful consulting of interests.
The force now raised was subject to all the inconviences of the Middlesex
Mi lit ia and a few more. The very restricted limit of service was intended to
encours ge the respectable citizenry to join, but Peter LeMesurier an erstwhile
Lord Mayor, reported that no ballotied men had ever enrolled and t e regiments
17
were made up of the relatives of the mob. Colonel hewnham, an officer in the
force and a member of the Lieufcancy, said in 1799 much what Lord Titohfield was
saying about the impossibility of executing t ne militia laws in urban conditions.
He found that as the 'Sards were not penalized if their men deserted, they did not
care whom they hired ad would supply Irish labourer# who absconded after a few
day3. If the regiments were to be disembodied, not half the men would ever be
got back.*® His words ere given point by a return from the West regiment showing
that 89 enrolled men never joined ad 87 deserted in 1796-9, though admittedly
the number fell from 45 in 1796 to 8 in 1798**® In April 17S8, the force had a
deficit of 378."°
As a large part of the force was at home, it was virtually disembodied.
The men were paid extra in lieu cf being given quarters and apparently lived with
their families. Colonel ! ewnham thought that only lucrative pay and allowance
could keep the force together under these circumstances.®*
Money questions were a scure of strife between the Lieutenancy and the
Corporation. The Trophy Tax was difficult to collect. Over £700 of the
Tax of 1793 was still owing three years later. The Lieutenancy gave up the tax
of 1794-5, evidently to smooth the passing of o e of the acts, and for a time
lived from hand to mouth,^ In August 1795, the City Militia was got ready for
embodiment but the order was delayed because it was feared that Parliament might
have to fce specially summoned for fourteen days after its issue. The Commissioners
had raised ECO men »'d spent £4000 on bounty. They had only £1000 left and men
were clamouring at the Guildhall for pay (they had bee temporerilyembodied for
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ari'-uaj. training) a d the rest of the bounty,6 From 1796, things improved because
money for the embodied force was issued by the government, In 17S9 trophy Tex
24
to the amount of £7365, 8.10, was owing from the previous two years," •
The Commissioners in 17SS made en effort to improve tno efficiency of their
force, corresponding to those in the previous section. It brought them into head-
on collision with the Common Council, again on the question of money. Early
in 17S9, they adopted a draft bill containing various provisions of which two
were controversial. The replacement of deserters was made a specific responsibility
of the Wards for which they served. This had been left vague in earlier acts
and deserters had not in fact been replaced. As compensation, vacancies from
other causes (death a d promotion) were to be filled by the Lieutenancy, out of
the Trophy Tax, Families in future were to be relieved at a specified rate a d only
if they lived within the City or three miles thereof. For men enlisted in
25
future, an allowance would be paid only for one child.
The Lieutenancy thus hoped to get the City to raise its full number of
men by diminishing its obligations in other ways. On March 13th a deputation
conferred with Dundas who agreed to make the measure e, government one. The
Common Council was now informed. They set up a committee which took exception to
the proposals and suggested amendments, The Commissioners in turn disagreed with
these and deputations from both sides waited on Dundas,Evidently he was
disconcerted by this conflict for at the e d of May the Commissioners asked if he
27
intended to introduce a measure that session, He mad© up his mind to do so and
28
they then appointed some of their members to assist him in the house. The
committee of Common Council thereupon reiterated their opposition and resolved to
29
petition the House of Commons on the subject. This must have madeDu das climb
down: the bill was modified in the City's favour.
The City's main demands had beer that all deficits should be filled by the
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Commissioners at the expense of the Trophy Tax and that the families belonging to
the regiment inside the City should not be supported; for the rest, support
should oe confined to one child even for those already in fc e militia. In support
of their first point t ey quoted Huskisson, Durdas* deputy. For the second, they
had a legal opinion of the late Serjeant Adair - we have noted that this was a
bone of contention in the militia in general. As concessions they offered
to fill the existing deficit by a general ro e levied by the Common Council and
to allow men who were dissatisfied by the reduced provision for families to be
30 31
discharged. The Act as passed settled the question of the families entirely
as the Lieutancy had proposed but adhered to the Common Councils distinction
between the existing deficit and the future replacement of deserters. The former
was to be filled by the Lieutenancy's method of impositions on defaulting wards.*52
33
The latter was to be a charge on the Trophy Tax. The Wards therefore might
escape responsibility in future as they had in the past.
The quarrel ended acrimoniously. Colonel Tew ham spoke angrily about t e
totally inadequate contribution of the City to defence a d sug ested that if they
refused to support their regiments properly, the men should be disbanded and
34
the City thrown open to the quartering of troops as a means of pressure.
The Corporation carried hostility further than threats. The new act made it
necessary for the Lieutenancy to produce accounts of the spending of the Trophy
Tax before they could draw on the Receive® "Jer.eral of the Land i'ax for more funds,
a d the accounts had to be passed by the City Justices before more Trophy Tax
could be collected. In December 179T, the Recorder ad some Aldermen sitting as
Justices refused to sanction the accounts, which hh catoned to bring business
to a stop. The Commissioners defended the various items that had been questioned
a d were sure that malice alone was responsible because the Justices in question
were all members of the Lieute-a cy ad had raised no objection to the accounts
35
when the Commissioners had discussed they. ' Altogether, the City militia
cannot be said to have made striking progress in our period.
The ?owor Hamlets compri?ed much of the Eest End of London - the
industrial and dtock area. It was Patrick Colquhoun, the most distinguished
of the stipendiary magistrates who drew the government's attention to their
military possibilities in 1794, He said that there had beer no militia raised
in tho district for tnirty years because the art of CharlesII's time which still
governed it only provided for four days exercise a year and it was not worthwhile
to sped money on such a force. The government seemed to have forgotten the
area, yet its population was probably equal to the City's. However, a large part
consisted of seamen (always exempt) and silk weavers,so only a modest proportion
should be called for, Colquhoun suggested 500 men (which he thought wouid be
1% of these liable) to be raised like the other militia but not serve outside the
JVI 20
district save/invasion or Insurrection.
Nothing was dene et thin time, but in 1796, further memoranda on the
subject appear a d in November Lord Cor wailis, who was Constable of the Tower
I 37
among other things, sent a qprhft bill to the Home Office which was pasred into
law with some alteration the following month. The Aot^® extended the militia
laws o the Tower Hamlets ar.d established a quota of 1120 (the original dtfftft said
lOOO) which wes divided between the parishes explicitly by the same clause.
Special qualifications were este lished for the officers aidj)epufcies (this had
not been in the c/tf»ft). The Constable of t e Tower took the place of the
Lord Lieute ont. As with the City, the traditional power to levy Trophy L'ax was
maintained and t e force was divided into two regiments, one to stay in the district
o e to go if desired up to twelve miles outside it or to the nearest camp oeyond.
The act was at once put in force a d in March 1797 the authorities were
•*G
relieved to report that the census had been made a d appeals heard without riots.
In May, the Ieputies told Cornwallis that the force was raised a d should be
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called out;. Experience in raising the parochial levy for the army had shown
40
that men would desert if not collected as soon as their bounty had been paid.
41
A one-clause Act was passed soon afterwards. The Deputies also said that the
burden on the parishes of paying half the price of a volunteer to the poorer
42
ballotted men would lead to discontent. It was proposed at one time to make
this bounty payable to men with not more than £100 worth of possessions instead
43
of £500 but nothing was done.
The Tower Hamlets $ilitia suffered all the trials of the other urban
forces. Down to 1799. 6064 men had been bellottad to serve and £20,000 had been
spent, but there were only some 750 men to show for it instead of 1120, Nineteen
ballots had been held everywhere. Of some 25,000 men of the right age, 8,300
ware exempt: there were many seamen and in that poor area many were let out by
being undersised or being poor men with families. The request was made that the
■ijjfrfo 44
Tower Hamlets should participate in the general reduction of 1799. To this
they hadllo right, having previously borne lass than their share. The force
that resulted from these efforts doss net seem to have been too bad.
45
One regiment was willing for a time to serve in Ireland. The officers are
46
stated to have been largely government officials.
The Sfcanneriss, at any rate for militia purposes, comprised not an area
but a group of people, the tin mineef of Devon and Cornwall, There was a project
to raise a body of Fencibles among them in 1796 by a member of the Pellew family
which was oppos-ed locally on account of the low standing of the ppfcoosef and
47
the danger of arming the turbulent, miners. Then the Prince of Wales soems
to have made one of his periodic attempts to enlarge his military stature by
asserting a right as Duke of Cornwall to call out and array the miners.
43
His agents conferred with the government in March 1797. In September, the
Law Officers having declared that legislation would be necessary, It was suggested
49
that they should co-operate with those of the Prince in framing a bill.
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Th© mattar then slept until the government apparently decided that
through being exempt from the militia the Stannaries had inadvertently been
exemptedrom the Defence Act. They therefore determined to settle the question
and asked the Lord Warden to find out if the local gentry would now be willing
50
to raise Fencibles. He replied that they would prefer a militia act - partly
to avoid supporting, what they had once opposed and partly because recruiting
would then be spread more evenly over the area and the miners, being liable to
51
be ballotted for replacements, would not encourage those who joined to desert.
The Lew Officers undertook the drafting of the measure and of orders to
bring the Stannaries under the Defence Act which he was to execute unless there
52
were local objections. The bill was passed in June 1798 and the new force
53
was ordered to be embodied the following month. The Act placed the Local
Warden in the position of the Lord Lieutenant. Under him were to be Special
54
Deputy Wardens, qualified as Deputy Lieutenants. Nine Subdivisions were set
55
up by the Act - five in Cornwall and four in Devon. The Deputies were to
conduct militia business in the usual way and through the ordinary officers of
the hundreds and parishes. As a check on the figures received, they might call
on the Captains of the mines and the Agents of blowing and smelting houses for
56
lists of the workers there. The size of the levy was not specified in the
57
Act - it was to be one seventh of those liable. The Solicitor General
sug asfced this rather than the national average of one sixth because the men
58
involved were almost all poor. There were to be two regiments if the number
59
exceeded 1200.
The Act when it ha^ been put in force aroused complaint from the gentry
of Cornwall, In April 1799, there was a proposal to augpient the force.
Though the Warden and his officers were required (S13) to apply the
Act to the Turners.
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Quarter Sessions complained that the Act has proved unpopular and was diffi¬
cult to execute, Cornwall as e whole was now overburdened and a great many
of her men were exempt as seamen. Bounties were rising and increasing the
expense to the parishes. Miners1 wages had gone up 40% since the war began and
the farms were being denuded of men. The system of deep mines using steam
60
engines resulted in high wages and the new Act made matters worse. The new
force was not augmented but the Royal Miners were a permanent gain to the militia
n
establishment,
(o) The Parochial Levy of 1796
This measure is for us an isolated incident, but there were attempts
in the following war to make the parishes raise men for the army, while the
scheme of 1796 was an extension of some measures to raise seamen, the results
of which had proved encouraging. It was a complete failure and ended such
attempts, for both services, for some time.
Two Acts passed in the autumn of 1796 regulated the levy in Scotland and
1
England respectively. They defined the quota of men to be raised by each
county. In England, each county was ordered to raise men either for the army
or the navy: the army was to get 6525 and the navy 6142, For Scotland, the
2
apportionment was not made in the Act, General Sessions of the Justices were
to be held in each county and were to be attended by the Justices of the boroughs
within the county. They were to apportion the quote between the parishes.
In England, the apportionment was to be based on the number of houses assessed
for window tax, as certified by the Treasury, In Scotland, valued rents or
3
alternatively the Land Tax assessment were to be the basis. The men were to
be raised by the overseers who with the consent of the vestry and principal
inhabitants might levy a rate for the purpose. In Scotland, the J^gfrifcors end
*
Though the Act made the men liable to serve only for the duration (cl.12)
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4
Bufgh Justices were to do this work. The men were to be handed over to officers
of the appropriate service sent to receive them. They were to receive one thifd
of their bounty at once and the rest wes to be remitted via the County Treasurer
to be paid when they arrived at their ships or units. They were to serve for
5
the duration plus a month or until arrival in Britain,
In England, meetings of the Justices in Petty Sessions wero to hear appeals
against assessments. They were also to decide cases in which the receiving
officers refused to take a man as being unfit. Men provided had to be between
sixteen and fortyfive years of age and fit for service. They were not to be
articled clerks or apprentices and in England poor men with two or more children
6
(other than sailors} were excluded. For each man not provided, the parish
had to pay a fine. In Scotland, this was to be £25, paid out of the rates.
In England, it was to be £10 more than the local price of a recruit and Petty
Sessions were to decide whether it was to be paid by the overseers personally or
7
added to the rates. Petty Sessions might engage volunteers with the fines if
any offered. Fines not spent by Easter 1797 wero to b® paid through the county
8
to the Treasury. In England in the first instance, parishes were to be given
three weeks to make the levy, and might be given a fortnight more. In Scotland,
9
they only had fifteen days.
The system thus resembled that of the militia but it used the civil
machinery of the county. The personnel being much the same, this was not a
vital distinction. The law made assessment simpler in England than in Scotland
and some questions of assessment as between Scottish counties and certain burghs
10
within them had to be decided by an amending act. In Ross-shire, complicated
tables were prepared showing the valued rent in each parish and apportioning
quotas to the nearest men. The surplus of each parish wes added to the next
11
in the list in the effort to arrive at round figures and apparently there iver©
12
money payments between parishes to adjust the assessment. There was e com-
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plicated argument between Ross and Inverness as to which county contained the
estates of the Lovat family, liability for church rates being apparently the
13
only precedent.
In the raising of the men, the urban areas were probably better pieced
than the rural, in contrast to the situation in the militia. The fleeting
K
population of a town held plenty who would enlist and in e "once for all" levy
such as this, thefr quality need not worry the county, Middlesex managed to
get 420 at least of its quota of 428, of 54 supplied by Marylebor.e three v^ere
born ilt Surrey, two in Kent, two in Essex, 23 in remoter British Counties and one
in Denmark, The bounty usually paid was £21 but 112 received other sums ranging
from eight guineas to £26-5, Parishes often paid different sums to different
14
men. Some doubt is thrown on the quality of recruits from urban areas by the
experience of the 65tb Regiment which received 145 recruits - 131 of them from the
West Riding - in January 1797 and within a month had discharged 142 men. As its
15
strength had only been 76 to start with, a fair number must have been recruits.
As to the methods of parochial officers, the four parishes of Bedford were
combined for the purposes of the act and set to raise seven men. Four of these
were raised by a Sgt, Nadan of the 4th Dragoons, The cost for all seven was
£110-16 (average £15-6-7 each) and Petty Sessions therefore adjusted the parishes
to pay £3-3-4 in lieu of the 11/1:2 of a man by which their quota ought to have
16
exceeded seven, Atherton in Lancashire (where the men were for the Navy)
appears not to hove employed professional recruiters, though various men were
employed to guard the recruits or help in other ways. The three men enlisted
had to be marched to Liverpool. The perish officers prudently did not give them





them ale at the start of the journey and ale and rum on the way#
K
On the army side, certain regiments were appointed by the Commander in
Chief to receive the recruits. They were all regiments that had come beck as
skeletons from the West Indies and each was to hove the men of certain counties.
(For some reason the apportionment of counties was completely reshuffled a little
later.) A party was to be sent to each county, of a size proportionate to the
quota. The Officer Commanding each party was responsible for approving the men
forthcoming and was to send them to the regiment in bodies under the command of
IJCO's, A Field Officer was to supervise all the parties of each regiment. The
officers were urged to cooperate with the civil power and treat the recruits
18
with kindness.
The question of where the recruits should be handed over perhaps caused
the most bother. At first, the counties were each asked to appoint a single
19
rendezvous for handing over the men. Certain Counties such as the West Riding
20
and Oxfordshire then asked that officers should attend the Pe tty Sessions and
collect the men there. At Halifax the recruits of 48 townships were collected
and already the disloyal xvere raising a cry against the extra expense involved
in bringing them so far. When the receiving officer at Pontefract refused to
come and collect them where they were, the magistrates felt obliged to adjourn
and send the men home, hoping that the government would give different orders.
The men, it was noted, refused to march unless they were paid the whole of their
21
bounty at once. As a result of complaints the government finally gave way and
22
ordered the officers to attend the Petty Sessions whenever possible.
Desertion was very prevalent and undoubtedly lay at the root of the above
problem. An amending Act was found necessary for England as well as Scotland
and its main provisions were that parishes must replace men who deserted before
These seem to have been the 2nd,9th,10th,11th,15th,16th,22nd,25th,29th,36th,43rd,
46th,49tb,52nd,58th,61st,65th,68th,76th and 77th Foot. See Note 18.
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the receiving officers had collected them. Parochial officers were furthermore
given the duty of themselves transporting the recruits to their regiment or to
24
Chatham if they were too late to be taken by the party. Another omission
rectified by this Act was the regulation height of recruits which wee now stated
25
as 5'4n or 5*3" for growing lads. Thereafter, the churchwardens of Newbury
for instance could be told that they could not supply men of whatever height they
26
chose. The Justices were empowered, furthermore, to order the payment of one
guinea a man besides the bounty for the purchase of necessaries. The officers
had been optimistically told to try and get the men to give up some of their
27
bounty for these.
No separate returns seem to exist of this levy but to judge by the surviving
returns of the receiving regiments, it was a total failure. The following made
notable additions to their strength in the first three months of 1797«-
The 10th Foot - 153 The 46th Foot - 156
" 11th " - 162 (inc.April) n 61st " - 471
" 15th " - 172 " 65th " - 176
" 16th " - 318 n 68fch " - 110
" 43rd " - 278 Total - 1818 28
The 9th,22nd,25th,29th,49th,58th and 77th made small gains.28
The fortune of the other four regiments is not known. All in all^ a poor attempt
to reach the figure of six or seven thousand (including Scotland) that was set.
Some Counties such as Worcestershire and Warwickshire failed to raise any men
30
at all.
What was the explanation? Some counties said they would have been able
to raise sailors but could not produce soldiers - Pembroke end Carnarvon for
31
instance. It was not possible to alter the obligation without fresh legislation.
A plan was mooted for transferring all the Welsh quotas from the army to the navy




In all probability, the main cause of failure was that no attempt was made
to enlist the sympathy of the counties. Anstruther, the advocate of the scheme,
had pointed out that the militia was not a real conscript force end was vitiated
by bad officers. To raise a smaller body by parochial levy and put it under
33
good army officers would do as well as an extensive augmentation of the militia.
But the interest felt by the officers in their militia regiments and their influence
in the county was what brought the men forward. On this occasion they were not
brought in - there were for instance no circulars to the Lord Lieutenants asking
their help. The 16th Regiment, whose good progress will be noted overleaf,
happened to be the Buckinghamshire regiment. At Lord Buckingham's suggestion
34
it was assigned that county's quota of 152 and in view of his exertions on other
K
occasions it is fair to assume that he took steps to get some men.
Anstruther may have learnt his lesson for we shall see him next an advocate
35
of recruiting from the militia. Others retained some confidence in parochial
levies. A.MHianby, whom the Home Office regarded as s trustworthy authority
thought in 1799 that they would produce men if the fin© in case of failure was big
36
enough. Unfortunately they were listened to, and further disastrous experiments
were needed to convince the authorities that here was an expedient which would
37
not work.
(d) The Provisional Cavalry.
The Militia was an infantry force. There were never wanting those who
desired to set up a H orse Militia and in 1796 the government mode the experiment.
Although for various reasons they were mistaken in doing so, quite a large body
of horse was raised by compulsion which could hove been mad© effective had it
been desired.
The Provisional Cavalry wa» set up by an Act of November 1796, amended by
1
another the following month. It was s levy of a man and a horse for every ten
horses on which the Horse Tax wes paid. The Lieutenancies were responsible for
c.f. in particular p. 62
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making the levy, which covered the whole of England and Wales. The General
Meetings received statistics from the Revenue Authorities and transmitted them
to the Subdivision Meetings. The Deputies at a first meeting arranged the owners
of less than ten horses (or with a fraction of ten above ten or twenty or some
2
round number) into "Classes" each containing ten horses. At a second meeting
one member of each class was chosen to serve (with his horse). Persons owning
ten horses or a multiple were of course liable straight off. If the horses in a
Subdivision were not a multiple of ten, the odd ones were to be Joined with those
of other Subdivisions before the ballot. At a third meeting, men were sworn in
to serves substitutes were allowed who were to be from the same or an adjoining
3
county.
The clauses declaring who was exempt are obscure. Persons who were unfit
to be soldiers, or aged less than sixteen or over fifty, articled clerks, apprenticej
and members of the forces were apparently debarred from serving in person. Members
of the forces and garrisons, resident members of the universities, ministers of
religion, medical men if specially exempted by their Subdivision Meeting, articled
clerks, apprentices, sailors, workers in the royal docks and arsenals and Thames
Watermen were all exempt in respect of one horsej if they had a second or more
horses, they would bo liable on account of those. Commissioned Officers were
exempt in respect of all their horses, whether publicly or privately owned.
Inferior excise and various customs officers were exempted in respect of a horse
4 ft
kept for performing official duties. The gsr,ending Act restricted exemption for
apprentices end articled clerks to those who hod been so before October 20th 1796
and also exempted persons who joined the Volunteer Cavalry by January 15th 1797 in
5
respect of up to three horses. The Subdivision Meetings were the sole judges
of the elegibility of appeals and were also responsible for exonerating people who
6
ceased to keep horses or kept fewer.
The financial provisions of the Acts were also complicated. The




reimbursed by the public. Those who did not have a horse suitable for
service were to be supplied with one by or at the expense of the classs this
was to be considered public property when the force was disbanded, A substitute
8
might if necessary be provided in the same way. If n substitute or horse became
unfit, the principal had to replace them, receiving help from the public in the
9
letter case. When the force was embodied, the bounty paid to substitutes was
10
to be reimbursed to the limit of £10, There was a scale of fines up to £25
for not providing clothing, men, and horses, for not replacing unfit horses and
(on classes) for not providing horses for ballotted men who had none suitable.
The various allowances from the public were financed by these fines and by a
12
quarterly assessment added to the liability of all who paid Horse Tax,
The Provisional Cavalry was to be officered in the same way as the militia
and might be embodied for active service at His Majesty's pleasure. It was not
to serve outside Great Britain, If horses died on active service, their owners
13
were to be compensated. Unless embodied, the force was to meet only for Musters
which could be ordered by the General Meeting with the King's consent. While
unembodied,substitutes might resign at any time, repaying any bounty they might
15
have received. The principals had to replace them. Only when a principal
16
serving for himself was found to be unfit was there a fresh ballot. Any surplus
17
of fines or the quarterly assessment was to be used to fill deficits.
There was a certain amount of dilatoriness in carrying out this levy, partly
because there was soon an option of raising Volunteers instead, Shropshire hoped
18
to have all its new levies completed by January 1797. but only two thirds of the
Provisional Cavalry had been ballotted for by the following October, The County
had rejeoted plans to raise ^lunteers instead in Janua ry, but canvassing for them
continued in the different localities and in May there was much doubt about whether
to continue the le-vy. In March 1798, there were still districts in the County
19
where the ballot had not been held. From Durham in April 1797 came a report that
20
there had been no ballot in the Darlington Ward Subdivision and none was intended.
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21
Tho Amounderness Subdivision of Lancashire took no action until April,
The complexity of the lew caused trouble and delay. The passing of an
amending Act so soon is s sign of this. Lord Radnor said the first Act was
22
completely unintelligible (which is not far from the truth). Even much later,
in the summer of 1798, the Attorney-General had some questions from the
Lieutenancy of Suffolk about the meaning of the Acts which after three months he
23
wes still unable to answer. Mistakes were made. In Carnarvonshire, the
Deputies granced complete exemption to the clergy instead of exemption in respect
24 gp 25
of one horse. There and elffiwhere there was doubt about the liability of women,
(As this was essentially a levy on property, they were in fact lieblej nor does
there seem to be anything in the Act to prevent their service in person). There
was doubt too as to whether a man was liable in the place where he was assessed or
25
where he paid his Horse Tax, Lord Itynevor also pointed out that if he was assessed
for the expenses in London where he paid, it would be hard on his neighbours at
26
home in hales where h© served. In the matter of where to serve, the Acts gave
27
c wide choice to the individual.
Matters were made more confused by ® printer's error in the published
version of the first Act which made it appear that persons enjoyed exemption not
29
only if they were but if they ever had been articled clerks or apprentices. The
government received may queries about this and sornCSubdivision Meetings were
postponed till the answer was received. All in all, the government grew very
tired of the spate of questions on the Cavalry Acts and told the Deputies that it
30
was entirely their duty to interpret the laws which Parliament had mad®.
The further working of the Acts caused some perplexities and a further
31
emending Act in 1798 dealt with them in part. It was not clear to, for
32
Instance, the Deputies of Rorfolk what was to happen if » principal died.
Colonel Burltmd in Somerset thought that in that case the horse was no longer
liable to serve but © substitute who had been sworn in was. He suggested that
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33
the substitutes should be released and a completely new man ballotted, It
was apparently the custom to pay substitutes only a small part of their bounty
34
to start with, as a "retaining fee". The rest was to be given him only when
35
h® was called out. The government approved of this system and the new Act
permitted a certificate by the Deputies to be sent to the Receiver General stating
what sum had been promised. The Receiver General, on the embodiment, would then
pay this sum to the regiment said so the principal was relieved of the charge
33
further than before. On the other hand, he seemingly had to go on paying for
the upkeep of the horse until it was called out, which was a burden if it was on©
37
got specially for the force.
Classes had apparently got together in many cases to share all the charges
of the levy. Burland asked that their agreements should be made free of stamp
duty grid the amending Act ma de it possible to escape theassessment for expenses
39
in this way and to enforce the agreements by appealing to the Justices,
In the Spring of 1798 the government was embodying its defensive forces and
took stock of the Provisional Cavalry with a view to doing the same. This enables
us to judge of its Condition, In February 1798, twenty-six counties had sent
40
returns showing that they had raised 7960 men, Dundas told the cabinet that
there were probably 12-15,000 in all and with some reform a force could be got out
41
of them, II® sent © circular to the Lords Lieutenant calling on them to muster
42
the force and send returns. An abstract of forty two replies in April shows
43
12,410 men available. As many counties had availed themselves of the opportunity
allowed then, of raising Volunteer Cavalry instead, this was a fair way towards
the 20,000 which had beer, envisaged as the probable yield of the levy,
44
Ten counties appeared to have appointed no officers. Almost all had
fyheld musters. These were/Subdivisions - which wos the mode envisaged by the
45
Act and the circular - and not assemblies of the whole force of each county.
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There was general agreement that; if the force was to continue as it was,
there should be some means of training it. The Marquess of Sal/sbury said that
the musters were unsafe, the Deputies having far too little authority over the
46
men. As early as November 1796 the officers appointed for the Cheshire force
47
lamented that they were unable to train the men. Colonel Burland and the
Deputies of Norfolk thought there should be four weeks of it each year as for the
48
militia. The amending Act of June 1798 went some way to meet this case. It
enabled regiments to be exercised in a manner to be laid down by the government
if the mon were willing to do this in return for a bounty of two guineas. Lists
were to be made and the men were to be called out by the constables, just like the
49
militia.
The main question in June 1798 was whether the Provisional Cavalry should
50
b© embodied or not, A scheme of establishment was drawn up and a circular
51
prepared to instruct those concerned how to mobilise the force. There was
52
much argument in which Lord Westmoreland defended the Provisional Cavalry and
53
Pitt and Dundas were divided on the subject, Finally, as we have seen, the
54
matter was decided by the generals who said they had enough cavalry. In
consequence, only the six most forward regiments - those of Somerset, Suffolk,
Kent, Northumberland, Berkshire and Worcestershire - were embodied. They totalled
55
some 1500 privates. Nothing wes done to train the rest and in March 1799 the
final decision was taken end en Aet was passed dismissing the unembodied portion
56
of the force and doing away with the machinery of ballots and classes. The
six regiments in service were to be assimilated to the Fencible Cavalry and
57
maintain their strength by ordinary enlistment. Thus the Provisional Cavalry
did not survive the improvement in the nation's military fortunes. The remnants
that did went out of existence like so much of the Fencible Cavalry in 1800
As the Provisional Cavalry declined, the efforts to use it as a means of
215-
encouraging enlistment in the Volunteer Cavalry were intensified. It had been
the amending Act of December 1796 which first permitted counties to exonerate
themselves in this way. If Volunteer Cavalry to the number of three-quarters
of the quota of a Subdivision were raised therein, the Deputies might suspend
the ballot altogether. If a le sser number came forward, they might elect to
serve in lieu of individuals or classes. The Deputies might postpone the ballot
till January 15th 1797 to allow time for offers and the Privy Council was empowered
to postpone it further. The Volunteers who came under arms in this way were to
receive the allowances for clothing which would otherwise have been paid to the
Provisional Cavalry and which were to bo obtained in the same way by an assessment
58
on those liable and who had been exonerated.
An Act of July 1797 empowered counties where the Provisional Cavalry was not
yet raised to continue substituting Volunteers in the above ways till October 1st
1797. The Act of June 17S8 laid down the sums to be paid, aid mad© the Lord
Lieutenant responsible f0r certifying what was due to the Secretary at War, who
60
would see thet i£ was assessed. It also enabled the Privy Council to suspend
the Cavalry Acts in any county where volunteers to the number of three quarters of
61
the quota had been raised between January 14th 1797 end August 1st 1798.
Indivld.ua Is ballotted or liable in their own right to serve in the Cavalry were
furthermore allowed to discharge their obligation by providing a man for th©
62
Fencible Cavalry.
The most useful result of the Provisional Cavalry legislation was the help
thus given to Volunteer Cavalry and it is in a further chapter that this must be
discussed.
Th© demis® of the Provisional Cavalry is associated with some interesting
apologetics on the subject. Lord Westmoreland pointed out in June 1798 that a
great deal had bean spent on the force and the Yeomanry was designed for a different
function. There wos no reason why Voluntary offers should not go forward as
63
well as the compulsory levy. The Hon, John Villiers suggested that the force
■
should be called out a section at a time, each section drilling for three months#
This would cost £375,000 a year as compared with a million and a half if the
whole were celled out# The officers were mostly confident fchet an efficient
force could be got this way. The Yeomanry wore well trained but could not be
moved far and he felt that a large mobile body of horse was needed on the east
64
coast#
In the previous December, Colonel Burland had ventured to suggest that
the Provisional CevaL ry should be a permanent Horse Militia, trained for twenty
days e year with help from the regulars# It could b® easily called out and
would make it unnecessary to raise Fencible Cavalry which cost more and competed
65
with the army for recruits. Mo one saemed interested in this idea. In March
1799, Colonel Dundas of the Berkshire regiment was all for turning the remnant
66
into Fencibles, as was done. He was one of the g»st zealous men in the force
but expressed no interest in it as en institution. For tha rest, there were
schemes to use it to drive the country, to turn it into horse artillery, even
67
to arm it with spears. It had reached "white elepnant" status.
The Provisional Cavalry was extremely unpopular, and did not become any
less so when it appeared that it was never to be used, Dundas waswarned that
68
this might happen even in 1796 and among others Colonel Cocks of Worcestershire
made it an argument in favour of calling out the whole. lie spoke oj the "jobbing
and cheating" connected with the measure and said that a General Meeting in his
69
county had only consented to a muster by a majority of one# His words aro
confirmed by a printed broadside issued by one of the Deputies who thought the
a
c.f, page 157
majority (depending on the vote of a borough magistrate) was not a true one and
railed against his colleagues for imposing on the people a burden at once
70
oppressive and unconstitutional. In Shropshire, the muster cost the county
71
£1000 and it was said that the measure had never been popular, A great many
people there had been forced to register horses on which they had hitherto evaded
the payment of tax; with the publication of the assessments for the purposes of
ballotting, their deceit would have become clear and they would have been denoun-
72
csd for failing to bear a fair share in the levy. The original act had
envisaged this situation and gave an amnesty in cases where false declarations
73
'were amended. All this was not likely to command the measure.
Lord Roue said the measure was much disliked by the farmers and middle
74
orders, Samuel Seymour thought that its abolition would conciliate the men of
middling fortune, say £300 to 5L400 a year who were the strongest support of the
75
constitution but were being alienated by the vreight of taxation. A local
Deputy wrote in to eey that poor tradesmen with on© wretched pony who only paid
tax because they could not swear that it was never used except for carrying goods
•?6
were hard hit, Thus the cavalry Acts were detested high and low, A corres¬
pondent of the Chairman of the Bast India Company said at the time when the
amending measure of 1798 was under discussion that "everyone was best off who
parted with the least cash", that it was a "pickpocket piece of business" likely
77
to rouse more anger then any tsx, Windham w®.s later to epitomise the confusion
of it all by speaking of "a pleasant conceit to make everyman ride another's
78
horse,"
The career of the remnant that saw actual service is no more then an
appendix to the story of the Provisional Cavalry. Three of the regiments
formed clearly owed their excellence to an enthusiast. The opinions of Colonel
Burland in Somerset have been explained. tie had been en officer in the county's
Fencible Cavelry regiment. Colonel Cocks in Worcestershire had previously organ-
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ited the county^eomanry. He brought forward th€£ force as we saw against
strong opposition. Colonel Dundas in Berkshire exerted himself to such effect
and was so well supported by the Lieutenancy that the regiment was mustered
79
before many counties had r-ompleted the ballot, the men v/er© mostly young ana
80
good snd the officers eager to serve.
Vestiges of their origin clung to the regiments and gave them some
affinity with the militia. The men's families were entitled to family allow-
Si 82
ances. The men received the "marching guinea" when called out. The horses
and original clothing supply had been provided by the ballotfced men. The clothing
of the Kent regiment was very bad and of the Sortnumber1and it was reported that
83
the horses were inferior and their furniture very defective. Colonel Burland
had a controversy with the Deputies of Somerset about defective horses. He
claimed that the Deputies should replace them, Th© solicitor advisin the
Lieutenancy thought the responsibility lay with the principal to whom th® defec¬
tive horse should be returned, Burland pointed out that th© Colonel and the
Deputies had equal authority in deciding which horses were defective and might
84
not agree. How men were to be replaced was not at all clear. It was as well
that the responsibility for finding horses, men and clothing was taken from the
counties in March 1799,
The transfer to a Fencible basis excited opposition only in the Northum¬
berland regiment. The men of two troops petitioned one of the county members
85
(Grey) on the advice of their wives and friends, asking him to intercede.
The regiment was mutinous for a time until brought to reason by two severe court
mertials. An inspecting officer's comment was "the men seen to know their own
qualifications for they are certainly better adapted for cow drivers than soldiers
86
in their present state," This regiment however was typical heither in spirit
87
nor quality. There were good reports of the Berkshire and Kent regiments.
The Worcestershire regiment apparently consisted of men enlisted at the expense
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of those liable to s#ve and rsmttiy Just before embodiment. They were there¬
fore nearer to ordinary recruits than to militia men privately provided,
89
This regiment extended its services to Europe and was sent to Ireland. The
90
Berkshire regiment was ready (at least in part) to do the same.
The fate of the unembodied men of the force was sometimes hard. Those
of the Norwich area begged to be embodied because they found it difficult to get
91
work - they could not guarantee that they would not be called away. From
TStercestershira it was reported that a body of very good men had been raised who
ought to be called into servica. Officers could not be found but that was merely
92
because no one would Join a force which might never serve. Cr ydon had to
watch five hundred cavalrymen go to waste while desperately striving to make"
93
good the deficit in the militia.
The Provisional Cavalry was the Pitt government's biggest blunder in the
recruiting field. To try experiments that failed was inevitable when an effort
was required on an unprecedented sealo, but in this cnre, a force vms called for
which the government Inter found it did not want. Unduly complicated methods
wore adopted in providing it end no way was indicated of training it. There were
roesons for all this: the high view of the importance cf cavalry noticed in the
first chapter end the peculiar view of cavalry as a genteel force end even a relic
of chivalry that will be mentioned later on. For the present we must notice that
the Provisional Cavalry, with the parochial levy, took to its furthest extreme
one of the prirciples pervading the militia - that cf a tax on property payable
in men.
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C ItAFTER VIII ; COMPARISON OF YIELDS
(a) The Line : Normal Yield
The different methods by which regularly embodied soldiers were brought
into the service have now all been examined. It will be as well as this point
to consider what reason there is to suppose that by adopting a variety of systems,
involving very different terms of service, it was possible to secure significantly
more men than could b® raised by the routine activity of the Regular Army,
Let us first consider what sort of men were enlisted by the originery regiments of
the Lin© and recruiting corps and then make comparison with other branches of
the service,
»
Were the generals right, and th© "scum of the earth" the only source of
recruits for the Line? Plenty of examples support their case, modifying it
slightly. We find wastrels and failures in business; such were George Frazer,
1
a grocer of Inverness ruined by "the ladies and the bottle", or John Graham, who
came to London from his native Ulster to set up in business, failed, ended up
2
destitute at Bath and under "inexpressible necessity" enlisted. More sinister
is the case of one Mears, committed to prison for en offence for which, if he
chose, he might compound with the prosecutor and with that end in view left at
liberty for a few days. Allowed this indulgence because h© was of good family,
ho responded by enlisting with a sergeant who told him that the commitment would
3
be broken thereby. Representatie of a very different group is James Morris, a
midshipman of the East India Company who, returning to England after a long
absence, heard of the death of his mother. Deranged by his grief he was enlisted
4
by a crimp of Orevesend. Lastly, let us notice a case of Reform, John Hawkins,
unruly son of a gentleman with a large fam ly, enlisted in the 29th. He repented
see pages 80-81
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of his action and prior conduct. His commanding officer gev® him a good
character and granted him many indulgences. As he nad been apprenticed to a
surgeon, a relative wrote to ask the War Office to let him serve as a surgeon's
5
mate in the navy.
The only type of recruit easy to survey in the mass rather than from
individual instances is the runaway apprentice. Few soldiers could write and
not very many were written ®&out, but the War Office's correspondence on
apprentices grew so much that from 1796 it is bound in a separate series of
6
volumes. The ¥iar Office abided by Lord Camden's opinion (so called, though
dating from 1760) that an apprentice was incapable in law of enlisting himself
7
without his master's consent. It was therefore willing to order their release
on the properly authenticated application of the master. He had to write in
8
person, enclosing the indentures. (Trouble arose when the signatures on the
9
, 10
two documents did not tally, or when the master was illiterate.) Discharge
11
was a matter of favour and was refused when the master had also applied to the
12 13
civil courts or when the apprentice deserted or had enlisted a second time.
Borderline cases were frequent. Apprentices were bound for less than seven
14
years, they were rebound to other masters (especially common in the Birmingham
15
district) or they were employees of members of the Sheffield Cutler's Company,
16
which had a specid status. Finally, the regiment could sometimes prove that
17
the master had consented to the enlistment, in which esse the army kept the man.
Until an amendment to the mutiny act in 1805 the apprentice enlisting
end making the prescribed declaration that he was not one, was not guilty of
18
perjury. He could, however, be prosecuted for fraud. In 1797, for instance,
an apprentice who had joined the marines was prosecuted at Warwick Assizes for
obtaining money under false pretences and sentenced to six months* hard labour
19
and tSiree public whippings in Birmingham. Cases are cited in which the master
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20
allowed the apprentices to join in order to seve them from being thus punished.
From 1796, the Wer Office encouraged regiments to report eases suitable for
prosecution, which if sanctioned would be undertaken by the regiment at the
21
government's expense. Mong other things, the War Office wished to establish
22
by test cases whether further legislation was needed to stop the abuse.
A letter to Fox, then Inspector General of recruiting, in January 17S8 seems to
indicate its conclusion. It refers to s lad who wished to be a soldier and
hoped to get out of reach before ha wa3 claimed. He is contrasted with those
who enlist merely to get the bounty and in the expectation of being claimed.
In the former case, the court might not convict and would never impose a heavy
23
sentence } in cases of the other sort, the result would be setisfaetorv.
We have now sampled all the evidence which comes more or loss from the
point of view of the recruit. It mainly concerns members of the artisan and
shopkeeper class. How the inscription books (Gf which more anon) giving the
previous occupations of recruits, whow that not more than e quarter or so
belonged to this class, A good half are always "labourers" end s largo part
of the remainder "weavers". The motives of this dumb proletarian element can
only be inferred from the comments of the officers engaged in recruiting.
It is natural to wonder if they wero more strictly economic than thoso postulated
by the Generals and displayed by the middle class wastrels. There is little
evidence, eertainly, that raising the bounty brought in nen who would not other¬
wise have joined, The effect was mainly to cause men to enlist for the bounty
and abscond (as above) and to draw them from one regiment to another.
There are cases in Scotland admittedly of weavers at xverk on "webs" for
which they had been paid in advance of being enlisted - it was necessary in such
24
cases not to send them to the regiment until thoy had fulfilled their contract.
This may be claimed as a case of the amy outbidding the civil employer. But we
find, one such man neglecting his wob, enlisting and thon being put in prison by
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25
the civil authorities. This looks like another case of a wastrel try-ing
to escape.
Grey had referred in passing, to unemployment as a reason for enlistment.
Sir John Moor® in the reports of 1804 thought that only a recession could
26
materially increase the supply of recruits while Craig mentioned the high
27
price of labour S3 the chief adverse factor. The easiest aspect of this
question to study is the effect of the harvest. Here are some Description
Book figuresj-
18th Light 29th Light 1st Btn.
Recruits raised in: Dragoons Dragoons 14th Foot 23th Foot
Jan. - March 155 259 117 36
April - June 163 238 66 61
July - September 170 135 79 27
October - December 342 277 124 17
Analogous is the report that recruiting for the Manx Fencibles had declined
29
because the Island was hairing a good fishing season. On the industrial side,
we can only say that the recruiters made for the big towns. Dr. Kerr told
Graham who was raising the 90th that Northampton was "perhaps the worst recruiting
town in England as we have no manufactory of consequence". When raising men in
peacetime for his son's promotion h® had been forced, despite his local influence,
to complete the quota by sending the sergeant-major of the local militia to
30
recruit in Birmingham. That tovm and its environs were spoken of by a local
magistrate as "this populous and trading part of the country (the grand nursery
31
for soldiers and sailors)". Even in 1793, the Colonel of the 77th reported
that there were so many competing parties there that his regiment could not get
32
a single man. The same tale is bold of Manchester, Leeds, Glasgow and London.
The Description Books and records of apprentices show a preponderance of men
m
coming from industrial areas. It could be simply that they were the most popu¬
lous, but the crises in industry and the unsettling effect of life in the new towns
/
seem to have predisposed men to enter the amy.
But c.f, page 225 : / c,f. E.halevy, Histoire du Peuple
Anglais, etc, 2nd ed. 1.73-4
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Wn&fc was th© physical standard of the recruits? Ths Description Books
so often referred to, were supposed to be kept by each regiment to answer this
question. They record when each man joined, his age and height, his birthplace
and former occupation. An innovation of the period under study, they were
carelessly kept and only a few have survived, mostly with some columns blank.
Some figures of age end height may be of interest:-
Under Over Under 5*5"- 0V©3
20 21-30 30 5'5" 5*7" 5*7"
20th Light
Dragoons 603 627 51 124 621 432
2Sth Light
IVagoons 416 262 17 206 322 157
14th Foot 156 421 145 214 23S 246
42nu Foot
(Black Watch) 294 93V 246 377 502 513
The a e columns speak for themselves. The minimum height laid down
34
for recruits was 0'5" but growing lads might bo taken an inch shorter.
Actually, plenty of men shorter than this v/ere taken, sometimes with the leave
of the authorities, but a good many were lost to the service through being too
35
short. An officer recruiting at Aberdeen had to refuse 204 men of - 4j|".
Major Sparrow, recruiting in Suffolk, desired tho standard to be lowered by an inch
36
because the men of that county tended to be short, Seaforth obtained this con-
37
cession when recruiting in the Hebrides for the 78th - the Highlanders were far
*
from being as tall as we sometimes picture them. The standard was waived
38
entirely for certain regiments raised on a territorial basis - which may partly
explain why more of the army was not so raised.
The recruits of the average Line regiment were thus a body of young
unstable men in which the ratio of the different classes "was much as in civil
life. The motives of these men seem to have been largely psychological.
On the other hand the tendency for recruiters to concentrate on urban areas
suggests that it was the conditions of life in towns that usually drove the poor
span into the right frame of mind. The fact remains that only a minority -
* Bulloch 394-6
••22 5-
further reduced by the cnoosiness of the army «. was so driven. Tho vast
majority everywhere considered any fate better then military service.
A great consequence of this as noted earlier was that it was usual to raise
each regiment frcm very widely scattered areas and compact local connections
S°f
were very unusual.
(b) County and Territorial Regiments
I I
Vie must now see if the forces raised on different terms and in different
f f
ways from the regiments of the Line were able to tap fresh sources of supply.
To succeed in recruiting within a given area would be in most cases equivalent
to doing this, in as much ee ordinary recruiting concentrated on certain localities
and there was need of a counterbalancing effort to sweep methodically through
the countryside in general. If novel methods can be shown to have produced fresh
men, the policy of having various forces besides the line will be shown to have
been a success.
The regiments (whether regular or for home defence; with the most indubit¬
able local connections v»rere those of the Highlands, Hot that they contained no
men from elsewhere. Even Seaforth had a contract with the notorious crimp -iaJtfcLin
1 2
of London and 85 of his men out of the first 600 were English or Lowlanders,
The second battalion of the Rothesay and Caithness Fencibles contained only 350
3
men from the northernmost shires where Sir James Sinclair's territory lay.
The BreadiJL banes recruited actively in the Lowlands, as for instance at Haddington
4
and Glasgow. To some extent they were still recruiting Highlanders.
At Dumbarton, a factory was laying, off men at one point and it was proposed to
5
enlist the Highlanders who had formerly been attracted to work there. An
analysis of the 79th regiment in 1799 shows that 50 had been born ir Inverhess-
shire but only 19 enlisted there, and 105 had enlisted in Glasgow. Fortythree
6
men born in Sootland had enlisted in London. This last case suggests that
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Sesfcrth's men from there, or the thirty gfcfc for the Meckay Fencibles and held
7
up by a shipping embargo on the way north may have been Scotsmen,
The Gordons procured 150 Lowlanders for their Fencibles but 300 como
8
from their own estates and 300 from those of their dependents. Three quarters
of their line regiment came from their own estates and the rest from Aberdeen-
9
shire. Sir James Grant's Fencibles, 590 strong in June 1793, contained only
seven rank and file who were not Scotsmen, There were 50 Grants, 41 Frszers,
94 Maodonalds and Macdonnells, 128 other "Maes" and with such names as Gordon
10
or Cameron, The Regiment of the Isles (Lord Macdonala's) raised in 1793
contained 455 Highlanders (200 Macdonalds) 103 Lowlandere and 92 English and
Irish, Its contemporary the Clan Alpines had 293 Highlanders 154 Lowlanders and
11
153 from outside - this at a low ebb in recruiting when the Highlanders had
been dre.inod.
It is impossible to think of the Highlanders being recruited on a large
scale save through their chiefs, Gordon of Coynaehie, having secured some men
to s@fire, said that he must be brought into the regiment or else they would not
l£
go, and he had not troubled to attest them because tney would go with no one else.
Colonel Baillie wrote to offer the government a Feneible regiment as the nominee
13
of the Mackays who alone could bring forward men from the district of Strathoven,
Apart from anything else, only the chief could override the claims of agriculture,
Eric ?/ackay gave orders that if need be the efficiency of the estate must be
14
disregarded in the drive for men. Grant induced the farmers to denude them¬
selves only by agreeing to leave the men on the farms until the snrir.g sowing
15
bed been done.
The Highlander hed very strong hopes of returning to civil life after a
period of soldiering. Various stipulations which arc noted elsewhere were
asked of the government to secure his rights and his links with his patrons.
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Th® Highlands raised many regiments of the line but they produced many more
of Fenciblee, and without the iiranunity of these from being swalloived by the
regular army, the chief's task might have been harder, Seaforth would have
16
preferred to raise Fencibles. The Highlanders had © lively fear of going
abroad and being "sold" and some of the Fencibles raised for the very limited
service of Scotland refused as we shall see to go any further. Thus the
government res limited in its choice of agents for recruiting in the Highlands
and to some extent also in its choice of terms under which the men would enlist.
How do the regiments with county connections compare with this?
We have shown already chat only the Feneibles and militia augmentation hove a
claim (apart from the militia proper) to be considered county forces. The
limitation of such forces to heme sarvice w»s probably inevitable if the local
gentry were to be brought forward in adequate numbers as officers- Was the
government reworded for making this limitation?
Certainly there were county corps that belied their name. Colonel
Countoney of the Cheshire Fencibles said that his regiment should never be
sent to Ireland because of the many Irishmen it contained. He slao hoped to
17
get recruits from the Isle of Men. Yet he at least made the claim that his
regiment wns raised, if slowly yet without the help of crimps. He honed that
18
men afraid of the operations of these criminals would join his corps,
19
Very much the same was said by Colonel Morrison of the Fifeshire Fencibles,
Various incidents suggest a genuinely local origin for these forces.
The Cambridgeshire Fencible Cavalry was not to be stationed at Cambridge because
20
the men ware natives and would immediately engage in the Town and Gown riots.
The Norfolk Cavalry was not to go to Norwich because the men came from there and
21
vrculd not be reliable against their friends. The portion of the Komerset-
22
shires ordered to b® disbanded lit 179E v«ras first sent back to the county.
Soma men of the Devon and Cornwall Infantry coming home from Ireland for the same
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purpose were (improperly) discharfad when the ship touched at Barnstapl®
because it was near their homes and the Officer in Charge was running short
23
of money. Sir Alexander Ron asked that the Berwickshire Cavalry be sent
out of the county where it had just been formed, Disciplineand training were
impossible when the men were still with their friends and always able to go
24
home.
Sir George Thomas who raised the Cavalry in Sussex got 27 men in a
week for his first troop from his own neighbourhood. Two more were proposed
26
to be raised locally, later in 1794, 1,'ext year, augmentation was easy
because the young men all knew him and came in at the rate of three a day,
26
Midhurst and Petworth soon had no Quarters enough to hold them. Colonel
Burgoyne of the Essex Cavalry complained when stationed at Exeter that it
27
was difficult to recruit - he could only get man in Essex and Bedfordshire,
Adjutant Wale of the Cambridgeshire Mlitie actually asked if he was permitted
to recruit for the augmentation of 1794 outside the county. In the end he had
three parties inside it, at Cambridge, Wisbech end Ely and two on the borders at
28
Royston and Ilewmarket, Localised recruiting was here a reality,
(c) The Militia
The county forces of enlisted men form a good introduction to the
militia, to which the sane limitations applied and which wes based in the
same way on the local gentry. The militia too was by no means entirely
localised. It was said that Warwickshire with its industrial areas supplied
1
half t.he recruits of each of its neighbouring counties. The accounts of
family allowances kept by the County Treasurer of Middlesex show that men with
families living in the county were serving in the militias of twentyeeven other
counties while the MiddlesexMilitia in turn contained men whose families lived
2
in thirtyfour other shires. But the tenendcy was the other way.
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The law required, as we have seen, that militiamen should come from
the same county as they served for, or an adjoining one. In Cambridgeshire
a magistrate pointed out that one defaulting substitute brought before him
3
was from another county and should not have been enrolled in the first place.
Of 723 man of the militia who enlisted in the 82nd regiment in 179S, all but
1S1 had been born in the county for which they were serving, and half the
remainder were serving for councieC adjacent to thoir own. The regiments
from which these men came included the Durham, East Riding, Shropshire,
Carnarvon, Gloucestershire, Somerset, Hampshire, Berkshire, Kent and Middlesex
4
Militias. Of 739 men who joined the first battalion of the 52nd from the
regiments of some twenty counties no less varied, only 22 3 hr.d been serving for
counties other than their own and again half these had come from adjoining
5
counties•
It was the general rule to station the militia regiments outside their
6
own counties - a sure sign that they had local ties with the people and could
not be trusted to act against them. Adjutant Wale wes anxious that the
Supplementary Militia Training of 1797 should be done at central county rendez¬
vous and riot in the Subdivisions oy which the respective bodies were provided.
In the latter case, the men would be laughed at by their friends for awkwardness
in drill, discipline would suffer because they would be able to go homo in the
evenings, and attempts at punishment would mean for tho officers the "risque
of being knocked on the head by old women and their families - I -assure you, I
7
fear these viragos ... more than I do the invasion of the French". When the
Supplementary Militia was raised in 1756, Lord Buckingham was diepleased that
8
his regiment, oeing at Bristol, could not do any recruiting. Such signs as
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fches© indicate that fch© militia was a truly lo-sl force.
The militia brought under arms many men unlikely to go into the line.
We have seen that few principals entered the service, though there were always
soma and they were always borne in mind. The Duke of Richmond asked that the
Sussex jt£ilitia should remain as one regiment when augmented in 179S because the
better sort of people in the force, who served for themselves, liked to be
9
sure beforehand under whoso command they were to be. The citizens of West¬
minster sent a petition to the Lieutenancy asking that the Supplementary Militia
bo drilled locflly, If it went to guy distance, those who might otherwise
servo in person would refuse to do so. Any sen who went would be rendered
unfit for ordinary work afterwards and agitators wore being sent by the **ondon
10
Corresponding Society to ©aliab and corrupt them. Principals were ©specially
rare in forces from urban arena. In Lancashire the following details exist of
men enlisting from the militia in the line in 1799 - admittedly an unsuitable
sample. ^
The 2nd Regiment s 134 of which 13 were principals
The 3rd Regiment : 202 of which IS were principals
The 5th Regiment : 83 of which 1 was principal
However,the substitutes and volunteers might not b® ordinary recruits.
Thomas Berry had left the Cambridgeshire$ilitia to work for his old employer
in Uxbridge (Middlesex). But he felt an attachment to his old regiment and
offered to coma back when tho war started, imagining there would be ademend for
12
substitutes. bdward Bmith had apparently bean induced by Lord Hardwick© to
offer his services and had been given a retainer. Unfortunately, the county
clerk was out when ho culled and he could not find a magistrate or anyone else
who was looking for a substitute. His wif® now appeared uneasy at the thought
of his going and he wished to withdraw. Nevertheless, he was willinr to abide
13
by Lord Hardwicke's decision. Men like these do not sound accessible to the
ordinary recruiter.
In terms of" groups rather than individuals, the militia was the means
of bringing forward man who were settled and vrith families* Regular soldiers
14
were or tho whole men without families, though there were many exceptions.
The militia contained an important married element, as the agitation over family
allowances bore witness. Out of over 900 Privates in the Cambridgeshire Militia
in 1799* 282 were married* together with 39 -8.CU0* *8. Of these men, 22 had no
15
children, 120 had one, 93 two* 61 three, 21 four, three hnd five and one had six.
Of a body of Middlesex militiamen with families outside the county in 1796* 65 were
16
without children, 88 had one child, 47 two, 27 three, 5 four end three had five -
it is interesting to note the ratio between families of different sixes. It was
found in (fiiorcastershire that the shortage of man, besides causing an influx of
boys, meant that many principals with large families had to serve in the
17
Supplementary Militia.
It was the Supplementary Militia that most demonstrably consisted of men
who would never have gone into the army* It iri.ll be recalled that this force was
originally raised without any idea of sending it or. permanent duty. A letter to
the l)uke of Richmond pledged the government in the strongest terms not to cell it
18
out unless invasion was immediately in prospect. It was analogous to the
Volunteers, When in 1797 it was called cut for drill, there were demands in some
dislfhch
pieces such os Lincolnshire that it should be formed into/battalliors to allav
19
fears of being sold to some other service.
To show the distinctive temper of the Supplementary Militia men, it is
necessary to refer to the enlistment of militia men into the line in 1799, All
the man, whether "old" or "supnlomantciry", b.pd the same opportunity to enlist, and if
they did not they were faced with tho disembodiment of some part of their number,
without any distinction between the two categories ae such. Yet Dundee in September
1799 said that in July, during the first reduction of the militia, tha "old militia"
20
had p roduced the bulk of the recruits for the line, the "supplementary" but few.
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Th® Durham regiment gave few to the line and this was put down to its being mainly
composed of supplementary men. Lord Derby*s reports suggested that in the
21
Lancashire militia the same distinction obtained. Colonel Eliot feared that
few of his Staffordshire regiment of Supplementary Militia would enter the line -
they had not been willing to do so when given the chance at the embodiment in 1798
when they knew only the good side of soldiering - trying on uniforms and drinking
22
the bounties. The Supplementary Militia had been less ready than the "old"
in 1798 to go to Ireland - the 300 of the Leicestershire for instance who stayed
23
behind were mostly new men.
The immediate reason for the difference would seem to be that the
Supplementary Militia was composed to a greater extent of family men (family
allowances ceased once the men had entered the army) and men who wished, like the
Highlanders, to return to civil life at the end of the war, 1799 was a period
of full employment* Colonel Patten of the 5th and youngest regiment of Lancashire
Silitia said that his men would prefer disbandment owing to the demand for labour
24
at Mai Chester where they could earn ten guineas in a few weeks. From the
corresponding regiment of the West Riding it was reported that the men were
industrial workers tempted in by the high bounties offered by the perishes urgently
needing to complete their quota at the embodiment. They wore now eager to return
to civil life and take advantage of the high wages. When the scheme for enlistment
into the line had been announced, their families had swarmed in from all over th©
25
Riding to dissuade them from doing such a thing. The demand for their labour
is illustrated by the Lord Lieutenant's request that equal numbers should be
disembodied from each regiment. Each was supplied with men by one area, which
26
would gain the advantage of extra labour if its own regiment alone were reduced.
The ultimate reason for the difference between the two sorts of militiamen
was however that the "old" men had become used to soldiering and unfitted for
anything else. Such at any rate was the opinion of the time. We have seen how
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27
at Westminster this result was expected to follow from twenty day's drill. A
memorandum of 1798 suggested that furloughs without pay should be given to the
"old" men, batches being let out for six months at a time. This would enable
them to revover (before peace and disbandment) the habits of industry and feelings
of duty towards their families which they hod lost. The supplementary men, the
28
writer thought, still had these feelings in full mearure. After disembodiment,
many of the West Somerset j^ilitia were expected to enlist, since they would not care
for "hard labour and poor living" after "better fore and an easier and more idle
29
life". A person with experience of recruiting in the West Riding thought even
30
the Supplementary Militia had been soldiers long enough to dislike work. But
naturally the longer 0 man had been in, the greater his desire to stay. Of the
723 militia men who went to the 82nd regiment, 248 had served for less than two
31
years and 360 had served for more than four. Of the 739 men going to the 52nd
(first bafctallion) only 56 had served as little as two years and 149 had served
32
more than ten.
It will be recalled that the officers reporting on the limit of service in
1804 regarded the soldier's life as a free and ensy on© which unfitted him for
33
anything else. Further examples of this view will be given when elistment for
the line from the Militia is considered - it was the basis of much of the confidence
placed in the measure. Interesting evidence that it had become part of the common
■
stock of ideas is provided by the fourth port of Cowper's poem "The Task" (1783) .
The poet speaks of the corruption of rural manners through the growth of
sophistication and wealth.
"But faster far, and more than all the rest,
A noble cause, which none who bears a spark
Of fmblie virtue, ever wish'd removed.
Works the deplored and mischievous effect.
'Tis universal soldiership has stabb'd
The heart of merit in the meaner class,
....the clown, the child of nature, without guile,
....is balloted, and trembles at the newst
....that instant he becomes the Serjeant's car®,
His pupil, and his torment, and his jest.
....he yet by slow degrees puts off himself,
*— - -r - rr - - -r - - •—— ——— —J —
Quoted in Holden 48.
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Crows conscious of a chaage, and likes it v/ellt
....end, his three years of heroship expired,
Returns indignant to the slighted plough.
....to swear, to game, to drinkj to show at home.
By loudness, idleness, and sabbath breach.
The great proficiency he made abroadj
To astonish end to grieve his gaging friendsj
To break some maiden's and his mother's heartj
To be a pest where he was useful oncej
A3fe his sole aim, and ©11 his glory now."
The Militi© then, and espicially the Supplementary Militia, brought men into the
service who would never hove entered the ©rmy. If they were kept in service
long enough, they would not wish to leave end would prefer the army to 0 return to
civil life. This was well understood on all sides - not without misgivings about
the social consequences, for to be © good soldier wes yet to be combined with
good citizenship.
(d) Cavalry Forces.
What has been said already is fully applicable to the various types of
cavalry force, but they had certain characteristics in recruiting matters that
were peculiar to themselves. Broadly speaking, they had a much easier tes# .
Major Grey In 1809 reported that the eavalry were popular because of the attraction
1
of having a horse. Lord Cornwallis thought much the same in 1804 - the cavolry,
2
he said were not short of men. Late in 1795, an officer who had been recruiting
for an infantry regiment at Glasgow was transferred to © cavalry regiment. He
wished to go on recruiting and said that the people preferred the cavalry. A
3
party with horses was necessary. In October 1794, when the infantry was being
allowed 15 or even 18 guineas levy money for each recruit, the cavalry wes only
4
getting 12. The spring of 1795 however saw infantry bounties at their peak, and
the Colonel of the King's Dragoon Guards declared that a draft from his regiment
would have to be made up by another from the infantry, as the high bounty offered by
5
the new regiments precluded ordinary recruiting. Thus glamour (plus, it must
be saidj a slightly higher rate of pay)was very slowly outstripped by the financial
power of the infantry levies.
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Th© cavalry could not only get men more easily but could aim at © better
class of recruits. This is most conspicuous in the case of the corps raised
for home defence. The New Roramey Fencible Light Dragoons were only to enlist men
6
of known residence. At the musters of the Provisional Cavalry, one or two
gentlemen appeared in the ranks, serving for themselves, William Colquhoun, M,P,
did so in Norfolk, and in Cambridgeshire a Mr, Bendyshe turned up who was the only
8
man in uniform. Doubtless they would have dropped out had their regiments been
permanently embodied, but in Berkshire it was reported that many gentlemen would
9
be willing to join the Provisional Cavalry for the period of an emergency only.
Thus it was in the cavalry, if ©nywhere, that personal service could be
celled for from respectable individuals. This made it a most suitable field for
th© activity of the county. It was also possible to bridge the gulf here between
the embodied forces and the Volunteers, The Fencible and Yeomanry Cavalry of
1794 were pg|r®lle4 levies by the county action. The Provisional Cavalry and the
augmentation of the Yeomanry in 1796-8 wero made connected levies, one being a means
of strengthing the other. There was an indefinable feeling that © gentleman-
ought to be ready to serve as a horse-soldier. It was this that led strength
to the drive for cavalry at this time and resulted in one of the most systematic
and enduring growth of the period - the Yeomanry, the local and personal force
of the county gentry and their middle class adherents.
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Chspter I3t s The Volunteer Movement,
(a) Government Initiative and Policy,
The Volunteers, like the militia, have not been explained or described as
the army has and there exists no generally accepted picture of the force as a
whole. It has again seemed worthwhile to digress a little in order to explain
the framework within which recruiting was carried on. In particular, without a
short account at the end of how effective the Volunteer forces appear to have been,
it is impossible to appreciate the degree of success attending the augmentation
of force in this way. Nevertheless, this chapter is not a complete account of the
Volunteers but only of how the men were got in end kept in.
The government might have set up a uniform national Volunteer force like
the present Home Guard, It thought it safer and more practicable to stimulate
offers of independent corps from individuals or groups with influence enough to
bring men forward. The sise and composition of the force was regulated by
stimulating or discouraging offers and by discriminating among those that were made.
It is the governments policy ss revealed by such action that is discussed in this
section, which amplifies what has been said in the first chapter.
The first line of policy was laid down in a paper sent by Dundes to Lord
A-mherst es early as February 1793, Dundas said that © number of people on the
coast had offered to be trained in the use of arms, for which there were precedents
in 1779, The plan was for corps to be offered through the Lord Lieutenants whose
recommendations would be necessary for acceptance. Officers would be commissioned
by the King and one at least in each corps would be an army officer from the half-
pay, The men would be drilled by N,C,0.'s borrowed from the regular army.
Companies of sixty men manning artillery on the coast were mainly envisaged, but
the possibilities of having Volunteers inland and of organising them into regiments
1
were allowed for. The plan of March 1794 included companies of this kind aid also





An Act of that period gave validity to the arrangements made.
Within this frame, the Volunteers operated till 1796, They were few in
number. Some artillery companies began in 1793 and a good few were raised in
1794, together with infantry companies in various inland towns. Many of the
counties raised corps of Yeomanry in 1794j there had been offers from Kent even
4
in 1793, The unmounted corps were essentially local. Their service was usually
limited to five miles from their place of formation and they were intended to
guard specific points of importances Fowey, Pensance, and Fishguard were sites
5
of the earliest corps. The Yeomanry were obliged to serve in their county if called
on by the civil authorities to suppress tumults and also to serve in adjacent
counties for the same purpose. In invasion, they could be ordered to march
6
anywhere by the government. These earlier corps were fairly close to the army.
Those of 1733 were formed by order of Lord^-niherst which caused some confusion
7
later, (From 1794, it was the Secretary of State who controlled the militia
who took charge of the Volunteers), There was permanent paid N.C.O.,s with both
8
cavalry and infantry corps who might be billetted like other soldiers. The
Volunteers were subject to military discipline when called out, though not otherwise.
The general tone of the papers of corps at this time suggests that they felt
themselves a good way towards being soldiers rather than men who oc-asionally
came under arms.
In 1796, the government held up all offers of Volunteers till the compulsory
9
levies had been made. It then consented to respond to the great increase of
enthusiasm which the increase of danger had called forth. The Volunteers now
ceased to be a fragmentary auxiliary doing a few odd jobs for the army and became
a movement of some sis®. The government diversified it accordingly, A printed
scheme was sent o-ut for a new sort of body, much less military than any hitherto.
It was to be composed of householders and their dependents organised into bands
of fifty without uniform and doing no drill (unless these things were desired by
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its members)# These bodies were designed for police work in populous areas and
10
acquired the name of Armed Associations. Their services were naturally very
localized. The infantry corps that were formed at this time, on the other hand,
were less local than most of their predecessors# Their services tended to be
available for the whole county in which they were situated and they could therefore
play a part in the more general work of defence. The Cavalry formations wore
of ■
much as before but encouragement was given for corps/pioneers and organizations
to transport stock out of the enemy's reach by voluntary provision of carts#
In 1798 the danger was again greater and the desire to arm more general#
It was then that the government was busiest in canalizing the enthusiasm. The
Defence Act provided for o census of all fit men between fifteen end sixty and
among other things the lists hed to specify how many wished to join the Volunteers#
The King was empowered to order the Lord Lieutenants to appoint officers to exercise
11
these Volunteers and all who were enrolled under the Act were to be obliged to
serve under the General Officer Commanding the Military District only in an
12
invasion or when called on to help drive the country, Dundes said that the
Act had been left vague so as to give latitude to the people in making voluntary
13
offers# but he proceeded to restrict that latitude by administrative action#
A circular in March promised the Lord Lietenants an account of the tasks to be
Id
entrusted to the Volunteers, distinguishing particularly between defence and police.
In April came the circular quoted in the first chapter which defined by social
composition the corps to be raised for these two purposes and in the same way
15
implied what types were inadmissible.
The main design was, while increasing the Armed Associations and cavalry
corps for mainly internal functions, to get a large body willing to go to the
limits of the Military District to oppose the external foe. The Defence Act
M
included in the plans of 1794 but none apparently formed.
See p. 20
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hinted at this by referring to the General Officer Commanding such districts,
the circular of April specified that corps not raised purely for police work
must accept such en obligation, and circulars in March asked the counties to find
out which of the existing corps were prepared to go that farj the Lieutenancies
were also to estimate what force needed to be kept in the county to maintain order
16
while the rest went off to fight.
The response to those invitations and directives was so good that the
government found itself obliged to limit the force raised, A shortage of arms
had appeared, A circular to the Lieutenants in May told them that they were to
get a ration of arms equal to their militia quotas in the case of maritime counties
and the City or half their quotas for the rest. They were to give two-thirds of
the arms to corps willing to serve in the Military District and the rest to local
corps. Although not all who wished it -would have arms, the force so provided
17
would be enough. Another circular instructed the Lord Lieutenants to decline
further offers of Armod Associations when they thought they had enough in the
county. The government would not in any case accept such offers when the town
concerned had fewer than 2000 inhabitants unless the corps would serve throughout
18
the county or unless it was specially recommended by the Lieutenancy,
The government thus provided itself with a force of the size it wanted
and composed in the right proportions, as far as could be judged, of troops for
defence and for local police. There was also an extensive organization of
pioneers, stock drivers and transport, and specialist bodies such as riflemen and
Sea Fencibles, Local circumstances at all times influenced the governments
decisions, Scotland was a permanent special case owing to the absence of the
militia. It was she who led the way in developing infantry corps willing to
serve throughout the county or even beyond. They appeared in some numbers even
in 1794, In 1797, the prospect of a militia led the government to lay it down
that no more Volunteers were to be raised there save on the coast and in large
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19
towns, Scotland none the less joined in the growth of Volunteers in 1798,
■
when England in e way caught her up.
Finance played an important part in government control of the Volunteers
and their expansion. Though at first it had been hoped that there would be
20
almost no expense, in 1794 all the corps were receiving (besides their arms)
the pay of the N.C.O.'s sent or hired to train them and those that were not mounted
21
received in addition their clothing (by en allowance) and two day's pay a week
22
for that amount of drill - a day meaning six hours. The further expenses of
the Volunteers were met by public subscriptions ot by the individuals. In the
years that followed, the subscriptions tended not to be received and the burden
on individuals grew heavier. The government had to give pay aid clothing to more
of the corps than at first. In September 1797, the War Office noted that £30,000
had been voted to clothe the Volunteers but the sum was not yet apportioned by
23
the Treasury, There was trouble when it had been, for the War Office had
24
inadvertently ordered more money to be issued than had been voted. Retrenchment
become necessary.
The government had provided the means to some extent when it started to
differenciate between police and defensive corps. The Armed Associations cost
nothing beyond their arms. The government drew this distinction with increasing
firmness, so that in 1798 corps could be faced with the alternative of serving
25
the full extent of the Military District or losing all their allowances. These
were however lessening in amount. The government in January 1798 cut the
allowance of pay from two days a week to one. There was a corresponding reduction
in the amount of drill expected, Ccrps formed before the?© order? were allowed
26
to keep to the old arrangement if they wished. The amount of drill done for a
For examples of the differing types of corps offered in each period in England
and Scotland, the reader is referred to H050/330-56 where the offers from each
county are preserved in chronological sequence.
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day's pay had somehow been reduced in the case of newer corps from six hours to
three. By way of compensation, the older corps were allowed to draw pay without
drilling if they could produce favourable reports from inspecting officers at
27
proper intervals.
Mien the counties were allowed to compound for their quotes of the
Provisional Cavalry by raising Yeomanry instead, a good financial backing was
given to the new cavalry corps by the assessments levied for the expenses of the
original force and now made over. The Provisional Cavalry Act of June 1793 fixed
th® allowances at three guineas a man serving each year for three year6j the
28
clothing alloivance at this period for infantry was only 13,4. It will be seen
how finance was made to favour the government's favourite schemes of a large body
of cavalry and a large force ready to serve at a distance. It also suitably
damped or sustained enthusiasm as the case might be, while itself limiting the
number of Volunteers which the government wished to have. A further Act of that
29
session allowed Volunteer Cavalry going on man® uvres at a distance to be
billetted as soldiers and recover some of their expenses from the Receiver General
of the Land Tax.
The government showed a certain degree of policy in th© use of the exemptions
which it allowed to the Volunteers. The Act of 1794 allowed all Volunteers raised
30
under it exemption from ballots for the old militia. The Supplementary Militia
31
Act allowed this only for Volunteers who were such on October 20th 1796. (The
Armed Associations probably could not be regarded as coming under the Act of 1794,
so their position was doubtful). An Act passed early in 1799 gave exemption from
the Supplementary Militia to all corps whose services extended to the Military
52
District. Another passed four months later in May gave a complete exemption
33
from the militia to all the Volunteers, even those in local corps. Perhaps
th© government had tried to carry out its policy end been overruled or perhaps
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the new act was connected in some way with the impending reduction of the militia.
Exemption from the Provisional Cavalry is explained elsewhere. Volunteers were
34
exempt from the tax on hair powder and, in the case of Cavelry, from duty in
respect of the horse they rode and from toll on the roods they used when going on
35
man oeuvree.
Pitts' government is commonly regarded es having been very haphazard in its
encouragement of Volunteers. It had in fact a tolerably clear idea of what it
wanted and sought to get this by suggestions and by varying its financial and
other inducements. It was careful too not to let the Volunteers stand in the way
of 3uoh compulsory forces as it was able to raise - with the exception of the
Provisional Cavalry which it finally decided it did not want. If circumstances
like the shortage of arms and money affected its policy, that is always likely
to happen with a force like the Volunteers which is lest in the queue.
(b) The Initiative and Control of the County.
The government relied on the county authorities to tell it what Volunteers
were needed for local purposes and what offers were trustv;orthy and in general
to encourage and direct local effort. Generals Commanding in various areas
sometimes took the lead, as when General Balfour encouraged the inhabitants of
1
Sunderland to form a corps of artillery or Lord Mulgravo did the same at
2
Scarborough. These were exceptions. It was only in 1798 that the Generals
took a large share in calling for Volunteers under the defence Act ana then they
did so in concert with the counties. Sir Charles Grey had for some time been
urging the people of Kent acid Sussex (where things were of course especially
urgent) to give him certain help. There wore now a number of meetings at which
ho stated his needs to the Deputies and gentry and reports were made of the work
3
going forward.
Down to 1798, the amount of work don© by the counties and the degree to
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which they wore organised depended very much on fluctuations of local enthusiasm.
The Lord Lieutenant was responsible for scrutinising all offers of service and making
his comment to the government. He was also the person most able to give ® lead
when such offers were wanted. Some Lord Lieutenants would not oodperate. Lord
Derby, Lord Lieutenant of Lancashire, told the Duke of Portland that his political
4
views precluded his giving any help beyond transmitting papers to those interested.
5
In 1795, he said he had never had anything to do with Volunteers in the county.
The Duke of Northumberland in that county dislikes the Volunteers as we have seen
6 k 7
because they interfered with the militia. His Deputies wore a feeble body
and the government had to make private enquiries through the Solicitor-General
8
to find out if certain offers from Berwick upon Tweed were made by reliable people.
The Lord Lieutenants were troubled with various boundary disputes. The
9 10
Mayors of Newcastle and Cambridge laid claim to be Lieutenants in their own
right, the better to dominate their local Volunteers. The Lord Provost of
Edinburgh made such a claim and it was more or less conceded; he seems to have
11
shared authority with the Lieutenant cf Midlothian. Lord Beaforth in Ross was
troubled by the "pendicles * of Cromarty and Nairn within his county to which his
authority did not extend. The Lieutenant of Nairn ceded control of his pendicle
11
for this function. In a generous spirit, the Lieutenant of Inverness thought
his county too large and tried to get a separate Lieutenancy set up for the
12
Hebrides, which was to be given to Lord Macdonald.
Below the Lord Lieutenant, the most active bodies in the English counties
were the committees set up to administer the voluntary subscriptions of 1794,
It will be recalled that they were for the most part simple meetings «f all who
13
had subscribed a certain amount. Some have left little sign of activity but
in Devon for instance, the committee, under the energetic chairmanship of Lord





set up sub-committees in every locality and did practically all tha business of
14
the Lieutenancy in this sphere, subject to the Lord Lieutenant's approval.
Cornwall also had a committee that seems to have been very active in the general
15
organizing of the defencest these two exposed counties obviously had more
interest in the matter than most.
In Scotland, the Lieutenancy from the start was ordered to organize voluntary
offers, and having nothing else to do it sometimes became active in this sphere,
Inverness was divided into nineteen districts each under a Deputy who busily occupied
16
himself in bringing forward the people of the area. Sometimes the Deputies
ware too active. Those of Kirkcudbright tried to insist not only that the offer
of the inhabitants of the town of that nam© should be submitted through then, but
that their right to command the corps be admitted as © condition of their
forwarding it. They accused Lord Daer of going to the government behind their
backs and he accused them of a partisan and secretive way of doing business and
17
failure to call publicly for offers.
Volunteer business certainly did tend to be in the hands of that faction
of the gentry in each county which believed in the Movement and had supported
the government in 1794. That was why the Defence Act served a valuable purpose
by making the whole Lieutenancy responsible for bringing forward the Volunteers,
It stirred up the slothful and put everything on a public and proper basis.
The work of the County In the Volunteer movement consisted firstly in
advising the government on the eligibility of offers. The Lord Lieutenant
tendered this advice but usually needed the help of underlings. Lord Fortes cue
in Devon referred all offers to the county committee, since he could not know
much ©bout everyone who came forward, and they in turn wont for advice to the
18
Sub-committe© for the area from which each offer ceme. In Warwickshire, the
offers of well-to-do individuals who were known to be hostile to the ministry
19
never csme before the Lord Lieutenant but were weeded out by his subordinates.
a/tvayf
The local Deputy in bcotlsnd was aimostxthe guide of the Lord Lieutenant,
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Sonetimes there was no reliable guidance. The Solicitor-General, whom we sew
investigating Berwick, found great difficulty as it was in © remoter part of the
county and the gentry in qpy case did not corn to have much to do with its
20
low townsmen.
Partisanship was s serious danger in this work of recommendation end the
government told Lord Lonsdale that he must not suppress offers but must always
21
transmit them, though with adverse comment if he pleased. The government did
not reject many offers until 1793, when it was picking and choosing according to
principle, and the fear of being too partisan is one reason why. Another is
certainly that most offers wore inspired to the extent of not being made without
the Lord Lieutenant's approval in advance.
The mors general task of planning the sire and shep© of fch® fore© in each
county was undertaken in s rudimentary way by any committee with a county
subscription to spend on Volunteers. Devon naturally went much further and the
22
committee secured the services of an artillery officer to survey the coast.
On his recommendations was based the plan of where artillery corps were to be
encouraged. Cornwall consulted officers in the locality in rather the same way.
In 1798, the government's request to know what force was necessary in each county
forced every Lieutenancy to take up the work. Estimates of loyalty were mad®.
Gloucestershire was thought to be safe except for a few dissenters among the
24
textile workers. In Warwickshire, the bigger towns were safe but the county
25
town and rural areas were not. West Lothian needed only half its volunteers
26
for internal purposes. Derbyshire and Staffordshire needed then all. So the
work of estimation went on, covering mainly the internal situation but in coastal
counties dealing also with the <^ternal throat. In 1799, the Devon Committee
took it upon itself to say that no more Volunteers should b© raised in the county
27
partly because the number of persons exompt from the militia was too large.
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Tlihen fch® Lieutenancy of Somersetshire declared itself unable to give guidance on
the forces needed there, the government wrote back sharply to say that no one
could be expected to judge properly of the local situation if it was not the
28
authorities of the county#
The part of th© county in raising the men that they called for was small
as yet# Subscriptions end meetings set things going and encouragement could be
given. The Duke of Gordon in 1797 gave his commendation as Lord Lieutenant
to the efforts of Aberdeenshire to raise forces according to the plans prepared
by the meeting of the county some v/ee ks previously. This wfs expressed in a
29
newspaper advertisement# As we saw in the first chapter, there were three
general enrolments of the men of Scotland willing to serve and there was one
undsr the Defence Act in England# There was Ho general attempt to follow this up
by putting the men into a count-y-wid® organization# In Scotland some counties
30
like Renfrew had almost from the start Regiments of Volunteers that were a
virtual sub-militia. Argyleshire proposed at one point to raise eight regiments
31
of this kind but her position was exceptional. The Dtike of Argyle wss so
32
completely pre&ninsnt there that he claimed to be hereditary Lord Lieutenant,
and the Volunteers were a single body under his auspices#
In England, the Yeomanry was raised to some extent on a county-wide basis#
33
There was tslk in, for instance, Lancashire about calling out the posse and the
34
plans of Dorset for "driving the county" by a county organization sprang from this#
There were various individual schemes for a more general organization than that of
th© many distinct corps. Major Knight suggested to Lord Bute, Lord Lieutenant
of Glamorgan, a general array of which the existing Volunteers would be the nucleus
35
to be financed out of the county rates# In practice as wc shall see, th© very
necessary build-up of the Volunteers into larger corps was done by ad hoc
amalgamations and without the interposition of the county#
What the county could do was to inspire some degree of uniformity in the
terms on which offers were made, As the Lord Lieutenant had to approve corps
and there wss s chance of their getting help from the county subscription,
such influence wss natural enough# lb is revealed by certain shared oddities in the
offers from certain counties, Cheshire*s had a clause forbidding (as an
36
. f
economy measure) the wearing of full uniform save on special occasions,
Gloucestershire^ for the same reason specified that there were to be no convivial
37 |
meetings. In Es3©x there was a promise to inform the authorities of all
, '//■ 38
seditious activities, while Norfolk men voiced their suspicion of things
// ' .?■ 39
military by stipulating that they were not to b® drafted.
To sum up, the activity of th® counties was uneven and nebulous but on
them fell - and in the end wss forced - the duty of advising the government
what volunteers it was necessary and practicable to bring forth in each locality.
With the general decisions taken at the centre, this advice made up a strategy
for recruiting the Volunteers,
(c) Types of Leadership,
The main power behind the raising of Volunteers was, as in the case of
ether forces, the connections produced by association in sundry civil affairs
and the leadership which this conferred on certain groups. We must now describe
the different types of influence which were used to promote the Volunteers and
which the machinery described above was used to set going and control.
The rulegjof the cototy possessed as such the power to lead and for the
Volunteer Cavalry, they tried to drew out the men of property within each county.
In 1794, a printed scheme based on that sent out by the government was adopted
in many counties and such Deputies as were interested in the work proceeded to
canvass the substantial fsrmers in each district. In Cambridgeshire there was
no success until 1796, Lord Haruwickc found it essentiel to canvass in person:
in September that ye©r he sent out eighty letters, held various meetings and
spoke individually to ® good many farmers. Fifty were persuaded to enrol in
1
six v/eeks, At Dereham in Norfolk in May 1794, the local gentry held a meeting
which none of the farmers attended. This was put down to the absence of any
advance explanation, and so the meeting was adjourned and two gentlemen went
round canvassing. The second meeting was well attended and when some gentlemen
2
had led the way in signing the engagement, a number of farmers followed.
The Yeomanry was intended to spread evenly over the country, Borkshire
3
Intended to have one Troop in each pe+-ty sessional division ana Wiltshire was
4
divided into ten districts, each of which was to produce s Troop. The uncertain
business of canvassing was a poor basis for such uniformity and the raising of
Yeomanry in lieu of the Provisional Cavalry enabled e. further effort in this
direction to be made. Lord Buckingham induced his county to exonerate itself
5
completely from the levy in this way and managed the gentry with some skill,
When Lord Inchi^uin withdrew his support because he had not been made Major of
one squadron at once, Sir William Young was told to per3U«d© Lord Kirkwall to
step forward end get him nominated without prior notice for this post, so that
Lord Inchi^uin could not start an agitation against those in control of the
6
Yeomanry withdrew with a view to getting the commission for himself.
To get a squadron for his brother William, Lord uranvill©, the Marquess proposed
to augment the Marsham troop, where an influential man must be put in as second in
command over the existing Lieutenant, who was not of a calibre to object.
He mentioned two or three gentlemen who would be able to bring men and a aid
7
that he could get some himself in that area.
It was not only men of substance ana their relatives who were admitted
to the Yeomanry. The rules usually provided for substitutes or volunteers to
serve at the expense of individuals who chose to provide them. They had to be
approved of by the better-off members of the corps, often by a two-thirds
majority, and it was usually stipulated that they were not to be domestic
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servants but most have a fixed residence of their own in the county; the stated
object of this restriction was that persons were not to be brought into the
8
Yeomanry who might enlist in the army. Auxiliary troops of servants attached
to the main body was sometimes proposed, as for instance by the Royal Edinburgh
9
Volunteer Light Dragoons. Sir William Erskine thought such bodies war© very
necessary to the efficiency of the force because gentlemen were not capable of
looking after their own horses properly. It was therefore necessary to fee® end
10
surmount the dangers of intercourse on equal terms between masters and men.
Mien the voluntary efforts of the humbler people are examined, there is
less sign of a desire to act on a count-y wide basis. The local king-pins acted
independently of each other in celling out their less prosperous neighbours.
At the some time, these would often be the local Justices and Deputies, deriving
from their office the right of Initiative. The chain of command downwards
was thus unbroken. Even in 1794, Berkshire told its Deputies to enrol those
11
who offered in each locality, and the Defence Act made it a duty. In pursuance
of this, one Cambridgeshire Deputy tried to bring the people of the Wis beach area
together to form a corps. he found it a thankless task because the shopkeepers
of Wisbeach could not serve at as great a distance from the town as the farmers
round it would. There were hard words, and the farmers ta^ited the Wisbeach men
with cowardice and produced a plan for a corps which would only defence Wisbeach
i2
if a certain number of men joined.
In Scotland as we have said, the Deputies very genfi^lly took the initiative,
The town council of Arbroath was waited on by the local Deputy and decided to
12
raise a corps, although confident that order could be maintained without it.
In Harris, the Deputies assembled the chief inhabitants who pledged their loyalty,
13
adding that they would bring forward the tenantry on the island. The Deouty
14
resident on Earra pledged the same, but he was also the sole proprietor there.
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The perish clergy, whether they were Deputies and Justices or not,
played a great pert in bringing forward volunteers, Two thirds of the Royal
Highland Volunteers in Edinburgh were said to have been brought forward by the
15
clergymen who acted as their chaplain. The Vicar of Northallerton sent a
plan of a rifle corps approved by the local gentry. Poor in all but children,
he had sent four sons to serve in the army and had tried to encourage e money
16
contribution from his richer neighbours. In Csnbridgeshire, the Reverend
Mr Harvey tried to get the men of Willlnton to enrol. They agreed with every¬
thing he ©aid to them but were afraid to enrol, for fear of unwittingly committing
17
themselves too far. The clergy of the archdeaconry of Newport Pagnall,
Buckinghamshire, were anxious to serve in person and bring forward the people
to maintain order should the Yeomanry be called out of the county. In that
event, they regarded it as their duty to be responsible for maintaining the
18
peace. Lord Buckingham was anxious to use the clergy everyjyhCre fc0 lead
the people, as the farmers in this county were too low in the social scale for
19
the work.
In order to make their initiative effective, the clergy often needed
to take command of the men they had brought forward. This naturally caused
some debate. The two Archbishops and eleven bishops issued a statement saying
that the clergy were bound to ive every help in repelling Invasion, but mean¬
time they must not accept commissions in the Volunteers but confine themselves
20
to auxiliary functions. This manifesto was widely challenged. The Vicar
of Petersfield said that it was inconsistent to imply th&c the clergy might
fight in an invasion but must not moke preparations t-c do so. The people would
21
think the clergy were being given a privilege and would become hostile.
*
Clergymen participated in militia business (example in Add.34303)
and were appointed Deputies in fair numbers (page 141 note 2)
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The Reverend Mr Story, who lost the chance of a commission in a Leicestershire
corps, did not see why he could not serve C-od in two waysj he had eleven children
22
and "every little is an object", In some cases it was a choice between a
clerical commander and no corps at all. The Vicar of Horsford said that the
corps he was raising would have to be commanded by himself however odd it might
23
look, Wufch such cases in mind, the Archbishop of Canterbury made an exception
in favour of clergy in his own see whose services were indispensable in gaining
24 25
those of others. There are several cases of clergymen commanding corps.
More generally the clergy contented themselves with taking the chair at
meetings and drafting the offers of service. Traces of such activity are very
numerous. It was not universally popular. Lord George Lennox reported that in
Devon the gentry were not active in the Volunteer Movement because it was so
26
largely dominated by the clergy and the churchwardens, their social inferiors,
27
But no doubt, the factors which led to the rise of the clerical Justice at this
time led equally to their prominence in the military movement.
Landlords naturally had a greet part to play in organising their tenants.
So far, the influences that have been described have not been directly economic
The parson and the squire usually did take the lead and so it was now. The
people of Hitchin, for instance, wishing to form e. corps, were advised on the
proper terms by Mr Wortham of Royston who sent the terms of the corps in that vil-
28
lege together with his opinion on what was wrong with it. He had been
x
Lieutenant-Colonel of the Cambridgeshire Militia and might be presumed to know.
But the territorial bond underlay all and sometimes ©btruded. Lord Derby atoned
29
for his earlier coolness by forming a corps among his tenants at Knowsley.
x
Confidence probably mislaced. His successor in the regiment celled
him "The Oracle of Upper Royston" but found him fainthearted ©nd
unco-operative in county military affairs. Add.35666; 147,308
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Sir Thomas Boughton raised one from his dependents near Nentwieh and not only
30
took commend but controlled every detail of its administration. The eccentric
Mr Beckford of Fdftthill in Wiltshire offered a corps of 500 soldiers and 450
31
pioneers drawn from his tenants and workmen in six villages. The Duke of
Northumberland offered a Legion of 1000 or more. His tenants had been cir¬
cularized and with two bailiffs still to report, 931 had already agreed to join.
He feared he would have to command in person, and if so would insist on not being
under the command of the local general, Musgrewe, who had served under him in
32
America,
Naturally it was in the Scottish Highlands that the landlords played the
largest part in the Movement, Dundas even sent out a plan early in 1797 to
!
array the Scottish clans. He told the Duke of Argyle that the old system of
33
trying to destroy Highland institutions was outmoded. The Plan envisaged a
force of 14000 men divided into nine brigades each of which would comprise the
clans centred in a certain ore® under the command of their chiefs, one of the
more eminent of whom was to command the brigade. It was noted that the High¬
landers were the only large body of men in Great Britain who ?/ere "absolute
34
strangers to the levelling principles of the present age".
The proposed brigade commanders were given the task of sounding the clans.
The answers received by the Duke of Gordon suggest that ordinary recruiting had
35
drained the land to such an extent that such a scheme as this was too ambitious.
It was also said that the men would not accept service throughout the British
36
Isles as proposed. In the end the scheme was dropped and the militia replaced
it at the centre of the government's attention.
The efforts made by the Scottish notfe-m©n wore nevertheless very con¬
siderable. We hove already noticed the offer of the Duke of Argyle. In
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Banffshire, the twentyone companies that were raised each consisted entirely or
37
mainly of the tenants of Lord Fife, Lord Findlater or the Duke of Gordon,
i
In Caithness by 1798, all the landowners except two had entered corps with their
38
men. Outside the highlands but characteristically Scottish was Lord Capellis'
39
raising of a corps at Maybole, a burghof which he was the feudal superior,
40
Sir James Grant offered two Battalions in Strathspey in 1797 and at the
inspection in 1799 of the rather smaller force sanctioned, he commented "it is
a pleasant scene to see seven hundred and si*ty three tenants and men of good
41
character come forward with such spirit cheerfulness and good order"
Cheerfulness no doubt was the rule when a landlord asked for his men's
services. Lord Macdonald assembled his followers in Skye early in 1795 and asked
42
them to join, whereupon more come forward then were needed. Should diffi¬
culties arise, however, the landlord was ready for them. In 1798, Lord
Breadalbane circularized his tenants (through the "ground officers") with a draft
offer of service which they were to be told he expected them to sign. It was
an offer of service to him, as he might direct, under the command of himself
or a member of his fanily. The tenants in fact, however, were to have a choice
43
of how to serve, Killin failed to acquiesce in this offer and a number of
its men failed to attend the Earl when he made a progress to receive replies,
44
Within a very short time Killin had repented end was ready to sign anything.
The Earl was advised to allow them to sign (with the exception of some ringleaders)
if they did so on behalf of their sons and servants as well, A paper records
45
the order in which they came to sign and who was allowed to. Excuses were
made for not attending the Earl} sheep shearing, rumours of a cancelled meeting,
46
and so forth.
The punishments inflicted show the quality of the threat that must have
brought Killin to heel. Of those who failed to attend the Earl, the villagers
living between the bridges of Dochart and Lochy were to be removed from their
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"pendieles" at once. Those elsewhere had leases, but these were not to be
renewed and they were to be removed next year. All would be represented to
government as enemies of their country and treated accordingly. The Earl felt
it his painful duty "to make examples of those who by their conduct may not
h>Y
appear to deserve the protection of government or any possession under it"#
We have now considered the channels through which the population, from
highest to lowest of the countryside and the smaller towns was brought into
service. The more populous areas were largely roused by the means that follow,
though the distinction is a very rough one. Parallel to the landlords1 corps
were those of factories and offices, Matthew Boulton thought the men of his
factory would serve best in a corps of their own. They would not waste working
time travelling to a place of drill and they would be on the spot in a b(>dy in any
sudden emergency# They had mostly been with the firm for many years and this
had bred a strong "esprit de corps" (Boulton's own expression). As they lived
48
scattered through four parishes, they could not be combined in any other way.
In Preston, a manufacturer formed a ccrps of 300 from his men# There
was already a corps in the town, but he thought a second one necessary because
49
there were factories in two opposite directions to be defended from the mob.
Canal builders made some offers. One, Pinkerton in the West Riding, suggested
that his men should become pioneers in an invasion - when work vrould stop
through lack of money. Lord Fltswilliem said this was a good scheme as the men
50
were of fine physique but would never enlist. Similar offers were made by
Telford in Shropshire and by the workers on the Grant Junction Canal to Lord
Buckingham who notices that the Duke of York had said that this type ®f service
52
was very useful. The East Indie Company raised two regiments to protect
53
its warehouses, and when they offered to undertake duty at a distance a third
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was raised to replace them. Any employe© unwilling to join this last was to get
54
the sack. From Liverpool it wes reported that employers were driving their
KC*J v
men into the "Volunteers.
An odd variant of these corps was the Knight Marshal's Volunteers formed
by Sir John Bland Burgess from the officers of the Marshals©® court and the
56
various departments of the royal household. The Customs Board was going to
turn its officers at headquarters into a corps, but the East India Company
57
offered to protect all the bonded warehouses as well as its own. There was
e suggested scheme, be it noted, to enable Members of Parliament and officials
to rush from their posts to the scene of an invasion and then bo sent to
58
suitable units ana serve on horse or foot as they wished.
Municipal Corporations naturally took their share in promoting corps.
Coastal Artillery wqs their especial province because forts were commonly put
up at private expense. Thus at Whitehaven in 1797, when a body of townsmen
attempted to form a corps to men the forts and broke into a store of arms kept
there, they were stopped by Lord Lonsdale, who said that a corps would be
59
organized by the Harbour Trustees to whom the forts and the arms belonged.
So we find that at Scarborough the Artillery Crops was raised under the auspices
60
of the Bailiffs. At Liverpool, the rsis on the Welsh coast in 1797 caused
61
the Mayor to institute a patrol for the coest and form a Committee of safety.
Later a large body of infantry was raised, batteries were built at the town's
62
expense; a body of well-to-do citizens who had all formerly been sailors had
63
offered to man them.
Municipal offers were not confined to artillery or to the coast. Wood¬
stock aid the Forst Hamlets formed a corps run by committees of the magistrates
64
of the borough and franchise. Portsmouth started an infantry corps by a
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65
resolution of its grand jury end invited enrolments at the town hall.
In most boroughs where a corps was formed, the Mayor at least took the chair
at the initial meeting. There was even a sense of duty about the connection.
At Aberdeen the Volunteers at one of their meetings declared that those who
enjoyed the sweets of office should help to defend them and that more of those
66
who had the freedom of the city should be in the corps.
Where there w®s no Corporation, the Vestry sometimes took a hand.
This was especially the case with urban Middlesex. Action against sedition
had started before war began. In Hackney, an association had been set up to
distribute tracts among the people and to come forward in aid of the magistrates
67
as early as December 1792. In the spring of 1794, there was a meeting of
chairmen of associated parishes which noted the need for defensive action and
particularly a plan drawn up by the parish of St. James to oppose riots.
68
The committees set up in 1792 were asked to consider plans for Volunteer Corps.
Soon after this, the London and Westminster Light Horse Volunteers was formed (or
69
rather revived) and asked the support of this organization. It remained the
only cavalry corps in the area, but infantry units were raised in large numbers
by the action of the individual Veftries. There does not appesr to have been
any official connection once they were formed.
In default of official initiative, various local associations were the
usual nucleus in towns. At Ipswich, an anti-leveller association formed in
70
1792 became a Volunteer Corps in 1794. The Constitutional Society at Leaminster
71
decided in 1797 to start drilling and invite others to join in, A friendly
society at Newbury offered its services. A Quartermaster of the Berkshire
72
Provisional Cavalry was willing to train them. Friendly Societies in arms are
73
found in the Isle of Man, The Order of Masonic Knight Templars (founded by
74
the Black Prince) made an offer as early as 1793, The Scottish Society in
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London wished to form a corps of expatriate ocots and there were similar plans
76 77
for the Welsh and the Irish and even the Swiss and the emigres. Windham
was especially anxious that these should be armed, lest it be said they were
78
not trusted. Most of those colourful schemes cone to nothing, but they are
symptomatic of the mod© of co-operation needful when there was no influence at
work from above. How suxh spontaneity might stop into the breach is shoivn
in the case of Ripon where the lesser men formed a corps without the help of
79
the Corporation or larger landowners.
W® have noticed that the government In 1798 decided that the urban poor
80
were not to be armed. Their way of specifying this was to say that urban
corps should be made up of respectiable householders or persons recommended by
two such - a stipulation that had already appeared in the plan for Armed
81
Associations in 1797. The factory corps clearly were not on this pattern
and there were a good many others that were not. Sometimes on the other hand,
the poor were excluded completely. The Armed Association of Chepstow was to
82
contain no labourers. The more general arrangement - especially for Armed
Associations - was to fellow the governments intention and admit the poor
under the special tutelage of the rich.
The men of an artillery company formed in Edinburgh were divided into
Privates and Matrosses. The former (with the officers) used their pay and
subscriptions to pay for the clothing of the latter and to relieve their families
83
when they were unable to work. The Rochdale corps formed in 1794 had 100
members who served at their own expense and 100 more who wore paid for by sub-
84
scription* The Armed Associations usually provided for two categories of
members in this way; those who could not serve in person joined in the sub-
85
scription. The poorer members had to be recommended by two householders
86
but also had, as a rule, to be accepted by the committee or by a meeting of
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the whole corpsj alternatively they might be expelled by such processes.
Sometimes majority voting was used, sometimes there was a system of black
balls, There was thus an effective system of control which applied in most
cases to the paying members as well. But the composition of a corps depended
on the standing of its initiators and when we hear a Penzance corps described
88
(by an enemy) as composed of shopkeeping Jews, butchers and blacksmiths, w®
need not expect too high a standard.
(d) The Motives for Forming and Joining Corps
The government's reasons for wanting Volunteer Corps have been explained
elsewhere. It is interesting to compare these with the motives of those who
took the initiative in forming corps in the manner just described, and of those
who followed their lead.
Defence and police wore the primary functions of the Volunteers and
local circumstances might make apparent some special need under one head or
the other and so inspire faction. This was particularly so on the coast.
The inhabitants of Appledor® in Devon were thrown into a panic one day by
seeing a strange ship in their harbour. It proved to be friendly, but they
1
resolved to form a corps and be ready next time, Dunbar, at the month of
the Forth, was the refuge of ships chased by the privateers which tried to
2
intercept the trade of the estuary, A corps was formed to defend the harbour,
3
Many other corps were inspired by the threat of privateers, among them Peterhead
4
and Rothiemay, The raid on Wales in 1797 was the origin of many corps.
We have noticed the case of Liverpool, At Bristol, the principal inhabitants
5
came out to patrol the town and afterwords decided to form a corps.
In spheres nearer to police work, a good many corps were formed for the
very proper purpose of taking over the duty of troops normally stationed in the
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vieinlty should they b© celled sway to oppose the enemy. Bolton, Peterborough,
6
Daventry and Lewes provide examples. In some cases the Volunteer Corps of a
place would itself undertake to serve at a distance in an invasion and a new-
corps would then be formed to replace it at home: we have seen the East India
7
Company do this, ~ A type of service increasingly offered was the escorting
prisoners*', eseorfih$
of/the townspeople should they have to flee before the invader was sometimes
9
an object as at Canterbury. Itymook in Gloucestershire offered to convoy
10
the barges on the canal. Notable objects in the neighbourhood called sotne-
11
times for special protection, such as tho governmentSs powder mills at Waltham.
Mien corps wore formed for police purposes, or even if that was not their
sole object, local unrest often provided the motive. The town of Oswestry wis
surrounded by an are® in which many colliers, lime-kiln workers and so forth lived,
Th® local dissenters were suspected of making trouble among them. Serious riots
in December 1795 were quelled by troops, who stayed till October 1796. Three
weeks after they had gone, there wer® further riots against the militia au gmenta-
tlon. The troops returned, but as they wer© expected to leave in the spring,
12
it was proposed to form @ Troop of Yeomairy. There were corn riots at
Chichester in 1795 and the better-off inhabitants were active in patrolling the
town; afterwards they decided both to start a subscription to relieve the poor
13
and to form a Volunteer Corps. New Galloway was one of a few places that
14
startedcorps as a result of militia riots. Clapham formed one for fear of the
15
debased poor of London who might sally out in an invasion to plunder.
The smooth running of the economy was a thought in the minds of many
Volunteers, Tavistock claimed that as a result of the activities of its corps
the market was safe from the mob and the farmers brought their corn to be sold
16
without fear, to the profit of the town. In Aberdeen even in 1792, the
-260-
merchants broke © dangerous and violent strike of seamen by the mere threat of
forming a corps# This incident was adduced as evidence of their usefulness
17
by th© Volunteer regiment that actually w%s formed later. An area round the Wash
was afraid of the "bankers'' or workers building dykes and canals round the fens.
18
Wisbeach finally formed a corps for protection against them and Stamford wanted
19
one in case the men refused to receive $heir pay in paper instead of specie.
Ashburton in Devon considered Volunteers necessary because of "a number of
laboring (sic) manufacturers who are occasionally deprived of their usual employ.
20
over whom some control may b© very necessary."
To be reedy against sedition was almost always an object. Rochdale,
impressed by © sudden spirit of activity by the disloyal, responded by forming
21
a corps in May 1794. Knutsford declared that it was itself loyal but needed
22
a corps to oppose areas round about that were not. In Essex as we have seen,
the Volunteers pledged themselves to report all treasonable doings and give
23
strength to the law by example. The Lieutenant of Renfrew said that the
Volunteers there "have been the principal means of crushing that seditious and
24
democratic tfpirit which so much prevails in the county of Renfrew", The Lord
Advocate thought that the Royal Edinburgh Volunteers had preserved the quiet of
25
Scotland. Conversely we find statements like that of Lord Moray that as
26
that county was loyal it was not necessary to raise many Volunteers.
In combatting sedition, th© Volunteers were as much © political as a
military weapon and we must now consider the purely political motives behind
the Volunteers. They were useful not only to frighten th© disloyal but to form
a rallying point for the supporters of the ministry and win over th© waverers.
In Warwick, the growth of new industries had led to a growth in the power of the
radical elements in the town who largely owned those industries. A Volunteer
6 27
Corps would act as a counterweight on the other scale. An amy officer reported
V
that th® district round Pomfret was thick with Presbyterians, A number of
rich members of the sect had settled there after the American Hilar and subsidized
the building of a chapel and an expensive mission. The' r sympathizers were
republican. Again, the foundihg of a Volunteer corps was expe-Cted to divert
28
enthusiasm to other channels,
fi' i; . * |
Wo have seen how anti- levelling societies sometimes took the load in
forming corps. The Loyal Association of Lancaster said they were stepping forward
\ 29
in this way to give some practical help to the ministry. At Wantage it was
A 30
simply said that the friends of government would join the corps. In 1797,
/ 1
the Manchester Loyal Associations and others joined together to form a corps
31
and foreswore all party feeling. But the enrolment on Lord Breadalbane's
J T
estate at thcb time excluded certain "covenanters" whose views on political
/' j f 32
matters were exceptionable, and some Exeter Volunteers who were ministerialists
objected strongly to being combined with other corps formed at a later date by
33
men who were cooler towards the government. The word "Loyal" which comes so
often in the titles of Volunteer Corps had e meaning that was often extremely
pointed.
Sometimes a corps was intended to combine the friends of authority into a
solid phalanx against the rabble. The Kilmarnock corps was intended to check
34 i
the worse sort. That of Bolton was composed of men whose influence was strong
in checking democracy and for that and other reasons th© corps should not leave
35 0
the town# Sometimes the idea was rather to win over the lower classes and kee
them loyal. A small businessman who wrote to Dundes offering the services of
his workmen as Volunteers said that an invasion would stop business and throw
many out of work. If they were in Volunteer Corps they could be taken into
pay and marched off to the frontj while their masters, formed into other corps,
36
stayed at home and kept order. The use of material inducements to tempt
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the working class to follow the lead will b® more fully considered later on.
57
Prom Sky® it was even suggested that ©migration could be stopped in this way.
Mr. Geddes, a glass manufacturer of Edinburgh, desired to form a corps
in his factory. Knowing the principles of each of his men, he could pick out
a body of the more loyal. His clerks, anxious to become officers, were zealous
for the scheme. If this plan were adopted in all factories, the disloyal would
not only be overawed but they would envy their loyal mates In their fine uniforms
and would b® anxious to mend their ways and be let in. The clerks would be
38
stirred into zeal in the way that his own had been. The ideas of Mr. Geddes
©re reflected in action taken elsewhere, notably in Inverness where there were
two largo factories. The local corps brought in at its own expense some
selected workmen "as pledges for the good conduct of the others" who "value
themselves much on the propriety of their conduct as members of the company and
39
by their example have visibly improved the morals of the other workmen,"
Naturally the radicals did not take all this lying down. In the parish
[V- .V-"
of St. Andrews, Norwich they were acoused of spreading slanders about the loyalty
of those who were offering a corps, which held up its being sanctioned! this in
40
turn caused a loss of enthusiasm and absenteeism among the members. At Ashton
under Line, the democrats succeeded in mance uvring themselves into control of the
41
corps end nominating officers friendly to themselves. Bitter local feuds ere
suggested by the desperate pleas of certain places that their offers should be
accepted. In 1797, when the government decided to accept no more offers from
Scotland, it wss represented thefc th© rejection of the offer of Melvill (in Fife)
42
would be a triumph for the local opposition. In Kilwinning, the rejection
43
of the local offer wss the signal for e storm of derisions The Lord Advocate
reported a similar danger if en offer to augment the Royal Edinburgh Volunteers
>' ■ 44'
were rejected. Tilihen all els© failed, the seditiou* could always tell prospective
f , ;! " " J ' t
;




Volunteers that they would be made into soldiers (as et Kettering) or even
46
(e.s at Inverness) that they would be sent to the West Indies.
The Volunteer Movement really seem:; to hove started the work of rallying
the nation that was to be undertaken more widely and successfully by the
Evangelical Movement. Wilbsrforce took an active interest in the origins of the
47
Volunteers in t ie West Riding towns and told Dundas that taking up arms had
48
a most inspiring effect on the well-affected. Sir James Grant (Lieutenant
of Inverness-shir©) thought the Volunteers, though expensive considering th©
49
service they rendered, were a powerful means of keeping up public spirit. At
Kettering, the corps caused the burden of war taxation to be forgotten (sided by
the fact that there were 3000 unruly tanners in the area who were often heard
50
to say that their friends the French would soon come and give them justice).
The Uist Corps was felt to be the means whereby many who would have fallen a
51
prey to seditious propaganda were kept firm. In Renfrew, th© Volunteers not
only kept down disorder but "caused the most hapny change in the ideas and
52
sentiments of the people". The Committee of the Chiswick Association summed
it up by saying that the Movement "have encouraged and restored a due principle
of subordination amongst the different classes of the people....induced the heedless
to reflect fairly upon the advantages they actually enjoy and the doubtful issue
of innovation,..,rendered disloyalty unfashionable, sedition dangerous and
53
insurrection almost impossible".
The motives indicated so far were all of a patriotic sort, one way or
another. Others were of a grosser or more dangerous kind4 Great advantages
of one sort or another were to be had from control of a Volunteer Corps. We
have seen the seditious trying to penetrate therru Atkinson the London banker
54
thought that s greet many hsd succeeded. Sometimes they tried to offer corps
of their own. They did a certain amount of privet.® drilling - ®t Nottingham
55
they were said to be more efficient than the Volunteers. This the government
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was determined to stop, as it mentioned in one of its circulars in the Spring of
56
1798. It was safefto form a corps for cover. At Inverness, the Volunteers
inflicted a total defeat on the mob in the provision riots of 1795. The
democratic party (whom w© last saw telling the Volunteers they would be sent to
the West Indies) now swore revenge and offered to raise a corps, seying that in
the next battle they would win. A townsman wrote to warn the government of the
57
plot, referring them to the Magistrates and Deputies who had not been consulted.
In the Isle of ¥lhite, a rifle corps was offered by a man who had fought
58
in Merles - on the wrong side. In Portsmouth, an offer was declined because
the person concerned had supported the mutiny at Spitheaa - though that was. not
59
the reason given.
As time went on, supporters of the constitutional opposition cams in
increasing numbers into the movement. The Duke of Montrose noted in 1798 that
60
the majority were doing so. Some had pure motives, such es Mr. Musgrave who
told Lord Hardwicke that he was opposed to the war but thought there should be
61
no question of party in national defence. Others were clearly anxious to catch
up on their ministerialist rivals in gaining influence from this source. Mr.
Scale of Mountboon in Devon had been active for the opposition and against the
war when he was sheriff. In 1798 he repented and offered to form a regiment.
62
Lord FortesCUe was anxious that this new loyalty should be ©ucoureged. Now it
transpired that the Dartmouth area where Scale's Influence was had been too well
tapped by other corps to supply a regiment. Scale therefor© asked other existing
corps at a distance of twenty or thirty miles to join him. This rather deceitful
method meant that the regiment; would seldom meet as a body and the men would lose
much time from work when it did. It was represented that this would bring the
63
valuable practice of amalgamation into disrepute. Scale was not suffered to
64
continue. The authorities were always in a dilemma over offers from the
opposition. When the Duke of Bedford suggested having a regiment on his Devon
-ass¬
es
©states, it was made a cabinet matter#
The Self-interest in commanders was often mor© palpable. Command of the
Volunteers could be useful in municipal politics. Thomas Hall, Mayor of Berwick,
raised a corps there at his own expense - as a reward for which he later asked to
66
be made neval and military Agent in the town. At an election for the mayoralty
in which his party was hard pressed, he caused a number of Volunteers who were
67
going to vote on the other side to march out of the town. It is not surprising
68
that in 1797 it was rumoured that a group of radicals were trying to form n corps.
No one who has read the account of Berwick given by the Tfebbs will be surprized
c°l
at this state of things. The Mayor of Cambridge, whom we have seen trying to make
himself independent of the Lord Lieutenant, atfcemptfl/to raise a municipal corps
in rivalry with one started by Professor Harwood, who was friendly to the county
authorities. To give himself an advantage, he proposed (with the other borough
magistrates) to finance it out of the rates if need be. His opponents decided
to test the legality of this in the courts. In the end, he found he could get
70
no one to join his corps.
Vanity was sometimes the motive force. Dr. Pegg© was described as the
father of the Oxford Armed Associations. He was Professor of Anatomy there and
his object (or rather his wife's) was to get a knighthood and so be the equal
71
of the Professor at Cambridge# Sir Charles Marsh was said to have taken
advantage of the enthusiasm at a banquet held to celebrate the victory of Lord
Howe to get pledges to serve in a corps commanded by himself. His associates
withdrew when they saw he intended to be in complete command and thereafter the
corps consisted of a floating population of low social origin and absentee officers,
m
Out of this Sir Charles got the rank of Colonel end his ssm/JPaymasfcorship# A
strong reply was written, denying this last charge, admitting that two officers
were permanently absent and seying that many of the men had entered the line -
72
a virtual admission of the first charge# Vanity could well, ef course, be, a
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hindrance as wall be a help. Lady Dacres flatly refused to count ensince or even
allow e corps to be formed by the tenants on a portion of her estate. They had
73
never shown her any sign of respect.
Straightforward financial gain was a common enough motive. Major McKerril
of the Paisley Volunteers asked for allowances from the government when the corps
wished to continue to rely on subscriptions. He did this to conceal how
extravagantly he had spent the funds. He flouted the committee set up to
supervise him end later caused a crisis by striking some members and leading one
section to withdraw • which to their mortification was declared illegal by the
74
local Justices. Charles Herries who caramonded the London and Westminster
Volunteer Light Dragoons went bankrupt and compounded with his creditors. He
refused to recognise the representative of the French East India Company, who
accused him of extravagance in the conduct of the corps. This seems likely
75
despite his denials.
Commander3 and members of corps alike were concerned to make a bit
commercially through the corps. The St. Anne's (Westminster) Association sent
out s circular in which was included the hope that anyone joining would find the
friendships end connections formed in the corps would contribute "to his interest
76
and happiness for the Rest of Life"* The Commandant of the St. George's
Hanover Square Corps was a tailor who took all their pay and supplied them with
any
uniforms. When members resigned, h® would not pay/surplus ox?lng unless they cared
77
to spend it in his shop. The Banff Volunteers were supplied with cloth by a
78
local firm. An insurance broker joined the Royal Edinburgh Volunteer Light
79
Dragoons end got the insurance business of the whole corps. Perhaps it is
80
not surprising that one consignment of arms turned out to have been insured twice.
At least one man - Edward Hughes - built up a fair business as Agent solely to
81
Volunteer Corps, Interests grew up steadily around the corps and it could not
well be otherwise. The Bailiff of Birmingham was allowed at his request to
82
furnish arms for the Warwickshire Yeomanry, in order to conciliate him.
i
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Careers might be forwarded in the Volunteers. The Edinburgh Light
Dragoons provide two good examples. Major Meltland the Commandant had been
invalided out of the army end had apparently hesitated between joining the militia
or the Volunteers. The Corps asked the Commander in Chief in North Britain to
give him a post on his staff and gained the support of the Lord Advocate. It
proved impossible to do this while he commanded the corps but the members were
83
determined to get him a post at the peace. Lt. Adams, the (paid) Adjutant,
was first borrowed and then taken over from the Cinque Ports Feneible Cavalry.
He became Adjutant also to the Midlothian Yeomanry and riding master at the Royal
Academy where he broke members' horses free - doubtless a good way of founding a
private practice. As Fencible officers only had temporary commissions, he had
84
improved his position considerably.
In a humbler way, the Sergeants who were lent by the army or militia to
teach the Volunteers also had prospects. The Prince of Wales sent one to his
friend Coke of Holkham end said he hoped this would enable him to gain some
permanent position for himself; he occasionally drank too much but was always
85
penitent and usually behaved well, A sergeant of the Cambridgeshire Militia
sent to teach the Volunteers at Wisbeach was anxious to stay there as ho oxpected
to end up settled for life . He was ruptured and therefore liable to discharge
86
from the Militia and desired to provide for his family. Another man, formerly
an N.C.O. in the Fencibles, was a candidate for the Adjtancy of she Leicestershire
87
Yeomanry.
We ere now dealing with motives that affected mainly the ordinary members,
the joiners of corps. Vanity played its part here too. The Chard corps more
or less collapsed because to save money it was proposed to wear very plain clothing
88
and caps. The men demanded a full-blown uniform. Mr. Vachell, a Cambridgeshire
Justice, Was of the opinion that a simpler organisation would do as well as the
present Volunteers, They pleased mainly the publican;; for th© young men
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congregated and spent their money freely debasing themselves and profiting only
89
the innkeeper. A Rutland Yeomanry advertisement was rather less harmful in
90
appealing simply to gentlemen who liked © good ride.
Money as an incentive is a difficult problem to discuss. No one doubted
the need for pay to the poorer members of corps - we shall consider that separately •
91
but that is not to say that pay was the motive for joining. Inverness-shire,
92 93
Berwick and Montrose gave bounties to their Volunteers « in the last two cases
£2*12 and £13 a man respectively « but this was a ainst the spirit of the
institution. The Tlvyaide Volunteers in South Wales engaged themselves to their
various masters for lower wages in consideration of the fact chat they would serve
94
part of their time with the corps and be paid by it. Fay was essentially for
time taken off from work. A corps might however create a financial incentive
by turning itself into a friendly society. The Knaresborough Volunteers were
suffering from absenteeism. This was attributed to the failure of the officers
to make proper use of the subscription money end their refusal to ask the War Office
for pay as the corps desired. The men told their officers in & petition that pay
should be drawn end part of it "funded in the bank" and a "final dividend" paid
at the peace. The result would be "strict discipline and obsequious subordination.
Such conduct would redound to the glory of the town .... and the terror and utter
confusion of our foreign and domestic enemiesI ........ accept for us the offered
gratuity as it becomes every cordial patriot to receive and your petitioners in
95
duty bound will ever fight".
The Renfrewshire Yeomanry (a county regiment of infantry) had a highly
evolved scheme. The pay was put in a fund from which benefit was paid to members
unable to work from "sickness or unmerited misfortune". There was also a funeral
benefit of £2 and provision for the families of men left destitute. Each company
was to try and save £300 in four years, so that the eeheme could continue when the
corps had been disbanded. It wras then to be formed into a Society of Loyal
Renfrewshire Yeomanry and continue as a friendly society. Meanwhile committees
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on which nil ranks wore represented administered the schemes. We have
already seen something humbler of the seme sort done by the Edinburgh Artillery,
Of course, regular pay for weekly exercises was in itself a standby in times of
unemployment. The pay given to the Volunteers thus played its part in binding
the poor to the established order.
Selfish motives are most apparent in the desire of many to enjoy the
various exemptions, espicially that from militia service, which the Volunteers
had been given, John Bevsn, a Justice residing at Swansea, revived in 1796 a
corps which he had had in the previous war and the arms of which he had kept.
At once there was a storm of protest, Sevan was a decrepit old man of
disreputable character. He had long been imprisoned for debt, living by his
wits until his creditors hod mercifully released him. He had once been a militia
97
officer but had been turned out as soon as aiyon© better could be got. His
officers Included a seditious innkeeper, a stupid young boy and a poor attorney
who was now ashamed of his part in the affair. The men had joined solely to
escape the ballot for the expected new militiaj they were laughed at and all
98
looked shamefaced. It was said that besides imposing an unfair burden on others,
99
the corps would intensify the existing shortage of labour;in the outcome, the
100
Deputies refused exemptions and complaints began on the other side,
A corps in Herefordshire was nipped in the bud by the Lord Lieutenant (a
man unfriendly to these exemptions as we have seen) when he refused to approve
101
of It unless it waived Its rights and submitted to the ballot. Some Yeomanry
in the Isle of Wight were anxious to have their offer approved in time to claim
102
the Horse Tax exemption. In Surrey, a Militia officer who had mad© a special
study of the deficit in the Militia reported that the Volunteers were joined
solely to escape the ballot. One Volunteer who had been bsllotted (for the
Supplementary Militia doubtless) said on coming to enroll that he did not know
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what Volunteers were for if not for this#
Some exemptions of s novel kind were claimed or sought. Kendal wished
to raise a Volunteer Corps at municipal expense instead of levying the Supplementary
104
Militia, Auchterarder asked to be excused from the militia because an offer
105
of Volunteers from the town had previously been rejected. Castle Cary and
King's Lynn ©sked and apparently sometimes got exemption from billetting troops
on the ground that with the Volunteers it was not necessary to have any in the
106
town. At Castle Csry too, e member claimed the soldier's right of not being
arrested for bankruptcy, as the corps had been alerted by the Sheriff and was
107
ready for instant duty. A Herefordshire poacher said he would join the
108
Volunteers if the law against a man's carrying a gun was repealed.
The argument in defence of the exempted was that their burdens were in
fact just as heavy. Members of the Aylesford Corps who thought themselves exempted
had spent more on their equipment than they would have done in insuring against
109
the ballot. The Islington Corps thought there should be exemption from the
Supplementary Militia ballot for all Volunteers who were unpaid. It was unfair
11C
to make tradesmen who had met their own expenses pay a further £6 for a substitute.
The conclusion which this suggests is that it was the poor, who were paid to join
the Volunteers and who might otherwise have had to serve in person or dig deep
in their savings, who used the Volunteers as a soft option. The cases of Swansea
end Surrey are in line with this. As the militia laws tended to favour the poor,
it could be claimed that their spirit was adhered to.
We may fittingly end this section, in which the varied and devious motives
in the breasts of the Volunteers have been exposed, by pointing fco some of the
dilemmas which they placed the government in, when there was need to decide who
might safely be armed. As already noted, it was difficult to decide if the
gentlemen in opposition might bear their share. How many, too, of the poor were
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to be armed? Sir George Q&esiphorus Paul, the distinguished magistrate of
Gloucestershire, found the cloth manufacturers of the area very anxious to bring
forward their workpeople. He told the government that he saw dUingei in this
measure although the employers felt it was safe enough. The workers would
certainly fight the French loyally but when the cfliangefwos pest they would
111
probably turn their arms against their employers and ask for higher wages.
In 1797, the year before this letter, a similar one had come from an ex-Provost
of Glasgow. The corps there was designed "to keep in order those designing and
turbulent manufacturers who take advantage of every opportunity to raise their
wages". If the corps was augmented as now proposed, it would not improbably
112
assist the other side.
There were those who held the view expressed by George Home in a letter
to the Lord Advocate, The French Revolution, he said, had made the cardinal
innovation of setting the poor against the rich. It was above all necessary
to put arms only in the hands of the latter and the excuse could be made that
to arm the people at largo would be too expensive. The small shopkeepers
113
were a particularly dangerous lot and ought also to be excluded. As against
this policy, it was maintained in Roxburghshire that the Volunteer Movement
114
enabled it to b© shown that the war was not one between rich and poor.
Volunteer Corps were a form of gratification which the government could allow
its supporters to have, Wilberforce complained that he was losing ground in
his constituency and sent a request from Lord Hawke to get an officer of his son's
115
Yeomanry Troop into either the army or navy. The government must have had
many corps it did not want. Lord Titchfield was told that though there was enough
infantry in the Middlesex, more cavalry would be invaluable and so offers which
116
comprized both must be accepted.
As if all this was not enough, religion added to the governments'
-272.
difficulties. The Jews of Portsmouth were kept out of the local corps. They
complained that they had bean admitted elsewhere and their patriotism would be
suspect if they were not allowed to join «* unless it was declared that this had
been done as & general rule. The local military commander, who had mad® the
objection because there were some undesirable persons in the Jewish community,
117
waived it when these had gone elsewhere.
The Roman Catholics had the worst difficulties. Sir Edward Smythe was
a pillar of order in Warwickshire, but his religion debarred him from holding
© commission in the Volunteer.-; and he could not form his tenants into a corps.
Despite disappointment ho resisted the blandishments of the disloyal, who were
118
very numerous in the area.
The government endeavoured to help the Catholics by maintaining that it
was no part of a ministor's duty to satisfy himself that the persons who were
119
to have commissions were of the right religion. This did not help when the
religion of a Volunteer was so notorious as to be known to the King. Lord Petre
raised a corps but George III refused to sign his commission. The Duke of York
said there were mony Catholic officers even in the regular forces. The King replied
that at anyrate he did not know them to be soj he would not know-ingly break
the law. Lord Petre retired and the corps was commended by someone else - who
120
was possibly a Catholic too. Once the ministers tried a battle of wills with
the King. A Mr. Weld was one of the prime movers of the Dorset Volunteers aid it
was most necessary to reward him. His commission was prepared and lay unsigned
121
for a year before the ministers gave up. The real disqualification for office
was thus to be known as a Catholic to the King.
Such were the difficulties which beset the government in carrying out its
policy for the Volunteer Movement.
(e) The Acceptable Conditions of Service,
We have now seen why and how men were got to join the Volunteers. If they
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hed been prepared to do so on any terms, there would have been no problem of
recruiting. As it was, no social pressure could lead them to offer save with
qualifications. These must b© explained in order to make clear the degree of
usefulness which the force might have.
The Volunteers always put a strict limit to the distance from home which
they were prepared to go. The lower classes wer© less fussy in this respect,
though even on Lord Breadalbsne's estate there \¥ere some who were dissuaded from
enrolling by their families because they were to be called to serve outside their
1
county. Any corps with an appreciable upper class element was likely to be
fairly static. Yeomanry corps tended to be formed with the provision that a
certain proportion should always remain in the county - in Huntingdonshire and
2 3
Oxfordshire a quarter, in Leicestershire a third. The Norfolk corps was not
4
to leave the county unless two thirds of the members agreed.
The motive behind this restriction was largely a desire to leave reliable
persons at home to keep order. Business men in the town corps had the additional
need to be near their businesses and give them constant attention. The insurance
broker who joined the Edinburgh Light Dragoons wrote to the committee to say that
his business would never let him go so far from the town, though he had not
5
publicly objected to the limit of the corps so as not to damp enthusiasm. Later
it was agreed that only one member of the partnership need even attend the drills
6
es someone had always to be on duty at the office. Many bodies of business men
stated in their offers that prolonged absence from home would mean ruin and
7
consequently distress (leading to riot) among their workpeople. Town corps
of middle-class membership therefore only agreed to serve in the immediate
vicinity. This was another reason for dividing corps into those for defence
and those for police.
The amount of drill which might be done was limited, with effects on the
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efficiency of the Volunteers, Some corps drilled on Sundays, like that at
8
Highgate, This was generally frowned on, Wilberforce was assured by Windham
9
that the War Office totally disapproved of it. The result is well demonstrated
by the experience of the Manchester Volunteers, In the summer, they were able
to drill in the eveningsj in winter, it was necessary to drill in working time
10
on weekdays. For a corps with working-class members (whichthis was) pay from
some source was therefore inevitable, Uor was this all, Bideford, noting that
corps roundabout were receiving pay but drilling on Sundays said that the farmers
were threatening to dismiss men belonging to the corps, saying that their work
11
suffered through this weekday drill. The Volunteers were regarded not as a
spore-time force but as competitors for labour, A project for a corps at Sudbury
12
in Devon was given up because labour was short on the farms,
IS
Many corps especially Yeomanry, did not drill at harvest time. The
hoy harvest was sometimes included in this abstention, which therefore covered
much of the summer. Some corps continued to receive pay at harvest time and
14
there were cases of their making up by extra drills for some weeks before.
Odd interruptions of drill by work are found from time to time. The Barra corps
took some time off when the members all soiled to Glasgow to sell their fish end
15
while the fishing season was on they did only half the usual amount of drill.
The Edinburgh Light Dragoons were virtually quiescent during the summer for the
opposite reasons to the above - the members were mostly lawyers and went to the
16
country seats of their families for the summer vacation.
There was a decided shyness of discipline and s military character altogether,
A small business men wrote to Lord Hardwicke that Volunteering involved a certain
amount of idleness and much eating and drinking. They would destroy the frugal
17
habits necessary to earn a living in trade and so he could not think of Joining,
The Volunteers were not under military discipline unless they were called into
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service, Some of the earlier corps attested the members as if they were soldiers
but et Bolton some who joined refused to sign attestations end the War Office
18
told the corps there wes no means of punishment. Similarly tfcb Drummers at
Fishguard "deserted" and made trouble by saying that they were not under military
19
law. The corps often instituted a system of fines for various offences but
there was no legal force behind these end no way to levy them unless they could
20
be stopped from pay. When a member of Colonel Orchard's regiment in North
Devon assaulted en officer, there wes nothing to be done about it but prosecute
21
in the civil courts.
All corps claimed and were automatically allowed to nominate their own
officers, which was don® in the same way as offering service - through the Lord
Lieutenant end subject to his approval. The government are sometimes blamed
for having countenanced this system but it was probably the only one possible.
Only the Lord Lieutenant could readily find out who was eligible and he could
scarcely avoid choosing those who had brought the Volunteers forward and under
whom more were likely to enroll. When a corps was formed at Blwidworth in
Hampshire, the Lord Lieutenant w®s advised to make the richer farmers and
tradesmen officers ®s they would be so pleased at their increased importance that
22
they would be eager to bring forward the poorer people.
Whet the government did discourage whenever it could was the election of
officers by a formal ballot. This might be construed as an ultimatum to the
Lord Lieutenant to accept the choice of the corps, or even as an attempt to
23
dispense with the King's commission. The government was also against the
24
©lection of N.C.O.'s as being likely to weaken discipline. These things
happened nevertheless, on occasion, and often with th© bad results anticipated.
There was s hotly contested election et Fishguard between a deserving old officer
end a rich man without experience who tried to buy his way in with beer and other
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25
largossa, A fierce contest at St, Andrews was prolonged by charges that some
votes cast were invalid. One man was kidnapped on that occasion, and sick men
26
were dragged to the poll. At Kirkcaldy, the command was vested in the Mayor
27
for the time being. One incoming mayor was persona non grata to the Lieutenancy,
In this case, a schism in the corps resulted, while at St, Andrews one company
28
(under the influence of one of the rivals) seceded.
As to the finances of the Volunteers, there were very few corps which
could keep going for more then a certain time without government help. In 1795,
the Royal Edinburgh Volunteers consisted of 700 men who had paid for their own
clothing. The expenses of permanent staff end K.C.O.'s were such that they had
nevertheless built up debts of £899 of which £450 had beexi met by a special
payment from the government. They reckoned the annuel provision which they
29
needed at £1262, At St, George's Hanover Square it was found that members of
the corps had to be paid whether they attended drill or not if they were to be
30
kept from resigning. An annuel fund of £5200 was necessary. The Hackney
Corps consisted of two sections, one paid and the other not, lhe expense was
met by a subscription, but when this wss exhausted in 1799 the paid corps was
31
disbanded. The Hull Volunteers felt able to renounce their pay in 1795 but
asked that it might be applied to the upkeep of other corps in the area as they
32
had very little money from subscriptions. These items will indicate the
costliness of Volunteers and the inadequacy of their resources, especially when
pay was required.
Sometimes there was trouble in raising funds even at the outset. At
Cowbridge in Glamorgan, it was hoped to raise £100 in 1797 and clothing was
33
bought at £2-10 a man. Actually only £80 was subscribed. For another corps,
Lord Carysfort wrote anxiously asking for allowances ana p®yj the local
34
tradesmen had supplied all its needs on credit. More usually a corps would
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run out of funds later in its career and be obliged to ask for pay. Ambition
35
to Improve efficiency could have financial repercussions. The Sheffield
Volunteers (among others) asked for permanent pay for an Adjutant, This was re-
36
fused as it might create a dangerous precedent. Later, corps of Yeomanry
were allowed to dismiss a proportion of their permanent N.C.O.*s aid apply their
37
pay (which they continued to draw) to the support of en Adjutant,
Requests for pay sometimes arose from jealousy and competition. From
Exeter and Manchester it was reported that members of an unpaid corps would leave
it forthwith and join those that had been formed on better terms if equal advan-
38
tapes were not accorded. When the government found it neces-ary, at the end
of 1797, to scale down the financial provision for Volunteers, there was some
talk of withdrawing pay from those corps that had originally done without it.
Lord Rolle protested that these older corps were the best trained and most useful
39
and it would be wrong to condemn them to disbandment in this way. From North
Devon, Colonel Orchard said that the newen corps in the area t?er® mostly formed
40
of men who had been expelled from his own corps and ill deserved such favour.
The expense of the Volunteers war. s deterrent to their formation. At
Leigh in Lancashire a project was abandoned after ». meeting had failed to reach
41
any conclusion about how the expense was to be borne. At Hendsworth, the man
who had initiated a corps and was to have been its Captain resigned when he snw
42
the expense that would be entailed. Many sets of resolutions for the forming
of corps contained references to economy and particularly tried to reassure
43
members that clothing was to be simple end cheap. Rut si though there were
44
some corps who promised to meet ell their expenses and even buy their own arms,
the government wan normally celled on at least for ®rms aid the pay of some N.C.O.*
from the start. Except for the Armed Associations, which were little more than
bodies of special constables, it normally found Itself er© long meeting on s
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considerable scale the costs of Volunteering,
(f) The Fruits of Volunteering.
The usefulness of the Regular Army end even of the Militia can be taken
for granted within certain easily expressed limits. The usefulness of the
Volunteers, product of such higgledy-piggledy action and hampered by the timidest
restrictions, cannot be taken for granted. It would be unreal not to consider
whether the government had troubled itself to no purpose.
The Artillery Corps were probably the most useful. They were often not
very military in character. They were not allowed to have field guns because
they would not be skilled enough to spike them if the enemy attacked in strength
1
and the enemy was likely to be in dire need of artillery. Thus these corps
might be reduced to the care of the forts (often local property) and other quite
static duties. At Sunderland s body of men turned up to practice with the guns
2
but had no officers. The government did not seem to mind - as a rule they would
have objected strongly,
■Whether military, or not, these corps did good service. Hartlepool was the
only haven for many miles where ships could shelter from privateers. Early in
1798, three of them chased a convoy into the harbour and for some days the forts
were permanently manned and the foe kept at bay. It was estimated that during
3
its existence the corps had saved 100 sail from destruction. The Wick corps
4
drove away the "Lion" lugger in October 1797, The corps at Ullapool proposed
to maintain a permanent guard at the narrow harbour mouth, so that enemy ships
6
would never be able to get in, When the Oxfordshire Militia plundered the
market at Seeford near Newhaven and sold corn below the ruling price, the local
Justice called out the Artillery Volunteers whom he commended and they manned
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6
the fort, keeping s®fe there a good quantity of provisions and eras.
Also for the defence of the coast were the Sea Fencibles, The plan
7
for these emanated from the Admiralty early in 1798, Previous to this there
had been various offers of an amphibous kind. The fishermen of the Lothians
8
were ready to serve on gunboats in the Forth, One ulterior object had been
9
exemption from the Press, Mfhich the government had declined to grant. It was
now proposed to raise a force of 18,800 men from those who followed maritime
occupations and give them the coveted exemption, A Post-Captain was to command
in each county and under him a number of Commanders were to be responsible for
so many beaches each. These Feneibles ware to serve in forts and also in gunboet6
against privateers. They were organised much as Volunteers but were not allowed
to be absent from home witheut leave. An attempt was made to divert seamen in
10
existing Volunteer Corps into the new body. It was not a strictly land force
and is more or less outside our subject but it ic mentioned hers as part of the
attempt to introduce more system into the irregular forces, Mmhan does not
11
speak highly of it and the price (of exemptions) was probably too high.
It was noted in the first chapter that the government made an attempt in
12
1796 to hsve a compulsory levy of gamekeepers, A body of sharpshooters derived
from this or some other source was greatly desired by the army who were fully alive
by now to the increased importance of Light Icfentry. Major Thomas Reynolds
for instance, in a report to Lord Cornwallis on the defence of the Eastern District
dated August 1796 mentioned the need of e large body of "rangers" and suggested
that the officers should be young gentlemen of the area, the N.C,0.'s gamekeepers
end the privates poachers I In April 1798 therefore, Dundas sent out a special
circular asking the Lord Lieutenants to make a census of gamekeepers willing to
serve as Volunteer reflemen, noting what specialised arms were available for them
14
locally. The response to this circular was probably not encouraging. In
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Loncaehire such gamekeepers as were not already in the Volunteers were mostly
15
either too old or had never used firearms, relying on nets and snares. From
16
Fife csrae similar reports. However, in Kent and Sussex, corps of Guides each
sixty strong were formed at the request of the Local Military Commander, Sir
17
Charles Grey, They were given the princely sum of £12 a heed to equip themselves.
Here and there about the country. Volunteer offers took the form of corps of
riflemen, rangers and so forth. Of these corps we may say that they were wanted
by the military and probably did not staffer too much from lack of formal discipline.
The bodies of pioneers and drivers are barely within our subject, but we
may not© that in the South at any rate a full organisation was created. Itineraries
were worked out over which the provisions and livestock could be conveyed out
of the enemy's reach. In the south-east the system was particularly complete,
18
thanks to the indefatgable industry of Sir Charles Grey, All was ready to
create temporary depots for the receipt of cattle end stores. Superintendents
19
were appointed to act under the Official Commissaries, They were mostly clergymen.
Of the mass of the corps of infantry and cavalry it can at least be said
that in many instances they were instrumental in keeping or restoring order,
20
In Inverness and Peterhead, meal riots were suppressed by the local corps. The
Sheffield Volunteers strove hrrd egeinst locol disturbance end their Colonel had
21 22
his horse shot under him. The Stockport Volunteers put down a riot. The
Plymouth Volunteers guarded property saved from fires and instituted s regular
23
nightly petrol of the streets. The Honourable Artillery Company suppressed
24
part of the recruiting riots of 1794,
Among the cavalry, the London and Westminster Light Horse Volunteers were
a source of strength on several occasions, notably in overawing the great meetings
25
oalled by the London Corresponding Society in 1796, Th® Buckinghamshire
Yeomanry defended stocks o? corn moving aloag Watling Street in 1795 and arrested
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26
the leaders of ® riotous attempt to impede them. In Birmingham and Stratford
on Avon the Yeomanry were active in the same year, cooperating with end learning
27
from the regular troops in the area.
There were a few grave cases of insubordination in the infantry. The
Dingwall corps did not stand the test of the meal riots as well as its neighbours
in Inverness, It joined the rioters end although very penitent afterwards had
to be disbanded. A new corps was formed which most of the members were allowed
28
to join. The Teignraouth Corps in 1797 refused to quell a riot and took to
meeting in taverns and discussing the fixing of the price of corn. It was
29
ordered to be got rid of. Some trouble was caused at the War Office in 1799
by © member of Professor Harwood's corps at Cambridge who had, while drunk,
proposed seditious tossts. There was no means of subjecting him to any punishment,
60
it seemed} his intoxication was regarded ss © mitigating factor.
The Yeomanry were safe from sedition but they and the infantry alike
suffered from everv form of f©int-heartedness and inertia. The Derbyshire
31
Yeomanry could not be relied on against the riots because it was harvest time.
The Edinburgh Light Dragoons had to be warned that hunting was no excuse for
32
absence from drill. Their minute book contains many exhortations to attend
drill regularly, but the corps slid steadily down from the early good ettendsnce
33
until only ® third of the members were normally present each time. When asked
for a return of his troop of Sussex Yeomanry in 1795, Lord Egremont said that
some members never attended and .jthers were gout-ridden end could not; something
34
better would bo needed to facvs an invasion.
The Rochdale Volunteers stood up well et first to the Viatard of riots but
"the devil in the shape of women is now using all his influence to induce the
Privates to break their attachment to their officers and ..... has already
35
debauched three from their duty". In Liverpool a corps nominally 1500 strong
could only muster 900 at drill. It was complained that "mechanics" had no permanent
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36
homes and it was difficult to keep a hold on them. At tha inspection of
June 1797, that old established corps the Fishguard Volunteers showed themselves
very unsteady in the few evolutions they ventured to perform* their clothing
37
was poor and they had lost some of their bayonets.
The Armed Associations were sometimes so ephemeral that they could scarcely
be said to hsve any discipline at all. The Lincolnshire corps which had neither
38
uniform cr drill was to be disbanded in six months time unless specially renewed.
39
At Marylebone, those who would not drill were given pikes. St, Andrews Hoiborn
also had piketaen, together with t body of attached soeciel constables who petrolled
40
the streets according to a set pi on. Thee,® bodies were sub-divided, according
to tha plan of 1797 into groups of neighbours who each had a list of the others'
41
names and addresses, to facilitate cooperation. Harries of th© Light Horse
wa3 eonterapfcous of these bodies. He recalled that in 1780 one such had been
42
shot up in mistake for tha rioters.
IVhafc judgment are we to pass on tha Volunteers? The Y eomartry had a good
basis in association with the county - nearly thirty counties formed such » corps
43
in 1794, The compounding for the Cavalry levy solidified this basis and
provided financial support. Mora elaborate training was encouraged. The
Edinburgh Light Dragoons went away to camp in 1799 at Musselburgh. Good x^rte
44
was done and they thoroughly enjoyed themselves. Here was the way to efficiency
and enthusiasm.
45
Infantry snd Cavalry alike were improved by the Acts of 1799 which, while
making militia exemption universal, provided for e comprehensive system of returns
and made regular attendance of the individual at drill and attested proficiency
of the corps conditions of exemption. Perhaps exemption was not too high ;:a
price for this. An extensive reorganisation noxv took place which may be regarded
as the fruit of past endeavours. It was as advertisements for the military lifo
that the Volunteers did the most obvious good. One® get in, the members were
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reedy to offer mora ambitious service - as we shall see in the next chapter.
Tho Volunteers had two great functions. They added in various ways to
social cohesion and they acted as e last line of reserve. IJo very great degree
of efficiency was likely to exist in any forco with the letter function while
the former entailed a fragmentation of the whole into a myriad parts formed by
local influence and existing for local purposes. A letter printed by the
Annual Register in 1799. protesting against the tendency to battallionise the
Volunteers states (though it roads like a caricature) a real case. Each Ward
In the City of London needed its own system of drill. Tho "gentlemanlike tactics"
of the merchants and bankers of Broad Stroot would bo no good among the Docks.
The oblique alignment useful la Crooked Lane would not serve on the heights of
Castle Barnard. Each corps should defend ita own area, fighting on ground
intimstely known to all. The oldest inhabitants would b© found the most skillful
in choosing positions "some recoBEiandimg to fortify the vestry and others to
keep s strong detachment in the public house". In the Volunteer Movement, the
love of one's Immediate locality, the most intense of human loyalties, ws to
46
find zealous end effective expression,
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CHAPTER X 8 VOLUNTARY EXTENSION OF SERVICE :
THE VOLUNTEERS AND FENCIBLBS
(a) The Volunteers.
It may be stated as a general rule that such Volunteer Corps as survived
for any length of time almost always extended the limit of territory in which
they were prepared to serve if celled out. No reason is normally assigned for
their willingness to do so, but it is fair to suppose that experience taught
them that the perils of military service were less then they had supposed. In
the Spring of 1798, the government put the screw on by asking what corps were
i) "
willing to serve in the military district and by restricting, at any rate for the
1
future, pay and allowances to those corps that would go that far. A considerable
2
number of corps thereafter went on record as extending in order to get pay.
The process was by no means without its trials. Some corps wer8 very
vigomously treated to produce the desired result. A company at Helston having
3
refused to extend, their commandant dismissed them end formed his corps afresh.
More generally, there was argument about the terms and extent of the new offer.
The Volunteers of Ross-shire demanded pay for as long, as it took them to get home
4
when their services were no longer required. Those of Thurso and Tivyside
desired assurances that their families would be looked after; in Sheffield, a
6
promise was made to that effect by the townspeople. At Blackenham in Suffolk,
n n
a corps of labourers extended their services to the military district for the
sake of the pay and were very mortified whan they found this area to be greater
7
than the county. In South Wales, trouble was caused by a map which showed the
ii <t ®
military district larger than had been described. Lord Radnor said that in
Berkshire they wished to know at what point the Volunteers would be called from
home. He was told that if not needed for the county police, they would be celled
-285-
9
on when the enemy appeard and "driving the county" started. The last
circumstances was stated by some corps as determining when their offer would
apply, All precautions were sometimes unavailing. The Culloden Volunteers
10
withdrew their offer, feeling that somehow they were surely being deceived.
There were attempts to escape the consequences of extension or offer
something as good. The Duke of Richmond complained that one artillery company
in Sussex had extended its services, with great benefit to itself, although it
could be sure of never being called away from the important point which it had
11
been raised to defend. Some corps, as at Dundee, Haverfordwest end Pondsmis
14
in Cornwall offered to do the "garrison duty" of the place as a fair equivalent,
Kettering found itself penalized financially because the corps was described
inadvertantly as an Armed Association, It was pointed out that it had obliged
itself to convey prisoners to the next corps, which as things were meant going
15
thirty miles or more. By contrast with all this, the Nairnshire Volunteers
extended their services without making any claims on government. The Lieutenant
of the county had to write and say that they had been brought to this step by
16
pride, and could not really afford to leave home without further financial help.
The efficient organization of the Volunteers was greatly helped by extension
of service. Major Knight wrote to Lord Bute concerning the steps necessary to
put the Volunteers in a state to take over the army's duty. The corps must
extend their services end then enough units would be pledged to operate in the
same wide area to enable battel^ions to be formed out of them. Problems arose
from this battal|ionizing. Knight pointed out that trouble would be caused by
any arrangement of rank which did not respect the gradations of civil life.
Lord Cawdor wiss only a Captain; he must not remain so in any rationalization,
17
Knight was ready to waive his rank for such a purpose. The views of Lord Cawdor
himself are available on the question of battsllionizing the Pembrokeshire
Volunteers, The senior rank in them was held by the commanders of the town corps.
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which were more larger than the more scattered bodies in the countryside.
Lord Cawdor regarded them as a poor lot and objected to being put under them, not
18
so much for himself as for the retired army officers serving in the Volunteers.
In Ross-shire, the matter was more nakedly put. It was undesirable that
19
gentlemen should be under the command of mere town magistrates.
Despite these hindrances to amalgamation, the movement for a more uniform
end stable force went on. As early as 1795, Lord Dg)thley called attention to
the disparities in the drill and methods of the fourteen troops of Kent Yeomanry.
Formed into two regiments they might be able to afford a permanent adjutant for
20
each, to their great benefit. In 1800 the amalgamation took place of the
Midlothian Yeomanry and the Edinburgh Light Dragoons - a project initiated by
the Lord Advocate who hoped in this way to provide permanently for the peace of
21
the Scottish capital. In Devonshire, it was proposed by amalgamation to
produce two regiments each from three to five old corps. The supervision of
22
the various corps was made a task of the Deputies. In Cumberland, the corps
refused to combine as bodies but it was hoped that the young men of each would
23
extend their services and come together in another corps. The Duke of Atholl
proposed the analogous plan of a Battallion of twenty companies, half always
24
to stay in the county and half to be a reserve for the Militia. Although
this interesting principle was not adopted, his county of Perthshire eventually
25
had 2500 men organised into seven bettallions. Thus the movement of 1799
towards bstt©llioniaing was turning the Volunteers gradually into a new irregular
militia, standing behind the embodied forces ss a worthy final reserve.
That Volunteering made many look more kindly on e military life may be
seen from this willingness of almost all Volunteer Corps to extend their services
more widely after a time. There is some evidence that men were sometimes
encouraged by their participation in the Volunteers to wish to enter the army.
The Royal Edinburgh Volunteers were reported to have turned the heads of the
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locel youth and made them military enthusiasts. One young member wished to
become a Lieutenant in the 78th then being raised - and officers to a regiment
26
in that state meant recruits or at least money. In Pembrokeshire a whole
company followed its commander into the Cambrian Rangers, a Fencible regiment
27
being raised in 1798-9. At Fishguard, it was complained that the Colonel
had seduced some of his men to Join the Rangers and then refused to pay or drill
28
the rest in the hope of forcing them in. The Colonel admitted there had been
recruiting for the Rangers but said the accusation of sharp practice was invented
29
by e rival for command of the Volunteers who supported it with bought evidence.
Unfortunately, attempts to enlist Volunteers v/ere almost always stoutly
resisted by their officers and other superiors. It is from their complaints
that most of our knowledge of the practice is derived. The grounds for objection
were as follows. It was naturally the poorer Volunteers who enlisted. Their
expenses had been met by the better off members of the corps who disliked losing
their money. The Rochdale Volunteers had been clothed by subscription and the
30
townspeople had also paid for N.C.O.'s to drill them. The members of the
Chew and Cheriton Corps (near Bath) received pay and took an oath. The officers
fancied that they could not enlist end certainly the corps would be destroyed
31
if it was allowed. The men of the Berwick corps, who had been enlisted for
© bounty in the first place, proceeded to Join the Royal Artillery. Discipline
32
again was threatened.
A milder attitude is exemplified by Bolton, which objected to its men
Joining the regiment of Fencible Infantry raised by Lancashire. There would
have been no objection to their Joining the regulars but on® defensive corps
33
should not steal from another. The Cheshire Fencibles enlisted some men of
the Denbigh Volunteers who had received their clothing allowance as bounty. It
was felt that if these men would go to the Fencibles, the regulars might have
34
(and as things were, ought to have) enlisted them.
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It was the N.C.O.'s and Drummers kept in constant pay by the Volunteers
who were most frequently the cause of trouble. Originally the government had
supplied these but they soon took to issuing the pay and letting the Volunteers
recruit the men, who were more or less soldiers. Sir James Grant complained
in 1799 that Drummers and Pipers for the corps of Inverness-shire were brought
in from a distance and cost s good deal to train. No sooner were they
35
serviceable than they embezzled their clothes and enlisted. Lord FortesCue
36
made the same complaint from Devonshire. In Glasgow, three Drummers taught
at great expense enlisted, one stealing his clothes. This corps was a striking
case all round. 200 out of 600 had enlisted. Their clothing was usually e total
loss because Volunteers were too vain to wear second hand uniforms. Employers
were afraid to let their men join the corps because they tended as a result to
37
become soldiers. The officers were thoroughly disheartened.
The corps took some direct action to recover their men. The Whitby
38
Volunteers browbeat an officer into surrendering a man of theirs. At Glasgow
they found that recruiting officers were accomodating but the many uncontrolled
39
Sergeants took no notice of them. Lord Seaforth's regiment of militia enlisted
one of the Banff Volunteers who later absconded and was put in the guard house.
A Volunteer officer (a carpenter in civil life) came to the rescue and swore he
would have him out of there. The Major commending the militia had been prepared
to release the man but hardened before these threats. The ensuing conflict was
carried right up to the Lord Lieutenant and finally to the Commander in Chief in
40
North Britain.
The War Office was consulted in ® greet many instances of this kind.
Windham laid down the rule that the enlisting of Volunteers was legal but to be
deprecated. The zeal of the Volunteers end the expense to which they were put
41
entitled them to consideration. Their ardour might otherwise be dampened.
This view was communicated in 1797 to the office of the Commander in Chief and
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apparently accepted there. In 1799, the War Office thought that the Duke of
York disapproved of the enlisting of Volunteer Drummers and Fifers but had not
42
prohibited it. Lord ForteaCu© in the letter cited earlier sold that the
43
regular army had ceased enlisting these categories but the militia had not.
Thus the issue remained undecided. The failure to make the most of this
contribution which the Volunteers might have made to the other services was a
distinct and unfortunate flew in the system.
(b) The Fencibles - By Unit6
The Fencibles raised in Scotland in 1793 in lieu of a militia were enlisted
for service in North Britain. They might only be marched into South Britain
1
in the event of en invasion. In 1794, when invasion had begun to look possible,
there was a more(noticed in Chapter I) to bring these regiments south. The
Lord Advocate thought that 3000 could safely be sent, leaving 1200 to keep order
within the country. He considered that the men would not feel any objection
2
to going while there was no threat to Scotland itself. Lord Adam Gordon
finally produced © plan to send 500 from each of four regiments, thus allowing
3
for the desire of the Highlanders to keep together. Each man got one guinea
4
bounty.
The regiments were consulted by their officers in March 1794 as to their
willingness to submit to this service. Even those from the Lowlands objected,
K
Thus the West Regiment raised the typical Highland objection to © voyage by sea.
Rumour had it among them that they were "sold" and troops of Horse were waiting
to force them on board. They broke into a riot. Finally, they were convinced
5
of their error, repented and put peacefully to sea. The South regiment was
little less reluctant, 181 were willing to go by sea or land end 150 more by
See Stewart of Garth II i Ixxxii
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land only# They fletly refused to go via Fort George# where the West regiment
was (th®y were themselves at Banff). This fort, the habitation of so many
recruits sent from the Highlands to distant climes, may have had a baleful effect
on these two regiments. The officers of the South were so far disturbed as
to throw the regimental ammunition into the sea. In the end, this regiment
6
also changed Its mind and went to England by land.
Of the Highland reriments, the Sutherlands and the two battallions of the
7 1
Breadalbane s refused outright and were never sent. The Argyles wero equally
8
recalcitrant at the time but changed their minds later in the year. The Gordons
were commanded by the brother in lew of the Duke, an English guards officer named
Woodford, The regiment suspected that he would sell them once he got to his
9
own country. There were stories of attempts to corrupt their loyalty. They
were called on to go by sea and as the Duke had feared, they refused. The Duke
in person now came and pleaded with the men. Thanks to his efforts they finally
10
consented to march on to the ships, the Duke being present to lead, them on.
The most violent reaction was from Sir James Grant's regiment then at
Linlithgow, The trouble there was caused by a company composed of Macdcnnells,
11
who were Catholics and much afraid of being victimized. Two requests were
made to the regiment to extend its services - a great reluctance being shown on
the first occasion to going by sea. At the second parade the Mecdonnells suddenly
broke ranks and rushed off to Linlithgow Palace, where there was a store of
ammunition. Others joined them until there were 300 locked Inside. They fired
at the rest of the regiment, which was apparently on the opposite side of She lake
on which the Palace stands and when two officers came to parley, they seized
them as hostages. These officers kept them out of mischief by persuading them
to do some drill and parleys began. A written promise was demanded that the
matter would bo dropped. Eventually the Colonel and the Major came in person
and gave assurances. The news that the Gordons had sailed also htd a sobering
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12
effect end the mutineers returned to duty.
Although Sir Jomes continued his efforts and even offered money out of
his own pocket to persuade the men, this mutiny turned out to hsve been decisive
13
end the regiment stayed at home. The irony of it was that the Macdonnells
were transferred at the end of the year to a regiment raised by their chief
(Glengarry) and which was pledged to serve not only in England but in Ireland
14
as well.
The government had got the four regiments it had settled for, but had
apparently reached the limit of success. Ho wonder then that they turned hence¬
forth as we shall see to plans for the recruiting for extended service of
individual soldiers in these Scottish regiments, A preternatural barrier of
suspicion had to be crossed here, associated in many cases with a language
barrier, A curious tale is recorded by the historian of the Reay (Mackay)
Fencibles. The grandson of one of the privates in the regiment recalled
hearing it said that one day the men had been addressed (in English) by Sir
Robert Sinclair. At the end of his speech, he called for three cheers, which
were given because British coldiers always did cheer when asked. Later the men
found that they had consented in so doing to an extension of service. Much
upset, they asked finally for three privileges as a reward for their offer (what
these were had been forgotten in the course of oral transmission). The request
15
was granted and the men had to be content. Such wa6 the character of extension
of service in the Highlands.
The various regiments of Fencible Cavalry raised in England and Scotland
offered from time to time to serve in Ireland. The Ancient British Fencibles
16 17
made such an offer in 1795 for example as did the Rutland Fencibles in 1796,
From 1798 onwards all the Fencibles (including the infantry raised in 1794 to
serve in the British Isles) began to offer to serve in Europe (like the Dumbarton-
18




These offers wera essentially a by-product of the process of disbanding
Fencibl® regiments in whole or part end enlisting individuals from them that
we shall consider next. Sir Thomas Wallace Dunlop's regiment of Fencibles -
one of those raised in 1798 - was found to contain too many boys for effective
service and was on the verge of being broke. The officers induced the men to
offer to serve anywhere in the world and then proposed that the regiment should
be sent to a station so distant that the boys would have grown to a proper size
at 20
before arrival. Thus regiments hoped to preserve their identity by supplying
more effectively the government's needs.
In 1799, the final decision was made that regiments must either agree
21
to serve at least in Ireland or else be disbanded. Once out of Scotland, the
regiments of that country seem to have been pliable enough. The Second Battallion
of the Rothesay and Caithness Fencibles were sounded by their Colonel Sir James
Sinclair who reported them willing to leave Britain if they might just have time
to go home and see their families and settle their wives. He played on their
22
desire to be rewarded with farms after the wsr. The regiments at home were
mostly still obstinate. The First Battalion of the Breadalbenes was not able
to produce more than 200 men to go to Ireland. 300 were demanded. Proposals
were made to give a substantfc—1 bounty or to recruit the men for another battaljiion
2 3
under the some colonel. In the end the regiment wos dismissed, to the anger
of Lord Breadelbane who attributed the failure simply to the number of willing
24
recruits the regiment had already provided for more distant service.
The Fencibles, unlike the militi®, did not present much of a problem when
once they had extended their services. The West Lowland Fencibles were very
25




The Durham and Esse* Cavalry regiments complained in 1799 at being made to serve
in Ireland upon the terms laid down for the ftigh establishment rather than the
better British tarns (this was a militia grievance too as we shall see).
Threatened with reduction, they quickly subsided. Lord Darlington resigned
from the Colonelcy of the Durhorns. Colonel Burgoyne of the Essex said that
26
his men had been tampered with. The undisciplined condition of all the troops
in Ireland is reflected in the Fencibles - nothing more.
The Fencibles then are seen to consist of a large body willing (either
at first or later) to serve in a wider field than at first planned, and a
smaller one unwilling to do any such thing,
(c) The Fenciblest By Individuals
The recruitment of Fencible men by other corps raised for more extens ive
service began with a scandal in the autumn of 1793, Alan Cameron of Erracht
was raising the 79th regiment of foot, as It was to become. Lord Breadslbane
offered to supply him with some men from his Fencibles, Cameron approached
Dundas through the invaluable Cochran© and Dundas declared that "the volunteering
spirit of our countryman ought not to be crushed". He gave his blessing and
1
proposed to show the correspondence to the King, On this authority sixty two
men were enlisted by Cameron from the first betfcallion at Aberdeen, early in
November, They had previously been given their discharges from the regiment.
As soon as he heard of it. Lord Adam Gordon the Commander in Chief in
North Britain declared the whole transaction improper end ordered the men to be
restored to their former regiment, from which he did not consider them discharged,
2
The expenses of the operation were to be borne by Cameron, There now ensued
an involved struggle, Dundee said that Cochrane had been very precipitate In
communicating his views. The scheme would have required a proper order and
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had turned out to be inadmissable. Lord Huntly end others had made offers to
raise regiments of the Line from Fencibles. They had been rejected because no
one would ever enlist in Fencibles once they became mere depots for supplying
3
the line*
Csmeron re arded the whole affair as a plot of the house of Cordon
against himself who had raised a regiment of the Line and Lord Breedel bane
who had raised two Fencible battalions "while perhaps a certain family has
found it inconvenient to do either". lie thought the Duchess was especially
displeased at the failure of Huntly, her son, to get permission to raise a
regiment. He advised Lord Breadal'oan® to stand firm "feeling as he does
independent of tho whole creation". Supporters were mobilized in Scotland
4
and the Earl was advised to go south and see the King. Meanwhile the men
had returned to the Fencibles and refused to do duty. They claimed to be
discharged. They were imprisoned. Henry Erskine, the Dean of the Faculty
of Advocates was brought in, with some other leading counsel, to give an
opinion on the legality of the discharges. They were unequivocal in their
favour and said that the men could be released by application to the civil court.
The authorities in London were anxious to smooth things over but Lord
Adam Gordon acted with a high hand. He caused a paragraph hostile to Lord
Breadalban® to be published in the Edinburgh newspapers. This greatly dis¬
pleased Lord A-mherst. He also refused the Earl (who as Colonel of the
Fenoibles was under his commend) leave to go to London to see the King,
6
The Earl's temper began to get worse. Dundas and Lord A-mherst now stepped
in. In January 1794, the fact of the men's discharge was admitted and they
were let out of prison. The question of the transgression of the officers in
discharging them remained to be smoothed over but on the main issue Cameron avid
7
the Earl had won.
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Thi3 incident has been recounted at some length because it is an
instructive p^tfce of recruiting politics. It is placed here because it
shows Dundas' early advocacy of extensions of service and the obstacles that
stood in the way.
In the following autumn, Dundes was able to apply this policy for the
first time, A circular was sent to all the Scottish Fencible Colonels, saying
that new Fencible regiments were to be raised to serve in Ireland and release
the regular troops there. They were invited to nominate someone to raise such
a regiment and enlist men for it from their own, as well as from outside.
The men extending their services were to receive a bounty of five guineas and
their old regiments were to recomplete with a bounty of ten guineas a man.
Another circular was sent out to influential persons who might choose to
8
raise regiments on these terms,
A large number of Fencible regiments were raised both in Scotland and
England that autumn of 1794, A small but useful part was played by extension
9
of service. Major Baillie got a few men from the Northern (Gordon) Fencibles
10
for the Inverness Fencibles, Glengarry as we saw earlier took the Macdonnells
11
out of Grant's into his new Corps, Sir James Grant was willing to raise a
further Fencible regiment for his son only if it was not made dependent on
12
recruiting from the old one. In the end, his son went into © new line
regiment. At some point Dundas had written to him privately asking if he
13
could spare eleven men of his regiment for Colonel Dundas (of the Scotch Brigade),
Using this as an aut ority to send his men to the line, Sir James set to work
disposing of such as were willing to his son's regiment and to the 97th which
14
he had raised himself. Here was a new aid accidental development of the
principle.
It was Lord Breedalbane, very suitably, who made the most use of the new
principle, raising a third regiment largely from his other two. He made his
-2S6-
orlginal proposal as far beck as Juno 1794 but encountered some opposition
15
from Lord Af-mherst. The military authorities remained watchful and it
was stipulated that no re ;iment being recruited from was to fall below 600
16
*
at any point. In spite of this, the Mayor of the second battalion com¬
plained that his men had been "picked and picked from" and recruiting sergeants
remained behind after the appointed time was over, disturbing discipline and
snapping up the few good men left. The regiment was reduced to some 300 men
together with the recruits and it was found that the agents of the new battalion
17
would take none of the latter but only seasoned soldiers. From the other
18
battalion 100 men went to the new corps.
There is no clear indication on the matter, but simple feudal influence
seems to have been the only a rent in this extension of service. The Gordons
again were unfriendly. The Duke felt that his pled es to the men's families
19
would be violated and it would not be easy to replace the men. Above all,
20
both he and Colonel Woodford felt that the wounds made by the extension of
service in the spring would be re-opened. The Bresdalbanws had refused to
extend their services as a regiment, they were now brought to do so as
individuals. The two ways were essentially complementary.
In the late summer of 1796, with e large expedition to the West Indies
pending, the army was beginning to feel the pinch for men. It was the Duke
21
of York who now pressed for enlistment from the Fencibles. A circular
was sent out in August permitting the privates of ell Fencible regiments to
enter whatever regular regiment they pleased and receive a bounty of five
guineas. As before, their old regiments were to get ten guineas to replace
22
them. Trouble soon arose. The Ancient British Fencibles were approached
by recruiters for the line before they had received any orders and wero much
bewildered. They were stationed in the West Riding and it was feared that
23
the many crimps of the area viould get among them. The men were plied
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24
with drink end discipline was impaired. Sir Watkin Williams Wynn protested,
as we saw earlier, against a measuxe that would destroy his credit in the area
where the regiment was raised.
The Cinque Forts Fencible Cavalry wrote to ask that the scheme should end
after a definite date and that the permission of the Commanding Officer should
26 26
be obtained by each man wishing to go. The latter request was granted and
it was later announced that the scheme had been laid aside s&ve when it had
27
the Commanding Officer's approval. One officer of the Fencibles who hoped
to get himself a commission in the Line by enlisting men from Colonel Parkyn's
regiment was mortified to find himsolf put under arrest - he had not heard of
28
the new order. In Guernsey (where many of the Fenciblos wore) Covornor
29
Small found that only the Glengarries co-operated and gave some men. In
30
Scotland the regulars got 05 men, it seems, before the fresh orders.
Their plan, having proved abortive, the authorities at the end of the
year caused all the Fencible regiments to reduce th8ir strength by a certain
amount. The infantry regiments not over 700 strong ware reduced to 500 and
31
the cavalry from 71 to 50 rank and file per troop, A circular was sent to
the regular regiments of Light Dragoons telling them to recruit from the dis¬
banded men of the Fencible Cavalry and giving details of where they were being
32
dismissed from their present corps. As for the infantry we have noted jtlready
how abody of the West Lowland Fenoibles marching home from the south were
33
expected to enlist on the way.
Occasional disbandment of Fencibles to allow of recruiting now became
a recognized policy. In 1799-1800 there was an orgy of it, reflecting the
general encouragement of extension of service at that time, A number of
regiments were disbanded altogether! in 1800, almost all the Fencible Cavalry
54
was got rid of. Arrangements were not lacking to absorb the men, When one
battalion of the Sutherland Fenoibles was reduced, General Wemyss was commissioned
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to raise a regiment of the line from them and from the county. For men
35
from the Fencibles he got tern guineas levy money and for civilians £15.
Sir James Grant's Fencibles were reduced at Edinburgh and he proceeded to
recruit them for a second battalion to serve in Ireland. Parties from other
regiments swarmed round, but against their competition he got half his old
36
regiment to Join the new one.
For the rest, the authorities ordered various regiments suitably placed
to try end get the men. The 46th and ?9th were advised to recruit those in
37 38
Scotland. The Fencible officers were told to assist. The local
connections evident in the raising of the two regiments noted above were
apparent throughout. The Perthshire Fencible light Dragoons were approached
by Lieutenant Colonel Dalton of the 4th Dragoons who said that he had been
39
brought up in Perthshire and there were many Soots in his regiment.
Considerable sueeess appears to have attended all these efforts, though there
appears to be no vary ready way of measuring it. The policy of granting en
absolute discharge to the men before trying to enlist them has been criticised
40
by Stewart of Garth and certainly seems a retrograde step, leading to dis¬
orderly recruiting and a leakage into civil life. However, the government
had no use for the services of these men save in the Line and there was no
machinery for disbanding them and then recalling them as there was for the
Militia - a further indication of the value attaching to the organization of
the latter.
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CHAPTER II t VOLUNTARY EXTENSION OF SERVICE ; THE MILITIA
(a) By Units
In 1798, with rebellion and invasion brewing the demand for troops in
Ireland had become desperate. In May Lord Buckingham, who was thought by
Dundas to echo the views of many, called for legislation to enable up to
10,000 men of the militia to serve in Ireland or on the north coast of France,
He had consulted his officers and thought he could get his regiment to
1
perition for such a measure. These sentiments were conveyed to Dundas by
Cr€nville, to whom he replied with three objections: the "principles of the
militia" would be underminedj the offers would not really be voluntary since
anyone not offering would be deemed a coward} the feeling of security on which
a resumption of the offensive depended would be destroyed by breaking into the
militia which was the only force intact for the ddfence of Britain except the
Guards, He added wistfully that they would have been "on velvet" if only
the Lords Lieutenant had not been so unfriendly to the scheme of recruiting the
2
army from the Supplementary Militia.
Lord Buckingham acquiesced in this line of reasoning but said he would
3
be ready to organize an offer whenever wished. On June 10th having con¬
sulted his officers again, he repeated the offer of his regiment and urged
the need of sending "10,000 men of all sorts" to Ireland. The government
warmed to the idea and he urged them to introduce a bill only after receiving
petitions from the regiments. He wished them luck against the more obstructive
4
Colonels and Lords Lieutenant,
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On June 18th a Royal Message informed the House of Commons that the officers
and men of certain militia regiments had offered to serve in Ireland and asked
5
them to consider legislation to make this possible for a limited time.
In the ensuing debate, the opposition explored very fully the first two grounds
of objection mentioned by Dundas. That Mr Pierrepoint and Sir Lucius Palk
declared that they would nevertheless go with their own regiments if they offered
was held by Sheridan to be an added proof that this was no voluntary affair.
Mr Taylor said he would think it braver to stay at home. Sir Lucius pointed
to a further danger} the country gentry would become unwilling to serve as
militia officers. Wilberforce agreed with this and admitted that the offers
might not be strictly voluntary. But the initiative had come, it seemed, from
the lower ranks in the regiments and the needs of the government v/ere very
great. He therefore supported the measure, A hostile amendment having been
defeated by 118 votes to 47, a suitable Address and a bill giving effect to
6
the new scheme were agreed to. What became of the arguments in this debate
we shall see in due course.
7
The Act now passed enable 12,000 militia men to serve in Ireland.
Their offer was to be voluntary and their commanding officers were obliged
to tell them beforehand that they were under no obligation to make it.
The duration of the Act was limited to a period ending one month after the
start of the next session. Vacancies by death or desertion in Irelaid were
not to be filled by the cojinties. In the execution of the act there was a
muddle caused by an apparent decline in danger - the victory of Vinegar Hill,
8
Regiments were embarked and then disembarked. Then the French landed and they
had to start again. On September 2nd the Home Office was Informed that 12,410
9
militia in four brigades had been ordered to Ireland. As the Buckinghamshire
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10
and Warwickshire regiments had already gone over, the limit in the Act
was being generously interpreted.
How voluntary were these offers? As a rule, they were not unanimous -
detachments of each regiment refused to go and were left behind. Most of
n
them were eventually concentrated 4n a body at Norman Cross, In the Lanca¬
shire regiment, there happened to be a shortage of new clothing. The men who
were going to Ireland therefore set upon the party who were staying at home and
12
stripped them almost naked. The offioers apparently did nothing to interfere.
Lord Rolle found the South Devon regiment very reluctant to embark. He went
aboard the ship and appealed to them to follow. When they would not, he
paraded them and went along the ranks asking each man why he would no- go,
correcting their misconceptions and hearing greivances. Finally a good body
was embarked and he suggested a spell of really hard duty for the restj they
had better leave their present station in any case, for the regular troops in
14
the area were threatening to lynch them. Three hundred of the Leicestershire
regiment who refused to embark at Liverpool were similarly sent out of the way
to Holywell, but the reason there was to prevent their contaminating other
16
regiments which came to embark with their views. Despite all efforts, there
were signal failures. Only half the Bast Suffolk could b® got to make any
16
offer.
The officers found some resistance to be due to specific greivances
which they could remove. Lord Rolle's regiment was one of those that had
been previously embarked earlier in the summer and were colled on later a
second time. When on shipboard before, they had found the conditions to be
appalling and they resented the stoppage of &|d, a man to pay for the voyage.
17
Lord Rolle remitted the stoppage. A precisely similar case was that of the
North Iiempshire regiment which had taken a rooted dislike to the guardship
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"Alkmaar" in which they were again called on to embark. They also com¬
plained that the increase of family allowances promised by the Treasury
had been interpreted in a miserly spirit by the magistrates. The Colonel
succeeded in placating the men and a great many who had at first objected
18
ended by going.
At the end of the year the Act was due to expire but the services of
the militia were still wanted. Dundas sent out a circular to the regiments
in Ireland. They were asked for the information of Parliament whether they
18
were willing to extend their offers. The answers being favourable, an Act
19
was passed in December extending the previous one until a month after th8
opening of the next session.
It is in the attempts to get the men to stay in Ireland that we see most
clearly how the system was made to to rk. From the West Suffolk and Warwickshire
20
regiments came complaints of the unwisdom of Parliament in not fixing a term
of service or merely extending the Act without a fresh appeal to the regiments.
A desire to go home had now been excited in the men which would not otherwise
have been there. The West Kent regiment should not be consulted, its ccnmardec*
21
wrote, unless they would be needed for longer than the rest of the winter.
Six of the regiments asked were willing to stay for an unlimited time but seven
more fixed dated upon which they were to return, ranging from the end of March
22
to the beginning of June,
An appeal to the regiment necessitated some consultation among the men.
This was all very well in cases like that of the Leicestershire regiment, when
the Colonel (the Duke of Rutland) addressed the men and asked them to reply
after deliberation; a respectful letter was sent by the Sergeant Major in
response declaring that the men had told their Sergeants they were willing to
23
stay as long as desired. In the South Lincolnshire regiment however, a more
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deliberative spirit prevailed. To keep it in mind that they were British
Militia, the men limited their offer to a period of six minths and made
their Colonel promise that they should stay no longer, save of their own
24
free will.
The longer a regiment had been in Ireland, the more difficult it was
to make it stay. The Warwickshire and Buckinghamshire regiments had gone
first and in December they were the most anxious to return. Lord Bucking¬
ham thought that Lord Hertford had allowed the Warwickshires too much linen.
25
They in turn corrupted his own regiment who at first refused to stay.
He thought one reason lay in rumours of other regiments deciding to go home
when the Act expired ana said that in any case they would not stay longer
26
than the spring. He opposed what was apparently the opinion of Lord
27
Cornwallis, that the regiments who had once offered might be compelled to
stay as long as the law permitted them to be there. Instead he used hi6 powers
of suasion upon his men to such effect that they apologized for behaviour so
insulting to their colours, their guns (which had been bought by a county
28
subscription) and himself. They agreed to stay until April, "Lord Hertford
has allowed the Warwick men to run riot and they tainted ours till they found
29
me more sturdy than his Lordship" was his summing up. Similar work was done
30
on the Warwickshire by Lord Hertford's brother and they all renewed their
offer bxoept a few, who refused to be sent home but asked to do guard duty in
31
Dublin,
Throughout 1799 fresh minor crises arose as the allotted terms of
regiments expired. When Parliament met early in September to legalize further
enlistment of the militia into the line, it had the effect of bringing forward
the date of expiry of the second Act permitting the militia to serve in Ireland,
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A new Act was later passed, extending the duration of the original Act still
32
further - to six weeks after the start of the next session. But meanwhile
the Cambridgeshire had been moved to demand repatriation by Christmas. They
were told it would be more liberal to stay until February, when the Act of
December 1798 would have expired if Parliament had met at a more normal time.
Finally they decided to do whatever seemed best to Sir Edward Nightingale
their Lieutenant Colonel. The Oxfordshire regiment who also began to murmur
33
were won back partly by threats and partly by lavish supplies of ale.
Various motives prompted a decline in enthusiasm. Lord Rolle and
34
Lord Buckingham both instanced the failure of the enemy to appear. They
also agreed that the troops expected those who came out first to go back first,
Lord Buckingham thought it essential to apply this principle fairly and promptly
36
if any more regiments were to be induced to come out. Lord Rolle Instanced
36
departures from the proper order of relief. According to Lord Buckingham,
37
the regiments felt they were being kept on to force through the Union.
There was a financial grievance over various allowances to the troops which
were lower in Ireland than in England. Lord Rolle here made himself the
spokesman of all the regiments. His own, he said, had beon promised English
allowances by Sir William Pitt as a condition of its offer. A representation
had been drawn up which he forwarded privately to London while representations
38
were also made in Dublin. Detailed answers were returnedj it was t^*4»ed
that the cost of living was lower and allowances could therefore be lower
too. Concessions were made on two points (one being the stoppage for trans¬
port which had already caused trouble) and the others, which affected mainly
39
the officers, were apparently allowed to drop.
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Th© duties in Ireland were irksome. Order had to be kept in a country
full of sedition and murderous outrage. There were no pitched battles after
the defeat of Humbert, but three men of the Worcestershires (for instance)
40
were murdered in their beds. Many regiments were cooped up in Dublin and
got tired of it. Fever broke out among them and raged through the winter,
41
causing the death of some officers. The "withdrawal of martial law (which
was a protection to the soldier against outrage) was a source of trouble in the
42
autumn of 1798, Officers and men were equally disgruntled. Lord Buckingham
was not allowed to take command of a detachment of his regiment sent against the
43
rebels. He at once became the implacable foe of Lord Cornwallls the Viceroy,
having tried to resign his command and was with difficulty dissuaded from laying
44
the whole matter before the King, Later, he disclaimed all connection with
the Irish government which had sent him a paper he should have received from
England, He passed on the unflattering views which Generals Lake and Nugent
45
(the latter his relative) had of their superior.
The great desire, uniting officers and men, ivas however simply to get
home quickly. The Oxfordshire Hilitia at on© point promised to stay until
Christmas 1799 on condition that they were then given a spell in the home
46
country. The men wished to see their families. The Bedfordshire regiment
47
was given this indulgence. The officers showed the strongest desire to
return. Many in Lord Rolle's regiment wore so anxious to attend to their pri¬
vate affairs that they told him they would resign if any attempt was made to
48
keep the regiment in Ireland beyond Midsummer 1799, The officers' point
of view is best expressed by some gentleman who served in the Berkshire Pro¬
visional Cavalry (an analogous force) in a memorandum on the proposal that
their regiment should offer its services overseas. Comfortably situated at
home, they hod entered the service from patriotic motives only to find themselves
"pressed to extend our services beyond our abilities or inclinations by adopting
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a line of life -which ought to have commenced at an earlier period when we might
have seemed an interest in the Profession if such had been our object". The
49
alternative of refusal would probably attach a stigma to their names.
In January 1799, Dundas asked the regiments who had previously offered
but not been made use of if they would renew their offer and relieve such
50
regiments as wished to come home and look after their county concerns,
51
All replied in the affirmative. The Tower HamletsHilitia later withdrew
52
its offer - it was thought to have been tampered with - and only half the
53
Korth Lincolnshire was prepared to go. But a fair body was willing and
the prospect of a regular system of reliefs was opened up, The system,
however, had become distinctly unpopular. Lord Cornwallis understandably
had told Lord Buckingham not to make any special efforts to get his men to
54
stay. He told Dundas in March 1799 that the extension of service of the
remaining Scottish Fencibles was vital, in order to replace the Militia held
by a "precarious tenure". The Leicestershire regiment which had offered to
55
serve indefinitely now clamoured to be home by June, Dundas promised to do
his best and said that he had not expected the Leicestershires to stay as
soon as there was any prospect of going home. In the event, 6863 militiamen
came home down to Midsummer 1799 and were replaced by 3468 militiamen and 3300
56
other troops.
The shortcomings of extended service by the militia thus served to promote
steps to make the Fencibles available abroad. It also opened up another vista.
Lord Buckingham had - again understandably - been convinced by experience that
57
extension of service by militia regiments would not work. He therefore
became a fervsent partisan of recruiting the Line from the militia. As he
had previously been an opponent even of the detachment of the Flank Companies
58
of militia for service within Britain, it is difficult to imagine his espousing
»
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the new policy save after the trial and failure of his ovm« He might have
added great weight to the opposition on this question and embarrassed the
government severely.
Apart from giving a stimulus to other forms of extension of service,
the appearance of the Enc;lish militia in Ireland set a precedent. Although
a languishing experiment at the end of our period, it was the shape of things
to come, Cornwallis and Dundas discussed the possibility of sending some J)fi£h
59
militia to England in 1799. The King was afraid that the English militia
would be offended but thought the Irish might go to the Channel Islands or
60
America. The Union gave an impetus to the interchange of the two militias,
61
which became the accepted practice in the next decade. The same advance was
62
then made by the Scotch militia as Duke of Montrose foresaw in 1799.
The expedient of 1798 was thus the start of a valuable reform, it gave succour
to the Irish government at a perilous moment and it provides interesting evidence
for us that the men who entered the militia (to say nothing of their officers)
cannot be regarded merely as soldiers of the Line who had taken a wrong turning.
They were not willing save in a very limited degree to do the work of the Line
and but for the existence of the Militia they would have been lost to the war
effort,
(b) By Individuals i The Earlier Schemes
The enlistment of militia men by the army had to be approached very
slowly and cautiously. The Constitutional Force was jealously guarded by its
officers from any attempt to make it subordinate to the army. The government
could not interfere with it arbitrarily without arousing much hostility among
the landed gentry. The passion that might be aroused by attempts to put
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militia men into units other than their county regiments was shown in the
x
affair of the Flank Companies in 1798, Infantry regiments at this time
normally hod a company of Light Infantry and one of Grenadiers who were
supposed to be skilled in skirmishing and the other duties of light troops.
In order to make a reality of this supposition, the Flank Companies h*>d to
betaken from their regiments and put together in special battalions for
training and perhaps for action too. In April 1798 the Commander in Chief
1
gave instructions for this to be don® to the Flank Companies of the militia.
There was at once an outcry led by Lord Buckingham, who said that it
was illegal to put militia men under the command of officers not their own.
The Law Officers gave a contrary opinion - the two sides of the question were
put to a meeting of militia colonels. Lord Buckingham thought his views had
2
been misrepresented to the meeting and was angrier than ever. Though pro¬
testing his desire(not to make trouble in public, he said he would disobey any
order to detach his Flank Companies and fight hard if called to account.
3
If the question was settled by fresh legislation, he would resign. The govern¬
ment received a mess of correspondence on this subject and were loath to have
recourse to the Legislature because there would be wide differences of view
revealed between different militia officers and the men would get to hear of it
4
and become unsettled. Eventually the trouble was smoothed over and the plan
5
was carried out but it did not cease to be disliked by many officers.
The more radical measure of turning men out of the Militia altogether was
likely to be even less popular. The Duke of Richmond wrote in January 1799 to
oppose any project of enlistment from the militia. He said it would produce
H
Described from the Dropmore Papers by Fortescue (IV 88E-6)
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few man and would further disgust the officers •who were already upset over
the Flank Companies} a great many would probably abandon the service when
6
pesxse came. Lord Dundas writing to advocate enlistment of militia men a
few months later begged that his views might be kept a secret - otherwise he
would lose all influence with the officers of the regiment of which he was
7
Colonel.
The government had therefore to proceed warily. Their first move was
in 1795. in connection with two special shortages of men, which the militia might
be able to remedy. The Artillery had suffered from a shortage since the war
8
began. It did not have recourse to any of the novel methods adopted for the
other arms and its demands were stringent because it required men who were at
9
least 5'7" tall. The militia contained some men of this height and moreover
its regiments had battalion guns and some of the men v/ere trained to their use.
10
The quest for sailors in 1795 has already been mentioned in this study.
The army was ordered to give up the sailors who happened to have entered its
11
ranks. A circular was sent to the Fencibles in February asking the number
12
of seamen in each regiment and they were later order to discharge them.
A similar circular was sent at the same time to the Militiai the Lords Lieutenant
13
in this case were asked to suggest how the men could best be transferred,
14
A good many regiments, such as the Berkshire and the Buckinghamshire,
reported that they had very few seamen. But the Dorset for instance had 104,
15
the Essex 52 and the Wiltshire 23 and the Middlesex regiments 112.
16
The Cambridgeshire had about 20 - the Adjutant was surprised to find so many.-
The Hampshire return was thought to be defective because dislike of the sea
17
service caused many to disguise their origin (in the Cambridgeshire the sailors
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18
were said fco b© indistinguishable from the rest) , On the other hand, the
enquiries in one of the Norfolk regiments were made very quietly by the Adjutant
Sergeant Major and Sergeants for fear that undesirable characters in the regi-
19
ment should pose as seamen in the hope of getting something out of it,
20
The seamen in the MiddlesexMilitia had mostly offered to enter the navy already
but the Sussex regiment was not told that there was any such prospect for fear
21
of causing; a panic. The Wiltshire men were expected to demand extravagefet
22
t rms to enter the navy if they saw any prospect of a discharge instead.
Several Lords Lieutenant were prepared to suggest that men should be
enlisted straight from the militia by offering a bounty. Lord iiardwicke
said that to dismiss them and then cause them to be Pressed would be construed
as a breach of faith. He adopted the idee of the Adjutant of the Cambridgeshire
that the regiment should get £20 for each man (as did the captains of merchant
ships giving recruits to the navy) half to go to the seaman and the rest to the
23
man got to replace him. Lord Townshend thought that compensation should be
paid to the principals when their substitutes turned out for the navy and had
24
to be replaced. Lord Berkeley wanted the seamen provided to count towards
the quota which each county and parish had lately been obliged by Parliament
25
to raise for the navy.
In June 1795 an Act was accordingly passed allowing men who had been
three years at sea or trained as gunners to volunteer for the Havy and Artillery
respectively. The number of gunners who might volunteer was limited to one
26
fiftieth of the regiment and the total number of volunteers to one tenth.
They were to be replaced by their regiments which were given ten guineas a man
and permitted to raise recruits by ordinary enlistment like the army for the
27
purpose, When a regiment was complete, more men were to volunteer until all
28
the seamen and gunners in the Militia had left it.
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The passage of this measure was the subject of a Protest by Lord Radnor
who from now on was the most implacable opponent of recruiting from the Militia.
He objected to the use of the Militia as a fund to recruit other forces. The
recruiting of replacement by ordinary enlistment was entirely contrary to the
existing militia law. To suggest that the militiamen had a right in certain
circumstances to a discharge from their present service was to undermine
discipline. Above all, the Act contained no time limit and nothing to prevent
29
the establishment of a precedent. Lord Radnot had earlier agreed to the
transfer of the seamen, but he had wished them to be replaced in the ordinary
way by ballot, the chosen man to be paid the cost of a substitute by the govern-
30
ment. He rightly saw recruiting by the militia regiments as a departure of
m
some importance. As for recruiting from them, "the militia contains a fund
for recruiting not only the artillery but every other corps in His Majesty's
Service, much too good not to be ardently coveted and (however the intention
31
be disclaimed at present) I fear resorted to ..."
The Act appears to have gone smoothly into effect. The only incident
which caused anxiety to the military authorities was when Colonel Pattison,
recruiting for the Artillery in the south-east, attempted to force the militia
Solonels to give up more than the stipulated maximum quota. This was put a
stop toj Colonels might be asked to strain the letter of the law in certain
32
respects but they were in no case to give up more than the proper number of mesa.
The total yield of the operation was small; figures received by the War Office
33
show 463 entering the Artillery and only 106 the Navy.
The enlistment of the Supplementary Militia in the Line was the next
scheme to be considered. In the autumn of 1797, this force was trained but
unembodied. Colonel Anstruther presented a plan for bringing it into service
■ See page 148
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against the impending danger from the French. There wore 24 skeleton
regiments in Britain, representing a great waste of the professional skill
of their officers. Twenty of them should recruit from the militia and Fencibles.
Each regiment should operate in its own county and the Lords Lieutenant and
militia Colonels would be pressed to help. This should be the beginning of a
genuine county basis for all recruiting. Low bounties would be the rule and
18,000 troops should b® procured "composed not of the dregs of the human race
but of robust active men such as form the bulk of the people of Britain",
On the other hand, it would be necessary to offer a limited engagement - in time
to five or six years, in extentto His Majesty's European dominions other than
Gibraltar - and discharge in the county where the men were raised. It ought
to be possible to get the men to extend their services further before then.
Anstruther appears to have envisaged recruiting largely from the old militia,
34
the gaps in which would then be filled from the supplementary.
Some objections were put up to his case, probably by a very senior officer,
which he proceeded to answer. The main ones were that recruiting from the
embodied militia was politically impossible (Anstruther thought the Colonels
might be placated by making the scheme optional for them) and that it was most
dangerous to recruit men for the regulars to serve in Europe only. A limited
period of service was a justifiable gamble because the war was unlikely to last
many more years. Limitation of extent however would make the relief of colonial
garrisons difficult and would diminish the desire for foreign service and concede
that it was unpleasant - whereas the glamour of foreign parts was regarded as a
recruiting asset. Anstruther replied in effect that there was no other way of
getting men and that foreign service could retain its prestige by (for instance)
appointing NCOs only from men enlisted without limitation, Anstruther and his
35
critic agreed that there must be no undue pressure on the men to enlist,
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An anonymous memorandum of December 1797 envisaged enlisting from the
Supplementary militia instead of, or as well as, from the old. The support
of the county magistrates and the municipal authorities was to b© safiMfed and
regiments were to be sent to recruit particular areas after their nominal
county attachments, their normal recruiting grounds and the areas where their
36
field officers had influence had been taken into consideration. In January
1798, General Dundas told the government that the Supplementary Militia was
37
the only source from which the army might hope to get men. Meantime the
government found that many Supplementary Militia men had joined the army.
The law officers reported that this was illegal even if they provided sub-
38
stitutes. There was a tricky problem here now that it had been decided
to embody the Supplementary Militia and the government devided to legislate,
allowing the men concerned to stay in the army and exonerating their parishes
39
from replacing them.
The short Act passed in January 1798 allowed regiments authorized by
th© King to enlist from the Supplementary Militia to the extent of 10,000 men
or one fifth in any county. The recruits were to get such bounty as might
seem fit and were to serve in Europe only and for six months longer than the
40
duration of the war. Thus recruiting from the militia was linked with
limitation of service - in the debate General Fitzpatrick for the Opposition
41
advocated the extension of some time limitation to the whole army, A later
42
Act legalized all enlistments from the Supplementary Militia down to Mey 15th 1798,
The application of these measures was closely linked with the embodiment
K
of the Supplementary Militia, Eleven regiments were appointed to enlist them,
and were told what counties to send parties to and how many men were to be taken
43
from each. They were to send one Captain and two junior officers for ©very 130
men they hoped to get, and as many HCOs as possible. First of all, a party was
* The 5th, 9th, 20th, 31st, 35th, 44th, 46th, 48th, 55th, 62nd, 85th Foot
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to go to each county rendezvous where the militia men were to assemble for
embodiments and stay four days. The bounty was to be seven guineas and one
to the bringer. Having recruited as many of these men as possible before
they were marched off, the party was to turn to recruiting that half of the
44
force which was still at home, unembodied. They were to go to wherever they
45
or the regiment possessed recruiting influence in the county. The Lords
46
Lieutenant were instructed to help them in every way possible.
The measure was not a groat success. The Lords Lieutenant were in
»
general unfriendly. There were exceptions to this rule. Lord Milford in
Pembrokeshire offered two guineas extra bounty to each man out of his own
47
pocket but could only indue® two to go. Lord Lonsdale similarly offered an
extra guinea to the men of Cumberland and Westmoreland and got the old Militia
48
to help in the recruiting but with poor results. When the second half of
the Supplementary Militia was embodied, a circular was sent to the Lords
Lieutenant expressing disappointment with the progress so far and ordering
them to keep the men four days at the rendezvous to give an opportunity to
49
recruit from them. The Lieutenancy of Cheshire tried to help matters by
offering a pardon to the many men who had failed to appear at the rendezvous
50
and were deemed deserters if they would come forward and enlist in the line.
The Lords Lieutenant in general were probably put off by the disorder
attendant on recruiting. The Duke of Richmond said that those who had enlisted
were mostly drunk and were sorry afterwards. The officers had tried to help
the 55th regiment but were disgusted to find that the best men had been weeded
51
out and the Militia was left with the refuse. Several parties had to be told
not to enlist any more when the men were actually on the march from the rendezvous
52
to their regiments. Men were apparently refusing to repay their marching guineas'
* See" page 299 y See page 140
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53
when enlisted - thus eausing a charge to fall on the regiments.
The enlisting of men not yet ordered to be embodied gave scmo trouble.
Lord Derby was much bothered by men joining; regiments not authorized to enlist
them. Proper returns were not sent and it seemed doubtful if the county
54
could be exonerated. Lieutenant Colonel Acourt of Wiltshire was told that
29 men in unauthorized regiments were to be included in the permitted maximum
from the county but they were only to count towards exoneration if they had
enlisted before it had been announced which regiments were authorized to enlist
55
such men. The amending Act, abolished this distinction, but it was still
difficult to find out if a man had enlisted.
Even had the Lords Lieutenant been friendly, the experiences of Lord
Milford end Lord Lonsdale suggest that few men would have entered the army.
Why the Supplementary Militia was so reluctant to do this is discussed in an
earlier chapter and further evidence will be presented in the next section.
It is probable that those who did now join the army were men who would have
don© so had there been no Supplementary Militia. Once in the array a good many
made a further offer to serve as ordinary soldiers without limitation.
56
This was accepted and they were given three guineas extra bounty. These men
were allowed to stay in the regiments they had originally joined. The remainder
57
were put together in three regiments. Of the former category there were for
58
instance 188 in the 55th and 278 in the 44th« Altogether returns from twenty-
59
five counties show3241 men enlisting in the army. These returns cannot be
regarded as complete even for the counties in question, but the total yield is
unlikely to have been more than about 2,500 - a very long way short of the projected
10,000.
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(c) By Individuals t The Events of 1799
The approached had now been tested to the great matter of enlisting
from the embodied militia, particularly the old militia. This idea had been
present in the memoranda of late 1797 but had not found favour. In the autumn
of 1798, when the danger of invasion had clearly subsided, the planners returned
to the charge. General Lord Fielding held a command in the north and had raised
1
a regiment of cavalry in 1794. He had advocated recruiting from the Supple¬
mentary Militia. In September he %vrot@ to suggest why the scheme had failed.
The militia officers should have been given a free hand and it was wrong to lay
down which regiments the men were to join - the "jealous suspicions and whimsical
temper which is inseparable from the lower classes of this country" had to be
borne in mind. While the Army of England remained partly broken up it was safe
to disembody, subject to recall, a third or even a half of the new militia.
This should be done during the winter and they should be allowed to enlist in
any regular regiment. By now they had become used to living without having
to work, and half of them would readily join the army to perpetuate this happy
2
condition.
Lord Fielding was told that there was no intention of disbanding the new
3
militia. He wrote again, conceding that disbandment would be objected to by
the militia officers* clique but economy was "a word naturally agreeable to the
ears of country gentlemen". Furthermore the lengthy embodiment of the militia
was driving this class out of it - probably only half the Captains in the force
4
possessed the necessary property qulification. The question of the officers
also interested the Duke of Gloucester, who spoke from several years' experience
as aa officer on the Staff, He said that the militia could never be entirely
relied on because its officers were not sufficiently skilled. He wished to
recruit 20,000 men for the army by compulsory levy and ballot like the militia -
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th® men to serve in Europe only and be discharged at the peace# At the same
time, the Provisional Cavalry and part of the militia would be disbanded and form
5
a fund to be recruited from for the new levy#
It was on May 1st 1799 that Henry Dundas finally presented his own
variant of these ideas as a memorandum to the ccbinet. He favoured the scheme
of a ballot for the regular army, coupled with permission to supply the quotas wit
volunteers from the Militia who would be brought forward by the people of each
county and not recruited by the regular soldiers direct. If this was considered
too much of an innovation, they could simply permit enlistment from the Militia
by the army. In any case, the men were to get at least ten guineas bounty ,
were to be put in regiments on a county basis and were to sei-ve in Europe only
and for five years or until the peace, whichever period was longer. The counties
would be placated by the reduction in the number of men they would have to find
(the militia was not to be recompleted and in the burden of militia men's familie'i
The militia Colonels were to be placated by doing away with the battalionising
6
of their flank companies. 28,000 men were hoped for from the measure.
When the cabinet was consulted, Windham produced his general scheme for
7
a limited term of service which we have already described. As he favoured
a large reduction of the militia in order to recruit from them, he cannot be said
to have opposed the measure. Lord C-renvill© said that all depended on the Lords
Lieutenant and militia Colonels. Whatever scheme they favoured ought to be
adopted. A measure which they refused to support would be futile even if it
8
was possible to carry it through the two Houses of Parliament. Dundas took
the same view and called a meeting of Lords Lieutenant and Colonels late in
May. The plans were put before them and they were invited to a further meeting
9
to give their views.
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Some of them sent their views in writing instead and it is clear that
they had come to accept enlisting by the army as a proper plan. Colonel Eliot
of Staffordshire said that it was a bitter experience for them and "opposition
10
will chatter" but patriotism must come first. Lord Dundas thought the
Supplementary Militia were now used to idleness and if faced with the alternative
11
of disbandiaent and working for a living they would enlist. Colonel Strutt
of Essex said that the officer commanding each militia re>;,5.ra0nt should read
the Orders containing the scheme to the regiment and then try to enlist them.
If he failed, a suitable number should be given furlough without pay to coerce
12
them. Lord Buckingham tried to insist that the Colonel should have the right
to refuse discharges to men who wished to volunteer, Dundas after consulting
13
with Pitt, refused this concession,
After these consultations came theAct of July 1799 which reduced the
militia from soma 90,000 to some 66,000 men by reducing the Supplementary Militia
14
quotas. Men might enlist in the army to the number of one quarter of the new
15
quotes, on the terms Dundas had suggested and were not tc be replaced. If the
Militia of a county was incomplete even to the new quotas, one quarter of the
16
actual strength might volunteer. The King was empowered to disband further
oortions of the militia (subject to recall) who might also enlist in the same
17
way. The King was to designate regiments to enlist from which the men might
13
not be drafted. The Commanding Officer of the militia was to explain the
terms to his men within two months and discharge men who volunteered. They
might choose any of the regiments designated and automatically became regular
soldiers on their discharge from the militia. One third of the bounty was to
be paid them at once and the officer sent to collect them was to get a guinea
for their necessaries. The rest was to be paid when they joined their new




Instructions were sent out at once to put the Act into effect.
The commanding officers were to read the Order explaining the scheme on three
successive days after roll call. The government hoped that they would not
refuse to give discharges (the Act did not specifically compel them to),
One most important concession to the militia officers was included at this stage.
At Dundas' suggestion, whenever sixty men in any militia regiment offered to go
together to the same regular regiment, one of their officers might go with them
20
with the commission of Ensign in the array. Colonel Eliot had suggested a
21
scheme of this sort and raising men for army rank by the militia officers was
henceforth a dominant theme in the discussion of future plans.
The offensive plans of the government revealed by the summer made the army's
need of more men clearer. Lord Buckingham wrote in September that his high
experiences had convinced him that it was impracticable for whole regiments of
the militia to extend their services, but he thought detachments might enter the
22 23
army en bloc. Colonel Eliot offered to enter the army with his entire regiment
24
and Greville was struck by the possibilities of such offers, A papor was put
before the Colonels at one point suggesting new regiments to bo formed out of
militia men, their old Colonels to nominate the officers in proportion to the
25
number of men supplied, Dundas decided that the case against the extension
of regiments (explained elsewhere) was too strong, but there could be grants of
Ensigneies as last time, with promotion for militia officers already in the army,
and another idea of Grenville's - individual companies of militia going together -
26
might work.
Lord Buckingham and others pressed another form of reward for militia
officers. They could not be expected to press the men to turn out if the conse¬
quent reduction in their regiments resulted in their own dismissal, A large
27
number of officers who might appear redundant should therefore be kept on.
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Dundas agreed with this reasoning and thought that good treatment of the officers
28
should be made conditional on the Colonel's co-operation in the levy,
29
As to the men, Lord Buckingham and Colonel Eliot had always neld that there
should be no complete discharges from military service during harvest time,
when the men might easily find work. Lord Buckingham suggested waiting till
30
October and then disbanding a good many men, subject to recall. Lieutenant
Colonel Elford of the South Devonshire thought this clever but dangerous.
The men, being subject to recall, would be unable to find steady work and would
be driven to despair. The intention of course was that they would be driven
31
to enlist. Lord Buckingham was strongly opposed to any complete Colonel's
ve£ on discharges and was ready to see the peremptory reduction of any regiment
32
whose Colonel was unco-operative.
Enlisting from the Scottish militia was mooted, but Lord Dalkeith reported
that the men were too raw to make it worth while and the force was so small that
33
a further reduction would cause it to disintegrate.
The Act of October 1799 was passed at a session of Parliament held specially
for the purpose. It followed the lines of the earlier measure. Two fifths
of the quotas of July had to be kept embodied but above that all the men might
34
enlist or be disembodied subject to recall. Commanding Officers were to
explain the scheme to the men within a month and might not rofuse to discharge
men (other than musicians and armourers) save by an appeal to the General Officer
36
commanding who was to decide, Where a minimum of eighty men wished to go to
the same regiment, officers from the same militia regiment mught be given commis¬
sions to command them as a company. Theywere to have the same temporary rank
as their militia rank and whatever permanent rank (with right to half pay) the
36
King might assign, Within the militia, the King might retain as many super-
37
numerary officers as he chose.
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Th© second Act mentioned th® Foot Guards and Artillery as bein ; entitled
38
to enlist. The latter had been permitted to enlist one man per 140 in each
regiment and even to enlist men in excess of the total permitted to volunteer -
39
paying £10 to the militia to replace each one. In October, the Guards were
40
meant to enlist 5000 and the Artillery 4000, The circulars sent out noted th©
Lino regiments that had been least successful in July and asked the militia
41
officers to help them catch up.
Apart from the constructive criticism in the light of which policy
evolved, there had also been an inveterate opposition conducted by some
stalwarts of the militia interest. One of the periodic meetings of Lords
Lieutenant and militia officers with seats in Parliament had in June condemned
recruiting from the embodied militia although they were prepared to tolerate it
if the men were disembodied first. Lord Fitzwilliam was is the chair and
42
there were seven other Lords Lieutenant and two Colonels present, Lundas
43
made a polite reply but said the method proposed was too slow. Colonel
Bast^jfd of the East Devonshire attempted to mediate by suggesting that a portion
of the militia be disembodied and enlistment be allowed nevertheless from the
44
rest, Dundae said this might be fitted into the existingscheme. Opposition
was persisted in by Lords Fitxwilliam, Radnor and Carnarvon who signed a Protest
45
against the July Act, In October, Lord Spencer reported that Fitzwilliam had
shown himself quite crazy on t ie subject in debate and Carnarvon had declared
46 -Shirt
himself absolved from his allegiance. These two, with Lord Buckingham^signed
a further protest.
It will be seen that the opposition was extremorin expression than in
views. Lord Radnor produced a plan very like Dundas1 original one for the
raising of quotas of men for the army to be coupled with a reduction of the
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48
militia. Th© trouble was partly caused by the clauses in the July Act
which had nothing to do with recruiting the army but were intended to fill the
existing deficits in the militia. They directed that if a deficit was not
filled after three months, a fine of £10 a man was to be levied by county rate
49
or on a particular area if that seemed more just. To hasten th® dispatch
of the men provided, they were in future to receive no pay till they reached
the regiment and if they failed to join they were deemed deserters and might be
50
sentenced to serve in the regular army.
The Protest of July complained that the militia would be destroyed by
taking from it all but the sweepings which th® army would not have and by
driving the gentry out of it, since they would b© required to act as mere
drill sergeants for thearmy. There was reference to th© "grating instructions"
to Commanding Officers of militia to crimp for another service theirwassoelated
and fellow soldiers". But there was also the charge that by refusing men pay
until they joined and deeming them deserters if they were late, the government
was conspiring to send them into the army. They could not join if they had no
money and they would all be put in the army as a punishment. Th© new quotas
ought not to have been fixed before the new annual lists of men liable were mad©
51
and the system of fines for the deficit was a new burden on the landed interest*
A paper by Carnarvon covering the same ground stressed that men were to be raised
at great expense by the landed interest and then seduced from their original ser¬
vice at public expense. Experienced sergeants were much better able to get
men than parish overseers? the system of fines would cause these to offer higher
bounties. The landlords bore a heavy burden from which placemen were exempt and
the whole of Scotland largely so. Thus the oppoisition movement was largely
52
a aneral grouse against th® cost of th© militia to th® land.
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As to the execution of the measures, wa have noticed elsewhere that the
"supplementary" men were much less forward than those of the old militia.
By August 1799 it had bean found that some regiments had come much nearer to
turning out their maximum numbers than others. A circular was sent to the
less successful ones telling them that the original Orders were to be read three
63
times more to the men and further progress reported. Then and in October,
regiments usually gave a high proportion of "supplementary" men as reason for failure
64
In the Norfolk area the new men were mostly srWed. In the Northamptonshire
56
those that, were unmarried were too short for the army. The Lancashire men
56
were afraid of what might happen to their families. The 4th Devonshire regiment
was in its own county and the men were with their friends and not wishful to
67
leave. On the other hand, Colonel Elford of the South Devon thought that if
the "supplementary" regiments were broken up, the men (who hoped to stick
58 59
together) would enlist. Colonel Eliot said the same. Colonel Elford
thought that a spell of leave would revive the spirit of the men and induce them
60 61
to turn out. The same was reported from the East Riding.
Recruiting was disorderly, even when within military precincts. "We
had a dreadful scene of riot and confusion for ten days" said the consnander of
the 5th Lancashire regiment, "and the regiment was completely disorganized - I
63
don't think anything will restore the militia during the present war".
Colonel Bastard remitted all punishments in his regiment and the men were
personally canvassed by tho officers. After a time, he asked if he might cease
63
because discipline was deteriorating. The men sometimes demanded the whole
of their bounty at once. The regiments were told not to accede to this request
64
if possible (it was in fact illegal). A party of recruits from the Leicestershire




Transport was a problem. The men might shoos© their own regiment from
66
those sanctioned but it was hoped thay would choose on© near at hand.
Depots ware set up to collect the men and dispatch them to their chosen regi¬
ments - the one at \vas in chaos for a time because someone had forgotten
67
to appoint an officer to take charge. They had mostly to bo moved to Kent,
where the forces of the fielder assembled on Bafham Downs. Carts were used to
move them quickly along the south coast and canals to bring others from the
68
north. When they joined their regiments, they got more bounty and there
was more indiscipline. Pitt and Dundas, attempting to review the new force,
found the men so intoxicated that they could only manage a very ragged feu d©
69
joie.
An occasional source of trouble was that men arrived at a regiment and
were found to be unfit. They war© then sent back to their former regiments but
70
having been discharged it was not clear if they could be taken back. One
militia very reasonably refused to receive back men who were considered unfit for
71
the amy.
Disorder was undoubtedly increased by the participation of the amy in
recruiting. T e intention was that the militia officers should do the work and
$ circular to the regular regiments in October pointed this out and told them
72
not to interfere. Lord Lonsdale complained however that the Cumberland regi-
73
ment had been stationed in barracks and plied with beer by the amy. The
East Norfolk reported that a recruiting party had come to ingratiate itself and
74
corrupt the men. The army had to be warned not to start work till the Act
75
came into force. Lord Radnofr* was infuriated when General Sir William Pitt
sent a regular officer to explain the scheme to the Berkshire $Llitia in his
absence. He also contended that he could receive orders on discharged only from




There wes naturelly some obstruction from militia ofi'icers - though Lord
Radnor for instance executed the scheme loyally despite his feelings. Lord
Buckinghamshire was rebuked for giving orders that only men of poor quality
t
should be let out of his regiment, the 3rd Lincolnshire. Colonels were giving
latitude on both occasions to refuse discharges in certain cases but not generally.
The Lieutenant Colonel of the Warwickshire ordered recruiting to stop on a certain
78
day, but was prevailed on to give up a man enlisted after that time.
The most striking case of obstruction was that of Colonel Lord Rolle of
the South Devonshire. He was on bad terms with Elford, his Lieutenant Colonel,
apparently because he and other officers had insisted on the regiment coming home
79
from Ireland but were now ready to see it recruited from. (This was certainly
cause and effect to some extent, as we have seen). Rolle, in explaining the
scheme to the men, made a political speech against it. Elford was obliged to
80
make another in its favour. Lieutenant English having induced a body of men to
volunteer, Rolle accused him of indiscipline and refused to recommend him for an
91
Ensigncy in the line. The young man's guardian was Holla's steward and acquies-
82
ced in this, but Elford wrote to Dundas and secured his interposition.
Rolle later went to see the King and Elford at once asked for an audience too.
He was afraid that his supporters (he was M.P. for Plymouth) might desert him
83
if it was thought that Rolle was his enemy and enjoyed royal favour.
Subsequently Rolle sulked and obstructed the proceedings by neglecting to sign
disoharges for the volunteers.
The giving of army rank to militia officers who brought in men naturally
led to a good deal of bargaining. Officers wished to bring recruits from other
85





companies for a temporary Majority but no rank was given above that of Captain.
One company was delayed because the men demanded that their fc'COs should go with
87
them. A Captain who had raised his company was permitted to go on half pay
88
at once instead of Joining a regiment. An Adjutant wished to have the half
pay to which retired militia adjutants were entitled as well as that of his
89
prospective army rank. Another Adjutant said he could raise men if they mirtit
90
go to the cavalry. A surgeon haggled to be considered eligible for a Lieutenancy.
91
He had boen a Captain but had accepted a vacant surgeoncy to cblige the regiments.
Commissions were begged for one or two civilians who had brought forward militia
92
men with whom they had special local influence. A Captaincy was asked for a
Lieutenant who had been kept out of a militia Captaincy by lack of a property
93
qualification.
The most weighty negotiation was concerned with Colonel Lord Grenville Leveson
Gower who offered to raise a regiment chiefly from the militia of Staffordshire
of which he commanded the fourth battalion. He hoped to get men particularly
from the Second regiment and the 2nd Shropshire regiment, Fe\v of his present
94
officers were likely to go with him and the rest would com® from the half pqy list.
He was given a letter of service similar to that under which General Wemyss recruited
*95
from the county and Feneibles of Sutherland and began raising the men.
Unfortunately by an oversight on the part of Sir William Fawcett in charge of the
Horse Guards while the Duke of York was in Holland, the matter had not been laid
96
before the King fcr his approval. He was very displeased when he finally was
informed and objected to the permanent rank of ^ieutonant Colonel being given to
the raiser. The high officers supported him as they always did in matters of
92
this kind. Pitt and Dundas were firm on the $ther side and Dundas was incensed
* Onto p.43eJ#?The Countess of Sufiaer land was his sister-in-law. The
corps was to have been the second battalion of the E2nd.
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98
to the point of resignation. Lord Stafford, alarmed at the peril to the ministj
99
at such a juncture, advised his son to go very warily. lie finally withdrew.
There was an attempt to continue the levy without its originator bj*t the
men raised an outcry that they had been "sold" and put crepe on their hats as
ICO
a token of their sorrow. It was agreed that all who wished should return to
the militia and special discharges from the army countersigned by the Adjutant
101
General were procured for them to prevent trouble,
We may conclude by remarking that the militia enlistment scheme of 1799
was mode to work largely by the efforts of militia officers and by the offer of
commissions in the army to stimulate those efforts. The value and product of
the measure are noted in the first chapter. It must b© asked in conclusion
if thoBe was any idea of having a permanent system of recruiting on this basis.
Lord Buckingham certainly had such an idea. As early as August 1799, he
proposed that militia regiments should enlist men by ordinary recruiting and at
the ©xpenso of government. Periodically, an equivalent number of men would be
102
invited to enlist in the line. He made this proposal port of the justifica¬
tion for asking to retain a large establishment of officers in the militia.
Ho was prepared himself to open an account with the government to recruit men at
seven guineas each. BY June 1800, he could be almost 300 over strength when men
103
could be allowed to volunteer for the army*
A good many militia officers with whom Lord Buckingham discussed this plan
104
gave it their approval. So did Lord Grenville and Lord Fortescue. Dundas
105
found it interesting and wished to have further details. Lord Buckingham was
106
thinking in terras of some permanent reorganisation of the militia at the peace
- but by then there was another government. The development of the militia as
a permanent school and reservoir of soldiers was delayed for several years, until
Costlereagh became Secretary of State for War. A valuable chance to develop a
permanent system had been lost,
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CHAETER XII : SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS
The object of this study has been to show the limitations within
which the government operated in the field of recruiting at the end of the
eighteenth century and to describe the social forces which it was able to
bring to its aid. A thoroughly ramshackle system is revealed, but never¬
theless it just succeeded in being a system. There is a strong probability
that no government, with the defective organization of society then prevailing,
could have done significantly better.
The subject of recruitment has not received very much systematic
attention from the military historians. For our period, the rather cursory
account by Fortescue in his general History has not really superceded the
work of Clode, now over eighty years old. In "The County Lieutenancies
and the Army" Fortescue has covered much of the subject for the period of
the Napoleonic War proper. This work, however, is essentially a fragment,
grudgingly written - as the rather curious Preface explains. General
historians pay little attention to how the forces were raised. In the
Revolutionary War particularly, the futility and unimportance of so much
of the Army's work has led them to neglect the analysis of the land forces.
This seen© wrong on two grounds. Firstly, the defensive operations and
preparations both in the British Isles and in the West Indies had an
importance and value greater than is sometimes implied. The threat of
the Negroes and Irish to the stability of the Empire and of the French,
aided by the seditions, to Credit and the Constitution, have not always been
fully understood.
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Secondly, the years after 1793 saw an expansion of the land forces to
an unprecedented size. On this war footing they remained for a longer time
than ever before, and they remained permanently much longer than they had
been before 1793-^ The Pitt government was faced with a new and difficult
problem in supplying men and this is at once an excuse for the mistakes they
made and a reason for studying their efforts and experiments,
Portescue condemns the recruiting policy of this time root and
branch "... within a month of the declaration of war there were already three
distinct forces, the Amy, the Pencibles and the Militia, all bidding against
each other for the recruits which only the Regular Army could turn to
2
efficient account". We have endeavoured to show in the first place that
there was good reason for maintaining large defensive forces and secondly
that men could be enlisted for them who would never have entered the Regulars.
It is of course true that there was plenty of competition and overlapping
between the different types of force, but the amy by itself would not have
secured an appreciable proportion of the men who as it was went into the
other forces. Finally, the system of extension of service, the cardinal
invention of our period, enabled the defensive to feed the offensive forbe
and become a true instrument of military education and factory of recruits
for the amy.
Portescue is on the side of the array against the civilians. Of the
authorship of "raising men for rank" he rightly says "assuredly it was not
Lord /—mherst, nor is it credible that it can have been any soldier.
It is safe to assert that it was the work of civilians". He goes on to
convict Henry Dundas and Sir George Yonge of "tried conceit, unwisdom and
3
incapacity". Upon them he places the blame for the failure of the
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augmentation of the old regiments in November 1793. They "believed
themselves to have found true economy in a clever and specious scheme
... for defraying the cost of new levies by the sale of commissions.
... the schema failed completely as is the common fate of all projects
•which aspire to obtain a costly article at a trifling outlay".^4"
Here he is on unsafe ground. The cost of the scheme, despite the sale
of commissions, was not trifling (as he shows himself) - it was greater
5
than that of previous levies. It was a measure designed to please the
army. It gave them strikingly better terms than heretofore. Yet the
army failed. The established military hierarchy could not deliver the
goods. The civilians, with their less reputable soldier helpers, had
to step in.
"Lord AlWherst was a worthy respectable old man", said Dundas,
"and nobody shall hear me say a disrespectful thing of himj but the
mischief he did in a few years will not be repaired by the unremitting
attention of many". He thought that the troubles of the amy dated from
the death of the old Duke of Cumberland and expected the Duke of York to
achieve striking improvements because he had the advantage of being a
prince of the blood.^ Whatever substance there may be in Dundas• defence,
it is undoubtedly true that the ministers did not have the authority to
overrule the military caste - with its close connections with the throne -
and were hampered at every turn by its interests and intrigues.
Fortescue complains that Pitt "never passed an Act for National
Defence without an amendment to substitute 'you inay serve' for 'you must
serve' ..* An Act to compel men to voluntary service, which (absurd as
it may seem) was the purport of (several) of his measures, in an Act to
enable man to evade service.The militia riots show all too clearly the
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reaction of the poor to even a very mild new measure of compulsion.
Had there been true conscription, they would have sold their lives dear.
On the other hand, the power of the upper class over the middling and lower
sort was very great, and if they were united and zealous and the compulsory
measure not too extreme, they might impose obd&ience or cajole their depend¬
ents into voluntary offers. Compulsory volunteering meant volunteering for
the upper class and compulsion for the rest. The government set a target;
the extent to which it was reached depended on the zeal that could be
excited in each locality. Absurd or not, the principle of compulsory
volunteering is surely one very evident in British life at all times.
Relying on the help of the rulers of the countryside in all kinds
of levies from Regulars to Volunteers, the government encountered no fewer
obstacles anu opposing interests than it did from the military caste.
Their experiences in trying to get the Militia to extend their services
either in units or individually show this more clearly than anything else
and have been described at some length for this reason. What the govern¬
ment could undertake depended on how many of the gentry were in opposition
or neutral. Measuers failed when the government miscalculated the amount
of support they would receive.
The government's polity was well based and the difficulties were
great. Nevertheless, plenty of scope remains for criticism. Dundas
admitted that the army had been ruined by injudicious economy before the
8
war and that there was need to guard against this at the peace.
The atmosphere of intrigue and shuffle, the delays and vexations attending
all transactions with the government were excessive and discreditable.
One regimental officer declared himself "as little inclined as any person
can be to trust to the promises of Mr Dundas - I know from experience how
gshallow they are". Lord Buckingham was very angry at one point because
-331.
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Dundas asked the advice of the Lord Lieutenants and. then proceeded
to make up his mind without waiting for their replies.The order
i




his office should have started earlier and extended more widely.
./■ j
More serious than habitual inefficiency was the lack of thought
given to military problems and the lack of organization for stimulating
and perpetuating thought. Staff work was in its infancy. Policy was
shaped "by scattered individuals, thinking perfunctorily and disconnectedly.
One of Dundas* few letters on policy (quoted twice in this chapter) ends
not with the conclusion of the argument but with the summoning of the
minister to breakfast. Another was only written because he was at home
11
with a "headack". Above all, the absence of a true staff and of
permanent officials adequate in numbers and calibre meant that the Executive
had an appallingly short memory. The mistakes of Pitt were repeated by
Addington. The balanced system of offence and defence in the forces which
had been built up by 1798-9 was not again in existence and improved upon
12
until the ministry of Castlereagh in 1808. It was only then, too, that
it became a system in the eyes of its creator. In the Dundas era, it was
a series of connected measures but their relationship is largely implicit.
Despite its grave shortcomings, the Pitt government displayed both
vision and determination in the matter of increasing the forces. Its
work here is fit to stand beside the great achievements of reconstruction
in the government of the Empire and the commercial system on which Pitt's
fame so largely rests. It was the triumph of British arms in the ensuing
years that obscured this fact. After 1815, Britain was able to keep her
army relatively small and to avoid the necessity of a real national military
system. Had Britain been forced to adopt full conscription, the events
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of 1798-9 * the great expansion of the compulsory levy and the recruit¬
ment of the Army from it - would have been looked back to as the key
event in the creation of such a system. The great national systems of
education or factory inspection had much less auspicious beginnings.
Victory fortunately blighted this prospect and the military strivings
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ibid 1.5,97 Minute of the Committee
ibid Account endorsed 1801
Add 35664 s 276
ibid 334, but see 355
ibid 359
ibid 396-7
HO 50/534 s 26.6.94. M. Burgoyne
Add 35664s 282, 296, 307
Abercairney 93J| undated accounts of bounties paid
HO 50/fe s 29
TO 1/1093 $ 4.7.95 J. Scott
TO l/l085 s 225
TO 1/10903 323
TO 4/157 s 337
TO 1/L086 s 45
TO 1/1082 s 107
TO 1/1085 s 243
TO 1/1094 s 31.7.95 J. A, Thomson
HO 50/51, undated return of augmentations under 34 Geo.Ill c.36
cf. 26 Geo.IIIel07 S.17
page
TO 4/155 s 9
HO 50/&2 3 23.9.94 (H. Houghton) enclosing resolutions of 22,9,94
IIO 50/31 s 4,5,99 (H. Dundas) and attached note
Add 41851 s 49
Dropmore III : 143-4 , HO 50/^6 3 30.11.96 Lord Buckingham HO 43/& 120,146
page
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CHAPTER III t Section (a)
1. WO 4/145 : 375
2. TO 4/145 : 468, 473
3. TO 4/151 i 439, 442, 454, 483
4. TO 4/l54j 252, 280, 386 TO 4/155: 3,
5. TO 4/i5l s 447
6. TO 1/1057: 283
7. Mslvilla 30 : 81
8. TO 3/il : 24, 30
9. " 24
10. TO 4/147 : 153
11. TO 3/il : 185
12. TO 4/lcO : 37
13. TO 4/151 : 30, 34
14. TO 4/154 : 71; TO 4/156; 421
15. TO 4/145 : 468, 473
16. TO 4/151 : 439, 442
17. TO 4/147 : 153 et ssq.
18. TO 4/150 : 37
19. TO 4/149 i 210,
20. HO 50/1 i 7 and
21. Add 43770 j 14
22. WD 4/150 : 113
23. TO 1/1099 I 371
24. HO 50/1 s 7 and
25. TO 4/155 s 42
26. note 15 supra
27. 3 "
28. TO 4/149 j 284,
29. note 12 supra
30. TO 4/160 s 89
31. TO 4/155 t 407
32. TO 1/1119 s 451
33. 1/1089 : 433
34. TO 1/1067 » 19
35. TO 4/150 : 37 cndC.f 353
36. TO 4/155 : 183
37. ibid
38. Add 43770 » 30
39. TO 4/158 : 496
40. TO 1/1.067 : 387
41. TO 4/155 : 407
42. TO 1A084 : 205, 207
43. TO 4/166 , 232
44. TO 3/19 : 223
45. TO 1/1099 j 371
46, TO 1/1052 : 289
47. TO 4/169 : 469
48. Add 43770 : 14







CIIAPTSR III Section (a) contd.
51. WO 4/154 s 71 TO 4/1^6 i 471
52. not© 4 supra
53. TO 4/154 j 376
54. TO 1/1069 t 69
55. TO 4/156 i 159
56. TO 4/149 t 267
57. WO 4/158 j 25, 212
58. TO 1/1090 s 417, TO 1/1093 j 305
59. HO 50/^53 5 enclosure in draft to Lord Amherst 5.9.93
60. TO 40/1: undated memorandum
61. ibid, 19 cmd. 21.10.93. Sffr G. Yonge
62. HO 50 /4 53 : 11.9 .93 anon.
63. TO 3/29 : 13
64. Dunn Pattison 23
65. TO 1/1088 i 26j TO 47/^557j 1079
66. TO/4/157 1 54
67. TO 4/158 : 432, c.f. 431
68. Seaforth D.l : 11 t 15.2.93 A, Brodie
69. TO 1,1098 1 433
70. TO 1/1096 j 475
71. Ann. Reg. (1796) 50
Section (b)
1. TO 1/1080 » 87
2. TO l/i082 t 181
3. Lyndoch 3597 : 119
4. TO 1/1061 j 61
5. Bulloch, 206
6. Abercairhey 931 5.5.94
7. ibid : (received) 5.1.95
8. Gray and Willcox: Kempt*s letters, esp. 14.10.95
9. Aboreairney 931 j 6.5.94
10. TO 1/1089 1 443
11. Breadalbane (Military) Box 12? undated draft, Tullibardine I 149
12. Mackintosh
13. Breadalbane (Military) Box 3 14.7.94
14. Dunn Pattison 2 and no£e 5 there
15. TO 1/1089 : 443
16. Breadalbane (Military) Box 12 undated draft
17. HO 50 /4 5 3 : 28 . 6.93
18. Breadalbane (Military) Box 12 undated draft
19. ibid 1 recruiting instructions of the Perth Highland Fencibles
20. Seaforth VII : 13.12.93 enclosed in 13.12.93 (A. Brodie)
21. TO 4/157 1 185s TO 4/162 : 2» 10 4/163 ; 459
22. TO 4/154 t 277
23. TO 1/1063 1 121
24. TO 1/1069 s 145
25. TO 1/1086 s 351, 543, 539, 645
26. TO 1/1093 s 20.8.95
27. TO 4/165 s 84 e.g.
-344-
CHAPTER III Section (b) contd.
28. TO 4/161 i 123
29. Grey and Willcox ; letters of T. Evans, October 1798 to April 1798
30. Seaforth XCIII t 102
31. Seaforth VIII 1.12.96 C, Mackenzie
32, Seeforth IX 5.1.97 ff
33. Add 43770 1 11
34. TO 1/1098 : 149
35. Atkinson t the Dorsetshire regiment II 53
36. Dropmore V 390
37. TO 1/1069 t 137
38. TO 1/1076 j 401
39. s 419
40, Lyndoeh 3596 : 39-97; and see Lyndoch 3644; 3595 : 72, 167, 270
41. Lyndoch 3597 s 102-14
42. Ann. Reg. (1795) 165; (1796) 50
43. TO 6/602 : 165
44. TO 1/1096 t 469
45. Cu-ninghame 520 : 26.1 .99 (Sf^r W, Johnstone) in 26.1.99 (E. Gardner)
46. ibid s 24.1.99; 10.4. 99 E. Gardner
47. HO 50/4 : 513
48. Grey and Willcox : Memorials to Lord Amherst and the Duke of York, etc
WO 4/165 ! 34
49. TO 1/1067 : 297
50. Seaforth D.l : 11 s 22 .2.94
51. ibid
CHAPTER IV i Section (a)
1. wo 1/4X19 : 51
2. WO. 1/1092 s 75
3. " 63. HE
4. " 9
5. " 87
6. WO 1/1085 i 5
7. WO 1/§Q2 s 17
8. " 99
9. Dudgeon i Appendix 3
10. WO. 1/602 : 41
11. TO 1/1092 » 139. 149
12. WO. 3/ll s 18
13. WO 1/1074 t 117, 121
14. WO 4/155 s 499, 500
16. WO i/1069 j 707; WO 1/1082 , 33!
16. WO 1/1071 i 419
17. WO 1/1089 s 451
18. TO 1/1089 s 105-9
19. WO 1/693 : 397
20. WO 4/^93 j 356
21. TO 6/67 j 44; WO 6/694 s 33; HO 50/28 s 22.12.97 H. Inglis, etc.
22. 39 C-eo. Ill c.109
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CHAPTER IV Section (a) contd.
23. WO l/jL077 j 5
24. TO 1/&93 i 397
25. TO " 429
26. TO " 753
27. TO 1/620 s 9
28. TO " 13} WO 6/67 s:123
29. TO 1/&S3 i 449# 545
30. Bropmore IV 85
31. HO 50/61 » 27.5.99
32. 34 Geo.III c.16 3,6
33. Laing II 646
34. TO 4/173-4: Indices "letters of service"
35. Adam 312
36. Bulloch 221
37. TO 1/1071 } 421
38. TO 4/149 t 30
39. Records of the Camerons, 17
40. Melville 23 i 42
41. TO 3/13 s 214
42. HO 50/61 i 27,5.99
43. WO 4/155 j 42 e.g.
44. Gardayne I : 11, footnote
45. TO 1/1090 : 745
46. " 743
47. " 719
48. WD 1/1094 : 15, 16 and 20.12.95, end note. J. Woodford
49* TO 4/160 i 157
Section (b)
1. Clode II Appendix LXXXII
2. WO l/l095 : 309
3. WO 4/153 s 199
4. " 275
5. WO 1/1056 s 485
6. WO 1/1073 s 375
7. WO 1/1076 : 307; WO 1/1079 i 369, 371
8. TO 1/1078 } 289
9. TO 1/1062 s 295
10. WO 1/1094 i 14.12.95
11. Seaforth XCIES6
12. TO 1/1072 , 75
13. TO 1/1089 « 433
14. TO 1/1C86 : 69-73
15. WO 1/1068 j 363
16. WO l/l094 i 17.11.95
17. TO 1/1086 j 393
18. " 397j ISO 4/158 : 164, 450
19. TO 1/1082 : 483
20. TO 1/4086 : 149
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CHABTER XV Section (b) contd.
21. TO 4/160 : 84j arid see page*?^"
22. TO 1/1091 : 11.8.95 W. Vincent, etc. WO 4/161 s 7, 62
23. Recruiting Instructions, Art, 20
24. Lyndoch 3595 i 120
25. TO 1/1059 s 281, 317 TO 4/150 s 98
26. TO 1/1083 ; 83
27. TO 1/1094 : 28.$.95 J. Wssse
28. TO 1/1083 : 201
29. TO 1/1081 : 16.3.95
30. TO 1/1071 : 345
31. Lyndoch 3525 j 152
32. TO 4/154 s 154
33. TO 4/165 : 77
34. TO 40ft : 2.2.9 5
35. TO 1/1068 J 13
36. TO 1/1089 : 351
37. TO 4/153 : 402
38. Lyndoch 3595 j 257
39. TO 1/1068 » 35
40. TO 4/611 t 126
41. TO 1/1086 i 91
Section (c)
1. TO 1/1083 » 9b
2. WD l/i094 s 31.7.95 J. Wheatley. 4.8.95 R. Baily
3. TO 1/1090 » 261
4. TO 4/155 t 206
5. See ©sp. 39 Geo.Ill c.20 s.55 and Schedule A cf. Recruiting Instructions
(1796) Arts. 17-8
6. WO 1/1063 s 135
7. TO 1/1093 : 113
8. TO 1/1085 : 45; WO 4/156 j 344
9. TO 1/1082 t 561, 563
10. TO l/lC73 : 43
11. Laing II 572
12. WO 1/1085 s 135
13. TO 1/1082 : 19
14. TO 1/1068 : 429
15. TO 4/155 s 138 cf Recruiting Instructions (1796) Art, 19
16. TO 1/1088 s 287
17. TO 1/1072 i 251
18. TO 1/1068 : 35
19. 7© 6/&93 j 753
20. TO 1/1075 j 17
21. TO 342 : 34
22. TO 14073 S 333
23. TO 14092 : 15
24. Walrond 130
25. TO 14087 t 413j V© Vl60 : 138, 131
26. WO 4455 S 189, 249, 250
27. WO 14074 t 79, 81, etc.
28. TO 14067 J 31, 35j TO 14079 s 127
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CHAPTER IV Section (c) contd;
29. TO 1/1060 « 65, 69, etc.
30. HO 50 /457 s 6.10.94 (Talbot) in 8.10.94 (Sir T. Shirley)
31. TO 4/162 a 108
32. TO 3/12 8 149
33. DO 1/1081 a 87
34. " 187
35. TO 1/1084 a 557
36. Lyndoch 3595 : 195
37. TO 1/4083 : 65
38. TO 1/1091 : 7.3.9 5 J, Ogle
39. TO 1/1078 : 57
40. TO 1/4079 : 233
41. TO 1/1081 a 243
42. TO 4/158 : 187
43. TO 1/1090 a 461
44. TO 1/1084 s 443 seq.
45. TO 4/173 s 468
46. TO 1/4060 1 563
47. TO 1/1074 j 221; TO 1/4078 a 279 but cf. TO 1/4091 1 43
48. TO 1/1058 a 156; TO 1/4091 : 29,8.95 R. W, Ofctley
49. TO l/l076 1 359 - 60; TO l/l091 s 13.7.95 D. Ord
50. TO 1/1062 : 426j TO 1/1084 a 599; TO 1/1078 : 13
61. TO 1/1056 a 385
52 . Sargc sttftt 73
53, TO l/i08S s 693
64. TO 4/610-22
55. TO 4/614 a 472-474
56. McGuffie chap.V
57. ibid : WO 4/611 ; 104
58. TO 1/4091 : 19.9.95
59. Lyndoch 3595 s 200
60. TO 4/158 a 317
61. TO 4/610 a 419
62. V© 4/169 ; 154, 156
63. TO l/l094 1 10 aid 14.3.95. C. Van deleur
64. TO 1/L097 a 427
65. TO l/l089 1 343
66. V© 1,1074 a 273







6. HO 50/453 a 28.6.93. F. H. Mackenzie
7. Bulloch 197
8. Mackay Scobie 367
9. Breadalbane (Milifc-ary) Box IS a proceedings of the Town Council
22 ana 25.2.93
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CHAPTER IV Section (d) contd:




Beeadalbane (Military) Box 12: list of 12.4.93
ibid : list dated April 1793
Ibid : undated paper
Seaforth LXVII 27.4.93 f
" " 12.5,94 A. Mackenzie
VII 17 end 19.6.93 G. Gillanders
ibid : 27.3.93
Seaforth D.l:ll:22.2.93
HO 50/453 ; 28.6.93
Bulloch 145-6
Seaforth D.l:ll:18.2.93
Stevrert of Garth II 351-3, 360-1
Mackay Scobl© 368
Bulloch 221





Seaforth VII 1.3.94 P. Fairbairn
Breadalbane (Military) Box 12: undated table of promises given to men






Breadalbane (Military) Box 12: list of November 1793




Seafcrth VII 19.6.93 G, Gillanders
Breadalbane (Military) Box 2: 29,5.97 J, MacGregor
Breadalbane (Military) Box 12: list of November 1793
Bresdalbane (Military) Box 1: 10.9.95
Breadalbane (Military) Box 12: 2.12.93
Seaforfch LXVII 12.5.94 A. Mackenzie
HO 50/fe : 16 and 19.5.93 F. H. Mackenzie : 25.5.93 Lord A. Gordon





Melville 1048 : 58
W 1/1070 : 565
W 1/1089 ; 741




QiAPTRR IV Section (e)
1. to l/ioei : its
2. TO 3/i8 i 357
3, TO 1/1102 j 185
4, TO 3/19 i 130
5. Anderson : Cheshire Regiment 107
6, TO l/l084 : 283
7. TO l/l07E : 143
8. TO 4/170 : 299
9» V®. 3/l8 : 77
10. V® 3/31 j 79
11. V® 3/19 : 237
12. V® 3/17 : 318
13. TO 3/l9 i 237
14. Wylly j Yorkshire and Lancashire Regiment 37
IE. V® 3/19 t 67
16. TO 3/&0 : 21, 154
17. TO Z/2,0 : 25
18. TO 1/1119 : 451
19. TO 1/1075 : 21
20. TO 3/18 j 255
21. V® 3/21 : 4
22. TO 3/^8 t 106
23. V® 4/158 t 483
24. 3ut/«teer j the King's Royal Rifle Corps I 229-30, quoting Fortes
III 518
25. Y® 3/18 s 256
26. WO 1/1084 : 193; TO 1/1070 1 431
27. V® 4/159 : 46, 141
28. Melville 1048 s 38
29. Y® 1/1085 s 65, 67
30. TO 4/158 s 45
31. TO 1/1077 1 147
32. Y® 1/1070 s 523
33. V® 4/156 j 395
34. V®. 4/157 : 303
35. Y® 4/157 : 406
36. TO 4/337 : 288
37. Melville 21: 9,2.95
38. TO 4/157 : 102-3, 165-6; Y® 4/162 : 176
39. TO l/l076 : 397
40. TO 1/1070 : 431
41. Y® 4/538 : 99
42. TO 3/15 : 124
43. W 3/21 : 9 3
44. TO 4/173 ; 150
45. V® 1/1082 : 505
46. TO 4464 s 225
47. note 24 supra
48. V® 4/135 ; 15
49. Y® 6/729 : 165
50. TO 6/l05 j 33-41
51. V® 4435 S, 18
52. TO 14096 j 251
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CHAPTSR IV Section (e) contd:
53. TO 1/1.084 j 117
54. TO 6/147 j 5
55. TO 1/392 : 471
56. TO 1/1068 s 369
57. TO 1/1096 : 139
58. WO 1/1CS4 s 117-9
59. TO 1/1098 : 123
60. TO 1/1096 s 137; TO 1/1068 t 369
61. wo 1/1084 t 373
62. TO 4/135 s 117
63. TO 1/1096 : 139, 251
64. TO 4/l046 : 56
65. TO 1/1096 s 205
66, TO 6/06 : 71-9
67. TO 6/§ll : 283, 425
68. TO 6/148 1 163
69. TO 4/153 : 466: TO 1/1070; 225
70. wo 6/147 : 486-92
71. TO 6/148 » 22
72. TO 1/1069 : 725
73. WO 4/171 : 398; WO 4/l72j 48
74. V© 1/1084 : 111
75. wo 3/15 j 76; WO 3/17 : 293
76. wo 3/h : 96
CHAPTER V Section (a)
1, TO 1/1064 : 325
2, WO 1/1093 « 321
3, WO 4/169 : 176
4, Lyndoch 3595 s 228, 230
6. W> 1/1089 » 683
6, WO 1/1057 j 161
7, WO 1/1073 j 435} WO 4/156 : 127
8. 35 Geo.III cap.64 s.6. (prolonged by annual acts thereafter)
9. WO 1/1057 s 619
10. WO 1/1061 : 173
11. TO 1/1084 » 279
12. WO 1/1062 i 297
13. WO 1/1062 : 159
14. WO 1/1087 s 101
15. WO 1/1094 : ?.1.95 J. C. Walpole; WO 4/166 : 311, 333
16. Memoirs of C-, Frazer quoted in Sir F. Maurice "the Scots Guards" p.218
17. WO 4/312 j 177
18. TO l/llOl j 315
19. V© 1/1074 : 627, 533
20. WO 1/1084 s 843
21. WO 1/1083 : 439
22. TO 4/149 j 125
23. TO 4/157 : 499
24. TO 1/1075 : 261
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CHAPTER V Section (e) contd:
25. TO 4/159 a 232
26. WO 4/156 j 34
27. Bulloch 270-1
28. TO 4/166 5 275
29. WO 4/165 j 420
30. 110 50/4 : 79-85
31. Lyndoch 3595 s 211
32. HO 50/23: 27.2.95 H. Morison
33. WO 1/1091 : 26.4.95 P. Pslit
34. WO 4/161 s 447
35. WO 4/173 i 225
36. WO 1/1070 s 509
37. WO 4/161 : 447
38. WO 4/173 i 195
39. WO 40Aj 8.12.95 (Sir W. Fawcett) and enclosures
40. WO 4/161 j 447
41. 10 1/1093 ; 27
42. WO 1/loSl : 83
43. 10 1/1091 : 19.7.95
44. WO 1/1070 a 473
45. " 509
46. TO 1/1083 : 439
47. WO 1/1094 : 17.5.95
48. N. Bannatyne : History of the 30th Foot a 179
49. 10 1/1074 i 65
50. WO 4/159 « IE cf. 10 4/156 : 20
51. Lyndoch 3596 a 70
52. WD 1/1089 t 921
53. TO 1/1087 a 419
54. TO 4/159 : 183
55. TO 1/1092 : 379. 391-3 cf. WD 1/1072 s 21
56. TO 4/154 s 443
57. TO 1/1089 J 883, 921, 923
58. TO 1/1091 a 4.10.95
59. TO 1/1060 : 319, 325
60. TO 1/1090 a 91
61. TO 1/1087 a 325
62. TO 1/1096 a 363
Section (b)
1. TO 4/165 a 383
2. V© l/l058 a 35, 41, 59
3. TO 4/175 : 7
4. TO 4/174 : 108
5. TO 4/155 a 494
6. TO 3/12 a 149
7. WD 4/156' a 324
8. V© 1/1080 a 313
9. WO 1/1072 a 521
10. see notes 8 and 9
11. TO 4/155 a 161
12. V© 1/1072 a 599, 605
13. TO 4/156 : 18} TO 1/1094 a 6.1.95 P. Tomkyns, etc.
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CHAPTER V Section (b) contds
14. WO 4/161 « 210
15. ibid 332j WO 4/162 : 134, 205
16. WC, 4/161 : 333
17. WO 4/163 : 441
18. TiTO 4/155 s 454
19. ibid i WD 27/&4 seq.
20. WO 4/15"- : 147
21. WO 4/156 j 4 57, 504
22. WO 4/159 : 169{ WO 3/llj 218
23. Recruiting Instructions (1796) Art.14
24. ibidj cf, letter;; of service of Regular and Fencibl© Regiments in WO.4
25. WO 4/155 s 9, 42, 210
26. WO 1/1086 j 629
27. V© 27/&4 s report on Berwick Fencible Cavalry
28. Seaforth LXVII : 10.6.93. A. Mackenzie
29. Cuntninghame 519 : 19 and 22.3.99 Sir W, Johnstone
30. WO 27/82 : 14.3.99
31. WO 1/1075 : 349
32. WO 1/1070 s 221
33. WO 4/153 : 373, 376
34. WO 1/1070 : 443
35. WO 1/1102 j 201
36. WO 4/153 j 77
37. WO 4/146 j 107
38. WO 4/153 i 168
39. WO 4/S77 s 255
40. WO 4/153 j 77
41. HO 51/151 : 61
42. WO 3 '/HO s 202
43. WO 4/198 s 356-65
44. WO 3/45 • 166, 172 , 210, 217, 230 , 251; WO 3/21 : 26
45. WO 1/1089 : 667, 669
46. V© 1/1059 t 5, 11, 17; WO 4/145 t 429-432
47. WO l/l059 i 1-45; WO 3/16 s 8
48. WO 3/15 j 148
49. Recruiting Instructions (1796) Arts 2, 8, 9
50. ibid. Art.10. WO 4/165 : 1
51. WO 4/171 j 182. Recruiting Instructions Art.10
52. Recruiting Instructions Arts. 3-8, 11
53. Cunningham© 505, 19.6.96 B, Heron; Cu-ninghame 507s 7.2.97 B. Heron
54. WO 3/15 : 65
55. WO 4/155 : 371-2
56. WO 4/155 j 239
57. WO 4/160 j 88
58. WO 4/169 ! 357
59. WO 3/l5 s 195
60. e.g. WO. 3/12 s
61. V© 4/156 s 375
62. WO 4/157 : 54
63. WO 4/157 t 156
64. WD 4/157 t 214
65. BO 1/1118 t 451
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CHAPTER V Section (b) contd:
66. WO 3/19 s 290
67. WO l/llOl j 315
68. Cu-ninghame 502, 504$ Accounts with Macondald, Bruce and Langdon. 504j-
account with W. Russell and his letter of 1.7.98
69. WO 1/1089 i 567
70. WO l/lo84 j 725
71. WO 1/1074 s 103
72. WO 3/17 t 328
73. WO 3/15 : 223
74. WO 4/154 : 415
75. WO 4/146 i 134
76. WO 4/171 I 348
77. e.g. WO 4/161 : 63, 362; WO 4/159 s 445
78. WO 1/1089 : 433
79. WO 1/1097 t 427
80. WO 1/1089 j 419
81. WO 1/1067 t 179
82. WO 1/1119 • 451
CHAPTER VI Section (a)
1. 26 Geo.Ill cap. 107
2. 37 Geo.Ill caps. 3 and 22





6* a s.105-7, 109-15
7. a s.22, 27
8. 34 Geo.Ill cap.31 s.5
9. 37 Geo.Ill cap. 3 s.18
10. cf. pageiV
11. 26 Geo.IIIcap.107 s.18-24
12. ft s.17
13. ft s. 50
14. Parlt. Hist. XXXII 1208
15. 26 Geo.III cap.107 s.24
16. tt s.24, 26. 37 Geo.Ill cap
17. 26 Geo.Ill cap. 107 s.51
18. rt s.42
19. 37 Geo*III cap, 3 s,10-1,13
20. »t " s,17;26 Geo.Ill cap. 107
21. 26 Ceo.Ill cap, 107 s.24; 37 eo.III cap.3,i
22. 26 Geo.Ill cap, 107 s.46
23. rt " s.96; 37 Geo.Ill cap.3,!
24. ft s .41.
25. 38 Geo.Ill cap. 18 s.18
26. 26 Geo.III cap.107 s.26-7; 37 eo.III cap.3
27. 26 Geo.Ill cap,107 s.53-9.
28. ?t s.1,5-14





CHAPIER VI 3ection (a) confad:
33. 26 Geo.III cap.107 s.95, 97, 103J 37 ' eo.III cap.3 s.32, 35, 37,
34. " " s.101-2.
35. " " s.38-9,83.
36. " " s.37. 37 Geo.III cap.22 s,9.
37. 29 Geo.III cap.107 s.116-26
Section (b)
1. HO 50/24 s 16.11.95. Deputies of Flint
2. HO 5140 : 142,187,224.
3. Add 34 303.
4. Bedfordshire Quarter Sessions Rolls 17 : 103.
5. Add 35665 i 407.
6. HO 51/6 : 203.
7. HO 50/66 s 17.12.96. R. J. Lloyd.
8. 26 Geo.III cap.107 s.33
9. HO 50 /58 s 6.3.99. 1N, Langton, etc.
10. HO 50/63 : 19.12.99. Duke of Portland.
11. L.M.I s 8.
12. HO 50/50 : 21.6.99. C. Ruahleigh.
13. Add 35667 : 1C8 seq
14. HO 50/43 : 30.7.98j HO 50/4 : 3. 9. 98> and 22.11.98. c.f. HOSO/44
12.9.98 (J. Matthews.)
15. HO 50/641 : 9,3,97.
16. see p,Z(Qct.M.
17. HO 50/66 : 10.12.96.
18. HO 50/62 : 29.7,99. (six signatures)
19. WO 4/770 : 21,72..
20. HO 50/19 » 30.12.92.
21. " " : 1. 1.93.
22. »♦ " : Jan*'93.
23. " " : 28.1.93.
24. " " : 6.2.93.
25. HO 504^ » 5.7.99. (W. Smith) in 11.7.99 (R. Brownrigg)
26. Lancashire : P.R.1700.
27. Holder 61.
29. Add 37874 : 249.
29. Melville 5 x 115.
30. Dudgeon s Appendix III.
31. Add 35667 5 193.
32. Add 35663 s 76.
33. HO 50/313 x 5.2.98.
34. 110 50/62 x 16,9.94.
35. Holder: 60.
36. Add 33105 x 83,91.
37. c.f. Add 43770 1 33.
38. 26 Ceo,III cap.107 s.48.
39. 35 Geo.III cap. 83 s. 4,
40. Add 35667 x 47.
41. HO 50/6o j undated.
42. HO 50/67 x 26. 4. 00.
4 3. HO 50/513 x 5.2,98.
44, Add 35667 x 228.
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CIIAPTSR VI Section (b) contd;
45. Add 35670 : 324.
46. Add 35664 : 240.
47. Add 35670 8 119,130.
48. Add 35664 j 262.
49. 110 50/50 j datec 1799.
50. " " : 28.3,99. F. Glanville.
51. HO 50/23 j 1.3.96.
52. " » : 13.2.95,
53. HO 60/85 s return of 18.4.96.
54. HO 51/148 s 314.
55. HO 50/34 ; 10.7.98.
56. HO 50/30 : undated.
57. HO 50/50 : 7.3.9D.
58. TO 17/1160.
Section (c)
1. HO 50/86 : 30.12.96, Duke of Aneaster,
2. 35 Oeo.III cap.35, and other Acts extending it Annually.
3. HO 50/8 j 303.
4. TO 1/1088 s 133.
5. HO 50/7 s 3.2.98. W. Grinfield.
6. Clode I 43.
7. Add 35665 : 243 - 8 c.f. 35 Ceo.Ill cap.35.
8« P« 3i6~?
9. HO 51/8 s 148,157.
10. " " s 176.
11. " " • nassim
12. TO 4/769 s 267 e.g.
13. TO 4/769-70 : indices : "C. Long".
14. Add 35663 s 63
IE. HO 50/19 s 13.1.83. Lord Buckingham. HO 51/8 : 195-6.
16. HO 50/19 : 28.1.93.} HO 51/8 s 186.
17. TO 4/770 : 54.
18. " " 8 72.
19. HO 50/Is s 26.1.93. S. Buck.
20. HO 50AO s 12.5,93. Anon.
21. HO 50/86 s 18.11.96,T, Coltman ; 9.11.96. Sir J. Barks.
22. HO 50/87 j resolutions of 8.12,96 and 14.1.97. in Duke of ! orthumberland's
of 17.2.97.
23. ibid s letter of 14.1.97. also enclosed,
24. HO El/10 s 371.
26. HO 60/88 s resolutions of 23.6.97. in Duko of orthumberland's ,of
28.6.97.
26. HO 43/io s 117.
27. 37 Geo.III cap.22.
28. 37 Geo.III cap. 3 s.2E,29. TO 4/82" s 1.
29. 37 Geo.III cap. 3 s.26.
30. 37 Geo.III cap.22 s. 6.
31. TO 4/824 s 60-184.
32. HO 60/86 : 31.12.96.
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33. HO 50/^3 i 5. 4. 97.
34. Md 35667 : 233,239 , 241,243,247.
35. ibid, s 317,321,333.
36. e.g. WO 4/§24 : 1.
37. HO SO/31 j Paper no. 3.
38. " " s 26.1.98.
39. HO 60/313 : drafts of Feb.1798.
40. 38 Ceo.Ill cap.18 s.2.
41. HO SO/31 s 26.1.98.
42. 38 Ceo.Ill cap.19,
43. 38 Ceo.Ill cap.18 s.7,
44. " " " 8.11.
45. " " " s. 5.
46. HO Softl : Draft circulars of January 1798.
47. HO 50/31 s Paper no.3.
43. " " 3 Paper no.7j drafts to Lieutenants of Jan.1798.
49. ibid, s 22.2.98. Sir. W, Fawcett, 24.2.98. R. Browrrigg*
50. HO Softs : 27.3.98. Lord Dundas, etc., a-d 29.4.98. Lord Fauconberg.
51. 38 Geo,III cap.18 s.3,6.
52. HO 50/fel3 : 9.2.98. Lord Hardwicke
53. 37 Geo.Ill cap.22 s.14.
54. 38 Geo.III cap.18 s.18.
55. HO 50/30 s 11. 2.98. T. Beyley L.M.I. : 31.
56. HO S0/30 s 11. 2.98. T. Bayley.
57. HO SOft s 6. 7. 98. Petition.
58. WO 6/188 3 1.
59. 38 Geo.III cap.18 s.15-6,
60. WO 6/188 s 218-29.
61. WO 4 ft76 5 310-24.
62. HO Softs 3 25.3.99.
63. Ibid, s 13.11.99.
64. ibid, s Lord Derby, endorsed 1799.
65. WO 6/189 3 6,28.
66. WO 4/776 j 310-24.
Section, (d)
1. McGuffie, ohsp£ 6, ll.
2. HO Sift s 208.
3. HO 50/19 s 13.1.93.
4. " " s 6.1.92 (sic) Lord Hollo; 10.1.93 C.Sisted 28.1.93 Lord Cook.
5. HO Sift 3 222.
6. 33 Ceo.Ill cap.8 ; HO Sift s 350.
7. 33 eo.III cap.8.
8. HO 50/19 s 28.1.,3. T. Gould
9. " " 3 13.1.93.
10. " " s 2.2.93.
11. HO 51/6 3 64 but c.f. WO 4/774 x 431.
12. HO SO/iO 3 10.4.93.(res. of Devon Quarter Sessions) in 25,16.93
(S. Bastnrfll).
13. 34 Ceo.Ill cap.47 ; 35 Geo.III cap.81 ; 36 -eo.III cap.114.
14. HO Softo : 19.7.99, J. Mitford, etc.
15. 35 Geo.III cap,81.
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16. WO 4/?74 j 337 j HO 50/£8 : 13.6,97. (W. Prica) and enclosure}
HO 50/50 undated memorandum on the esse.
17. WO 1/1102 ; 385.
18. HO 50/39 ? 26.12.98. W. Lygon.
19. HO 50/30 j 26.6.99. and 27. 6. 99. (A, Onslow).
20. WO 4/774 : 337.
21. 39 Geo.Ill cap.106 s.15.
22. Burgoyne : 42.
23. HO 50/>G : 29.2.99. H. Sloane.
24. TO 6/169 : 99 ; HO 50/30 s- 12.7,98. G. Rose (two letters).
26. TO 6/69 : 142.
26. p. 0-2
27. HO 60/31 s 1.6,99.
28. ibid. : tltajfcif|*8l noteS.
29. HO 60/51 t 27.5.99.
30. HO 50/50 s 20.6.99.
31. " " : 19.6.99, W. Wood.
32. 230-2.
Section (e)
1. Ann. Rag. (1793) 175.
2. Melville 20 % 25.1.93. Schoolmaster of Selkirk ; 1.2.93. Duke of Gordon.
c.f. Fortescue IV 217.
3. Tullibardine 149 ; HO Eo/365 s 12.4.97. Duke of Athcll.
'
4. Melville 7 : 154.
5. HO 50/348 : resolutions of 2.3.97. in 14.3.97 (Lord HoVfle) HO 50/^51 :
resolutions of 7.3,97. in 8.3.97 (Lord Cranford). HO EG/552 j
resolutions of 7,4.97. in 18.4,97. (Sir J, rant).
6. 110 50 /555 : 12.4.97.
7. Ann, Reg, (1797) s 126.
8. Melville 7 : 170.
9. HO 50/29 : 26.12.98. draft to Atholl.
10. tl : 10,9.98,
11. 37 Geo.Ill cop.103. s.15,17.
12. rt >1 8.16.
13. tt »! s.2E.
14. Melville 4 E : 34
15. 39 Geo.Ill cap.62 s,l.
16, 37 Geo.Ill cap,103 s.20,55.
17. 39 Geo.III cap.62 s.4.
IS. 37 Geo.III cap.103 s.21.
19. tt n s *2,3*
20. tl it " s.39»
21. ft n s .40-1.
22. TO 4/75 ! 411.
23. 110 50/9 : draft circular of March 1798.
24. 38 Gee.Ill cap.44.
TO 4/775 s 411,417.
26. n • 411.
27. HO 103/6 : 390.
28. HO 50/29 s draft of May 1798.
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29. Seeforth XCIII 8 j Seaforth IXs- 1,24,26,31.6.98.j 10.7.98.
C. Mackenzie.
30. HO 50/9 : 31.7.98.
31. Seaforth XCIII 1,63,65.
32. " " 181. so® e.g.,p.103.
33. HO 50/&9 s 10.5.99.
34. « " j 14.5.99.
35. Seaforth XCIII 17.
36. " " 83.
37. " " 206.
38. " " 34,39,45,48.
39. WO 6/188 : 93.
40. Seaforth XCIII 203.
41. " " 180,204.
42. " " 131,180-1.
43. HO 103/2 : 374.
44. 38 Goo.Ill cap.12.
4 5, 6©afort:i XCIII 52,66.
46. Melville 5 s 115.
47* Seaforth XCIII 9,23.
48. Seaforth IX s undated not© by P. Fairbairn,
49. Seeforth LXI s 13.12.98. P. Fairbeirn.
50* Seaforth XCIII 87.
51. " " 27.
52. Seaforth IX ; 11.10.98. Lord Senforth jl9.10.98. Mary Mackenzie;20.10,98.
G. 3impsonj22.10,98. P. Fairbairn. Seaforth LXI : 13,12.98,
P. Fairbairn,
53* Seaforth XCIII 130.
54. " " 94.
55. " " 221.
Section (f).
1. HO 50/26 : 22*11.96. (Duke of Ancaster)and enclosure.
2. HO 50/<J6 : 9.11,96. Sir J. Ba ks.
3. " " j 1,11,96. C. Tatham, 5 4,11.96 M. Tomlin in 5.11.96 Duke of
Ancaster.
4. M " j 1,11.96. C. Tatham.
5. " rt : 5 and 7.11.96. T. Coltman. HO 50/&6 7.11.96 Sir J. 3anks,
6. " : 5 and 9.11.96. T. Coltmar.
7. " " j 9.11.96. T, Coltman, F» Wilson, J. Anderson,
8. " s 11.11.96. Sir J. Banks.
9. " j 18.11.96. T. Wilson. HO 50/26 j 10.11 ,96. Mayor, etc.
10. Add 35667 s 130,133,136,
11. HO £0/26 s 17.]1,96, (Lord TownshendJ with resolutions of 15.11.96.
12. HO 60/26 : 27,11.96 Lord Townehead.
13. " " : 17.11.96.
14. " " s 11.11,96. (Lord Northampton) with 11.11.96 (G. RoM son etc.)
15. " " : 13.11.96. Lord Northampton.
16. " " s 25.11,96 and 13.12.96. Lord Buckingham.
17. " " s 7.12*96. Lord Buckingham.
18. HO 50/531 i 24,11,96. Lord Hardwicke.
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19. HO 50: 6.17.96. Lord Warwick, 18.12.96 Lord Barekley.
20. " " : 3.12.96. Lord Clive and J. Myttors etc,
21. " " : 23.11,96. E. Corbet,
22. HO 43y& : 470.
23. HO SO/$6 s 22,12,96. W. Lowther.
24. 110 51/450 : 41,45,47,49.
25. HO 43/6 i 110,121,141,163,173.
26. ibid, i HO EC/fe6 : 10.11.96, (draft toT, Coltman.).
27. HO 50/26 : 11,11.96. Sir J. Banks.
28. * " s 11.11.96. T. Coltman j 14.11,96. Sir. J. Banks,
29. " " ; ibid.; 13.11.96, T, Coltman. and Sir J. Banks » 14.11.96.
T. Coltman ; 15.11.96. Sir J. Banks.
30. " " s 25 and 28,11.96 T. Coltman.
31. " " : 19.11.96.
32. " " s 20 and 24.11.96. Lord Townshead.
33. " " ; 5.12,16. J. C. Villiers.
34. " " : 3.12.96. enclosed in 9,12.96. (Lord Northampton).
35. " : 13,17 a d 18.12.96. Lord Buckingham.
36. " ; 7.11.96. Sir J. Banks.
37. " " j 6.12.96, Lord Warwick,
38. " " ; 5.12,96. J. C, Villiers,
39. HO 50/fe s 8.2.97, proceedings of a Subdivision Meeting at Brigg
40. Holder. 66,
41. HO 50/^6 : 13.12 ,98. Lord Buikeley,
42. " " s 7,11,96. T. Coltman.
43. " " j ibid.j 9,11.96 (J, Anderson) in 0.11,96 (T. Ccltman)
44. " " % 22,11,96. (Lord Newark) with enclosures of 18 a. d 19,11.96,
45. HO 50/6 : 227.
46. HO 50/29 j 30/6/67.
47. HO 102/14 : 17.8.97. in Lord Adam Cordon's, 23.8.97.
48. ibid. j..23.8.97. (R. D, Saunders) in 24.8,97. (Lord Holtle).
49. HO 102/14 j 22.8,97. Luke of Roxburgh.
50. " " ; 23,0.97. Duk® of Roxburgh#!Weir 5.
51. Weir 5,
52. HO 102/14 : 28,8.97. R, Hay.
53. Weir 5.
54. Weir 4.
55. HO 102/14 3 23,8,97. (2 letters).
56. " " s 25.8.97.
67. Laing II 613.
58. HO 102/15 ; 3.9.97 (C. tSoStufly ) and 6.9,97. (Lord Oroftftfrd) la 9.9.97
(R. Dundos).
59. HO 50/554 : 29.9.97 (Lord Hopetoun) 8.10.97 (H, Dundas),
60. Laing II 616.
61. " 615.
62. HO 102/14 3 26.8.97.





68. HO 102/14 s enclosures of 26.8,57. in R. Dundas, 27.8,97.
69. HO 102/14 : ibid, s 28,8.97 (Mr. Lapslie)
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74, Laing II 622,
76. Laing II 612.
76, HO 102/14 : 27.8.97. W. McMillan. ; HO 102/16 s 6.9.97. Lord A. Gordon.
77, HO 50/29 » 23.8.97.
78, HO 51/1SO s 438,443-9. HO 103/4 j 280.
79, HO 103/4 t 276,273,283,
80, HO 102/14 s 27.8.97.
81, Weir5s7.j HO So/9 : 26.8.97. - W. McDowall.
82, HO SO/29 : 27.8.97 j HO 102/14 : 27.8.97.
83, HO 50/29 % R. Dundss (endorsed 2.9.97.) ,• HO 103/ : 300.
84, HO 50/9 ; 1,9,97, (Lord A, Gordon) with enclosure.1,9.97 (R, Dundes)
Bulloch X$1II,
85, HO 102/16 : 4.9.97.
86, HO 103/ : 307.
87, " " j 276,278,283.
88, HO 102/14 : 30.8.87.
89, Dudgeon : Appendix III.HO SO/9 s 4.9.97. enclosed in J. H« Cochrane
13,9.97. HO 102/4 : 28.8.97. and enclosure.
90, HO 102/5 s Printed pacer, undated.
91, " " : 6,9.97. R. Dundas,
92, HO 60/9 s 26,3.97. a d enclosure,
93, " " : 12.9,97. and enclosure,
94, HO 102/4 s 27.8,97 (R. D, Saunders) in 27.8,97. (R. Dundes),HO 102/5
2,9,97. Duk© of Roxburgh,
95, HO 102/5 s 2,9.97, j HO 50/g same date. Both by the Duke of Roxburgh.
96, HO 50/54 . 29.9.97 Lord Hopefcoun j 8,10.97. (H, Dundas) and enclosures,
97e HO 102/5 j 8.9.97. (C. Bosnelly) in 9*9.97. (R. Dundos)
98, HO 5o/9 : R, Dundas (endorsed) 2,9,97* j 9.9,97.
99* HO 102/5 : 8.9.97. Duke of Buccleuch; 9,9.97 R. Dundas.
100. Laing II : 623 ; HO 102/4 s 30,8*97. Lord A, Gordon. HO 102/5 :
enclosure in Lord A. Gordon's, 3,9*97.
101. Laing II 619 j HO 102/g : papers sent by R* Dundss, 26.12.97.
102. Laing II 623.
103. " " 631,
104. HO 102/5 : 26*8.97. Duke of Montrose (two letters).HO 102/5 : 7.9,97.
Duke of Hamilton.
105. HO 102/4 ; 28.8.97j HO 102/g - 7.9.97, Duke of Montrose.
106. HO 102/5 j 13.12.97. Lord Dalkeith.
107. HO 102/5 : 12.9.97 (R. Craigie) in 16.9.97. (R, Dundas).
108. Dudgeon. Appendix IV. HO 102/4 1 31.8.97, D. Williamson.
109. laing II 622. 110 102/g : 5. 9. 97 (Lord Eglinton) in 8,9.97 (R,Dundas)
110. HO 102/5 j 9.9,97.
111. " " : 8. 9. 97.
112. HO 102/5 : 19,9.97. Lord Fife j enclosures in 20.9.97. R. Dundas.
113. HO 102/5 j 3.10.97,
114. " " j 19.9.97.
11-5. " " j 4.9.97. in 5.9.97. (R, Dundas),
116, " " j enclosure in 8.9,97 (Lord A. Gordon),
117. " " : 19.9.97. Duke of Atholl.
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118. HO 102/15 : ibid, ; 10.9.97. (Duke of Afcholl) in 12.S.97. (R.Dundas)
119. HO 102 ,/L5 ; 2,10.97, (A. Campbell) in 3.10.97. (R. Dundas)
120. HO 103/6 : 329.
121. HO 50/69 s 3.9,97. Duke of Portland. HO 102/14 : 27.8.97. H.Dundas.
bullochli. .
122. HO 102/14 2 30.8.97. Lord Garlies.
123. HO 60/29.2 30.8.97. Sir G. Elliot.
124. Bulloch, xlix
125. HO 102/14 2 23 an#25.8,97. Duke of Montrose.
128. " " ; 28,8.97. Mr. Lepslie.
12-7. " " s 26.8.97. (I. Campbell) in 27.8.97. (R. Dundas).
128. HO 102/i5 2 4.8.97. (Duke of Atholl) in 5.9.97. (R. Dundas.) HO 102/15
enclosure in 8.9.97. (Lord A, Gordon).
129. HO 102/14 : 23,8,57, (R, D. Saunders in 24.8.97. (Lord A. Gordon).
130. HO 102/14 2 deposition of W. Aston 27. 8, 97.
131. Laing II 612.
132. HO 102/1-5 : 8.9.97, (C. fiosnelly) in 9.9.97 (R. Dundas)
133. Laing II 618.
134. HO 50/69 2 12.9,97 W. McDowell.
135. " " 2 9. 9. 97. R. Grierson.
136. HO 50/29 2 30.8.97. Sir G. Elliot 5 HO 50/&56 4 29.8.97. Lord Galloway.
CHAPTER VII Section (a)
1, HO 50M 5 23.3.96 Lord Warwick
2, 37 Geo.III cap.22 s.16
3, HO 50/6 : 1.8.93 (General Johnston) in 6.8.93 (Lord Amherst)
4, HO 50/66 3 18.11,98? see also WO 6/188 2 134
5, HO 50/6 2 26,7,99 Lord C, Somerset; returns of 24,7.99
6, W 27/&2 2 18,3,99 A. Ross
7, WO 17/1159 - 60
3, HO 50/35i 11.11.98
9, HO 50/63; 23.2.95. HO 50/66; 22.11.98
10, Middlesex Militia Records, Bundle 96, ii; undated paper
11# ibidj account of 1796-7
12, ibid| Bundle 16
13, ibld4 Bundle 16; Bundle 96, ii
14, ibidj Bundle 16
15, LM 1/1 1 19-21
16, HO 50/35; 21.11.98 Lord Derby
17, LC 4235
13, LC 14/1 2 circular of 10.12,99
19. LC 2 sl3
20. IiO 50/65 s 20.7.98 Printed paper
21. LM 1/1 2 61
22. HO 50 /36 2 22,5.99. Lord Titchfield
23. HO 50/28 2 6.11.97
24. HO 50/36 2 23.10.99
25. HO 50 /56 2 22.5.99
26. Middlesex Militia Records, Bundles; 16, 96 ii ; Stables' accounts
and undated memorandum
27. HO 50/58 2 24.11.98 C-. Shepley, etc.
28. HO 50/^5 2 7.11.98; HO 50/317 : 10.9.98 Lord Derby
29. HO 50/513 : 3.1.98 W. Banks
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4/635 j 219
50/35 : 17,5.98 (T, Richardson, etc.) in 21,5,98 (M. Lewis)
4/835 : 217
50/35 : 19.5.98 J. Holland
4 j 170
50/38 s 26.3.98 Lord Onslow
50/35 : 20.7.98 Printed paper
50/35 : 23.7.98
14/1 : 15.10.98 To Lt. Brookbank
1/1 : 61
14/1 : 12.9.98 to Bayley
18.11.98 To Lord Derby
2.7.99
50/35 s return of 2.7.99

























1, 34 Geo.Ill cap.81
2, 35 Geo.Ill cap.27
3, 36 Geo.Ill cap.92
4, " " s.2, 3, 5-8
5, 34 Geo.Ill cap .81 s.4-11
6, 35 Geo.Ill cap.27 s.2-5
7, 34 Geo.Ill cap. 81 s.7j 35 Geo.III cap.27 s.3j 36 Geo.Ill cap.92 s.ll
8, " " s.40
9, " s.46
10. " " s.49-52
11. " " s.44
12. HO 50/36 : resolutions of 19.6.99
13. Ho 50/3l : 4j Add 43770 : 12
14. Ann Reg. (1795) 213
15. Add 43770 : 12
16. ibid j Melville 1048 : 60} Goold ¥i/alker} History of the H.A. C,
17. Add 43770 » 12
18. HO 50/36 s 1.5.99
19. M 13.5.99
20. TO 6/183 : 37
21. HO 50/36: 1.5.99
22. HO 50/36 : account for 1796 dated 11.5.99
23. HO 50/34 : 17.7.95 E. G. Smith
24. HO 50/36 : account for (1798) dated 11.5.99
25. HO 50 /36 enclosure in 29.3.99 (E.G. Smith)} resolutions of 18, 24 & 30.1,9'
26. HO 50/36 resolutions of 26.3.99 and 19.6.99
27. HO 50/36 29.5.99 (with enclosure) and 5.6.99 E.G. Smith
28. HO 50/36 12.6.99 E. G, Smith
29. HO 50/36 resolutions of 19,6.99
30. ibid
31. 39 Geo.III cap.82
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32. 39 Geo.III cap,92 6,2
33. " " s.3
34. HO 50/&6j 1.5.99 (two letters)
35. " 6.12.99 E, G. Smith
36. HO 50/&1 s 1 (and enclosure)
37. HO 50/372| 403-27
38. 36 Geo.iii cap.25
39. HO 50/^7 i 7.3.97 D. Williams
40. WO 6//T81 s 503
41. 37 Geo.III cap.75
42. WO 6/181 J 503
43. HO 50/56 : 5.3.99; minute of Vestry of St, Geo within the Tower
Hamlets enclosed in 9.3.99 J. Clement
44. HO 50/^6 : papers dated March 1799
45. " 23.9.99 M, Smith
46. " papers dated March 1799
47. WD 6/191 s 148; Add 37876 : 172-4
48. HO 43/3 ; 99, 532
49. H043/10 i 56
50. TO 6/197 : 123, 148
51. HO 50/41 s 10.4.98
52. TO 6/197 s 148-9; HO 50/59 t 12 and 16.5.98 J. Mitford
53. HO 51/il : 391
54. 38 Geo.III cap.74 s.2
55. " " s.7
56. " " s.ll
57. " " s.7
58. HO 5o/39 s 12.5.98
59. 38 Geo.III cap,74 s.19
60. HO 50/S9 s resolutions of 4.4.99 enclosed in 8.4.99 T. Gregor
Section (c)
1. 37 Geo.III caps. 4-5
2. n cap. 4 s.l; 37 Geo.III cap.5 s.l
3. " cap. 4 s.3-8; 37 Geo.III cap.5 s.3, 8
4. " cap. 4 s.15; 37 Geo.III cap.5 s.5, 13-4
5. " cap. 4 s.2, 18, 25, 38; 37 Ceo.Ill cap.5 s.2, 19, 23
6. " cap, 4 s.9, 20, 37; 37 Geo.III cap.5 s,21, 24
7. " cap. 4 s,21; 37 Geo.III cap. 5 s.4, 5
8. " cap. 4 s#24; " cap. 5 s.22
9. " cap. 4 a.21; " cap. 5 s.4
10. " cap. 39
11. Seaforth LXXs paper of 24.12,96 signed by D. Cameron
12. cf, 37 Geo.III cap.39 s.l, 2, 3, 7
13. Seaforth LXVII; paper dated 18.2.97; 4.3.97; J. Grant
14. Middlesex Militia Records Bundles 18, 19b, 97
15. TO 17/185
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16. Bedfordshire P.R. 1/17; order of 3.1.97 and various receipts
17. Lancashire P.R. 1713
18. WO 3/fe9 s 172; WO 4/167 j 136, 199, 150 end see WO 3/29 : 162;
WO 3/17 2 8
19. WO 3/&9 s 134, 207
20. 10 3/29 s 208
21. HO 50/126 s 17.12.96 li. Wickham, etc.
22. WO 3/SO : 10, 18
23. 37 Geo.III cap.24 s.3
24. " " s.6, 8-10
25. " " s.ll
26. WO 3/17 ! 22
27. 37 Geo.III cap.24 s.2 10 3/17 j 8
28. WO 17/111-2, 117-8, 153, 158, 181, 185, 189
29. 10 17/109, 124, 129, 135, 162, 173, 198
30. 10 3/17 : 62, 96
31. HO 50/26 s 17.12.96 Lord Bu^keley; 21.12.96 J. Philippe
32. WO 4/167| 210; HO 43/6; 338
33. Add 43770 2 33
34. HO 50/fe6 : 6.12.96; W 3/39 2 172
35. pagei</-2
36 HO 50/50 2 13,6.99 forwarded La 15.G.99 J. King
37, Fortescue (L); Chap.Ill
Section (d)
1. 37 Geo.III caps, 6 and 23
2. " cap. 6 f.1-8
3. " " s.11-2
4. " " s.15-6, 18, 23
5. " cap. 23 s.l, 3, 4
6. " cap. 6 s.4, 13
7. " " s,24, 38
8. " " s.16-7, 19
9. " " s.25, 41; 37 Geo.III cap. 23 s.14
10. " cap. 23 s.19
11. " cap. 6 s.26-33
12. " " s.39, 40, 42
13. " " s,44-7
14. " " s.35-6
15. " " s.34
16. » « s.41
17. " " s.40
18. HO 50/fe6i 24.11.96 Lord Cliva
19. WO l/§02 s 81, 83
20. HO 50/&8 received 25.4.97 R» Burdon
21. LXA 2
22. HO 50/&6 2 8.12.96
23. WO 1/642 2 395, 423, 469
24. HO 50/fe6 : 19.12,96 Lord Bulfceley
2.5. ibid; HO E0/fe6 2 resolutions of 12.12.96 in 18.12.96 (Duke of Beaufort)
26, HO 50/fe6 2 8,12.96 Lord Radnor
27. WO 1/942 2 671
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CftAPTBR VII Section (d) contdt
28. 37 Geo.III cap,6 s,21-2
29. HO 43/fc s 245-6, 275 etc.
30. " 303$ HO 50/^6 : 3.12.96 Lord Powis
31. 38 Geo.III cap.84
32. WO 1/642 » 115
33. " 131
34. Add 35667 t 258
35. WO 6/197 j 156
36. 38 Geo.IIl cap.94 s.4
37. WO 1/6 i2 : 367
38. " 131
39. 38 Geo.III cap.94 s.5-6
40. WO 1/&42 : 41
41. Melville 1048 t 75
42. S© l/342 s 45
43. " 155
44. ibid, HO 50/32 s 15.3.98 0. A. Poole
45. 37 Geo.Ill eap.6 s.36 HO 50/^8 » resolutions of 2.8.97 In 6,8.97
Duke of Ancestor
46. HO 50/4C : 2.3.98 (two letters)
47. HO 50/26 i 25.11.96 (J, Leicester etc.) in 28.11.96 (Lord Stamford)
48. WO 1/942 s 115, 131
49. 38 Geo.IIl cap.94, s.9-12
CO. WO l/>42 t 239
51. Si© 40/il , enclosure in 7.7.98 W. Huskisson
02. ,W0 1/942 , 255
53. W 1/^42 , 247
54. " 255
55. V© 4/463 i tap. 12, 14, 16, 21
56. 39 Geo.III cap.£3
57. " " s.S, V© 4/463 i 465
58. 37 Geo.IIl cap.23 s.20-4
59. " cap.139
CO. 38 Ceo.HI cap.94 s.19-20
61. " " s.18
62. » " s.21
63. V© l/42 2 299, 303
04. " 247
05. HO 50/fe 2 enclosure in 14.12.97 R, Brownigg
06. V© 1/942 j 621
67. " 29, 33, 871
68. Add 43770 s 3
69. HO 50/40 2 2.3.98
70. HO 50 /345 t Printed paper dated 12.12.97
71. HO 50/40 t 6.3.98 Lord Olive
72. HO 50A& 1 24.11.96 Lord Clive
73. 37 Geo.IIl cap.6 3.9
74. WD 1/342 s 589
75. " 593
76. HO 50/^6 j 4.12.96 A. H. Eyre
77. S© 1/^42 , 263
78.
79. HO 50/40 2 12.3.98
80. WO l/)42 j 295
81. 38 Geo.III cap.94 s.24
82. S© 40/il 2 enclosure in 7.7.98 W. nuskisson
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: 449, 453, 457, 461: WO 27/62 : 19.9,99 General Cowell
» 477, 481, 485, 489, 529, 633, 553
: 675
: 19.9.99 General Cowell
: 12.4.99 General Rooke? WO 27/62 3.10.99 Colonel Fisher
: 639
577j Sutton Chwp.il
295 cf. page below
275
147, 427
: 24.11.98 G. Shepley, etc.
CHAPTER VIII Section (a)
1. Memoirs of G. Frszer quoted by Sir F. Maurice, "The Scots Guards" 218
2. WO 1/1072 : 223
3. WO l/iOE6 : 105
4. WO 1/1090 : 373
5. WO 1/1068 : 151
6. WO 4/457-8 etc.
7. Clode, Vol.11 Appendix XC
8. TO 4/156 : 67 e.g.
9. TO 4/155 s 443 e.g.
10. TO l/i068 : 165 e.g.
11. TO 4/457 * 17
12. TO 4/457 : 295
13. TO 1/1077 : 31 e.g.
14. TO 4/155 : 508
15. TO 4/6l4 : 439
16. TO 1/1077 : 299
17. WO 1/1070 : 245
18. Clode II 35
19. TO 4/457 : 72
20. TO 4/162 : 337
21. TO 4/457 : 27, 94, 98. e.g.
22. TO 4/457 1 13
23. " 99
24. Breedalbane (Military) Box.l: 2, 7, 19.7.97 and 4.8,97 (J. Campbell^;
23.3.97 D, Morrison
25. Breadalbane (Military) Box 2: 8,1.96 R. Stewart
26. TO l/602 : 87
27. TO 1/602 s 115
28. TO 25/279, 307, 337, 357
29. Sargoaftht 71
30. Lyndoch 359 5, 102
31. TO 1/1038 : 287
32. TO 1/1062 : 289
33. TO 25/684, 307, 337, 379
34. TO 3/28 s 22
35. TO 1/1064 s 61
36. TO l/l078 : 119
37. TO 1/1062 : 97: TO 4/146 : 493
38. TO 4/155 : 9, 42, 210
39. pages 3tr>L/f.
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CIIAPTER VIII Section (b)
1. page 35
2. WO 17/199 j report of 8.8.93
3. Stewart of Garth 7? 371
4. Breadalbane (Military) Box 3: 1.9.94 R. Bailliej ibid Box 17 list
of 10.4.93 recruit! of C. Campbell
5. Breedalbane (Military) Box 17j 21.4,93 M. Maclean
6. WO 27/62 t return of April 1799
7. HO 50/63 : 27.2.95 : H. Morison
8. Stewart of Garth II 366
9. Stewart of Garth II 260
10. Mackintosh23
11. WO 27/62 : returns of 4.6.99 and 24.5.99
12. Bulloch 198
13. Melville 6 1 201
14. Mackay Sftobie 368
15. TO) 1/1059 t 161
16. Seaforth D.l : 11 : 18.1.93 A. Brodie
17. WO 1/1084 s 7, 125, 681
18. " 221
19. TO 1/1090 t 89
20. TO 1/1067 : 83
21. TO 1/1082 s 649
22. TO 4/162 .• 306
23. TO 1/1089 s 817
24. HO 50/t348 j 3.8.94
25. TO 1/1080 » 39, 331
26. TO 1/1094 : 7.6.95
27. TO 1/1082 : 649
28. Add 35664 : 276, 309
Section (c)
1. HO 50/19! 2.2.93 Sir C. Willoughby
2. Middlesex Militia Records Item 56
3. Add 35667 s 294
4. TO 25/489
5. TO 25/405
6. TO 3/11 : 178
7. Add 35667 : 136
8. Add 42058 1 46
9. HO 50/68 1 6.3.98
10. Add 43770 ! 17
11. LM.l S 89-102
12. Add 35663 1 32
13. Add 35665 : 155
14. McC-uffie Chap. VI
15. Add 35672 : 246
16. Middlesex Militia Records Bundle 19b
17. HO 50/59 i 29J8.99 Lt. Col. St. John
18. HO 43/6 j 333
19. HO 50/67 ! 8.2,97 Resolutions of Brigg sub-diva.
20. HO 50/62 s 11.9.99
21. TO 6/188 i 300, 302
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CHAPTER VIII Section (c) contds
22. HO 60A> • 14.6.99
23. HO 50fa : 8.9.98 0. Nicollfi
24. HO 50/&6 s 28.8.99 P. Patten
25. HO 50/59 i 28.8.99 G, Cooke
26. " 22.11.99 Lord Flt*wllli«m
27. Add 43770 j 17
28. HO 50/30 : 24.2.99 Anon
29. HO 50/«58 : 22.10.99 J. K. Tynte





1. TO 1/1119 j 451
2. TO l/§02 ! 59
3. V© l/i.090 t 493
4. TO 4/154 i 415
5. TO 1/1058 j 139
6. TO 1/1073 3 65
7. HO 50/40 s 28.5.97 R, Harvey
8. Add 35667 3 301, 303
9. HO SO/41 3 20.4.98 C. Dundee
CHAPTER IX Section (a)
1. HO 51/147 3 30
2. ParIt. Hist. XXI 89
3. 34 C-eo.Ill cap.31
4. HO 5o/>37 s 7,3.93 Printed paper
5. HO 51/147 3 65-6, 73
6. 34 C-eo.Ill cap. 31 s.l
7. HO 50/6 3 345
8. 34 Geo.III cap.31 s.2
9. see e.g. HO 50/331 s 25.3.97 Lord Mount Edgecumbej 110 50/335 ; 28.11.96
W. McDowall
10. Ana. Reg. (1797) 237
11. 38 Geo.III cap.27 s.1-2
12. " " s.8
13. Montefiore 189
14. WO 6/193 s 20
15* " 47
16. " 30-40
17. " 157, 166
18. " 173
19. see Melville 7 3 150
20. HO 51/147 s 30
21. Berry
22. V© 4/154 s 20
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CHAPTKR IX Section (a) contd.
w
23. WD 4/169 s 316
24. HO 43/10 : 177
25. WO 6/193 : 47
26. " 1, 2, 20
27. WO 6/138 s 62j cf. HO 50/41} circular of April 1798
28. 38 Geo.III cap.94 s.18} Minutes) Meeting XXXVIII;Montefiore 213
29. 38 Geo.III cap.51
30. 34 Geo.III cap,31 s»5
31. 37 Geo.III cap.3 s.18
32. 39 Geo.III cap.14
33. " cap.35
34. 35 Geo.III cop.49 s.5
35. 37 C-eo.Ill cap.106 s.2} 38 Geo.III cap.51 s.4-6
Section (b)
1. HO EO/333 t 19.4.95} also printed paper of 23,3.95
2. HO 50/346 : 28.10.96} 10.5.98 in 13,5.98 Lord Fauconberg
3. V© 30/^8 : 73; Edmeades7-iL
4. HO 50/2 s 11.9.94 T. Carter
5. HO 50/23i 27.2.95
6. 110 50/341 : 9.3.97
7. HO 50/541 : note on back of draft answer to offer of 7.2.97 (J. .Wilson)
8. HO 60/548 s 15,4.97 J. Mitford
9. HO 43/11 j 75 see page
10. wo 6/197 J 360
11. Melville 6: 165 Dudgeon, passim
12. HO 50/555 j 30.11.94 (two letters)
13. HO 50/352 : 29.1.95
14. H0.60/332 1 esp. 3, 5f IS, 22.7.94 end 26.5.98 (Lord Fortescue) with
enclosed resolutions Freeman 4-6
15. HO 50/331 s 7.5.98 Lord Mount Edgecumbe
16. HO 5o/)62 1 esp. 24.9.94 Sir J. Great with enclosure
17. HO 50/35A : undated psj>€K(l795)} 5.8.95 (W. Copland etc.) and
enclosures} 12.9.95 (Lord Deer) and enclosures
18. HO BO/532 s esp. 19.5.98 Lord Fortoscu©
19. HO 50/345) received 10.6.98
20. HO 50/548 : 15.4.97 J. Mitford
21. 110 43/§ : 420, 531
22. HO 50/532 1 resolutions of 30.5.94 in 19.7.94 Lord Fortescue
23. 110 50/531 1 7 and 30.5.98 Lord Mount Edgecumbe
24. HO 50/41 j 4.4.98 Lord Berkeley
25. HO 50/41 ! 27.4.98 Lord Warwick
26. HO 50/41 s 12.4.98 Lord Hopetours} 12.4.98 Lord Stafford} 13.4.98
Duke of Devonshire
27. HO 50/46 : 30.11 .99 Lord Fortescue
28. WO 6/197 s 134
29. Sinclair 37-8
30. HO 50/355 : esp. resolutions of 20,6,94 in 24.6.94 W, McDowell
31. HO 50/347 s resolutions of 10,3.97 in 11,3,97 Duke of Argyle
32. HO 103/1 s 505
33. LM.l s 44
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CHAPTER IX SKection (b) contd:
34. IiO 50/333 s closure in 8.5.97 (Lord Rivers)
35. HO 50/535 : 28.5.93
36. see IIO 50/1531
37. see HO 50/1535
38. see HO 50/534
39. see 110 50All
Section (c)
1. HO 50/1531 : 24.11.96
2. HO 60/1541 s 30.6.94 (B. G. Dillingham) end enclosures
3. HO 50/1530 s undated plan for cavalry in Berkshire
4. HO 50/1545 j 4.6.94 (W. Hughes) and enclosure
5. HO 50/Is30 s 22.2.97 Lord Buckingham
6. Add 41851 : 89, 96
7. " 94
8. see e.g. HO.60/1541 : enclosure in 5.6.94 Lord Townshend j HO 50/346j
17.7.94 (R. Hill) and enclosure
9. Minutesi Meeting IV : Art.6
10. HO 50/^9 s 5.4.98
11. HO 50/1530 : undated plan for infantry in Berkshire
12. Hay : History of Arbroath, 355 .
13. HO 50/1552 : 25.8.94 (N. Macleod) in 11.9.94 (Sir J. Grant)
14. IIO 50/1552 j 8.8.94 (R. McNeel) in 23.8.94 (Sir J. Grant)
16. HO 50/1550 : 15,5.97 A. Murray
16. HO 50/40 : 17.2.98 B. Walker
17. Add 35670 j 53
18. HO 50/41 : 18.4.98 A. H. Cathcart
19. " 22.4.98
20. Montifiore 208 j Berry
21. HO 50/42 j 14.5.98 : J. Cookson
22. HO 50/44 j 19.11.98
23. HO 50/1541 : 31.3.97 (W. Binton) in 4.6.97 (Lord Townshend)
24. HO 50/40 s 10.5.98 S. Murray
25. e.g. HO Eo/344 : 1.2.99 (P. Brooke) and enclosure
26. TO 30/§9 j 136
27. S. and B, Webb, History of Local Government, the Parish and the County;
pages 350-<>&
28. Papers of the Hitchin Volunteers, Box 2* 17.6,98
29. HO 50/315 ; 3.4.98
30. HO 50/1531 : 22.6.97 in 25.6.97 (Lord Stamford)
31. HO 50/41 » 25.4,98 (Lord Pembroke) and enclosure
32. HO 50Ail s 19.5.98
33. Argyle Papers • reports of the H.M.C VI, 620
34. Bulloch xxxix
35. Bulloch xlii
36. Melville 5 s 95
37. HO 50/46 j return of 22.8.98
38. HO 50/34? : 4.6.9E W. Sinclair
39. HO 50/347 : 15.2.97 Lord Eglinton; 2.3.97 (J. Crawford, etc. in 9.3.97
(Lord E$linthn)
40. HO 50A^2 s 20.3,97
41. HO 50/553 : 10.9.99
42. HO 50/352 : 6.1.95 in 25.1.95 (Sir J. Grant)
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CxLAPTER IX Section (c) contd:
43. Breedalbane Military Box 12s 26.6,93 and enclosure
44. ibid : undated latter enotctsed "Mr Ken edy"
46. ibid s paper dated 16.6.98
46. ibid : 14.6,98 D, McDiarmid, etc.; 16,6.98 A. Clerk
47. ibid : undated paper
48. HO 50/&43 s 4.6.98
49. HO 60AL4 : 19.4.93; HO 50/&15 : 9.6.98
60. HO SO/41 18.4.98 in 26,4.98 Lord Fitzwilliam
51. 110 50/43 s 11.6.98 in 14.6.98 Lord Fowls
52. HO 50/330 : 18,6.97 and enclosure
63. HO 60/fe : 2.10.96 R. Brovmigg
54. HO 60/539 s 17.6,98 J. DosanoRet; resolution of Court of Directors
20.4.98
55. Melville 1048 : 104
66. HO 50/46 s 27.4.98; HO 50/539: printed undated paper
57. TO 6/878 t 267, 271
58. 110 60/41 : 13.4.98
59. HO 50/<538 : 2.4.97 A. Balnj 24.4.97 Lord Lonsdale
60. HO 50/346 s 12.6.94 W. Clarkson, etfi.
61. HO 60/27 : 2 (with enclosure)
62. HO 50/4l : undated letter, Colonel Dawkins to General Greenfield;
Ann. Reg. (1798) 218
63. HO 50/28 s 23.4.97 (G. Dunbar) in 26,4.97 (Lord Derby)
64. HO 50/42 s resolutions of 8.5.98
65. HO 50/4i j resolution of 16.4.98} 25.4.98 (S. Gaseleo)
66. Sine1sir 67
67. HO 50/339 : Printed paper with resolutions of 1 and 6.12.92
68. HO EO/339 : 12.4.94 (W. Devaynes) with enclosures
69. HO 60/<339 : 9 end 24.6,94 (C. Herries) with enclosures
70. HO 50/344 : 6.6.94 C. M. Barclay
71. HO 5o/336 s resolution of 3.3.97 in 20.3.97 Lord Bat©man
72. TO 40/d2 s 10.4.98 J. Wheatley
73. HO 50/S40 s roll dated 24.8,98
74. TO 1/4.057 : 666, 671
75. HO 50/43 s 23.7.98 (L. D. Campbell) in 26.7.98 Lord Titchfield
76. Add 37877 t 276
77. TO 6/498 : 69; HO 50/4l ? 14.4.98 C, James
78. Add 37877 ; 311
79. TO l/i085 j 319
80. page 30
81. Ann. Reg. (1797) 237
82. HO E0/&40 : resolutions of 15.4.98 in 14,4.98 Duke of Beaufort
83. HO 60 /550 : resolutions of 3.3.97 in 4,3.97 T. Elder, etc.
84. HO 50/47 t 2
85. e.g. HO 50/40 s resolutions of 23.2,98 in 7.3.98 Lord Clive;
HO 50/543 j resolutions of 2.5.98 in 14.5.98 Lord Stafford
86. e.g. HO 50/42 t printed paper in 2.5.98 H. Partridge; resolutions of
10,5.98 in 11.5.98 Sergeant Adair
87. e.g. HO 50/42 : enclosure in 23,5.98 G. W. Prescott
88. TO l/4082 : 623
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CHAPTKR IX Section (d)
1. HO 50/332 t 1.3,97 (T. Hogg) in 2.3.97 (Lord Fortescue)
2. HO 50/354 : 31.5.94 (C. Middlemo.s) in 8.6.94 (Lord Tweeddole)
3. HO 50/347 s resolutions of 5,2.95 in 13.2.95 Duke of Gordon
4. HO 50/348 : 3.4,95 (A. Duff) in 7.5.95 (Lord Fife)
5. HO 50/27 : 3.3,97 (Lord Buckingham) and enclosure
6. HO 50/314 j 12.F.98 (Lord Derby) end enclosures} HO 50/341 :
resolutions of 2.3.97 in 3,3.97( Lord Northampton}; ibid
resolutions of 10.3.97; HO 50/344 : 4.3.97 H. Shelley
7. page 2$b"$
8. HO 50/45 t 12.2.99; E. Granger; HO 50/43 ; 30.6.98 (F. Buller) and
enclosure; HO 50/337 : resolutions of 20.4,98 in 22.4.98
Lord Rot#itfy
9. HO 50/42 1 1,5.98 (J. Abbot)and enclosure
10. " 12,5.98 (J. II. Muggriatfe) and enclosure
11. HO 50/i544 s resolutions of 29.4.98
12. HO 50 /545 : resolutions of 23.3.97 in 23.3.97 Lord Clive
13. HO 50 /644 : 15.4.95 s Duke of Richmond
14. HO 50/45 1 26.2.99 J. Gordon
15. HO 50/344 t 25.3.97 S. Thornton
16. HO 50/41 : 2,4.98 (F. Barrow) with enclosure
17. HO 50/41 : 24. 2.01 (T. Bannerman) with enclosure
18. HO 50/531 s 7.4.97 Lord Hardwieke
19. HO 50/338 « 11.4.97 (M. Johnson) in 5,4,97 (Duke of Ancaster)
20. 110 50/532 : enclosure in 10.6,97 Lord Fortescue
21. HO 50/21 ; 2
22. HO 50/43 : 30.5.98 G. Seycester
23. see HO 50/534
24. 10 1/1090 : 109
25. W l/l085 s 585
26. HO 50 /550 : 14.7.94
27. HO 50/645 : (received) 16.10.99 Lord Warwick
28. HO 50 /546 s 30.5.97 and 7.6.97 T. Cockell
29. HO 50 /27 5 25.2.97 J. J. Graye
30. W 1/1081 : 291
31. HO 50/7 s 5 (enclosures dated 22 and 28,2.97)
32. Breadalbane Military Box 4 : 15.6.97 F. Campbell
33. HO 50/>32 ; enclosure in 16.8.98 Lord Fortescue
34. IiO 60/347 : 5.4.97 Lord Eglinton
35. HO SO/122 s 2.8.94 J. Bradshaw, etc,
36. Melville 1049 s 83
37. HO FO/352 s 17.9.94 : Sir J. Grant
38. HO 50 /350 : 6.2.95 Sir J. Dalrymple
39. HO 50 /652 : 31.1.97 (J. Mackintosh, etc) in 8.2.97 (Sir J. Grant)
40. HO 50/44 : printed paper of 7.8.98
41. HO 50/317 j 17.7.98 E. Christian
42. HO 50/551 : 24.3.97 G. M. Leslie
43. HO 50/547 5 8.5.97 Lord Elginton
44. Melville 7 t 150
45. HO 50/42 : 25.5.98 J, Curry
46. HO 50/552 j enclosure in 31.10.96 Mr Frazer
47. see HO 50/346
48. add 41085 s 10
49. HO 50/40 s 23.2.93 Sir J. Grant
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CHAPTSR IX Section (d) contd:
50. HO 50/42 : 25.5.98 J. Curry
51. HO EO/362 j 29.11.96 (E. Mocdonald) in 13.12.96 (Sir J. Grant)
52. 110 50/355 : 8.12.95 W. McDowell
53. HO 50/46 s 2.7.99 Printed paper
54. Melville 28 i 47
55. HO 50/55 : 19.4.98 G. Certwright
56. WO 6/193 t 157
67. HO 60/552 : enclosure in 31,10.96 Mr Ffazer
58. HO EO/336 s 18.2.98 T, Curfcyj 24.3,98 (Lord Wiltshire) and enclosure
59. 110 50/^36 • 10.5.97 (Sir W. Pitt) in 11.5,97 (Sir W, Heethcote)} 14.6.97
and 22.7.67 G. Goddenj HO 50/41 j 23.4.98 Lord Wiltshire
60. Melville 28 : 62
61. Add 36669 s 350
62. HO 50/41 : 4.4.98 and enclosure
63. 110 50/43 : 16.6,98 (W. Elford) and enclosure
64. HO 50/.332 : 8.9.98 Lord Fortescue
65. Add 40101 s 1-5} Add 40107 : 24
66. WO l/llOl s 283
67. HO 50/348 t 12.7,96 : R, Sanderson
68. " 9.2.97 Anon
39. History of Local Government, Manor and Borough 504-29
70. Add 35670 : 3o
71. Dropmore V : 86
72. HO 50/7 : enclosure in 23.1.98 (R, Brovmigg); enclosure in 19.2.98
(M. Lewis)
73. Harvey 94-6
74. HO 5o/555 s 25.5.95 Anon; 20.11.99 T. Scott, etfi,
75. HO 50/539 s endorsed 27.2.99 Mr Huber
76. V© 1/1082 t 71
77. HO 50/339 t 30 . 3.97 G. Willingham
78. Bulloch 342
79. Abbotsford 872 j 48, 52
80 Minutes, Meeting VII
81. Abbotsford 8724 5j HO 50/44 : 5.11.98 E. Hughes
82. HO 50/545 : 20.7.94 Lord Aylesford
83. Abbotsford 872 s 63 . Minutes, Meetings XLI and XLVIII
84. Minutesj Meetings X, XI, XXX General Meeting III.Abbotsford 872 : 58
85. Harvey 91-4
86. Add 35670 s 48
87. HO 5Q/o38 t 3.12.97 (Duke of 3eaufort) and enclosure
88. HO 50/543 : 22,6,98 : J. Deane
89. Add 35667 s 45
90. J.S.A.II.R. IX 188
91. HO 50 /352 : 27.1.95 (G, Frezer) in 4.2.95 Sir J. Grant
92. HO EO/548 : 8.2.97 T. Hall
93. HO 50/551 $ 20.10.96 (A. Gardiner) in 27.1C.S6 (Lord Douglas)
94. HO Eo/55 s 30.1,i98 (T, Lloyd) in 4.2,98 (Lord Lisburne)
95. HO 50 /346 ; 27.5,97 W. Place
96. HO 50/555 s Printed papers enclosed in 22,4,97 W. McDowell
97. HO 50/585 : 9.11,96 T. Morganj (received) 17.12.96 J. Bevan
98. MO 50/387 s 353
99. see also HO 50/&7 : 21.1,97 the Deputies of Swansea
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CHAPTKR IX Section (d) contd:
100. HO 50 /33E s 17.3.96 J. Bevan; HO 50/fe5 : 7.3.97 W. Jones
101. TO 6/199 : 288
102. HO B0/40 : 16.2.98 (R, Vyse) and enclosure
103. HO 50/30 i 9.3.99 T. B. Small
104. HO 50/545 s 6.12.96 J. Harrison
105. Lyndoch 3597 : 70
106. V© 1/L079 : 187; TO 1/1093 -1.10.95 R. Stevens; TO 1/1081 s 371
107. TO 1/1093 s 29.10.95 R. Stevens
108. Melville 28 : 12
109. HO SO/44 : 24.8.98 four Deputies
110. HO 50/40 t 1.3.98 (A. Aubert)
111. HO 50/41 s 27.4.98
112. HO 50/550 : 27.2.97 ; Sir J. Dunlop
113. Melville 6 s 157-8
114. HO 50/355 i 7.9.94 Duke of Roxburgh
115. Add 41085 s 28-30
116. TO 6/L98 : 29.5.98
117. HO 50 /43 : 4.5.98 J. Seir : 1.6.98 Sir TO Pitt
118. HO 50/345 : 24.4.98 Lord Warwick
119. TO 6/198 s 297, 403
120. Add 37845 : 77
121. ibid 3 Ho SQ/42 : 18.4.98 Lord Rivers
Section (e)
1. Breadalbane Military Box 12 : enclosure in 20.6,98 (M, McNie)
2. HO 50/536 % printed paper in 17.4.94 (Duke of Manchester); HO 50/342:
resolutions of 5.4,94 in 19,8.98 (Duke of Marlborough)
3. HO E0/338 : 1 and 15.5.94 Duke of Beaufort
4. Harvey 46
5. Abbotsford 872 : 48
6. Minutes: Meeting LV
7, e.g. HO S0/4l : 4,4.98 (Lord Braybrooke) and enclosure 7,4.98 Lord
Tweeddale; HO 50/315 : 11.5.98 J. Lees
8, HO 50/41 : resolutions of 16.4.98 in 18.4.98 Lord Titchfield
9. V/Q Wi&' *36
10. HO So/44 : 18.10,98 T. Bayley
11. HO EO/332 : 30,5.98 I. Byers
12. " 24.9.97 Lord Fortescue
13. i.g. HO SO/41 : 29.4.98 (F» Fane) and enclosure; HO SO/SSQ : 7.6.98
J, Dennistoun
14. Will (Kincardine Volunteers) 34-5
15. HO 5o/352 : 25,5.97 (R. McNeil) in 16.6.97 (Sir J. Grant)
16. Abbotsford 872 : 79
17. Add 35667 : 52
18. WO 1/5.07 8 : 59; TO 4/155 : 243
19. HO 50/41 : 3.4.98 Major Rock
20. TO 6/199 : 124
21. TO 4/169 : 481
22. HO 50/336 : 22,4,98 (H. Hood) in 27.4.98 (Lord Wiltshire)
23. e.g. TO 6/197 : 224, 308, 334
24. WO 6/198 To the Duke of Leeds, 12.6.98
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CliAPTKR IX Section (9) contd:
25. HO 50/6 : 26
26. HO 50/351 : 20,2,99 (J, C eape) and enclosures? 2 and 5,3,99 T, Erskine
27. HO 60/551 s 12.9,97 and 15.11,97 Lord Crewfurd
28. HO 50/45 s 2.2.99 C. Dempster, etc.
29. W 1/1085 s 587
30. HO 50/44 s 5.8.98 Lord Chesterfield
31. HO 50/45 : 5,4.99 Lord Titchfield
32. WO l/i094 s 7,5,95 J, Way
33. HO 50/535 5 17.8.97 J. Sevan
34. HO 50/45 s 14.1.99
35. e.g.HO BO/40 : 22.2.98 P. Ramsbotham? HO 50/44 ; 15.8.93 R. Tranlett.etc,
36. HO 50/6 : 465
37. see HO 50 /587 : 68 5
38. HO 50/44 : 15.8.98 R. Tranlettj 15.9.98 T. Bayley
39. HO 60/332 : 20.12.97
40. " 23.12.97
41. HO 50 /44 : 31.8.98 E. Gorst
42. HO 50 /343 : enclosure in 25.5,98 Lord Stafford
43. e.g. HO 50/4l : Bristol resolutions of 18.2,97? HG 50/641 : resolutions
in 6.4.98 Lord Townshend
44. e.g. HO 50/350 1 resolutions of 14.2.97 in 25.2.97 Duke of Buccleuch?
HO 50/331 : resolutions of 1.6.97 in 5.6.97 Lord Stamford
Section (f)
1. 110 50/41 : 4.4.99 J. Crew } HO 50/371 ; 24.3.94 Duke of Richmond
2. TWO 40/6 : 8,7.96 Sir W. Howe? undated note by M» Lewis
3. HO 50/633 : 22.5,8 C. Spearman
4. HO 50/349 i 4.10.97 (W. McLeay) in 14.10.97 (Lord Caithness)
5. HO 50/649 1 memorandum of 24.1.95 in 11.2.95 R. B.A. Macleod
6. ISO 1/1083 : 117 j 125
7. WO 30/64 : 252
8. WO 6/692 : 243; Dudgeon, Appendix I
9. " 37
10. ISO 6/i43 s 130
11. Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution and Empire II 121
12. page 2b-
13. WO 30/67 : 131
14. WO 6/193 s 155
15. LC, 16
16. HO 50/^9 : 2.5.98 Lord Crawfurd
17. HO 50/40 s 5.3.98 (Lord Romney and enclosure? WO 6/138 : 37, 60
18. see WO 30/68
19. W 1/631 : 205
20. Melville 7 : 109
21. WO 1/1082 : 193
22. ISO l/lo94 : 1 and 5.8.95 H. Watson
23. HO 50/532 s 15.2.96 J. Hawker
24. Coold Walkerm
25. HO 50/339 j 3.9.94 (C, Harries) and enclosures? 1,8.97 (C. Herries)
26. HO 50/630 s 25.3.95 Lord Buckingham
27. Adderley 13
28. Melville 7 : 109? HO 50/655 : 18.8.96 and 5.10.96 (F. H. Mackenzie)
29. HO 50/632 : J. Kewcombe (undated) in 11.6.97 (Lord Fortescue^j and
other letters
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CHAPTflR IX Section (f) confcd;
30. HO 50/531 : 4.4.99 B. Harwoodj HO 51/fe9 * 349
31 • hO 5o/tH ' Q«-kc ©£ OcvottflnrC
32. Minutas5 Meeting XXXI
33. Minutes s general Meeting V
34. HO 50/544 : undated, in 31.8.95 (Duke of Richmond)
35. HID 1/1086 t 101
36. HO 50/^19 : 12.2.99 (P. Dawson) in 14.2.99 (Lord Derby)
37. HO 50/l 1 3.7.97 (Lfc. Col. Tilson) in 7.3.98 (R. Brownigg)
38. HO 50 /339 : paper in 7.6.94 (F. Renton)
39. HO 50/.539 : Printed paper in 21,6.97 Lord Titchfield
40. HO 50/&2 : Printed paper of 30.4.98
41. Ann. Reg. (1797) 237
42. HO 50/539 } 9.6.94
43. J.S.A.H.R. XIX 75
44. Minutes^ s Meeting LXI - LXVIIj General Meeting VII
45. pageft$/
46. Ann. Reg. (1799) : 448
CHAPTER X Section (a)
1. WO 6/L97 : 234 , 2 84, 337
2. e.g. HO SO/45 : 11.3 .99 J. Harrison; 5.4.99 J, Watson
3. HO 50/45 i 1.3.99 I. Head
4. " 5.2.99. Lord Seaforth
5. 110 EO/349 : 11.3.97 (Lord Ciathness) and enclosure; HO 50/41 s 2.4
(Lord Lisbume) and enclosure
6. VvO 40/12 s Printed paper of 16,4.98
7. HO 50/44 s 1.12.93 T. Lodge
8. HO 50/340 s 3.6.99 (Sir R, Salisbury) in 6.6,99 (Duke of Beaufort)
9. HO 50/40 i24.3.98 and enclosure; WO 6/197 : 75; cf WO 3/iS : 121
10. HO 50^52 J 14.2.97 Sir J. Grant
11. HO 50/30 s 24.2.99
12. HO 50/351 j 11.1.97 Lord Douglas
13. HO 50/46 j 18.5.98 J. Rock
14. HO SO/45 s 25,5.99 J, Banfield
15. HO 50/43 j 25.5,98 Dr. Curry
16. HO 50/41 j 3,4.98 J. Brodie
17. HO 50/41 : 31.3.98
18. HO 5C/fe5 s 6,2,98 and enclosures cf. HO 60/23 : 15.2.95 J. Ackland
19. Seaforth XCIII : 112, 114-5
20. HO 60/4 : 125
21. Abbotsford 872 s 163
22. WO 6/199 : 149
23. HO 5o/45 : 21,2,99 Lord Lonsdale
24. HO 50/29 s 12,5.98
25. HO 50/45 s 2.4.99 Duke of Atholl Tillibardine 157
26. Seaforth VII 27.10.94 C, Mackenzie
27. HO 50 /542 s 30.1.99 T. Phillips
28. HO 50/45 s 18.4.99 (8 signatures)
29. " 24.5.99 Col. Bowen
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CHAPTER X Section (a) contdt
30. W 1/1071 s 117
31. HO 50/46 ; 10 and 22 .8,99 3, otepnens
32. HO SO/548 : 20,3.97 : T. Hall
33. WO 1/1078 s 80
34. HO 50/46 s 26.11.99 Lord Kirkwall
35. " 8.11.99
36. HO 50/44 : 27.12.98
37. HO 50/io : 23.2,93 (J, McDowell) with enclosures
38. WD 1/1081 s 529
39. HO 50/40 s enclosure of 12.1.98 in 23.2.98 J. McDowell
40. Seaforth XCIII s 95, 98, 121, 123-4
41. 1S(0 4/169 : 398
32. WO 4/175 : 68
43. HO 50/44 : 27,12.98
Section (b)
1. WO 4/146 : 310
2. Melville 6 : 139
3. Mackintosh
4. WO 4/l52i 345
5. Mackintosh4i-3
6, " :tfSLyndoch 359 5 i 121
7. Mackintosh 40
8. Mackintosh^





15. Mackay Scobie 31
16. W 4/158 i 366
17. HO 50/E t 12.12.96 s R. Brownigg
18. HO 51/149 i 95, 97
19. WO 6/119 s 309, 323
20. WO l/tl02i 185-91; WO 27/&2s 12.3.99 (T. Garth) and enclosure
21. WO 6/131 s 213
22. WO 1/1103 ! 297
23. Melville 7 : 210
24. WO 1/1102 : 11, 13; TullibardinQl<6?
25. Melville 24 i 24






1. Breedslbane Military Box 1 i 18.10,93 A. Cochrane
2. ibid : 18 and 21.11.93 Lord A. Gordon; 12 and 20.11.93 A. Mackay;
19.11.93 : P. McDottall
3. ibid s 14.11.93 Lord Amherst s 8, 9 end 27.11.93 H. Dundas
4. ibid : 20.11.93; 15 and 27,12.93 A. Cameron
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CHAPTER X Section (e) contds
5, ibid s 22.11.93 A. Cameron.} 27,12,93 (H. Erskine) and enclosure
6, ibid : 27,11,93 A, Cameron} 11 and 21,12,93 Lord A, Gordon} 5,12,
and 13,1,94 H, Dundas
7, ibid j 25,12,93 H. Dundas} 10,1,94 A, Cameron
8, TO 6/ll9 : 10, 13
9, see TO 4/155 •. 384, 419
10. TO 1/1096 : 73
11. Mackintosh £|
12. TO 1/1096 t 403, 407
13. Mackintosh St
14. TO 1/1097 s 149
15. TO l/l096 s 43} Breads! bane Military Box 1 : 4,8,94 ll, Dundas
16. Breadalbane Military Sox 1 17,11,94 Orders
17. ibid s 20,3,95 A, Munro
18. TullibardineI155
19. Bulloch 130-1
20. V© 1/1096 j 677
21. Add 33102 s 3
22. TO 3/28 : 114-5} TO 4/160 * 276
23. TO 1/1091 : 31,8,95 R. Fuleston
24. V© 1/1094 : 7.9.95 Sir W. W. Wynn
25. V© 1/1089 : 187
26. TO 3/38 : 119
27. V© 4/lSO i 376, 403, 407
28. TO 1/1085 : 443-5
29. V© 1/604 i 135
30. TO 4/161 : 264
31. TO 4/152 : 111, 181
32. " 173
33. page *8
34. see TO 3/32
35. Y© 4/173 i 481
36. Mackintosh 7^
37. e.g. V© 349 j 287-8
38. " 220; Abercairney 932 : 14,2.00 Orders
39. Abercairney 932 j 20.2,00
40. Stewart of Garth II 365
CHAPTER XI Section (c.)
1. Dropmore IV s 217, 222
2. » 223
3. " 227
4. " 231, 235
5. Parlt, Hist. XXXIII 1493
6. " " " 1493-
7. 38 Geo»III cap,66
8. Hoiden 75
9# HO 50/? i 2.9.98 (R, Brownigg) with return
10, Holden 75
11, see e.g, TO 3/19 s 309
12, WilliBEison 150-1
13, HO 50/8 i 30 and 31.8.98
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CIIAPTKR XI Section (a) contd;
HO 50/6 : 8.9.98 0. Nicolls
HO 50/6 : 4.9.98 Sir C. Grey
HO 50/6 s 30.8.98
HO 50/k) : 29.1.99 H, Sloane
TO 6/138 i 1281 HO 50/30 : 24.11.98
39 Geo.III cap.5
HO 50/60 : 4,12.98 Lord Suston 25.12.98 Lord Hertford
ibid : 4.12.98 G, F. Hctton
ibid : paper of December 1798
HO 50/65 : 12,3.99 (Duke of Rutland) and two enclosures
HO 50/30 : 3.12.98 H. Sibthorpe
Dropmore IV i 410, 503
" 368
" 397, 402
HO 50/6o : 13.12.98 (Lord Buckingham) and enclosure
Dropmore IV j 412
368, 412
HO 50/50 : 25.12.98 Lord Hertford
39 and 40 Geo.III cap.15
HO 50/62 t 24.9.99 Si* E, Nightingale; Add 35672 : 279, 288
HO 50/63 i 24.5.99; Dropmore Iv 351
Dropmore IV 343, 397
HO 50/63 s 24.5.99
Dropmore IV 368, 397
HO 50/63 i 14 and 19.11.98
" 22 and 30.11,98 (H. Dundas} and enclosure
Holden 85
DropmorelV; 368; Add 41851 : 154
Add"41851 : 14C, 146
Dropmore IV : 286
" 291, 296, 352
402, 404, 410
HO 50/37 : 16.10.99 Lord C. Somerset
HO 50/62 ; 19.9.99 and 28.10.99 F. Koore
HO 50/33 s 17.3.99 and 24.5.99 Lord Rolle
TO l/§42 s 573
HO 50/60 s 15.1.99; TO 6/L88 s 156
TO 6/188 s 168; and see HO 50/60
HO 50/36 : 23.1.99 M. Smith
KO 50/30 : 20.1.99 B. Bromhead
Dropmore IV 1 392
Add 401C0 : 212
214
HO 50/32 : 13.9,99
pagejOe
Add 40100 s 212-14
" 220
H. Macannally; The Irish Militia, chap, XVI
page 167 s Clode I 3QC-1 etc.
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CHAPTEK XI Section (b)
1. W 3/48 i 174
2, Dropmore IV j 177
3* " 177, 179
4. " 169
5. HO 50/^1 : 1.5.99 H. Dundas
6. HO 30/30 t 24.2.99
7. " 7.4.99
8. see HO 50/469 - 72
9. 180 4/773 t 299
10. page 72
11. w 3,As i 184
12. WO 3/<J8 : 80 j WO 3/43 » 150
13. WO 1/^67 s 47
14. HO 50/43 s 19,2,95 Lord Buckingham 20.2,95 Lord Radnor
15. HO 50/43 s 3.2.95 Lord Roversj 8,2.95 Lord Howard} 11.2.95 Lord Pembrokt
16. Add 35665 s 323, 335
17. HO 50/43 s 12.3.95 (W. Mltford) in 1.4.95 (Sir W. Heathcote)
18. Add 35665 : 319
19. HO 50/43 s 20,2.95 (J, Johnstone) In 20.2.95 (Lord Townshend)
20. HO 50/43 : 21.2.95 Lord Titechfiold
21. HO 50/43 s 25,2.95 (J. Clitheroa) in 27.2.96 (Duke of Richmond)
22. HO 50/43 : 11.2,95 Lord Pembroke
23. " 26.2.95 : Add 35665 s 319, 323
24. " 20.2,95
25. " 22,2.95
26. 35 Geo.Ill cap.83 s.l—3
27. " " s.4, 6
28. " " s.4
29. Ann. Reg, (1795) 151
30. HO 50/23 : 20.2.95
31. Ann, Reg. (1795) 151
32. WD 4/773 : 275, 284, 313, 319
33. " 309-10, 316, 343
34. Add 37876 t 182-3
35. " 188
36. " 197
37. HO 30/sl : first undated memorandum
38. WO 4/9 » 25.12.97
39. Ann. Reg. (1798) 217
40. 38 Geo.Ill cap.17
41. Ann. Reg (1798) 218
42. 38 Geo.Ill cap.55 s.E
43. HO 50/4l : paper Ho.l
44. HO 60/4 s circular of 23.1.98 and schedules
45. of. WO 3/4578 i 137
46. HO 60/31 f draft circulars of January 1798
47. HO 50/7 s 19.3.98 : R. Browniggj HO 50/37 : return of 24.7.98
48. HO 50/33 » 18.3.98
49. WO 6/198 : 4
50. HO 50/32 s 2.6.98 (C. Potts) in 7.6.98 (Lord Stamford) V® 6/188 t 64
51. HO 50/38 : 7.3.98
52. WO 3/18 s 79, 107
53. WO 4/425 : 74
54. HO 30/53 5 24.3.98
56. V® 6/197 s 76
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CTIAPT&R XI Section (b) contd:
56. ID 3/i8 : 391, 424
57. " 302
58, " 424, 433
59, 6®0 iiO 50/63-9
Section (c)
1. TO 4/4*1 • 338
2. HO 50/44 : 29.9.98
3. TO 6/4.88 j 125
4. HO 50/44 s 30.10.98
5. Add 37842 t 206
6. IIO 50/61 s 1.5.99
7. pageW-
8. HO 50/6l t marginal note on 13.5,99 (H. Dtaadas)
9. TO 6/193 j 220, 222
10. HO 50/60 1 14.6.99
11. " 12.6,99 and enclosure
12. " endorsed 8.6,99
13. " 25.6.99 H, Dundas
14. 39 Geo.Ill csp ,106 s.1-2
15. " " s.2, 21, 23, 26
16. " M s„27
17. " " s.30-1, 34
18. " " s.21
19. " " S.18, 23-4
20. HO 50/§j 12.7.99 Duke of York} TO 6/193 1 256-70
21. HO 50/6O | 14.6.99
22. HO 50/32 : 13.9.99} Dropmore 5 s 363, 381
23. HO 50/68 8 3.9,99
24. HO 50/S2 j 11.9.99 H. Dundas
25. Melville 1048 : 169
26. HO 50/62 : 8.9.99 Lord Granville; 11,9,99 II. Dundas
27. HO 50/32 : 25.7.99; 25.8.99} 13.3.99
28. " 11.9.99
29. " 13.9.99} HO 50/60 : 14.6.99
30. " 14.7.99
31. HO 50/63 s 27,10.99
32. HO 50/62 8 25.7.99
33. HO 60/69 8 21.9.99
34. 39 and 40 Geo,III capi 1 8.1, 14-18
35. *' " "5,6, 10-1
36. " " " s, 7, 8
37. " it « £>lg
38. " " " s.2
39. E0 50/6 8 circular of 31.7.99
40. HO 50./ol 8 paper of 7.9,96
41. TO 6/4.88 s 330-64
42. HO 50/30 : 24.6.99 (Lord Fit swillism)and enclosnr®
43. HO 50/30 8 25,6.99
44. HO 5o/31 s 26.6,99 (endorsed from Colonel Bastard); draft answer to
of June 1799
45. Parlt. Histy. XXXIV 1139
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CKAPTSR XI Section (c) contd:
Add 41854 s 190
ParIt. Hist. XXXIV 1183
HO 50/50 s 18.6.99
39 Gee.Ill cap.106 s.9—14
s,16-7
ParIt. Ilist. XXXIV 1139
HO 50/30 s 18.6.99
TO 6/188 : 269-75
HO 50/3€ : 25.8.99 R. Harvey
HO 50/37 : 23.8.99 R, M, Blanco©
HO EO/56 : 25,8.99 : H, R, Gall
HO 50/53 t 30.8.99 i B. Iray
13.10.99
HO 50/^8 : 21.10.99
HO 50/53 j 24.8.99
HO 50/59 » 22.10.99 Col. Meister
LC. 5 s 26
HO 60/53 t 27.7.99
TO 3/20 s 26
" 434
TO 3/19 s 502
WO 3/£0 j 6, 17
TO 3/&0 s 6, 282j TO 4/175 : 17, 40, 69, 86, 88, 127, etc.
Fortescue I¥ 658-9
TO 3/£l s 7, 25, 69, 102
HO 50/36 : 12.11.99 (Clotheroe) in 16.11.99 (Lord Titchfield)
TO 3/20 i 427, 435
HO 50/33 : 29.8.99
HO 50/56 s 11.6.99 J. Woodhouse
TO 3/19 : 438
HO 50/32 : 17 and 20.7.99 TO 6/188 t 232
HO 50/32 } 20.7.99
TO 6/188 s 247
HO 5o/>8 j 31.7,99 W. Warehobe
HO cO/33 t 25.3.99
12.9,99. W. Elford
" 27.7.99 and 3.9.99 with enclosures(W» Elford)
3.9.99; 8.9.99; 13.10.99 (W. Elford)
23.10.99 (W. Slford); in 26.10.99
17.11,99 J. Boggis; 'TO 6/189 j 22
HO 50/.52: 11-2.10.99 Lord Buckingham TO 3/>0 j 431
HO 50/53 : 27.10.99 P. Klrwan
TO 6/183 : 420
HO 50/52 ; 25,12.99 W. Johns
HO EO/39 ; 16.10.99 (H. J. Weir) in 17.10.99
HO 50 /36 : 9.12.99 J. P. Ellis®
HO 50 /52 : 29 . 8 . 99 J. Brooks; HO 50/54 s 25.10.99 H. Sloan®
HO 50/34 : 23.10.99 Lord Salisbury
HO 50/38 j 9.10.99
TO 4/176 L 92
Gower Correspondence 1 269-70




CHAPTBR XI Section (c) contd:
100# HO 50/^8 : Lt, Col. Madsn, undated
101. W 3/& j 13, 20, 22
102. HO 50/32 i 25.8.99
103. " 29.8.99 and enclosure
104. ibid : and latter of 25.8.99
105. HO 50/52 j 11.9.99
106. " 13.9.99
CHAPTER XII
1. Clods I 259 - 78j Appendix M
2. Forfcescue IV j 33
3. " 214
4. " 211-2
5. " 211 nets 2j of, ante p
6. Dropmora IV 263
7. Fort«6cue IV 892
8. Dropmore IV 263
9. Cunninghams 520 : 8.7.99 S» Gerainsr
10. Add 41851 : 81
11. Dropmore IV 263 t Laing II 646
12. Forteseue (L) Cbep. IV
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LIST OF THE SOURCES ADD PRINCIPAL WORKS CONSULTED
Primary Sourcos - MSS
Public Record Office
ISO 1 War Office : In letters (Secretory at War, Secretory of State)
¥£> 3 War Office : Out letters : Commander in Chief
WO 4 War Office t Out letters s Secretory at War
WO 6 War Office : Out letters : Secretory of Stat©
WO 17 War Office : Monthly Returns
WO 25 War Office : Registers ,• Various
WO 27 War Office : Inspection Returns
WO 30 War Office : Miscellanea - Various (Defence)
WO 40 War Office : Selected Unnumbered Papers
WO 47 War Office : Board of Ordnance s Minutes and Correspondence
110 43 Domestic (Entry Books)
HO 50 Home Office j Military (In letters)
HO 51-2 Home Office : Military (Entry Books)
HO 102 Home Office s Scotland (In letters)
HO 103 Home Office : Scotch Correspondence
British Museum
Rainsford Papers s Relevant Volumes s Add 23655
Pelhcm Papers : Relevant Volumes : Add 33101-3, 33120
Minute Book of the Forest Subdivision, Berkshire s Add 34303
Hordwicke Papers ; Relevant, Volumes : Add 35663 - 73, 35894
Windham Papers : Relevant Volumes Add 37842, 37844-7, 37874-8, 37891,
37903, 37922-3, 37928-9
Melville Papers : Relevant Volumes s Add 40100-2, 41085, 43770
GrCnvillc Papers : Relevant Volumes : Add 41851-5, 42058
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National Library of Scotland
Melville Papers. Abbotsford MSS.
Lyndoch Papers. Minute Book of the Royal Edinburgh
Watson Collection. Volunteer Light Dragoons,
Register House, Edinburgh
Seaforth Papers Cunningham® of Thornton
Breadalbane Pepers Muniments
Abercairney Muniments
Birmingham Central Reference Library
Grey and Wilcox Collectiom-






Papers of the Hitchin Volunteers
Lancashire Record Office
LC Lieutenancy t Correspondence
LM Lieutenancy j Minutes of General Meetings
LV Lieutenancy : Miscellaneous
LXA Subdivision of Atnouhclcrnclf J Various proceedings




132 Papers of Kicholos Grimshcw
137 " " the Preston Volunteers
DD X Miscellaneouss-
190 Longfcon of Kirkhem MSS
Middlesex Record Office
Militia Records
Primary Sources - Printed
Statutes of the Realm
Arranged approximately according to the chapters of the thesis which
they beer upon, with brief indication of contents.
General (Chsps. ii-v)
The annual Mutiny Acts (see esp. 39 Geo.Ill cap.20)
39 Geo.Ill cap.36 (Fenciblos permitted to be raised)
35 Geo.III cap.64, renewed by 36 Geo.Ill cap.36 and annually thereafter.
(Increased payment for billetting)
39 Geo.III cop.109 (Recruiting forces for the Fast India Company)
The Militia and its Augmentation (Chaps.ii and vi)
(a) 26 Geo.III cap.107 (General Militia Act)
34 Geo.III cap.16 (Aup^mentofcion by Volunteers)
36 Geo.III cap.116, annually renewed (Increased financial provision
for officers, etc.)
37 Geo.III cop.3 (Supplementary Militia)
37 Geo.III cop,18 (Supplementary Militia amendment)
38 C-eo.III cap. 18 (Supplementary Militia embodiment)
38 Geo.III cap.19 (Supplementary Militia embodiment)
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(b) 33 Geo.III cap.8 (Militia men's families)
34 G ©o «111 cop.47 (Militia men's families)
35 Geo.III cap.81 (Militia men's families)
36 Geo.Ill cap.114(Militia men's families)
(c) 33 Geo.Ill cap.39 (Application of the money raised for
35 Geo.III cap.5 (
36 Goo.III cap.16 (militie purposes in certain places
(d) 37 Geo.III cap.103 (Scottish Militia)
38 Geo.III cop. 12 (Scottish Militia amendment)
38 Geo.III cap.44 (Scottish Militia embodiment)
39 Gao.IIl cap.62 (Scottish Militia amendment)
Some Special Forces and Cases (Chap.vil)
(a) 34 Geo.III cap.81 (London Militia)
35 Ceo.Ill cap.27 (London Militia - amendment)
36 Ceo.Ill cap.92 (London Militia amendment)
37 Geo.III cap.25 (Tower Hamlets Militia)
37 Geo.III cap.75 (Tower Hamlets Militia embodiment)
38 Geo.III cap.74 (A Militia in the Stanneries)
39 Geo.III cap.82 (London Militia - amendment)
39 Geo.III cap.90 (Special system for Middlesex and Surrey)
(b) 37 Go®.Ill cap.4 (Parochial Levy s England)
37 Geo.III cap.5 (Parochial Levy - Scotland)
37 Geo.III cap.24 (Parochial Levy j England - amendment)
37 Ceo.Ill cap.39 (Parochial Levy s Scotland - amendment)
(c) 37 Ceo.Ill cap.6 (Provisional Cavalry)
37 Geo.Ill cap.23 (Provisional Cavalry - amendment)
38 Ceo.III cap.94 (Provisional Cavalry - amendment)
39 Geo.III cap,23 (Provisional Cavalry abolition)
-388-
Tho Volunteer Movement (Chep.ix)
34 Geo.III cap.31 (Enabling them to be raised)
38 C-eo.Ill cop.27 (Defence Act)
38 Geo.Ill cap,51 (Extra allowances to the Yeomanry)
39 Geo.Ill cap.14 (Exemptions and returns)
39 Geo.Ill cap.35 (Exemptions one! returns)
Militia - Extension of Service (Chap, xj)
35 Geo,III cap.83 (-nlistment by the Navy and Artillery)
38 Geo.Ill cop.17 (Enlistment from the Supplementary Militia)
38 Geo.Ill cop.55 (Enlistment from the Supplemejitary Militia)
38 Ceo.III cop.66, extended by 39 Geo.Ill cap.5 and
39 and 40 Geo.III cap.15 (Regiments to serve in Ireland)
39 Geo.III cap.106 (The Line to enlist from the Militia)
39 and 40 Geo.III cop.l (The Line to enlist from the Militia)
Historical MSS Commission
Argyle Papers (in the Vlth Report)
MSS of the Hon. J. B. Fortes cue preserved at Bropmore
Laing MSS
Other Printed Sources
W. Cobbett j History of the Parliamentary Debates
The Annual Register (State Papers and Reports of Parliamentary Debates)
Regulations and Instructions for carrying on the Recruiting Service for
H.M. Forces Stationed Abroad (dated 20th March 1796 and issued by
Sir William Fcnvcett, the Adjutant General, by command of the Duke
of York).
J. Bruce j Report on the arrangements which were made for the Internal
Defence of these kingdoms when Spain, by its Armada, projected
the invasion and Conquest of England (dated 15th May 1798)
-389-




F, Adamst The Clans, Septs and Regiments of the Highlands of
Scotland (second edition)
W, T, Berry: The Volunteer Movement
J, M. Bulloch: Territorial Soldiering in North-east Scotland 1759-1814
A, Burne: The Noble Duke of York
C, M. Clod©: The Military Forces of the Crown
E« Desbri^re: Projets ®t Tentatives d© Debarquement ouxjles Britanniques
J. W, Fortescue: A History of the British Army
The County Lieutenancies and the .Army 1802-14
H, Furber: Henry Dundas, First Viscount Melville
E, H, Stuart Jones: The Last Invasion of Britain
The Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research
T, H, McCuffie: Social Life in the British Army, 1793-1S16
(M.A. Thesis, London, 194oX
C, Sebag Montefiore: A History of the Volunteer Forces
D, Stewart: (of Garth) Sketches of the Highlanders (edition of 1822)
D, J, Sutton: Home Defence in Worcestershire, 1793-1815 (ft.A. IhCfiS
fi'trmih$h<nv Ifio)
Marchioness of Tullibardine (®d): The Military History of Perthshire
W, Will: The Kincardineshire Volunteers
Regimental
H, A, Adderley: History of the Warwickshire Yeomanry Cavalry
C. T, Atkinson: The Dorsetshire Regiment
N. Dannentyne: History of the 30th Regiment
J. M, Burgoyne: Records of the Bedfordshire Militie
Historical Records of the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders (collective
authorship)
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R, C. Dudgeon: History of the Edinburgh or Queen's Own Regiment of
Light Infantry Militia
R, B# Dunn Pattison: History of the 91st Highlanders, now Princess
Louisa's Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders
J. F, Bdmendes: Historical Records of the Wast Kent (Queen's Own)
Yeomanry
C-, Fellows and B, Freeman: Historical Records of the South Nottinghamshire
Hussar Yeomanry
B, Freeman (ed Earl Fortescue): The Yeomanry of Devon, 1794-1927
A, D, Greenhill Gardyne: The Life of a Regiment (The Gordon Highlanders)
R, Gurney: History of the Northamptonshire Regiment
J, R, Harvey: Records of the Norfolk Yeomanry Cavalry
R. Holden: Historical Records of the 3rd end 4th Battalions, the
Worcestershire Regiment
"Q.L.": The Yeomanry Cavalry of Worcestershire, 1794-1813
I-I, B, Mackintosh: The Grant, Strathspey or First Highland Fencibl©
Regiment, 179 3-9
C, H, Markham: History of the Northamptonshire and Rutlend Militia
F, Maurice: History of the Scots Guards
B# E# Sargcaltfcts The Royal Manx Fencibles
I* H« Mackey Seobie: An Old Highland Fencibl© Corps *J>
D, Sinclair: History of the Aberdeen Volunteers
G, I!, Lloyd Verney: Records of the Militia Battalions of the County
of Southampton
C-, Goold Walker: The Honourable Artillery Company, 1537-1926
H, Welrond: History of the First Devonshire Militia
R» W. Weir: History of the Scottish Borderers Militia
W. Will: The Iluntly Volunteers
R, J, T, Williams:)n: The Old County Regiment of Lancashire Militia
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A large number of Regimental Histories have been
consulted but are not entered here as they contain very
little bearing on the subject of this study. A few of
them, together with one or two other works, appear in
isolated references, where the titles are given in full.
Generally speaking, it is only the histories of home
defence forces that consider recruiting thoroughly -
having little else to talk about.
